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War of the Worlds
A t 9 p.m. on Saturday, February 12, 1949, a breathless announcer inter-rupted a popular musical program on Radio Quito with the urgent breaking news of a Martian landing at Cotocallao on the northern 
edge of the Ecuadorian city. A reporter on the scene provided a terrifying 
description of the death and destruction that aliens were leaving in their wake 
as they advanced on the capital. The minister of government came on the air to 
urge calm in order to facilitate the evacuation of the city. The mayor told women 
and children to ee to the surrounding mountains, and called on the men to 
defend the city. Church bells tolled in warning, and listeners could hear a priest 
begging for divine intervention. Frightened citizens, some only in their pajamas, 
rushed into the streets in panic thinking that the world was coming to an end. 
A stream of police cars with their sirens blaring and lights ashing rushed north 
to Cotocallao to battle the Martian invasion.
If this narrative sounds familiar, it is because local producers adapted this 
radio depiction of H. G. Wells’s classic novel The War of the Worlds from Orson 
Welles’s broadcast of October 30, 1938, that claimed that aliens from Mars had 
invaded New Jersey. That airing terried thousands in the United States, but the 
outcome in Ecuador was far worse.
Welles had informed his listeners that the broadcast was radio theater, but his 
Ecuadorian counterparts did not bother with those niceties. The radio station 
only belatedly explained that the broadcast was a hoax. Ocials pleaded for 
people to remain calm, but watched helplessly as the crowd’s fear turn to rage 
with the realization that they had been duped. The mob descended on the radio 
station and set it ablaze. Because the police had gone to Cotocallao, the govern-
ment called in the military to restore order. The army responded with tanks and 
tear gas to disperse the crowd, but not before the station was reduced to rubble 
with the besieged sta of one hundred still inside. Some managed to escape out 
of a rear exit, but others were trapped on upper oors. As many as een charred 
bodies lay in the wreckage. The daily newspaper El Comercio, Quito’s oldest 
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newspaper, owned the radio station and was located in the same building. The 
re destroyed the newspaper’s presses and les, and for three days it was not able 
to publish. When the paper resumed distribution, it was thanks only to the gen-
erosity of their competitor El Día who lent them their printing press.1
The communists had nothing to do with the broadcast or the resulting riot 
and ruin, but that did not stop the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 
assuming that radicals must have been behind the mayhem. Aer all, the events 
matched the agency’s preconceived notions of how communists operated. Rather 
than engaging in a serious political program to build a better world, US govern-
ment ocials charged that the communists were subversives bent on death and 
destruction designed to disrupt the smooth functioning of society. For that rea-
son, the CIA was on the lookout for communist inspiration or instigation of vi-
olent events. In this case, however, the agency concluded that the riot had no po-
litical undertones, nor did any evidence emerge that it was communist-inspired. 
From an investigation into “sources inside the higher echelon of the National 
Headquarters of the Ecuadoran Communist Party in Quito,” the CIA con-
cluded that the communists were not aware in advance of the broadcast, nor did 
they have plans to exploit the carnage le in its wake. In fact, according to the 
CIA’s sources, two communists lost their lives in the re.2
Few people today remember or know about the broadcast of “The War of the 
Worlds” in Quito, but the CIA report speaks volumes on both the pervasiveness 
of US surveillance operations as well as the potential possibilities, boundaries, 
and obstacles to their knowledge and understanding of leist movements in 
Latin America. United States ocials were determined to implicate the com-
munists in coup plots as they repeatedly pointed to external support for sub-
versive movements. This included the fabled search for “Moscow gold” even 
as they were never able to nd any concrete evidence to support their charges. 
Their investigations were ultimately misguided as they failed to comprehend 
the domestic roots of radical critiques of society. At the same time, CIA sur-
veillance oers glimpses into internal debates within the communist party, and 
presents an opportunity to gain unique insights into the actions and thoughts 
of those involved in leist, labor, and other social movements that challenged 
US hegemony in the region. The resolutions and platforms that emerged out of 
their congresses and other meetings illustrate the presence of intense discussion 
and a deep commitment to advancing a political agenda. Communists sought to 
empower marginalized workers and peasants to enable them to assume control 
over society—and this posed a threat to the economic interests of United States 
corporations, as well as those of the domestic ruling class in Latin America. 
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Disempowered people imagined another world without racial discrimination, 
sexual violence, and economic exploitation, one in which they democratically 
made decisions as to how they would run their lives. Examining the actions and 
motivations of communists who supported these struggles and the challenges 
that they confronted provides an opportunity to analyze the emergence of mass 
popular movements dedicated to the creation of a more just and equal society.
The artistic directors of the “The War of the Worlds” did not intend for the 
radio play to be an allegory on the cold war, but it was broadcast in that envi-
ronment. The events of that Saturday night soon disappeared from the pages of 
the newspapers, but they reected a much larger clash, as the socialist economist 
Manuel Agustín Aguirre would put it later that year, between two worlds and 
two dierent types of economies. On one hand was the current liberal, capi-
talist, laisse faire economy with all of its problems, and on the other hand the 
promises of a centrally planned socialist one. Capitalism had abandoned people 
to the blind forces of the market, whereas socialism promised to introduce a ra-
tional economic system that would lead to the liberation of humanity. “Slavery 
and freedom: two opposed and opposite worlds,” Aguirre concluded. “It does 
not seem dicult to choose between them.” The conict would lead to a con-
frontation between two dierent worldviews, but Aguirre was optimistic that 
ultimately the future was bright.3
That the United States government would intervene in the internal aairs of 
a Latin American country to undermine the realization of such loy goals comes 
as no surprise to scholars and even casual observers of the region. In 1950, the 
State Department readily admitted that it sought “to combat this Communist 
threat” in the region. It did so even as it claimed that the United States govern-
ment adhered to a policy of nonintervention in the internal aairs of other coun-
tries.4 Such high-minded declarations were obviously rhetorical and self-serving, 
as the long history of United States involvement in Latin America immediately 
makes apparent. Only four years later, Dwight Eisenhower’s administration sup-
ported a military coup in Guatemala to overthrow the popularly elected Jacobo 
Arbenz government, followed by attempts to assassinate Rafael Trujillo in the 
Dominican Republic and Fidel Castro in Cuba.5
The goal of this book is not to document or analyze these interventions, nor 
to parse out the semantic dierences between what an advocate might present 
as international solidarity versus what an opponent would denounce as imperial 
endeavors. Rather, as with my previous book on the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) in Latin America during the Second World War, my intent is 
to use information that the CIA and other United States agencies gathered in 
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the postwar period to document progressive movements for social change in a 
context where few other sources exist.6 Even with all of the inherent limitations 
of foreign agencies, their extensive surveillance networks provided eective cov-
erage of internal developments in Latin America. While one might question the 
wisdom or rationale behind those investigations, they do leave historians with 
a remarkable documentary record through which scholars can reconstruct the 
history of the le.
Surveillance
The postwar le in Latin America has been the subject of relatively little aca-
demic study. In comparison to the size of protest movements in the 1940s and 
1960s, leist mobilizations during the 1950s can appear small and insignicant. 
Even participants largely ignore those years in their memoirs, preferring to skip 
from the excitement of the mid-1940s antidictatorial battles to the intensity of 
the 1960s guerrilla insurrections.7 Organizational capacity declined during these 
years, particularly from its height during a postwar democratic spring. This was 
due to a variety of factors, including cold war paranoia of communist subversion 
that led to a suppression of popular organizing eorts. The external ideological 
and economic interests of United States capitalists intermingled with those of 
the domestic ruling class in Latin America and reinforced a common agenda of 
repressing leist aspirations. Furthermore, the emphasis that orthodox commu-
nist parties placed on peaceful paths to power contributed to the disappearance 
of 1950s activism from scholarly treatments and hence from popular memory as 
well. A result, as the scholar of social movements Hernán Ibarra observes, is a 
decade that has received little academic or popular attention.8
Despite this lack of study, making sense of organizational developments be-
tween the Second World War and the Cuban Revolution (what I term here as 
“the 1950s”) is critical to gaining a better appreciation for the heightened level 
of militant mobilizations in the 1960s. The sociologist Floresmilo Simbaña has 
called the 1970s and 1980s the “worst” studied decades in Ecuador, not in the 
sense of a lack of studies but because the investigations that scholars have under-
taken do not adequately account for the degree of social movement organizing 
during those years that inuenced subsequent and much more visible political 
developments in the 1990s. His argument is that to understand contemporary 
Indigenous mobilizations properly, we need a better comprehension of the or-
ganizing activities that laid the groundwork for them.9 Indigenous activists 
celebrate the 1990s as a “gained decade” in terms of large protests, but those 
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participants could not have realized those achievements were it not for advances 
in grassroots organizing eorts during the 1980s, even though those years are 
remembered as a “lost decade.”10 Similarly, political activism in the 1960s can 
only be properly understood if we have a clear analysis of what preceded it during 
the 1950s. Intense and continual organizing eorts in the years aer the Second 
World War laid the groundwork for subsequent militant mobilizations that 
would not have happened were it not for those earlier, less visible actions. Po-
litical strength does not emerge out of a vacuum, but is built on much longer 
organizational trajectories.11
Even though the 1950s represents a void in studies of Ecuador’s social mo-
bilizations, it is not objectively speaking a decade during which nothing hap-
pened. Militant leists remained actively involved in a wide range of political 
movements and engaged in intense debates over how to transform their society. 
Much as the neoliberal 1980s provide an important context for understanding 
heightened levels of Indigenous protest in the 1990s and the advances of the pink 
tide in the 2000s, the conservative 1950s are key for a proper interpretation of 
the radical and turbulent 1960s. Without an appreciation for the context that a 
longer trajectory of social movement organizing provides, subsequent militant 
actions can appear to be an aberration rather than the result of sustained politi-
cal engagement.
One explanation for a lack of adequate studies of the 1950s is a paucity of 
sources that chronicle social movement activities. As a reection of this absence, 
Ibarra only includes one document from the 1950s in his impressive anthology 
on the communist le from 1928 to 1961.12 This lack of written material is part 
of a broader phenomenon among progressive activists. Brad Duncan sought to 
chronicle the printed legacy of the US radical le in the 1970s in his book Finally 
Got the News. In an interview, Duncan comments:
Most participants never kept any of those yers, because ultimately they 
were organizing tools meant to mobilize people for specic events. So 
they’re by denition ephemeral, which is why almost no one keeps them, 
which makes studying the history of radical movements more dicult. We 
know that our enemies want to erase this history. So do your part for peo-
ple’s history and don’t throw away a damn thing.13
As I note in my previous book on the FBI, activists rarely took the time, or had 
the inclination, to record their actions. This is particularly the case when repres-
sive governments could use that information to prosecute them. Militants some-
times destroyed their own archival records rather than being caught red-handed 
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with incriminating evidence. Military regimes, furthermore, routinely burned 
subversive material because they feared its contents. As a result, little communist 
party material from the 1950s survived in Ecuador.
In the absence of other sources of information, police surveillance can provide 
an important opportunity to reconstruct the history of popular movements. 
They allow scholars to see and understand aspects of this history that govern-
ment agencies were not looking for or did not nd particularly important or 
interesting. As such, these records have remained underutilized and underthe-
orized as a window through which to critique social movement challenges to 
exclusionary government structures.14 In my previous book, I drew on FBI coun-
terintelligence documents that I serendipitously discovered among State Depart-
ment records to write a history of the political le in Ecuador during the 1940s. 
Long before the cold war, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover famously maintained a 
paranoid and irrational fear of communism and that xation carried over when 
Franklin D. Roosevelt extended the bureau’s mandate to include Latin America. 
With the signing of the National Security Act of 1947, those surveillance opera-
tions moved from the purview of the FBI to the newly created CIA. Unsurpris-
ingly, intelligence gathering continued without a break under the new agency, 
seemingly utilizing the same tactics, drawing on the same sources, and perhaps 
even employing the same agents. The CIA perpetuated Hoover’s anticommunist 
agenda without pause, even though, as with the FBI, its ocers reported on the 
presence of weak and small parties that provided little threat to United States 
security concerns.15
While governments typically establish agencies such as the CIA for the col-
lection and analysis of intelligence, they tend to dri into covert operations in-
stead.16 Much has been written about the CIA’s attempts to subvert democracy 
in pursuit of the US government’s imperial agenda, and little need exists to re-
visit that history here.17 Nor is that the purpose of this study. Rather, another 
aspect of the agency’s work provides scholars with a rich fount of information 
on the social and political history of other countries. Whereas anticommunist 
operatives might plant fraudulent documents and advance derogatory narratives 
to undermine their opponents, if functioning properly those who gathered intel-
ligence would seek to create an accurate and unltered record of political events, 
especially since these documents would be only for internal use rather than pub-
lic dissemination as propaganda tools.18 A review of CIA documentation before 
it dried into covert regime change operations reveals a preponderance of items 
about Latin American from the late 1940s and early 1950s that contain a wealth 
of information on domestic developments. This book mines the massive archive 
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that the CIA and other agencies created, not for what it can tell us about those 
agencies or United States policy objectives and decisions, but rather what we can 
learn from the activities that government ocials investigated.
In 2000, the CIA released some of their declassied intelligence documents 
in redacted form in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) database at the US 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Mary-
land. Although advertised as a publicly accessible repository of CIA records, in 
reality the material was available only on a limited basis on a stand-alone work-
station that was not always operational. In January 2017, the CIA published 
the records of the CREST collection online in their Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room that provides for their easier and wider 
dissemination. The release of these and other CIA surveillance documents ll 
in gaps in a context where few other sources exist, and as such oer scholars an 
excellent opportunity to explore the history of the Latin American le in more 
depth than was previously possible. This study turns to these artifacts to chart 
social movement organizing eorts during a “lost decade” of political activism 
during the 1950s.19
My training is as a social historian, and this book does not purport to be a 
diplomatic study, nor is it particularly concerned with national security issues, 
United States policies, or the intricacies of intelligence gathering (although, of 
course, by necessity it is framed by those investigations).20 The diplomatic his-
torian Alan McPherson has quipped, “The more historians nd out about the 
Cold War in the hemisphere, the more that Cold War itself fades to the back-
ground.”21 That paradox holds true for this work. It is not specically about the 
cold war per se, except that chronologically the period it covers corresponds with 
the rst decade of what historians have traditionally understood to be the cold 
war. My concern is not US-USSR relations, but instead how activists in Latin 
America advanced an alternative vision of how to organize the world. It shares 
with the historian Greg Grandin an understanding of this epoch as a sociologi-
cal process and historical experience that is best interpreted through the lens of 
intellectual history and bottom-up mobilizations.22 And, in that fashion, it does 
directly engage issues of a capitalist versus socialist mode of production that was 
at the heart of the cold war. The cold war was peripheral to the events chroni-
cled in this book even as that larger political context profoundly informed and 
prescribed the world in which militants operated.
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Toward a Deeper Study
CIA documentation provides an especially important opportunity to explore 
a variety of issues that communists as well as the broader le faced in the early 
postwar period, with ramications that extend well beyond both that time 
frame and the borders of Latin America. While both United States and Latin 
American government ocials could be blinded by their own anticommunist 
assumptions and attitudes, the information that they assembled oers a unique 
opportunity to delve deeply into the internal workings of communist parties. 
While the communist party in Ecuador was never particularly large or strong, 
its members struggled with universal issues of organization, strategy, and tactics 
as they sought to advance their political agenda. In the process these militants 
created the conditions for heightened levels of political activism in the 1960s. 
Advances during the 1950s were very much part of a longer trajectory of active 
engagement that has either been lost or largely forgotten. Although politically 
antagonistic to communism and the le in general, CIA surveillance provides 
convincing documentation of the persistence of social movement organizing 
during that decade. The data that CIA ocers generated allows us to push at 
the edges of our knowledge and understanding of how communists operated, in 
Ecuador and elsewhere.
The opening of the Third or Communist International (Comintern) archives 
in the aermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to an explosion 
of studies of local communist parties. As the historian Barry Carr aptly notes, 
most of these studies examine the period from the creation of the Comintern 
in 1919 to its formal closing in 1943. Access to available sources inform and con-
strain many of these studies, particularly with an abundance of material in the 
Comintern archive from the 1920s through the rst half of the 1930s, aer which 
the volume drops o noticeably. Carr observes, “As a result of this imbalance 
we know much more about the development of Latin American communism 
during its rst two decades than over the last four or ve decades of its evo-
lution.” He calls for studies that explore local parties in the aermath of the 
closure of the Comintern, particularly during the onset of the cold war.23
Not only do we need better examinations of the postwar period, but we also 
need to understand variations both between parties in dierent countries and 
among disparate political tendencies within a single country. Despite being or-
ganized as national parties of a centralized movement, communists never func-
tioned in a univocal fashion. Carr states, “We have to distinguish between the 
policies and prescriptions elaborated by the directorates of political parties (‘the 
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policy of the Central Committee’) and the actions of the members and cadres in 
the local cells and committees.” Carr urges us to think of communisms—in the 
plural—to understand better how these ideologies and strategies were debated, 
and the inuences that peripheral actors had on the formation of centralized 
policies. This approach also acknowledges and incorporates expressions that 
were not part of the pro-Soviet communist party, including other leist ten-
dencies such as anarchist, socialist, Trotskyist, Maoist, social democratic, and 
le-liberal parties.24
My work takes up Carr’s call by delving into crucial events in Ecuador. Both 
politically and historiographically this country existed on the periphery of CIA 
operations and US-Latin American relations and the cold war itself. Even so, 
signicant and broader issues of political strategies and strategic alliances that 
have long plagued the le played out during the postwar period in Ecuador, and 
are worthy of a deep and penetrating study.
By no means is the CIA documentation perfect. CIA history sta member 
Woodrow Kuhns excuses the intelligence agency’s failures. “Dramatic, sweeping 
events, such as wars and revolutions, are far too complex to predict or analyze 
perfectly,” he states.25 A more fundamental problem is the underlying politi-
cal agenda that drove its intelligence collection eorts and colored its perspec-
tives and analyses. A large part of the dissident CIA ocer Ralph McGehee’s 
complaint about the agency with which he worked for a quarter century was 
the disinformation campaigns that attempted to mold public opinion, and the 
manufacture of false intelligence to justify policies and advance institutional 
or personal interests.26 These shortcomings, however, are the limitations of any 
historical documentation. Even with all of their inherent deciencies, these sur-
veillance records present scholars with penetrating insights into the struggles 
and diculties that the Latin American le confronted in the postwar period. 
Inadvertently, they highlight how activists responded to the challenges and op-
portunities that they encountered. More sources are better than no sources, and 
as historians we work with the sources we have rather than the ones we wish we 
had. It is in this context that the opening of long-closed archives and the release 
of declassied documentation have led to calls to reexamine the cold war, as 
“not only a possibility but a necessity.”27 This book contributes to that larger 
historiographic project.
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Ch a pter 1
Postwar Le
T he Latin American left should have emerged from the Second World War in a strengthened position. Objectively, many factors played to their advantage. The le’s archenemy, fascism, had been resoundingly 
defeated in the war. The Soviet Union momentarily enjoyed warm relations with 
the other Allied powers, thanks in large part to the leadership role it had taken in 
defeating the Nazis in Germany. Many hoped that a United States-Soviet Union 
alliance could bring peace to a war-weary world. The international political envi-
ronment had decisively shied against dictatorship, leading to unprecedented 
political openings in Latin America that provided the le with more breathing 
room than it had ever previously enjoyed. A brief period of calm between the 
Second World War and the onset of the cold war allowed for the ourishing of 
democracy in Latin America as elected civilian governments replaced authori-
tarian dictatorships.1 In this environment, leists across the Americas partici-
pated in governments, including joining cabinets in Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador. 
An embrace of a peaceful and electoral path to power seemed to be bearing fruit.
Neither the CIA nor the communists operated in a political vacuum. In order 
to comprehend fully how Ecuadorian communists and the le in general fared 
in this environment, including the types of programs they advanced and the ob-
stacles they faced in doing so, we must rst step back and look at the broader con-
text in which they operated. This includes an overview of the di
erent political 
parties and social forces that existed in the country, and how the le responded 
to a rather unique (both for Ecuador in general as well as for Latin America at 
the time) succession of elected civilian governments.
This chapter provides an empirical grounding on which to build an un-
derstanding of how communists rose to the challenges they encountered, and 
how their actions allowed them to build a base for subsequent triumphs and 
advances. A primary concern was the construction of electoral alliances to gain 
a larger voice in the midst of shiing political landscapes. A countervailing ten-
dency insisted that their struggle should be rooted in peasant and working-class 
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organizations. Electoral versus social movement strategies (in addition to an op-
tion for armed struggle) have long divided the le, and Ecuador in the 1950s was 
no exception—nor were the debates that surrounded these issues extraordinary. 
Rather, Ecuadorian communists faced many of the same threats and opportu-
nities that activists around the world have long confronted as they fought to end 
economic exploitation, racial discrimination, and social injustice.
Cold War
The anticommunist cold war historian and State Department analyst Rollie 
Poppino observes, “The acceptance and respectability of communism in Latin 
America reached a peak in the years between 1944 and 1947.” He continues, 
“Communist parties generally were in a stronger position than they had ever 
enjoyed, and their over-all membership soared to heights they have since been 
unable to equal.” Communists gained adherents and sympathizers “because 
their programs seemed to promise fulllment in Latin America of the popular 
aspirations for a better life and personal and political liberties that gured so 
prominently among the war aims of the Allies.” The control they exercised in 
labor movements reected the level of support for their political and economic 
programs both locally and internationally.2
The liberal political scientist Robert Alexander who collaborated closely 
with State Department and labor ocials in the United States on their anti-
communist campaigns expressed a similar analysis. During 1945 and 1946, he 
acknowledges, “Latin American Communists were at the zenith of their power 
and inuence.” Not only did they operate legally in most countries, they also had 
elected members to local governments as well as federal legislatures in about half 
of the countries in the hemisphere. With their participation in the Chilean cabi-
net, they “seemed well on the way to achieving the rst Communist government 
of the hemisphere.” With that victory, others were sure to follow.3
Despite all of these advantages, communists soon became marginalized. A pe-
riod that should have represented a shi to the political le, unprecedented labor 
militancy, and a consolidation of democratic governance instead ended with 
suppression of communist parties, repression of labor movements, the exclusion 
of the le from politics, and a dramatic swing to the right with the installation 
of military juntas and heightened levels of political violence.
Poppino notes that “tactical blunders and embarrassing revelations” alone do 
not account for the dramatic fall in prestige. He points as well to “the actions of 
political adversaries and hostile governments which destroyed the respectability 
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of the party, cut into the sources of Communist strength, and appeared to elim-
inate Communist political inuence in most of Latin America.” This included 
successful attempts to wrest control of labor and student organizations from 
the communists. Conservatives removed communists from oce, outlawed 
their parties, and closed their newspapers. In this repressive environment, party 
strength declined precipitously along with a rise in military and authoritarian 
dictatorships. These regimes championed their anticommunist credentials in 
part “to win favor or to forestall criticism from the United States,” but also 
to eliminate domestic opposition to their hold on power. In short, according 
to Poppino, “Communist fortunes declined as rapidly as they had risen.”4 As 
the cold war reached deeper into Latin America, these conicts became ever 
more intense.
Political Parties and Social Movements
A traditional interpretation of Latin American political structures presents 
them as built on a triad of forces that include the latifundia or land-holding sys-
tem, the military, and the Catholic Church. British ambassador Norman Mayers 
expanded on that denition to identify the principle power players in Ecuador 
in the 1950s as the military, the church, bankers, certain families, labor organi-
zations, universities, and the cultural center known as the Casa de la Cultura 
(House of Culture). Governments were ultimately beholden to the will of the 
armed forces, the ambassador noted. The Catholic Church remained “the main 
supporter and organizer of conservatism,” and held “considerable control” over 
that political party. Bankers exercised particular inuence on the coast. Fam-
ilies were either conservative or liberal, and Mayers listed the most important 
names (as will become apparent in this book) as Plaza, Jijón, Chiriboga, Estrada, 
and Ycaza. “Religion, nationalism and family are still strong conceptions and 
values in this old-fashioned country,” the ambassador commented, even with 
an ever-present undercurrent of nineteenth-century liberal anticlericalism. The 
traditional powerbrokers were all of European heritage. “The Indians are apart 
and their values unknown,” the ambassador reported.5 Those of African descent 
did not even warrant a mention, and only men registered in his calculations.
As with the rest of Latin America, battles between conservative and liberal 
parties dened the nineteenth-century political landscape. Scholars generally 
recognize Gabriel García Moreno, who embraced a fanatical adherence to Cath-
olic doctrine and was president from 1861 to 1865 and again from 1869 to 1875, 
as the initiator of modern conservatism in Ecuador. He founded the Partido 
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Conservador (PC, Conservative Party) in 1869 and attempted to install a theo-
cratic though modernizing state that included massive road and railway-build-
ing projects.6 Eloy Alfaro, who seized power in an 1895 revolution, was the 
principal gure behind Ecuadorian liberalism. That same year he founded the 
Partido Liberal Radical (PLR, Radical Liberal Party). Alfaro stripped the Cath-
olic Church of the powers and privileges it had enjoyed under García Moreno, 
and implemented a wide variety of social reforms. Liberals subsequently held 
dominance over Ecuador’s politics for the next half-century.7
Socialists established Ecuador’s third traditional party (aer the liberals and 
conservatives), the Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano (PSE, Ecuadorian Socialist 
Party), in 1926 in the aermath of a military coup on July 9, 1925, known as 
the revolución juliana or July revolution. A cadre of young progressive mili-
tary ocers—who had become disillusioned with what they condemned as a 
corrupt and opportunistic coastal liberal oligarchy who were unable to bring 
about any real change—led that revolt. In power, they introduced a series of 
modernizing social reforms.8 The socialist le soon fractured, particularly over 
the issue of whether to aliate with the Moscow-based Comintern that Vladi-
mir Lenin had created to lead a global revolution. At its second congress in 1931, 
party leader Ricardo Paredes who favored such aliation formally transitioned 
the PSE into the Partido Comunista del Ecuador (PCE, Communist Party of 
Ecuador). Socialists who opposed subjecting party policies to external control 
regrouped in 1933 to launch a new socialist party with the previous name PSE. 
A third group comprised primarily of progressive military ocials constituted 
the Vanguardia Revolucionaria del Socialismo Ecuatoriano (VRSE, Ecuador-
ian Revolutionary Socialist Vanguard).9 These rival leist groups sometimes 
collaborated with one another, and at times fought for the allegiance of their 
peasant and working-class base. Oen they formed alliances with liberals, most 
commonly as the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN, National Democratic 
Front) or a variation thereof.
In the 1950s, the political landscape became more complicated than the 
traditional tripartite division into conservative, liberal, and socialist parties, 
particularly with the rise of personalist and populist movements.10 Expanded 
literacy rates brought new voters into the electoral process, which should have 
expanded the le’s base of support, but instead these new political groupings 
gained their allegiance. At the time, political scientists identied populists run-
ning personalist campaigns as the primary characteristic of the country’s politi-
cal system.11 The most signicant and long lasting of these was the Velasquista 
movement that backed the perennial populist José María Velasco Ibarra in his 
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various campaigns for the presidency. Velasco Ibarra was a political chameleon 
who made a career out of campaigning on promises to govern on behalf of the 
poor. Once in oce, however, he betrayed their interests and ruled instead in 
favor of the oligarchy. As a result, he managed to nish only the third (1952–56) 
of his ve terms in oce. He assumed the presidency for the rst time in 1934 
with conservative support, but failed to complete a full year before popular op-
position to his policies led to his removal. He returned the second time in the 
aermath of a May 1944 revolution. Optimistic hopes for the creation of a more 
inclusive and just society fell under his sway, but his conservative populism and 
authoritarian style so alienated the population that his defense minister Carlos 
Mancheno removed and exiled him in an August 1947 coup. Velasco Ibarra’s 
last two times in oce (1960–61 and 1968–72) similarly resulted in military 
governments. As with Peronism in Argentina, Velasco Ibarra’s coalition was not 
ideologically coherent and found itself divided into various wings with compet-
ing interests.12
Galo Plaza Lasso formed the Movimiento Cívico Democrático Nacional 
(MCDN, National Democratic Civic Movement) in 1948 as a vehicle for his 
electoral aspirations. The MCDN, and the Plaza family in general, had an un-
easy relationship with the liberals with whom they competed for votes. On an 
opposing pole of the political spectrum, in 1951 Camilo Ponce Enríquez and 
Sixto Durán Ballén founded the Movimiento Social Cristiano (MSC, Social 
Christian Movement) that quickly displaced the PC as the main right wing force 
in the country—and the only grouping from this period to survive as a potent 
political force into the twenty-rst century. Although conservatives in whatever 
form comprised the largest single political party in the 1950s, with their roots in 
narrow aristocratic interests they never managed to poll a majority of the vote.
In 1942, Jorge Luna Yepes founded the Acción Revolucionaria Nacionalista 
Ecuatoriana (ARNE, Ecuadorian Nationalist Revolutionary Action) as a “third 
way” movement that opposed both “Yankee imperialist capitalism” and “Bol-
shevik Marxist imperialism,” as well as both the conservative and liberal parties. 
Spanish falangist and Italian fascist movements strongly inuenced its ideology. 
It drew support from conservative Catholics; embraced “hispanismo,” a cele-
bration of Hispanic culture; and assumed extremely nationalist, authoritarian, 
hierarchical, and doctrinaire positions.13 Opponents denounced the organiza-
tion as comprised of thugs who formed shock troops to attack student activists, 
labor unions, and the press. The British consul James McAdam Clark described 
the ARNE as a small, nationalist organization that was “falangist in origin” 
with a tendency “to xenophobia and paramilitary training.” The ARNE “seems 
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to be quite well organized,” Clark remarked, particularly in terms of its ability 
to inltrate its members into positions of inuence.14 Although it was “weak in 
numbers,” it was “loud in self-assertion.”15 The German-Ecuadorian writer Lilo 
Linke similarly described the group as a small but “aggressive and vociferous” 
force who embraced a militaristic style of organization.16 Both the le and more 
established political parties feared the ARNE as a threat because of its extremist 
ideology and inammatory tactics. The populist politician Velasco Ibarra, how-
ever, courted the support of the ARNE both in his 1952 presidential campaign 
and subsequently while in oce, including naming its leader Nicolás Valdano 
Ra
o as secretary-general of his administration. The British ambassador found 
the party to be “strange company for a President who claims to be liberal in his 
politics and lay in his convictions.”17 While naturally ARNE members would 
be attracted to Velasco Ibarra’s caudillo style of leadership and could only gain 
from his popularity, his acceptance of their backing was a blatantly opportu-
nistic move.
A populist party known as the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP, 
Concentration of Popular Forces) briey threatened to become the dominant 
political force in Ecuador during the 1950s. Its leader Carlos Guevara Moreno 
initially joined the Unión Popular Republicana (UPR, Republican Popular 
Union) that Rafael Mendoza Avilés had created to campaign for mayor of Guay-
aquil in 1947. Mendoza lost that race, and two years later Guevara Moreno as-
sumed control of the party and renamed it the CFP. Guevara Moreno supported 
Velasco Ibarra during both his second time in oce in 1944 and again during 
his third term in 1952, but he tangled so badly with the president during both 
of those mandates that he end up exiled from the country. In between those 
two terms, Plaza imprisoned Guevara Moreno for a year aer he led a failed 
coup attempt against his government. Despite Guevara Moreno’s popularity in 
Guayaquil, his ambitious attempt to become Ecuador’s leading caudillo even-
tually failed.
In 1931, Guevara Moreno together with Rafael Coello Serrano formed a group 
in Guayaquil that they called the Communist Party, Section of the Communist 
International. Guevara Moreno later joined an international brigade on the side 
of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, providing him with unmistakable 
leist credentials. In 1945, as minister of government in Velasco Ibarra’s admin-
istration, Guevara Moreno turned against his former comrades on the le and 
willingly resorted to violence and shock tactics to squelch all opposition. The 
New York Times aptly described Guevara Moreno as “a former Communist who 
turned against Moscow but is expert in the use of Communist techniques to 
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sway the masses.”18 He used demagoguery and antisystemic rhetoric against per-
sistent social and economic problems to appeal to the working class. At the same 
time, breaking with the communists led his former comrades to condemn him as 
an opportunist and traitor. PCE secretary general Paredes denounced the CFP 
as being nanced by reactionary bankers and exporters who were closely associ-
ated with Yankee imperialism.19 The competition for the same base of support 
led to the CFP becoming a principle opponent of the communists. No love was 
lost between the two forces.
In addition to these parties, several social movements played signicant roles 
in shaping the political landscape in the 1950s. Most signicant was the power-
ful leist trade union federation Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador 
(CTE, Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers). The CTE sought to establish 
regional federations in each province, as well as connections with continental 
and global labor movements. The two most important provincial organizations 
were the Federación de Trabajadores de Pichincha (FTP, Pichincha Workers 
Federation) centered in the capital city of Quito in the highlands, and the Fed-
eración Provincial de Trabajadores del Guayas (FPTG, Provincial Federation of 
Workers of Guayas) based in the commercial center of Guayaquil on the coast. 
Under the leadership of socialists and communists, these federations assumed 
intensely nationalist and radical positions. The CTE also aliated with the 
Mexico-based Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL, Con-
federation of Latin American Workers) as well as the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU).20 A persistent goal of United States government ocials was 
to break Ecuador’s labor movements away from communist control.
In the rural highlands, the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI, Ecua-
dorian Federation of Indians) became a dominant political force. Although in 
subsequent decades new organizations surpassed it in size and signicance, the 
FEI was the rst successful attempt in Ecuador, and indeed one of the rst in 
the Americas, to establish a pan-ethnic federation for and by Indigenous peo-
ples. The Alianza Femenina Ecuatoriana (AFE, Ecuadorian Women’s Alliance) 
promoted the incorporation of women into political movements, supported the 
cause of world peace, and lent solidarity to victims of war. The militant Feder-
ación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Ecuador (FEUE, Federation of Ecuador-
ian University Students) provided the most important voice for students. The 
FEUE allied with the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS). As 
with the labor federations, the United States Embassy and CIA engaged in a 
long campaign to sever student ties with communist-aliated organizations.
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Labor unions (in particular the CTE), universities, and the Casa de Cul-
tura all tended to the le, with some members associated with the communist 
party. In May 1947, assistant military attaché Adelbert Boggs draed a detailed 
thirteen-page report on the organization and operation of the PCE that sum-
marizes the functioning of the party. Party headquarters were in Quito with an 
executive committee that oversaw daily operations. Regional committees op-
erated on both the coast and in the highlands with six provincial committees 
under them. The base of the party was comprised of about sixty cells with a 
total estimated registered membership of ve thousand (out of the country’s 
population of three million). Cells ranged from 20 to 150 members, with an 
average of 40 to 50 in each. About half the cells (and about half the members) 
were located in Guayaquil, with Quito representing another sizable proportion. 
A bi-annual congress was the party’s main decision-making body, with national 
and regional conferences meeting in the interim. Boggs estimated that 80 per-
cent of the members were not active, but if sympathizers in labor unions, student 
groups, and among government employees were included the total could reach 
20,000. Those numbers varied based on the whims of political opportunism 
and the current popularity of party leadership. The party sought to implement 
its program through the organization of labor unions that would contribute to 
the fostering of a Marxist class consciousness and the spreading of a communist 
ideology among workers and others in its base. Its primary objective was to gain 
power through legal means, specically via engagement with the electoral pro-
cess.21 This emphasis on peaceful and gradual paths to power is what eventually 
led a radical wing to break from the party in the 1960s.
Intelligence estimates consistently repeated this gure of communist party 
strength at ve thousand, a number that other operatives may have lied from 
Boggs’s report. In 1952, the State Department’s Oce of Intelligence Research 
(OIR) dropped that number to 2,500, noting that the main base of support still 
remained in Guayaquil and Quito. The signicance of the change in numbers is 
not immediately apparent, if indeed those numbers represented anything more 
than rough guesses. A larger membership base would have allowed the PCE 
to register their party with electoral authorities, but that was not necessarily 
desirable because doing so would expose their members to government surveil-
lance. Instead, a signicant base of supporters favored dedicating their energies 
toward the mobilization of labor and other grassroots movements. According 
to the OIR, communists were “inuential, but not dominant” in the CTE, and 
also exercised importance in transport and other industrial unions. Similarly, 
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communists were inuential but not dominant in student and teacher groups. 
The OIR also claimed that the PCE drew support from socialists through their 
front organizations, particularly in labor, student, cultural, and political activ-
ities.22 The report presents an image of communist strength in Ecuador that 
was not necessarily out of line with what was the case in other Latin American 
countries.
While publicly United States ocials and the Latin American ruling class 
exaggerated their fear of communism as they engaged in propaganda campaigns 
against the party’s political agenda, in private correspondence individual diplo-
mats sometimes painted a quite di
erent picture. Henry Dearborn at the Ec-
uador desk in the State Department astutely observed in April 1947, “We have 
known that the Communist Party in Ecuador has been weak and futile for over 
a year.” He noted that the party “shows little indication of recovering the rela-
tively strong position which it had in 1944 and 1945.”23 In 1949, the embassy’s 
labor attaché Benjamin Sowell similarly conceded in an internal memo that few 
communists were present in the country and that their actions did not justify 
close surveillance.24 This phenomenon was not unique to Ecuador nor to Latin 
America. Around the world, communist parties faced struggles over leadership 
and conicts over strategy, particularly between peaceful paths to power versus 
revolutionary violence and tension between submission to a Soviet political line 
and autonomous processes.25
In contrast, the British ambassador Mayers noted that even though the PCE 
was legal and only had about ve thousand members, “these small numbers do 
not reect its real strength and inuence, which is greater than they would lead 
one to suppose.”26 Linke similarly stated that the PCE had survived “for many 
years mainly because of the perseverance of half a dozen persons who succeeded 
in obtaining the scanty backing of small workers’ groups just sucient to keep 
the party alive.”27 The ability for the PCE to punch above its weight is in part 
what makes it an important topic of study.
Popular Fronts
Coalition building has long been key to winning elections, but how and with 
whom to build alliances can be highly controversial. The 1928 sixth Comintern 
congress launched its “ultrale” phase that advocated a “class against class” or-
ganizing strategy instead of working with other progressive forces. At the Com-
intern’s seventh congress in 1935 and with a fascist threat looming on the hori-
zon, Soviet leaders reversed course and returned to a previous policy of building 
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coalitions with other sympathetic forces. In March 1934 and in anticipation of 
this policy change, communists in Ecuador began to appeal for a united front 
with vanguardists, socialists, and liberals to keep the conservatives out of power. 
Subsequently, the political center and le would periodically coordinate activ-
ities. Competing interests, however, frequently led to divisions on the le that 
opened up the way for conservative victories. The formation of anticonservative 
alliances remained an intensely contested and complicated undertaking, with 
signicant trade-o
s no matter how they were formed.
The Chilean le had more experience with popular front experiments than 
anyone else in Latin America, which led Alexander to observe that although 
small in numbers the Ecuadorian Communist Party was, along with the Chil-
ean Communist Party, “one of the two best manipulators of fellow-travelers in 
the whole continent.”28 In 1946, Gabriel González Videla won election with 
communist party support and he initially rewarded several of its members with 
cabinet positions. This triumph launched a period of intense social mobiliza-
tions. But this democratic opening quickly came to an end in what scholars term 
the “Chilean cold war.” Aer a year in oce, González Videla swung abruptly 
to the right and repressed labor movements that challenged his economic poli-
cies. Communists quit his government rather than acquiesce to his conservative 
policies. A signicant turn to the le within the communist party hindered the 
continuation of the alliance and contributed to ruling class fears in the face of 
growing working-class politicization. González Videla, in turn, outlawed the 
communist party and severed diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. A leist 
goal of achieving positive policy reforms through collaboration with a moderate 
government had reached a dead end.29
Similarly, the Ecuadorian le continually debated what position to take in 
elections, including who to run as candidates and whether to form coalitions 
with other parties. As in Chile, these coalitions were not without a great deal 
of controversies and complications. At the time, Alexander faulted the Ecua-
dorian socialists for being too eager to work with the communists in a broad 
progressive electoral front. He complained that socialists too easily fell victim to 
fears of a conservative victory as an excuse to collaborate with the communists, 
both in electoral alliances and in the labor movement. As a result, the socialists, 
even though they outnumbered the communists, “generally followed policies 
dictated by the Communists,” a common complaint that United States ocials 
also made.30 Decades later and in retrospect, the historian Enrique Ayala Mora 
had a somewhat di
erent interpretation of the ultimate outcome of these alli-
ances. He observes that during the 1950s the communists “did not undergo any 
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signicant growth and increasingly diluted its revolutionary strategy in order 
to permit alliances with Liberalism and a degree of participation.”31 Unlike 
what Alexander feared, this strategy did not appear to leave the communists in 
a stronger position.
The communists would run their own slate of candidates when they failed to 
build a popular front with other progressive forces, but alone they never polled 
particularly well. Furthermore, oen the le performed better in local races than 
they did in presidential contests, but that did not deter activists from dedicating 
most of their attention to the race at the top of the ticket. The CIA observed 
that their total of ve thousand votes in the June 1950 midterm congressional 
election was “a considerable increase” over their previous tally of about three 
thousand. Nevertheless, “Communists continue to occupy a position of minor 
political importance in the country.” The agency did not foresee “any signi-
cant gains in the coming months.”32 But that did not dissuade the CIA from its 
continued surveillance of the le. If it admitted that the communists did not 
present a threat they would lose their raison d’état, and by extension historians 
would have lost an important source of documentation on the le.
Even with these admissions of weakness, the CIA continually monitored 
communist party participation in elections, a rather paradoxical concern for an 
agency that assumed that communists would only engage in illegal and violent 
activities. Analysts never bothered to comment on that contradiction. Further-
more, a certain amount of irony exists in the PCE’s insistence on being included 
in electoral coalitions because, as Karl Marx famously noted, elections are little 
more than a mechanism by which the oppressed are allowed once every few years 
to decide which particular members of the ruling class would misrepresent and 
repress them in parliament.33 What does emerge from the surveillance, however, 
are insights into internal party debates. One intelligence report, for example, 
concerned a closed party meeting in Quito to decide whom to support in the up-
coming November 1948 municipal elections. The party instructed cell leaders to 
tell members to campaign for a selected list of candidates.34 These compromises 
meant that opponents exaggerated the level of a communist threat and at the 
same time the le had no clear path forward by which to gain power. Inherent 
contractions throve on all sides. This embrace of an accommodationist position 
eventually led a le wing of the party to break away in the aermath of the 
Cuban Revolution.
The communist party consistently realized more success as a social move-
ment that engaged with labor and other social issues than as an electoral or 
armed force. In part this was the result of both tactical and ideological choices. 
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According to the dominant mode of communist thinking, unindustrialized and 
economically dependent countries such as Ecuador were not ready for a socialist 
revolution. Orthodox interpretations of Marxist theory stipulated that a more 
fully developed capitalist economy needed to emerge before a transition to so-
cialism could begin. In part, that perception is what led communists to engage 
in popular front alliances with more moderate groups. But that did not stop 
activists from pressing militant political agendas, particularly in the realm of 
labor organizations.
Democratic Parentheses
The 1950s are known as an extraordinary (for Ecuador) twelve-year “democratic 
parentheses” during which a series of three presidents were elected in what crit-
ics generally recognized as free and fair elections and were able to nish their 
terms in oce and hand power to an elected successor from an opposing party.35
It had been a quarter century since a duly elected president, José Luis Tamayo 
(1920–24), had successfully completed his four-year term of oce. The July 
1925 revolution introduced an exceptionally chaotic period with frequent and 
extraconstitutional changes in power. Twenty-one chief executives held oce 
between 1931 and 1948 and not one managed to complete a term. Now, even as 
military regimes took hold in the postwar period elsewhere in Latin America, 
Ecuador faithfully held presidential elections every four years, even though liter-
acy requirements excluded a majority of the country’s population from voting. In 
addition, voters participated in midterm congressional elections and yearly mu-
nicipal and provincial contests. This sequence of electoral campaigns provides 
the context in which the le pressed their political demands.
This democratic parenthesis emerged in the aermath of the May 28, 1944, 
revolución gloriosa or “glorious revolution” that opened up political spaces and 
allowed for the ourishing of subaltern mobilizations that ushered in a period of 
progressive reforms. A general strike on that day culminated with the removal of 
the unpopular president Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Río.36 The gloriosa was part 
of a broader “democratic spring” that spread across Latin America in the midst 
of the Second World War. Residents became conscious of the irony of ghting 
fascist dictatorships in Europe while su
ering under authoritarian regimes at 
home. These contradictions led activists to revolt against their local govern-
ments. A hemispheric movement began in May 1944 with a general strike that 
removed the military dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador. 
His fall on May 9 had repercussions throughout the region, with protests in one 
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country encouraged uprisings in others. Revolts in Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, and Ecuador soon followed. Student strikes in Nicaragua attempted but 
ultimately failed to remove Anastasio Somoza García from power. The most 
signicant and longest-lasting of these protests was in Guatemala that led to 
the resignation of Jorge Ubico on July 1 and introduced a ten-year period of pro-
gressive reforms. That democratic experiment ended with a 1954 CIA-backed 
military coup followed by decades of genocidal violence. The brief postwar dem-
ocratic spring of which the communists had taken advantage was an anomaly 
rather than the new normal.
Ecuador’s democratic parentheses began with the election in 1948 of the mod-
ernizing landowner and pro-United States politician Plaza. The future president 
had been born in New York City where his father Leónidas Plaza Gutiérrez was 
stationed as a minister to the United States. Plaza had a long history of political 
involvement. Velasco Ibarra appointed him as ambassador to the United States 
in 1944, and later in 1968 he was elected secretary general of the Organization 
of American States (OAS). In all of these positions he maintained close relations 
with the United States, which gave him a reputation as an agent of imperialism. 
Plaza also owned the extensive Zuleta hacienda in northern Ecuador where he 
acted as a modernizing landowner. Both in and out of government he was com-
mitted to a capitalist mode of production.37
Plaza’s election appeared to introduce a remarkable period of political stabil-
ity and economic growth, but that development represented more supercial 
form than substance. Booming banana production led to a quickly expanding 
export economy, with Ecuador providing up to 25 percent of the global market. 
Not everyone shared equally in this economic growth. While prots soared for 
plantation owners, workers’ wages declined, which led to rising rates of inequal-
ity. With government policies swinging ever more rightward during the 1950s, 
workers and peasants protested their marginalization from economic growth, 
which contributed to the strengthening of the le.38
Aer four years in oce, Plaza handed power to the populist leader Velasco 
Ibarra for his third of ve terms, the only one he was able to complete success-
fully. Velasco Ibarra, in turn, handed power over to his minister of government 
Camilo Ponce Enríquez, the rst conservative elected as president of Ecuador 
since the 1895 liberal revolution more than sixty years previous. Ponce, in fact, 
was only one of three conservatives who won a presidential election in Ecuador 
in the twentieth century.39 Hernán Ibarra aptly notes that Plaza was associated 
with imperialism, Velasco Ibarra with the oligarchy, and Ponce with feudalism.40
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None of these politicians represented popular aspirations for a more just and 
inclusive social order.
In 1960, Velasco Ibarra returned to the presidency for his fourth of ve times 
in oce. As with all except the immediately preceding mandate, his governance 
quickly degenerated into a military regime, bringing an end to a succession of 
elected civilian administrations. Caught between an unwillingness to promul-
gate agrarian reform legislation and an inability to contain rural protest, the 
military forced the populist president out in November 1961 aer only fourteen 
months in oce. His vice president Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy assumed 
control until he too was removed in a July 1963 military coup. Ecuador had 
returned to its status quo ante of frequent and extraconstitutional changes of 
power.41 At the same time, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 had 
triggered a period of intense protest across Latin America that in Ecuador fos-
tered the draing of a 1964 agrarian reform law and opened up possibilities for 
participation for previously excluded populations.
Despite an apparent rightward shi in politics, electoral support for conser-
vatives steadily declined during the 1950s. In 1948, the conservative candidate 
Manuel Elicio Flor Torres won 40 percent of the vote in the presidential elec-
tion, which turned out to be a high point of their strength. That dropped to 
33 percent for Ruperto Alarcón Falconí in 1952 and to the low of 29 percent 
with Ponce’s election in 1956. A variety of demographic and sociological factors 
explain this loss of electoral support. One was population shis from the high-
lands to the coast and from rural to urban areas, in both cases from places where 
conservatives traditionally held dominance to those of liberal control. A mod-
ernizing capitalist economy also swung the country away from a feudal mode of 
production that, together with the backing of the Catholic Church, had pro-
vided the conservatives with their base of support.42 Paradoxically, Ayala Mora 
observes, “the loss of control over the electoral majority allowed the Conserva-
tive Party to increase its share of power, especially at the local and congressional 
levels.” This was due in large part to a change in social forces, particularly with 
the old landholding oligarchy becoming a new agricultural bourgeoisie, and a 
fracturing of traditional alliances.43
Rising literacy rates accompanied these demographic shis, which brought 
new voters into the political system who had risen out of the working class and 
had little reason to support the aristocratic liberal and conservative parties. Re-
strictions on su
rage rights meant that before the 1940s only 3 percent of the 
population partook in contests that selected what were purportedly popular and 
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democratic governments. Participation rates began to rise with the 1948 election, 
the same year in which (literate) women rst participated in signicant num-
bers, but literacy requirements meant that less than 15 percent of the population 
was even eligible to vote. Over the course of the next decade, the percentage of 
voters slowly grew to almost 20 percent. Rather than opting for liberals or le-
ists, however, these new voters provided populist politicians with their margins 
of victory. Although leists might see conservatives as their biggest enemies, it 
was populists who denied them electoral victories.
Although few recognized it at the time, Plaza’s election in 1948 had 
ushered in an unusually politically stable decade for Ecuador. This period of ap-
parent tranquility should have o
ered the le a golden opportunity for growth. 
The communist party did not face the legal or physical repression that its coun-
terparts did in many other countries. Furthermore, a functioning electoral sys-
tem was consistent with the peaceful and parliamentary path to socialism that 
many of the communist leaders advocated. Yet, the communists had diculties 
in turning this situation to their advantage. Instead, growing cold war tensions 
led to a rising tide of anticommunist sentiments. Domestic and international 
factors intertwined and reinforced each other to create the hostile environment 
in which the le operated. In comparison to the 1940s democratic spring and 
1960s guerrilla insurrections, a combination of repressive local governments and 
international cold war policies seemed to circumscribe the possibilities for ad-
vancing social change in the 1950s. Overcoming those challenges would require 
a long and uphill struggle.
During the 1950s, even as the political center in Ecuador appeared to shi 
rightward, a remarkable period of constitutional continuity settled over the 
country. While the le seemed to lose space to an ascendant right, the conserva-
tive share of the popular vote actually declined during those years. Conservatives 
may have been the largest single electoral force, but they never enjoyed majority 
backing, particularly among the large, disenfranchised population. Although 
the entire le lost electoral support at the top of their tickets during this decade, 
it was also a time of advances on a local level, particularly in terms of articulating 
party platforms, building labor movements, and nding other ways to advance 
progressive ideas. Electoral contests as well as the popular fronts and labor and 
student organizations that the le fashioned to press their agenda formed an or-
ganizational base for the much more militant actions that emerged in the 1960s.
An analysis of political developments in the 1950s demonstrates that the com-
munist party never disappeared, but rather continued to play a signicant role 
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across the decade and beyond. In a fractured political environment, if the le 
were to emerge victorious it would have to build coalitions with sympathetic 
forces. Deep political divisions, however, complicated that process. In particular, 
rising anticommunist sentiments marginalized what was a small but well-or-
ganized segment of the le. Realizing organizational success proved to be im-
mensely dicult to achieve. The le momentarily lost some political space, 
but, as Greg Grandin notes, in the process it transformed “power relations that 
allowed broader participation in politics, culture, and society.”44 Those trans-
formations laid the groundwork for dramatic developments that were to come. 
Throughout all of these twists and turns, CIA surveillance provides insights 
into the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that the party con-
fronted. Our understanding of the past is richer for the documentary record 
they le behind.
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CIA
T he Central Intelligence Agency justiably has gained a repu-tation as the covert action arm of the United States government, partic-ularly as a result of its involvement in subverting progressive democratic 
governments in places such as Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973 and replacing 
them with brutal, right-wing military dictatorships. Covert actions including 
interventions in the internal aairs of other countries is the most controversial 
of the CIA’s clandestine functions, but that is not the agency’s only or even orig-
inal purpose. The National Security Act of 1947 that President Harry Truman 
signed instructed the CIA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence, 
as well as to perform other duties related to intelligence gathering on national 
security issues. The agency quickly expanded from that rather limited mandate 
to other, oen less savory, tasks.1
Broadly speaking, intelligence agencies such as the CIA engage in three dif-
ferent types of activities. First is the collection of raw data through surveillance 
of targeted sources; second is research and analysis of that information com-
bined with other secret, ocial, and public sources to create nished intelli-
gence to guide policy makers in their decision-making processes; and third are 
the covert operations designed to act on that intelligence to alter political land-
scapes. Critics have long complained that the CIA’s primary task has not been to 
coordinate the collection of information or to analyze that data, but to conduct 
covert foreign policy.2 Those operations have garnered extensive attention. In 
addition, most published memoirs and studies of the CIA retain a top-down 
perspective that emphasizes the roles of CIA directors, Washington-based poli-
ticians, and other policy makers.3 Their actions and the intelligence that analysts 
(known colloquially as the “wise men”) produced at agency headquarters tells 
us more about United States policy objectives than it does about the subjects 
they analyzed.
Rarely studied are the raw data that CIA ocers collected from their agents 
in the eld. Even with its inherent limitations, the information that these ocers 
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compiled based on human intelligence can provide useful and sometimes even 
fascinating empirical data that scholars can parse for their unique insights into 
local developments. This surveillance sometimes revealed valuable details that 
are dicult or impossible to nd anywhere else. As with any historical documen-
tation, both the eld reports and nished intelligence produced in Washington 
must be read carefully and critically for the gaps and perspectives that they con-
tain. When correlated with other sources, this material can lead to a fuller and 
more robust picture of how the le responded to challenges that it faced.
Before delving into the details of the CIA’s surveillance of the Ecuadorian le, 
it is rst worth considering how and why the agency collected this information, 
and who did the collecting. The more we know about a source, the better we can 
critique it and the more we can extract from it. Understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of the material assists us in gaining a deeper appreciation for the light 
it sheds on historical events.
Albert Haney
A strict code of secrecy complicates the process of identifying the authors of 
CIA reports or even the names of individual ocers or analysts. Allegedly for 
national security purposes, government agencies redact names of operatives and 
methods of investigation or withhold entire documents that might assist with 
the identication of those involved in clandestine activities or the specic nature 
of their operations. The suppression of the identities of ocers makes it exceed-
ingly dicult to know how information was acquired or the qualications of 
those who draed agency reports.
Anything related to the CIA or spy operations in general inherently elicit a 
good deal of popular interest. Former CIA deputy director Ray Cline complains 
that the public’s fascination with espionage and covert actions overshadows the 
agency’s principal responsibility of “analytical research to reduce raw data to 
meaningful ideas.”4 As Donald Daughters, a former FBI agent during World 
War II in Chile, noted in an oral history interview with his grandson and an-
thropologist Anton Daughters, “It’s always the Americans who are most inter-
ested in gossiping about anything that smells of secret intelligence. It really gets 
people excited, gets the blood owing, and they can’t wait to talk about things 
that relate to secret intelligence.”5 That is not the intent of this work, but rather 
a reliance on the CIA is part of an attempt to locate information and exploit its 
value in a situation where few other sources exist. In fact, the specic origins 
of the raw data—whether it came from diplomatic ocials, CIA ocers, or 
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military attachés—is of less interest in this work than the insights that the doc-
umentation can shed on domestic developments in Latin America. Identifying 
authorship, whether individual or collective, and methods of collection is pri-
marily of interest for its value in parsing out assumptions and perspectives that 
help evaluate the validity of the data and, more importantly, provide a mecha-
nism for analyzing the information that it contains. Author and context are key 
for gaining a fuller understanding of a source.
As is oen the case, a censor’s pen is not always complete and the withholding 
of information can be partial and uneven. Sometimes two dierent inspectors 
will review the same document at dierent times resulting in two dierent sets 
of redactions, leaving an uninitiated outsider a bit confused and bewildered 
about what exactly was objectionable with the information that was withheld.6
In those cases, one has to wonder, as did former CIA consultant Chalmers John-
son, whether the redactions simply hide the potential embarrassment “to have 
it known that such conventional journalism passed for strategic thought.”7 As 
Sherman Kent, who pioneered many of the methods of intelligence analysis for 
the CIA, determined in 1951, 95 percent of the material in CIA estimates was 
available from publicly available sources.8 On rare occasions, internal correspon-
dence mentions a name in passing that allows not only for conrmation of the 
CIA as the source of information but also points to a specic individual as a 
CIA ocer. Sometimes corroborating material, including from other govern-
ment agencies, inadvertently allows for the identication of a source.9 It is at 
those times that researchers begin to gain a better understanding of the resultant 
documentation.
The inconsistent nature of redactions allowed for the identication of Army 
Colonel Albert Richard Haney as the rst CIA ocer stationed in Ecuador. 
Haney arrived in Quito in February 1947, before the CIA formally began op-
erations in September of that year, with the designation of “attaché” in the em-
bassy. The FBI at that point was wrapping up its counterintelligence eorts in 
Latin America and passing its operations o to the Central Intelligence Group 
(CIG), the immediate forerunner of the CIA. According to former FBI agent 
and historian Raymond Batvinis, the agency’s director J. Edgar Hoover gave his 
personnel the option of either returning to conventional FBI work or joining 
the CIA. “Many chose the CIA,” Batvinis claims, “and by 1950, three years aer 
it came into existence, every CIA station chief in Latin America had previously 
served” with the FBI in Latin America.10 Haney painted a somewhat dierent 
picture of the transfer of authority. “Hoover didn’t like losing the responsibil-
ity,” Haney later commented, “and in most countries of Latin America the FBI 
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burned its les and dismissed its agents rather than turn them over to us.” Haney 
claimed that when he arrived in Quito the only thing that the bureau had le 
behind “was a row of empty safes and a pair of rubber gloves in what had been 
an FBI darkroom.” He hired the ex-FBI chief ’s driver and through that person 
contacted most of the bureau’s sources and reconstructed their spy network. “I 
have a feeling J. Edgar is never going to forgive us for taking over this territory,” 
Haney concluded.11 Richard Bissell, who was later in charge of covert actions at 
the CIA, similarly stated that he did not “believe the FBI ever got over its West-
ern Hemisphere operation’s being turned over to the agency.”12 The legendary 
tensions between the dierent agencies ran deep.
Ecuador was not Haney’s rst—nor his last—post in Latin America. Be-
fore coming to Ecuador as a major in the army, he was assigned in July 1945 
as an assistant military attaché to Colombia, a post he held for about a year.13
In January 1947, the department appointed him to Quito as a level six Foreign 
Service sta ocer (FSS-6) with an annual salary of $5,940. A month later, the 
department designated him as an “attaché” to the Quito Embassy, apparently 
his diplomatic cover for his work with the nascent agency.14 Aer two years in 
Quito, in mid-1949 he moved to Santiago, Chile with a promotion to a level four 
Foreign Service sta ocer (FSS-4) although he still held the title of “attaché” 
and continued with the CIA.15 Haney remained in Chile through 1951 when the 
agency promoted him to Chief of Station (COS) in South Korea.
Scholars have described Haney as “a handsome, rugged six-footer who had le 
a Chicago business career . . . to enlist in army counterintelligence” during World 
War II. He headed up the US Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 
Panama rounding up German immigrants whom the government feared might 
be potential Nazi agents.16 Bissell described Haney as “young, bold, and enthu-
siastic about the possibilities for covert action,” which made him an ideal candi-
date for such work.17 Haney had a “pugnacious personality,” with one co-worker 
claiming, “I didn’t know anyone who liked Haney.”18 In his history of the CIA, 
the journalist Tim Weiner describes Haney “as garrulous and ambitious” who 
some thought “a dangerous fool” who tended to fabricate evidence or, worse, em-
ployed informers who were “controlled by the other side.”19 Despite—or maybe 
because—of these character aws, Haney enjoyed a lengthy career in the CIA.
Haney had decided to join the CIA against the wishes of his wealthy spouse 
Irene Budlong Haney who wanted him to return to his business career in the 
United States. In Ecuador and Chile, the couple lived “rather expensively in 
accordance with Mrs. Haney’s tastes.” In 1951, she divorced him rather than ac-
company him to Korea.20 It was particularly in Korea where Haney ran into 
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trouble for fabricating evidence in the United States-led war against the north. 
Despite the “human wreckage” he had le behind in Korea, CIA director Allen 
Dulles tapped him in 1953 to lead Operation PBSUCCESS, the CIA’s plot to 
overthrow Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz. Consistent with his previous 
track record in Korea, Weiner describes Haney’s plans for the Guatemalan coup 
as “one of the loosest cannons in the CIA’s arsenal.”21 Despite his incompetence, 
six months later the CIA-engineered military coup removed the democratically 
elected Arbenz from oce.
It is unlikely that Haney was alone in his initial post with the CIA in Ec-
uador. At a minimum, he would have had the assistance of one or two oce 
support sta to type correspondence and perform other clerical duties. He may 
have also had one or two case ocers under his command, even though it is 
dicult to verify the identities of his assistants and collaborators. Even so, by 
all appearances, the CIA’s initial footprint in Ecuador was signicantly smaller 
than that of its predecessor the FBI. At the height of its operations in October 
1943, the FBI had twenty-one people in Ecuador with ve in its Legal Attaché 
Oce in Quito, four clerical ocers, four undercover agents, two radio oper-
ators, a police liaison ocer, and a police security ocer. Two agents were at 
the consulate in Guayaquil, in addition to undercover agents in both Guayaquil 
and Cuenca.22 The CIA never approached that extent. Station size varied from 
two (as in Chad) to several hundred (as in Saigon during the Vietnam War), but 
most had twenty-ve to thirty people.23 The agency’s Ecuador station would 
have been on the small size.
CIA stations operated with the approval of the State Department and gen-
erally under the cover of an embassy or consulate.24 In order to maintain that 
appearance, CIA ocers needed to transfer stations every two to four years, as 
was the practice in the diplomatic service. That created a problem for the agency, 
as it was not always easy to hand over sources and agents from one ocer to the 
next.25 The head of CIA operations in each country was called the Chief of Sta-
tion (COS), and reported to the ambassador.26 The reality could be—and oen 
was—quite dierent. Case ocers habitually lied, including to State Depart-
ment colleagues and ambassadors, especially about controversial operations.27
Ambassadors oen recognized and accommodated themselves to these contra-
dictions. Although as part of the career foreign service Maurice Bernbaum had 
his share of dealings with the CIA—including during previous stints in Ecuador 
and at the Ecuador desk at the State Department in Washington—when he 
returned to Ecuador as ambassador in 1960 he pretended not to know anything 
about CIA operations even though he theoretically oversaw them.28
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The COS typically worked out of the political section of the embassy, and 
was responsible for coordinating CIA inuence with political parties, civic as-
sociations, student groups, labor unions, the media, and the military. Under the 
COS were Chiefs of Base (COB) who oen worked out of consulates in dierent 
regions of the country. Philip Agee, a dissident agent who gained fame for “nam-
ing names” in his memoir Inside the Company, arrived in Ecuador at the end of 
1960 aer the Cuban Revolution and in the context of the agency signicantly 
ramping up its activities to prevent another such catastrophe in the hemisphere. 
He described the CIA’s Ecuador operation as “small,” even though it had a bud-
get of more than half a million dollars. In addition to Agee’s post as operations 
ocer, the Quito station consisted of the COS James Noland, reports ocer 
John Bacon, operations ocer Robert Weatherwax, a communications ocer, 
an administrative assistant, and a secretary-typist. The post of deputy chief was 
vacant when he arrived, but was lled the following year. The Guayaquil op-
eration consisted of the COB Richard Wheeler (his predecessor in Quito), an 
operations ocer, an administrative assistant, and a secretary-typist.29 Presum-
ably, the CIA station was much smaller during the late 1940s when Haney rst 
launched its operations.
Agee does not name the station’s assistants, who were generally young women 
and hence tend to become invisible in the historical record. In a subsequent mem-
oir, he recounts meeting the deputy chief of mission’s secretary Sharon Hurley 
in Germany in the 1970s aer he le the agency. He “hardly noticed” her even 
though her “desk had been a minute’s walk down the hall” from his in Quito.30
Because they typed the outgoing cables and dispatches, read incoming trac 
from headquarters, and maintained nancial records, the dissident CIA ocer 
John Stockwell describes an assistant as one of a very small handful of people 
“who knows everything the CIA is doing.”31 Seemingly no memoirs, studies, or 
extended discussions exist of their role in the agency’s operations. Researchers 
have ignored their activities to the detriment of gaining a fuller understanding 
of history.
Both the FBI and CIA placed some of their personnel under commercial 
cover in which they purportedly worked for an amenable United States rm. 
One example of commercial cover was David Atlee Phillips who published an 
English-language newspaper in Chile in 1950 when Haney recruited him into 
the CIA. That cover was eective because the business provided a justication 
for his presence in Chile and a reason for him to move around and meet people. 
The newspaper also furnished the agency with convenient access to a press that 
they could use to print their propaganda.32 Sometimes personnel would go under 
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“deep” cover, which meant cutting all ties to the government and blending into 
the local landscape until the agency needed them for an operation.
The most common was “ocial” cover in which spies ostensibly became State 
Department employees, including receiving State Department passports and 
full diplomatic protection.33 In the case of the FBI during the war, the secretary 
of state would cable ahead to the embassy that a legal attaché was arriving and 
that “his salary and expenses will be paid by another Government agency.”34
Even so, none of the FBI agents were included in the State Department’s foreign 
service lists that provided the rank and salary of all diplomatic ocials, whereas 
each CIA ocer is listed the same as other personnel (except that undercover 
agents would not show up in diplomatic records). In both cases their absence or 
inclusion makes it dicult for subsequent scholars to identify individuals who 
worked for their respective agencies. Unless an operative went on to a distin-
guished (or notorious) career in the CIA, that person could fade into the his-
torical background with little trace—which presumably was the agency’s intent. 
The tendency to refer to CIA stations euphemistically as a “controlled American 
source” (CAS) further complicates identication of agency personnel.35 Even so, 
in essence, the State Department provided diplomatic cover for political police 
engaged in illegal spying in other countries.
The size of the sta of the United States diplomatic mission in Ecuador ex-
panded dramatically during the 1950s, but when Haney arrived in 1947 it was 
still quite small. At that time, the embassy sta in Quito had fourteen members 
including consuls, attachés, and other ocers, plus six more at the Guayaquil 
Consulate and two military attachés.36 By 1960, the embassy employed eigh-
teen ocials divided into executive, political, economic, consular, and admin-
istrative sections. In addition, the diplomatic mission included four military 
attachés; y-eight with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 
the predecessor of the present-day US Agency for International Development 
(USAID); seven at the United States Information Agency (USIA); one with the 
Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS); plus six more 
ocials in the Guayaquil Consulate.37 The CIA had many places in the embassy 
where it could hide its ocers.
CIA operatives were oen but not always located in the political section of 
the embassy or consulate. In the case of Ecuador in the early 1960s, Agee states 
that the CIA’s base operation in Guayaquil “forms the entire small political 
section of the Consulate.” In contrast, Weatherwax was “under Public Safety 
cover in USOM,” the United States Operations Mission in the Quito Embassy.38
Furthermore, political attachés were not necessarily CIA ocers. For example, 
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George Jones entered the Foreign Service in 1956 when he was twenty-one years 
old. His rst international post was to Quito in November 1958 as a political 
ocer, but he was never part of the CIA. Jones le Ecuador in November 1960 
just before Agee arrived and went on to a long career in the Foreign Service. All 
of these factors complicate a fuller understanding of the data that the dierent 
agencies generated. Even so, the distinctions between the dierent agencies be-
comes more academic if the interest is not in critiquing United States policy but 
rather reading the documentation their personnel generated for what it can tell 
us about local conditions in Latin America.
Information Reports
George Jones, the political attaché in the Quito Embassy in the late 1950s, cate-
gorized CIA ocers as “professional intelligence ocers” who “were very ded-
icated to their career, very hard working” and the information they generated 
“was certainly useful.” Much of the data they produced, “too much of it” really, 
“covered the same areas that the embassy political ocers were working on” and 
that created “a constant source of irritation.” Jones complained that the CIA 
ocers did not tell “Washington that much more about normal, overt politics 
that was of any tremendous interest.” At the same time, “The same point could 
be made about much of our reporting, was there really any need for Washington 
to know who was in and who was out, and what the inner machinations were 
of party X compared with party Y.” He said that ocials in Washington had
an insatiable demand for information . . . which drove both the embassy 
and the CIA, and yet one wonders what Washington ever did with the 
mountains of information that it got. Other than to ll up the les and 
demonstrate how well informed they were. I always thought that by far, 
we were the best informed government in the world. We produced the best 
information of any foreign service in the world. I had much more doubt 
about our knowing what to do with the information that we got. At times 
I think there was a lot of information for information’s sake, rather than 
relating it to things that we really needed to know.
In particular, Jones applauded the CIA’s reporting on the communist party. 
While the quality and level of information would vary between countries and 
at dierent times, “there were times and places where they had really good pene-
tration into the leadership of the extreme le and were able to give us some really 
useful information about what the le were up to.”39 Even though Jones thought 
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the amount and detail of information that the agency collected was excessive and 
perhaps even meaningless, it does provide historians with a valuable source for a 
study of communism in Latin America.
As Jones notes, CIA ocers draed a surprisingly large volume of intelligence 
(later called information) reports that detailed local developments in their coun-
try of surveillance. Patrick McGarvey, a CIA ocer who le the agency aer 
fourteen years in a state of disillusionment, relates the “tremendous pressure” 
to produce reports, because come promotion time ocers were judged based on 
the number of cables sent to Washington. “Quality doesn’t count, just quantity,” 
McGarvey complains.40 As a result, the reports were oen only a page or two in 
length and sometimes a sequence of memos summarizes dierent topics from the 
same informer. Agee states that the reports were a pain to produce because of the 
specic format and model that the CIA required their ocers to follow.41 The 
reports typically feature factual narrative summaries of political developments, 
presumably drawn from raw data that their contracted agents had collected and 
on other inside knowledge extracted from their sources. Before declassifying 
these reports, the CIA redacted all indication of who (or what) their sources 
might have been and how their ocers acquired the information, which makes 
it dicult to draw denite conclusions regarding their provenance and validity. 
Sometimes the reports concluded with brief editorial or evaluative comments, 
although the CIA also redacted any identifying marks as to who those commen-
tators might have been. Occasionally case ocers would transcribe information 
from an organization they had placed under surveillance or enclose a copy of a 
proclamation that the group had distributed. These documents provide valuable 
details that are dicult or impossible to nd anywhere else.
The rst intelligence report on Ecuador in the CREST database is dated May 
1947 and concerns the visit of an Italian economic commission to Ecuador.42
That topic is a historical anomaly, and not a common subject in the agency’s re-
cords. Before the war Italian military missions provided training in many Latin 
American countries, and their governments were as loath to give up the Italian’s 
expertise and access to hardware as the United States was eager to displace them. 
The defeat of Benito Mussolini solved that problem, and Italy was no longer a 
competitor for imperial control over Latin America.
The second intelligence report (see gure 2.1) is more representative of where 
the CIA dedicated its eorts. That one is dated two days aer the rst, and 
concerns communist party activities. It is one-page long and includes three top-
ics of examination. The rst is a report on an Indigenous conference in Quito, 
the second notes that party leader Pedro Saad had recruited one hundred new 
Figure 2.1. The second intelligence report from the CIG on Ecuador that includes 
information on an Indigenous conference and communist eorts to organize an 
agricultural cooperative. Source: Central Intelligence Group (CIG), “Communist 
Party Activities,” May 21, 1947, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov 
/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00457r000600140010-3.
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the amount and detail of information that the agency collected was excessive and 
perhaps even meaningless, it does provide historians with a valuable source for a 
study of communism in Latin America.
As Jones notes, CIA ocers draed a surprisingly large volume of intelligence 
(later called information) reports that detailed local developments in their coun-
try of surveillance. Patrick McGarvey, a CIA ocer who le the agency aer 
fourteen years in a state of disillusionment, relates the “tremendous pressure” 
to produce reports, because come promotion time ocers were judged based on 
the number of cables sent to Washington. “Quality doesn’t count, just quantity,” 
McGarvey complains.40 As a result, the reports were oen only a page or two in 
length and sometimes a sequence of memos summarizes dierent topics from the 
same informer. Agee states that the reports were a pain to produce because of the 
specic format and model that the CIA required their ocers to follow.41 The 
reports typically feature factual narrative summaries of political developments, 
presumably drawn from raw data that their contracted agents had collected and 
on other inside knowledge extracted from their sources. Before declassifying 
these reports, the CIA redacted all indication of who (or what) their sources 
might have been and how their ocers acquired the information, which makes 
it dicult to draw denite conclusions regarding their provenance and validity. 
Sometimes the reports concluded with brief editorial or evaluative comments, 
although the CIA also redacted any identifying marks as to who those commen-
tators might have been. Occasionally case ocers would transcribe information 
from an organization they had placed under surveillance or enclose a copy of a 
proclamation that the group had distributed. These documents provide valuable 
details that are dicult or impossible to nd anywhere else.
The rst intelligence report on Ecuador in the CREST database is dated May 
1947 and concerns the visit of an Italian economic commission to Ecuador.42
That topic is a historical anomaly, and not a common subject in the agency’s re-
cords. Before the war Italian military missions provided training in many Latin 
American countries, and their governments were as loath to give up the Italian’s 
expertise and access to hardware as the United States was eager to displace them. 
The defeat of Benito Mussolini solved that problem, and Italy was no longer a 
competitor for imperial control over Latin America.
The second intelligence report (see gure 2.1) is more representative of where 
the CIA dedicated its eorts. That one is dated two days aer the rst, and 
concerns communist party activities. It is one-page long and includes three top-
ics of examination. The rst is a report on an Indigenous conference in Quito, 
the second notes that party leader Pedro Saad had recruited one hundred new 
Figure 2.1. The second intelligence report from the CIG on Ecuador that includes 
information on an Indigenous conference and communist eorts to organize an 
agricultural cooperative. Source: Central Intelligence Group (CIG), “Communist 
Party Activities,” May 21, 1947, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov 
/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00457r000600140010-3.
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members on the coast, and the third relays information on communist eorts to 
organize an agricultural cooperative in Riobamba.43 These reports subsequently 
came at a fast and furious pace, and largely maintained this emphasis on com-
munist activities. The memos oen appear in batches—sometimes as many as 
ve a day—and number in the hundreds, and this is just for Ecuador. Although 
identifying details in the declassied versions of these documents are redacted, 
it is reasonable to assume that many if not most of these initial ones represent 
Haney’s work.
In addition to the information reports sent to Washington, Haney also sub-
mitted secret memos—typically related to communist activities—to the em-
bassy sta in Quito. The rst (or at least the rst that has come to light) is also 
from May 1947 and concerns a cable that he had received warning that commu-
nist parties throughout Latin America were seeking to inltrate United States 
embassies through domestic servants and locally hired personnel. Their goal was 
to identify sta who were working on anticommunist campaigns.44 Coming as 
he did in the midst of the departure of the FBI in March 1947 and before the for-
mal creation of the CIA in September 1947, Haney conducted his investigations 
under the auspices of the CIA’s precursor Central Intelligence Group (CIG). He 
signed his work as “civil attaché,” a variation on the FBI’s “legal attaché” and a 
moniker that the bureau’s agents sometimes also used. This pattern continued 
even aer the creation of the CIA. For example, in December 1947, chargé d’af-
faires George Shaw provided a copy of a memo to the civil attaché—presumably 
Haney—that concerned Saad’s application for a visa to visit his father Kalil who 
was undergoing treatment for cancer in the United States. Saad’s request for a 
visa triggered quite a diplomatic scramble, including questions as to how his fa-
ther had acquired a visa. Ultimately the consulate denied the communist leader 
the visa because of his political aliation.45
Haney’s investigations resulted in detailed records of labor and communist 
party activity. A July 1947 memo concerned a trip of Mexican labor leader Vi-
cente Lombardo Toledano’s associate Francisco Arechandieta Ortega through 
South America to organize a congress of petroleum workers. Along the way 
Arechandieta contacted both labor and communist leaders. Haney stated that 
Arechandieta was “reportedly carrying plans for the coordination of sabotage 
for all oil pipelines in Latin America.”46 A week later, Haney provided Shaw 
with a detailed, seven-page memo on Arechandieta’s activities while in Ecua-
dor. The document closed with an editorial comment that Ecuadorian security 
agents had botched their surveillance of Arechandieta, and despite their eorts 
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the labor leader had managed to establish contact with local communists and 
successfully completed his mission.47
A certain amount of duplication was involved in communicating this infor-
mation to Washington. Shaw dutifully forwarded Haney’s rst memo on Are-
chandieta to the State Department, identifying the source only as “a reliable 
informant, which is graded B-3,” a pattern that became standard practice.48
Rather than forwarding the second report, Shaw indicated that it would reach 
the department “through other channels,” presumably directly from the CIG in 
Washington. Without naming Haney, Shaw indicated that the CIG ocer had 
done his work well, with a careful observation of the movement and actions of 
the international labor leader.49
The next memo concerned communist aliations of student representatives 
to a forthcoming congress in neighboring Lima, Peru. In this case, Shaw hand-
wrote a note on the memo to “le” it rather than report it to the State Depart-
ment.50 The embassy may have grown weary of the ood of information from an 
overeager operative. Conceivably, the return of Ambassador John Simmons to 
his post resulted in more judicious communications with Washington. Or, per-
haps, the embassy sta simply determined that this specic bit of information 
was not of sucient value to communicate to Washington. Another possibility 
is that in reality the extant documentation may just be skimming the surface 
of the depth of collaboration between the newly formed CIA and diplomatic 
personnel in the embassy. Other memos detailing the sharing of information 
may have been lost, destroyed, or not yet released to the public. Ultimately, the 
precise provenance of specic pieces of information are of secondary concern if 
the interest is to uncover the history of the le.
The handful of surviving memos from Haney are either signed personally by 
him or appear anonymously from a “controlled American source,” the euphe-
mism for the CIA station. Initially embassy ocials stated that the information, 
which they quoted verbatim in their dispatches to the State Department, came 
from “a reliable source,” while later missives simply indicated that it came from 
a “controlled American source.” Oen the same information also appears in in-
formation reports that an ocer sent to CIA Headquarters, though in an edited 
format and sometimes with a similar or identical subject line. Haney, as well as 
other CIA ocers, likely provided the same information in dierent formats 
according to the needs and desires of a specic audience.
A curiosity is that the CIA information reports carry a distribution date about 
a month aer the events they describe—and a month aer embassy personnel 
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communicated the same information to the State Department. Reading the ar-
chival documentation as it appears to have been received in Washington would 
seem to indicate that the State Department was constantly scooping the CIA 
on information from its own personnel, which given the nature of inter-agency 
disputes would hardly seem likely. Embassy dispatches and CIA intelligence 
reports that communicated similar if not redundant information to their respec-
tive agencies in Washington could alternatively point to a sharing of informa-
tion, a reliance on the same informers, or even a certain amount of competition 
to be the premier source of intelligence. More likely, the variance may just re-
ect a dierence between sending and reception dates that could merely denote 
the length of time it took for a diplomatic pouch to arrive in Washington. The 
released versions of the CIA reports typically have the date of information re-
dacted as well as the rst paragraph of the report, which presumably would shed 
light on the delay.51 The redundancies between dierent government agencies, 
including repetition in the submission of data to Washington reects, as Jones 
complained, a push for more, though not necessarily better, information.
The documentation the CIA le behind on its investigations of subver-
sive movements in Ecuador reects exaggerated fears, misplaced concerns, and 
bureaucratic attempts to justify the agency’s existence. While the surveillance 
inadvertently provides a rich source of documentation on domestic aairs in 
Latin America, CIA ocers interpreted those developments through a cold war 
lens that colored their understanding of the events they observed. This distor-
tion emerges particularly apparent in the constant attacks that Galo Plaza Lasso 
faced on his administration. Rather than recognizing the communists’ com-
mitment to a peaceful transformation of society, a prevalent assumption among 
United States policy makers was of the presence of an international conspiracy 
that sought to sow chaos across the region. What their narrative ignored was 
that the communist party was opposed to involvement in military coups and 
instead advocated working within the connes of the established political sys-
tem to achieve political change. Despite these shortcomings, the agency’s written 
record provides a rich archival source for understanding communist organizing 
eorts. Although partial and oen problematic, it allows insights into how po-
litical activists shaped their struggles and advanced their concerns. The types 
of issues they confronted transcend time and space, and permit a better under-
standing of the world they inhabited.
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A disconnect often appears between the CIA’s reporting on internal political developments and local realities, and nowhere does this emerge more plainly than in the United States fears that com-
munists would disrupt the smooth functioning of society. Despite the PCE’s 
orthodox adherence to a peaceful transition to socialism, the CIA constantly 
sought to implicate the party in extraconstitutional challenges to power. This 
contradiction is particularly evident in its treatment of repeated coup attempts 
against Galo Plaza Lasso’s government as well as the destruction that came in 
the wake of “The War of the Worlds” radio broadcast. Even though communists 
were not involved in either, agency ocials tried hard to tie them to the unrest. 
In such cases, CIA reports say more about Washington’s policy objectives than 
they do about local realities. Nevertheless, a careful parsing of the surveillance 
data lends insights into the communist party’s electoral strategies and other 
mechanisms they used to advance their political agendas.
Galo Plaza Lasso
Leists have long debated what position to take in electoral contests, and the 
1948 presidential campaign in Ecuador was no exception. Aer intense discus-
sions and negotiations, a coalition of liberals, socialists, and other leists nom-
inated the populist and former dictator General Alberto Enríquez Gallo for 
the presidency. Enríquez Gallo’s candidacy led to contentious arguments within 
the communist party over whether or not to ally with liberals in support of a 
moderately progressive politician. From their perspective, an Enríquez Gallo 
presidency would denitely be preferable to the alternatives: the independent 
Plaza who was the candidate of a reactionary bourgeoisie and would deliver 
the country to the Yankees, or the conservative Manuel Elicio Flor Torres who 
threatened to return Ecuador to the oppression of its feudal past. The commu-
nists criticized Flor for his “defense of the interests of large landholders who 
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oppress the Indians.” The PCE presented an alternative platform that included 
agrarian reform and the development of cooperatives to “protect Indians and 
peasants” and abolish “exploitative feudal vestiges.” They called on “workers, 
peasants, Indians, servants, teachers, artisans, etc., to defend their conquests, the 
Labor Code and social laws, to not permit their destruction.”1 To this end, the 
communists urged the importance of organizing a broad, progressive coalition 
that would block the election of conservative, pro-imperialist, and feudal candi-
dates. The socialist and liberal parties, however, excluded the communists from 
their coalition, which led to no small amount of consternation among party 
members. In the end, the party urged their members to cast blank ballots in 
the presidential election. Enríquez Gallo proved to be a relatively colorless and 
weak candidate, and Plaza narrowly defeated Flor, although he crushed Enríquez 
Gallo by a wide margin.2
Communists approached Plaza’s election with a good deal of wariness. A CIA 
ocer (presumably Albert Haney) reported that coastal party leader Enrique 
Gil Gilbert had stated that the PCE “would probably be forced to operate clan-
destinely aer Galo Plaza assumed oce.” Gil Gilbert informed cell leaders that 
the party had developed a plan for “the exact dates, times, and places of future se-
cret Communist meetings in Guayaquil” in case the party were to be outlawed.3
Shortly aer Plaza took power, Haney reported that the communists welcomed 
his opposition because they thought that outlawing their party would backre 
and make the PCE more popular, even though little evidence exists that this 
idea would work out so well in practice. Nevertheless, some leaders pondered 
whether the party could work more eciently if it were forced underground. 
This included acting “in ways which are presently denied to it”—apparently a 
vague reference to members who advocated more militant action that eventually 
led to a le-wing breakaway in the 1960s. Some members proposed distributing 
handbills that would provoke the government into action. While Gustavo Bec-
erra was preparing a handbill in his bookstore that called for a leist coalition to 
oppose Plaza, the police arrived and seized the entire lot. Party leaders were in-
censed and at rst planned to respond with a public statement, but then thought 
better of it. Becerra, who was head of the party’s intelligence activities, investi-
gated how police knew about the handbills and who ordered them to conscate 
their propaganda.4 Unfortunately, the available documentation does not indi-
cate the outcome of his inquiry, though of course it is notable that the CIA had 
access to this information. It may be an indication of an inltrator in the party 
or collaboration between United States and local government ocials. At least 
dating to the FBI in the 1940s, the United States had signicant police training 
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missions that facilitated the sharing of information, although covert activities 
that involved direct intervention in the internal aairs of another country did 
not escalate until the Eisenhower administration.5
Aer barely a month in oce, the CIA reported that opposition to Plaza’s 
government had increased appreciably. This opposition ranged from the extreme 
right to the extreme le, but these contestations for power came from competing 
elements of the political class rather than leist militants who sought a fun-
damental structural transformation of society. Although various military and 
civilian conspiracies repeatedly threatened the president, the inability of these 
opponents to unify their forces assured his continuance in oce. Even so, a po-
litical context in which it appeared that Plaza would not be able to hang on for 
the full four years of his term provided ready gist for such a narrative.6
“The Communists are reported to have decided to take advantage of Plaza’s 
statement that he would not declare the Party illegal,” an ocer related. “They 
are accordingly endeavoring to organize all political opposition to Plaza into a 
solid coalition, and to organize a series of paralyzing labor strikes.” The commu-
nists were engaged in “strenuous eorts” to form a coalition with other socialist 
and leist parties, and took steps to plant discontent toward the government 
in these other groups. To this end, they held numerous meetings with other 
parties. “The Communists have also stated boldly that the Plaza administration 
could not be expected to remain in oce for more than six months,” the ocer 
asserted.7 Misstatements of fact in this unusually lengthy and detailed informa-
tion report could call any and all of these hyperbolic assertions into question, 
although given that it was a quarter century since any elected president had suc-
cessfully completed a four-year term in oce it would have been a fair assump-
tion that Plaza would not be able to nish his either.
Press reports, both in the United States and in Ecuador, were full of news of 
repeated coup attempts throughout Plaza’s presidency. Intelligence operatives 
were continually on the lookout for communist involvement in these challenges, 
even though thoughtful reection should have revealed that such actions were 
not consistent with the party’s current political line. Instead, communist lead-
ers advocated for achieving change through peaceful and parliamentary means. 
Nevertheless, in November 1948 the US military attaché in Quito reported that 
Plaza was “thoroughly aware” of potential coup threats, and was “doing every-
thing possible to oset any revolutionary action or attempt of violence.” While 
it would be possible to avoid a successful coup, doing so “seems very dicult.” 
According to the attaché, complicating the president’s task was both a strong, 
presumably conservative, pro-Argentine element in the country and “a small 
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well-knit Communist Party” that “assisted and encouraged” the unrest.8 Such 
statements conated reactionary anti-United States sentiments in Argentina 
with the communists’ much more ideologically driven anti-imperialist positions. 
The exaggeration of anticommunist fear mongering should have been obvious, 
especially since ten days later the same attaché opined that while a military coup 
was likely, the result would not necessarily be “a Leist regime” since the best 
organized opposition came from other quarters.9 Even so, the next report a week 
later claimed communists were “actively attempting [to] organize opposition 
groups into [a] revolutionary movement.”10 Despite their best attempts, United 
States ocials were never able to prove communist complicity in repeated coup 
attempts against Plaza’s government, even as it should have been readily apparent 
that those endeavors typically came from the right rather than the le.
To further its ideological agenda, the CIA maintained its surveillance of the 
communists whom they considered to be an “active and a potential source of 
trouble in an emergency.” Even though the communists were not an eective 
threat to the stability of Plaza’s government, they were “taking advantage of the 
present economic crisis by agitation among the workers and by actively partic-
ipating in strikes.” The biggest threat came from their presence in organized 
labor rather than as an illegal and subversive force. Nevertheless, the Plaza gov-
ernment was adroitly coping with the situation, and at present it was “under 
control.” The communists appeared to be harassing the government with the 
goal of discrediting it, but stopping short of precipitating its overthrow for fear 
that such an action would bring the conservatives to power. In fact, a common 
apprehension that Plaza’s fall would only benet a political opponent halted 
much of the opposition to his government. Similarly, rival factions in the mil-
itary balanced one another out, even though opportunistic elements could act 
in an unpredictable fashion. In this environment, the communist party sought 
to increase “its organizational activity in order to revitalize and strengthen its 
position with labor and with members of the armed forces.”11 CIA analysts were 
at least partially right in that regard.
CIA case ocers willingly stretched the available evidence to implicate 
communists in these potential military coups, even when they were obviously 
of rightist rather than leist inspiration. In one example, an ocer reported 
“Guayaquil Communists are planning to cut communications with Quito in 
the event of trouble,” as if including this comment would sully the communists’ 
name.12 One particularly long memo attempted to clarify the “confusion as to 
the true identity of the organization behind the leist, subversive troop move-
ment” through a review of previous coup threats. Despite his best attempts to lay 
Coups 43 
blame at the feet of the communists, the CIA ocer (presumably Haney) had 
to concede no evidence existed of communist inspiration or control of the coup 
attempts despite the government’s tendency to label all movements as such.13
Communist steadfast opposition to coup plotting did not mean that other 
sectors did not try to garner their support. In at least one case, Colonel César Al-
faro, deputy chief of the armed forces, and the populist Carlos Guevara Moreno 
sought out communist support for their coup attempts. Rather than pledging 
support, the communists agreed “to promote a campaign of national unrest.” 
Comments that Pedro Saad had made at an open meeting, however, contradicted 
that information. “Despite the grave errors made by the Plaza administration,” 
a CIA report summarized him as stating, “the Communists would continue 
to support Plaza for the time being rather than give aid to a military-arranged 
coup.” The report followed this with an editorial comment: “This statement 
may have been made for Plaza’s consumption.”14 Further straining the credulity 
of an alliance between Guevara Moreno and the communists was what the CIA 
itself reported several weeks later—that Guevara Moreno had claimed that if he 
seized power he would immediately ban the PCE. Even if his statement was an 
opportunist gesture to gain the support of the United States government (which 
it probably was), it also won him the backing of the falangist group ARNE.15
The communists had little to gain from such shenanigans.
A CIA ocer also attempted to implicate the communists in “revolution-
ary actions” that the VRSE leaders General Luis Larrea Alba and Dr. Eduardo 
Ludeña were coordinating between Quito and Guayaquil. The VRSE’s history 
and military roots made it more likely that its members would engage in a mili-
tary coup than those of the PCE, but distinctions between various leist groups 
oen escaped the agency. What their “intelligence” mostly reected was a lack 
of understanding of deep divisions on the le. This report describes the VRSE 
as “a radical socialist party closely aliated with the Communist Party,” and 
Ludeña was “generally regarded as a Communist” who “handles VRSE matters 
of a clandestine nature.”16 In an eagerness to blame all troubles on the commu-
nists, the report collapses the entire le together into an undistinguishable and 
homogeneous whole, and exaggerates the close connections between the two 
leist parties. Several weeks later, a case ocer once again reported that Lar-
rea Alba and Ludeña were preparing to lead an army revolt. According to the 
informer, the situation was serious.17 Several days later, this same information 
appeared in a weekly summary published at CIA Headquarters in Washington. 
Given the general dissatisfaction with the Plaza administration, the CIA ana-
lyst ranked the threat to the stability of his government as serious.18 The agency 
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suered from a feedback loop in which listening to its own rhetoric reinforced 
its anticommunist assumptions.
The socialists were also more likely to support a coup attempt than were the 
communists, something that emerges numerous times in CIA reports. Accord-
ing to a case ocer, the communist preference for the status quo “irritates the 
Socialists who claim that the Communists are holding back from a leist de-
mand for revolution by the people and accordingly are obstructing their chances 
of ultimate success.” At one point the socialists turned to their 1948 presidential 
candidate Enríquez Gallo to see whether he would lead a “revolution.”19 Linger-
ing distrust between the general and the communists meant that the latter were 
less than excited about supporting the general. As long as the Plaza government 
did not persecute the communists, they were content to leave things alone. Even 
so, the CIA maintained a paranoid and seemingly irrational fear of the PCE.
Communist leaders publicly and repeatedly reiterated their moderate posi-
tion. For example, the FEUE invited Saad to give a talk to a packed auditorium 
at the Central University in Quito in commemoration of the third anniversary 
of José María Velasco Ibarra’s March 30, 1946, self-coup that represented a de-
nite blow for the le. In his opening comments, FEUE president Juan Manosal-
vas noted that both the socialists and communists were in favor of peace and 
opposed imperialist forces that were attempting to provoke a new world war. In 
his speech “The Process of Democracy in Ecuador,” Saad declared that Marxists 
were against an immediate alteration in the constitutional order because of the 
danger of a right-wing military junta taking power as had happened recently in 
Venezuela and Peru. Rather, at present, he saw the Plaza government as the lesser 
of two evils. He counseled patience and predicted that soon Ecuador would 
achieve a proletarian democracy through a democratic-bourgeois revolution. In 
the meantime, he advocated for a revision of the conservative 1946 Constitu-
tion in order to conscate foreign oil companies, break up large landholdings, 
provide women with equal rights, and introduce universal surage.20 A week 
aer the speech, the embassy’s rst secretary Maurice Bernbaum forwarded the 
CIA’s summary of the speech that was largely extracted from media accounts 
to the State Department. Bernbaum added his own editorial comment on the 
PCE’s hesitancy to advocate for the overthrow of Plaza’s government due to a 
fear that the party might lose its “liberal privileges” under an inevitable resulting 
right-wing military dictatorship. Both Bernbaum and Haney noted the leist 
criticism that Saad faced for his cautious position, from radical communist party 
members as well as the socialists who were much more vocal in their condemna-
tion of the Plaza government.21
Coups 45 
Military ocials and perennial coup plotters César Alfaro and Carlos Man-
cheno, the military ocer who removed Velasco Ibarra from oce in August 
1947, were more deeply involved in these plots than the communists ever were, 
but those facts did not conveniently t an anticommunist narrative. This was 
the case even though the CIA and other US government agencies had access 
to ample information that implicated military ocials in subversive maneuver-
ing.22 In one case, a CIA ocer claimed that the communists had followed a 
threatened coup attempt in January 1949 “with great interest” and aerward 
“received a full report” on the events. According to this report, the commu-
nists “frequently invoke the name of Colonel Carlos Mancheno” even though 
their conspiratorial eorts were not related.23 In March 1949 as part of an eort 
to score a political comeback, Mancheno managed to negotiate his election as 
president of the local liberal party council in Quito. His appointment triggered 
a strong opposition from some other liberal party members who feared that he 
was attempting a return to power.24 CIA analysts concluded that he represented 
the radical wing of the liberal party. That wing did not have substantial strength, 
but his election was noteworthy because of his links with subversive activity in 
the military.25
On July 26, 1949, Mancheno launched yet another failed coup attempt 
against the Plaza administration. That action led Plaza to quip, “I am witness-
ing a demonstration of the national sport.”26 CIA analysts described this attack 
as a “asco” that indicated to both Mancheno’s friends and enemies “that the 
armed forces were by no means inevitable collaborators in any revolutionary 
movement.” Military leaders quickly repudiated Mancheno’s action and pledged 
loyalty to the president, while those liberals and socialists who had supported 
the putsch “were quickly and unequivocally disowned by their parties.” Signi-
cantly, now the CIA observed that the communists had “been notably inactive 
and extremely careful to avoid giving any appearance of participation” in Man-
cheno’s repeated coup attempts. According to the CIA’s analysis, their absence 
was motivated by an understanding that the coup had little hope of success, and 
that those who led the uprising were not sympathetic to the communist party 
or its goals. The outcome of the coup would not have likely been in their favor.27
Notably, rather than instigating the coup attempt, it was the liberals who ap-
proached the communists and asked for their support with the latter responding 
in a noncommittal fashion rather than the communists leading the charge.28
On the eve of the coup, according to “information from a controlled Amer-
ican source,” the party was in the process of reassessing its policy toward the 
current government. Since the communists were “making such progress under 
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the favorable atmosphere of the Plaza Government,” they had decided to adopt 
“a policy of non-opposition.” According to the CIA ocer, the PCE was afraid 
of the potential ramications of either a military coup or the assumption of a 
conservative government to power, and therefore had opted to work peacefully 
and wait for “der tag,” a more conducive time to press their agenda. At the same 
time, the CIA’s source cautioned of plans for a strike in the Ancon oil elds “to 
promote new disturbances” since with the resolution of other strikes “the labor 
horizon apparently appeared too calm.”29 Even so, Haney was determined to 
present the PCE’s policy of nonopposition to Plaza as opportunistic rather than 
principled in nature. According to his memo, communist leaders had taken this 
position only aer they received assurance from the Plaza administration that 
the government would not seek to circumscribe the party’s political freedoms 
as long as they refrained from engaging in revolutionary action. While the PCE 
was critical of Plaza’s pro-United States policies, they avoided involvement in 
coup plotting “primarily because they did not wish to have the PCE outlawed by 
the government in retaliation.”30 Haney made no mention or acknowledgement 
that perhaps this political position emerged out of an ideological assumption 
that Ecuador did not meet the basic objective conditions necessary for a revo-
lutionary transformation of society. Interpreting the decision in transactional 
terms highlights how his anticommunism hindered his ability to understand 
communist motivations.
But that was not the end of the story. Based on information from sources in 
both Quito and Guayaquil, Haney claimed that party leaders had decided on a 
change in policy toward the Plaza government. Allegedly at a July 14, 1949, meet-
ing at Saad’s house in Guayaquil, Alfredo Vera and Ana Moreno had agreed to 
join in eorts to “guide the Party’s political eorts to the overthrow of the Plaza 
administration.” Reportedly the communists would join socialists and liberals 
in their conspiracy, and were attempting to collaborate with leist army ocials 
such as Larrea Alba, Enríquez Gallo, and a Colonel Quintana. The hope was 
that these ocials “would create a military government that would be friendly 
to the Communist Party.” In return for their support, the communists were to 
receive a share of cabinet posts in the new coalition government, specically 
the ministries of education and economy. The alleged targeting of those two 
ministries was to reduce the United States inuence in the country and provide 
jobs to party members that would strengthen the party’s nancial situation and 
enable stronger support for worker strikes. According to these informers, liberals 
were more interested in the collaboration of the communists than were the so-
cialists, but both recognized that the communists were the only group that was 
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suciently disciplined and organized to carry through on a revolutionary con-
spiracy. The plan was to have the communists organize a series of labor strikes 
during the installation of congress on August 10 that would target United States 
companies. The goal was that the strikes would so disrupt the country and its 
economy that it would force leist military ocials to step in and restore order. 
Saad had abandoned all other party activities to dedicate himself to organizing 
this opposition to the government.31
Other, competing narratives emerged out of the CIA’s reporting on these 
coup attempts. According to another memo, communist leaders were gathered 
in Quito on the eve of the revolt to plan their upcoming congress in Guayaquil. 
Unlike the liberals and socialists, they “had no knowledge of the revolution.”32
Aer its collapse, according to Haney, the coastal regional committee of the 
PCE declared that although the party was in favor of “a revolution which would 
bring a true Liberal into power, the Party could not support an oligarchic gov-
ernment such as Mancheno, allied with Arroyo del Río and Carlos Guevara 
Morena [sic].” Mancheno’s coup attempt demonstrated the level of popular 
discontent with the Plaza government due to the interventions of “the Yankee 
imperialists, the Church and the rich factory and hacienda owners.” The memo 
continued, “When the time was ripe, the PCE would advise its members when 
to strike against these forces.” The statement closed with a list of party goals, 
and a declaration that the only path to a genuine revolution would “be one in 
which the true leaders of the masses would be brought into power and the pueblo 
liberated from their imperialistic masters.”33
Bernbaum faithfully forwarded this information from Haney to the State 
Department, but added his own caveats and qualifying comments. He rightfully 
observed, as he had noted in previous correspondence, that the PCE had little to 
gain from engaging in coup plotting. In fact, earlier in July liberal leaders whom 
the CIA now accused of cavorting with the communists in conspiring against 
Plaza had been arrested—much to the consternation and condemnation both 
of the party and the general public—in an alleged plot against the government, 
but there were no whispers of communist involvement in that activity.34 To un-
derscore this point, Bernbaum noted that the communists had no knowledge 
or involvement with Mancheno’s July 26 attempt. What Bernbaum should have 
recognized, and perhaps did, was that the conspiracy that the CIA ocer laid 
out was most unlikely, both in terms of the people involved and how it did not 
match with the party’s current line. Vera, for example, came from a conservative 
wing of the party that made it improbable that he would engage in such insur-
rectionary tactics. Moreno was one of the party’s most militant members and 
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constantly tangled with Saad, and was therefore unlikely to collaborate with 
him in as sensitive of an operation as this would be. Bernbaum seemingly ac-
knowledged the problematic content of this “intelligence” with his equivocal 
concluding comment that perhaps the nature of such an alliance would emerge 
during the forthcoming session of congress.35 A week later, the embassy once 
again cited what it considered to be reliable reports of communist intentions to 
instigate strikes that would correspond with the opening session of the federal 
congress on August 10.36 Rather than crediting the PCE with pursuing a serious 
political agenda, United States ocials had trouble seeing beyond an alleged 
desire to disrupt the smooth functioning of society.
Of all the dierent forces at play, the communists acted in the most ratio-
nal and least opportunistic fashion. In retrospect, their abstinence from coup 
plotting played to their benet because, as a CIA analyst in Washington re-
marked, “no one, in or out of the government, has tried to make a whipping-boy 
of the Communists.” This observation contributed to the CIA’s conclusion that 
“Nothing in the current Ecuadoran situation is causing or immediately por-
tends noticeable change in status of US security interests in the area.”37 Had 
the communists lent their support to the coup, inevitably the CIA would have 
used it as a justication to ramp up their anticommunist rhetoric. Ambassador 
John Simmons expressed a dissenting view to that which the intelligence agency 
advanced. From his perspective, Plaza faced more of a threat from a military 
coup or a right-wing opponent like Guevara Moreno than from the commu-
nists.38 Blinded by their own anticommunist assumptions, the CIA continually 
exaggerated the threat that the PCE actually presented to the country’s political 
stability.
Aer a year in oce, Plaza passed a milestone by surviving two more coup 
plots. Near Loja, in southern Ecuador, authorities arrested Quito city council 
member and FEUE president Bolívar Gálvez and liberal leader Julio Moreno for 
alleged involvement, but again the coup attempt was not of communist inspi-
ration.39 Plaza credited the army with suppressing these attacks on his admin-
istration. The Hispanic World Report, a monthly summary of news from the 
Hispanic American Studies program at Stanford University, thought that ironic 
since the military typically took the lead in such attempts.40 On November 4, 
1949, assailants damaged a bridge in Cuenca with a bomb blast just aer Plaza 
had crossed it. Some again accused the communists of being the author of the 
attack, but no evidence emerged of their involvement.41 It seemed as if these 
attacks would never cease. None of these putsches had managed to advance a 
leist agenda.
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A careful study reveals a mixed record on the ability of various United States 
agencies and individuals to understand repeated coup plotting in Ecuador. 
Haney’s strong anticommunist sentiments in particular colored his ability to 
present an objective and accurate assessment of communist attitudes. His track 
record helps explain a marked disconnect between State Department reports 
that featured a more measured analysis and those of CIA ocers who tended 
toward exaggerated and conspiratorial statements. A result is that United States 
diplomats articulated somewhat more accurate understandings of the commu-
nist party’s tactical positions than did CIA ocers and analysts, even when the 
embassy sta relied on CIA investigations as their source of information.
War of the Worlds
It was in the midst of this coup plotting and challenges to Plaza’s hold on power 
that Radio Quito broadcast its version of the “The War of the Worlds.” The 
CIA engaged in a deep investigation of the incident, desperate to determine 
whether a communist conspiracy underlay the events. In retrospect, it is not odd 
that the agency would do so. Several years later, Welles’s original transmission of 
“The War of the Worlds” provided a model for a “panic broadcast” designed to 
undermine Jacobo Arbenz’s progressive government in Guatemala.42 In Ecua-
dor, the socialist lawyer Juan Isaac Lovato provided a legal defense for those who 
had staged the play, which in the minds of some further implicated the le in 
the violence. In the end, and with a good deal of stereotyping and racist disdain, 
analysts at CIA Headquarters in Washington looked to the event as “another 
dramatic incident showing the emotional instability of Latin American crowds 
and their potential for violent reaction to chance events.”43 At a dierent time 
and in another place, analysts would have immediately recognized the events for 
what they were—an innocent prank gone terribly awry.
Looking for scapegoats, the police detained Radio Quito’s dramatic director 
Eduardo Alcarás and art director Leonardo Páez who had staged the broadcast. 
The station owners refused to take responsibility for the chaos, claiming that 
Alcarás and Páez had prepared the broadcast without their knowledge.44 A CIA 
ocer discovered that Alcarás had signed a monthlong contract with Paéz and 
Carlos Mantilla Ortega, the general manager of the radio station and director of 
El Comercio, to produce two radio dramas, including “The War of the Worlds.” 
Despite claims of innocence, Mantilla had been complicit in a series of planted 
stories leading up to the broadcast, including one sensationalist report the day 
of the broadcast that alleged unidentied ying object (UFO) sightings around 
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Quito.45 Alcarás brought the script from Chile where he had previously been in-
volved in its production, and local performers rehearsed the script in the studio. 
According to a CIA report, the radio production itself only lasted for een 
minutes, from 9:15 p.m. when it broke into a regularly scheduled music program 
to 9:30 when Alcarás announced that it had been a dramatization and was not 
true. Apparently in that short amount of time news spread quickly across Quito 
leading to panic and destruction. Within half an hour people had broken into 
the El Comercio building and began to destroy it and its contents. According to 
the CIA, the police had not headed out to Cotocollao as the press had reported 
but instead had retreated to their police stations where lacking proper leadership 
they were “utterly confused and disorganized.” Fearing a coup attempt, minister 
of defense Manuel Díaz Granados mobilized military troops who descended 
on the station with their tanks and dispersed the crowd. With the army having 
cleared the way, the reghters were nally able to approach the building and 
put out the ames.46
Despite this narrative, the CIA was not content to let the communists o so 
easily. In an attempt to connect the communists with the unrest, an ocer noted 
that El Comercio and Radio Quito supported president Plaza whereas the le 
opposed him. In fact, the ocer claimed, the communist party had “prohibited 
all Party members from reading the El Comercio, charging it with being a cap-
italistic, anti-Communist newspaper.” Furthermore, allegedly leist university 
students cut re hoses, broke re hydrants, and otherwise interfered with the ef-
forts of the reghters to put out the re. Meanwhile, the paper’s owners Carlos 
and Jorge Mantilla Ortega met with the president and emphatically denied that 
they knew anything about the broadcast, and declared that the re was the work 
of the communists and must have been premeditated in order to cause so much 
damage. Furthermore, they asserted that they had not been aware that they had 
been harboring communist agitators in the radio station. Defense Minister Díaz 
Granados concurred that communists had planned the entire event.47
Almost a year earlier, on April 9, 1948, the assassination of the popular liberal 
leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in neighboring Colombia 
led to massive protests known colloquially as the Bogotazo. At the time, both 
the mainstream media and the newly formed CIA looked to the communists as 
a convenient scapegoat. It did not matter that the communist party, neither in 
Colombia nor in Ecuador, had anything to gain from engaging in such illegal 
activities. Now, a year later, events appeared to be repeating themselves with 
some pointing to the communists as attempting to turn Quito into a “second 
Bogotá.” Particularly in Guayaquil, a series of arson attempts fueled speculation 
Coups 51 
that political agitators were seeking a repeat of those events.48 This perceived 
threat and fear became a common theme in both embassy and CIA reports. 
“The actual strength of the communists,” an informer told vice consul Walter 
Houk, “was a dicult thing to gauge.” From Houk’s perspective, the commu-
nists “did not have much of a political organization, but that they had agitators 
who would be ready to take advantage of any unrest or upheaval, and might 
produce great damage with the volatile populace in their spell, similar to the 
Bogotá riots of last year.”49 The CIA freely quoted sources that reinforced this 
narrative. For example, the Mexican youth leader Manuel Popoca Estrada was 
in Ecuador at the time and allegedly joined student activists in the storming of 
the radio station. According to the agency, “Popoca wrote a letter to a prominent 
Communist leader in Guayaquil, stating that the local Communists had noth-
ing to do with the radio broadcast but in his opinion the entire incident was a 
good thing as it showed the people how much power they had once they were 
organized into a mob.”50
Despite these conspiracy theories, the CIA “ascertained from reliable sources 
that the Communist Party Headquarters knew nothing whatever in advance 
of the broadcast and were as frightened by it as were the majority of the people 
of Quito.” For several days, party leaders remained “very apprehensive over the 
public charges and rumors that they were responsible for the broadcast and re.” 
The party debated publishing a handbill proclaiming their innocence and de-
nouncing the authorities for their failure to prevent the broadcast and resulting 
death and destruction. In the end, they decided that it would not be politically 
expedient to do so.
While the responsible (and some would say conservative) party leaders sought 
to distance themselves from the disturbances, the CIA emphasized that “as indi-
viduals, certain members participated in both phases of the incident.” Further-
more, the CIA was adamant that when news of the chaos reached Guayaquil 
some members there “were elated over the incident and were only awaiting an 
opportunity to take similar action.” According to this narrative, Ecuador was 
on the verge of a social explosion and the communists should take advantage of 
the situation. Fostering this paranoia were media reports of attempts to start 
res in Guayaquil that because of its wooden construction could be consumed 
in a conagration. The CIA, of course, linked those anonymous arson attacks 
to communist conspiracies.51
“In a very condential conversation,” party leader Saad blamed the riot and 
destruction on Ecuador’s distressed state of aairs. He feared that the commu-
nists, as well as other leist parties, were losing control. He acknowledged that 
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some in Guayaquil wanted to burn and sack the city in a repeat of what had 
happened at Bogotá a year earlier, and that the party was attempting to avoid 
such actions. A problem, as could be observed in Bogotá, was that when a crowd 
lacked a proper political orientation it would go its own way. The party sought 
to “guide the people but economic misery is driving them now to wild ideas.” 
Saad confessed that he hoped that “the worst can be avoided although the danger 
is great.”52 His statements are not reective of a party that advocated for violent 
and extraconstitutional changes in power.
Most of those the police had arrested in connection with either having partic-
ipated in the broadcast or the assault on the radio station were not communists 
and had no record of involvement in political activities. The exceptions were 
Gustavo Ramírez Gutiérrez, a Nicaraguan communist who was deported from 
the country; the French communist Raymond Mériguet who claimed he was 
not in Quito at the time; and a communist university student named Romo 
Leroux (presumably Ketty Romo-Leroux). The CIA contended that Raúl Mo-
lestina, the pianist for Radio Quito and one of those who died in the re, “was 
an ardent Communist and the leader of the Communist Party Cell ‘San Blas’ 
in Quito.” The ocer also identied violinist Corsino Durán Carrión, another 
employee of the station, as a communist, and possibly Luis Cevallos as well.53
None of these people played visible roles in the annals of the party’s history. 
Nevertheless, if indeed the communists were behind the violence, they suered 
from it as much as anyone.
Throughout all of these coup threats and other political disturbances, 
what US government ocials did not generally recognize, or did not want to 
admit, was the communist party’s opposition to extraconstitutional alterations 
in power. As the labor historian Jon Kofas testies, “the Ecuadorean Communist 
party was not revolutionary and presented no threat to the oligarchic-dominated 
institutions. Not only were the communist party’s links to Moscow insigni-
cant, but the party preached reformism and European-style social welfare pro-
grams within the parliamentary system.”54 No evidence exists that the PCE 
seriously pursued plans for sabotage, which raises questions as to the validity of 
the CIA’s intelligence.
Decades later, the agency nally seemed to recognize that reality. “The 
country has no signicant subversion or terrorism problem that immediately 
threatens its neighbors,” its 1970 handbook on the region stated.55 “The PCE 
has never attempted guerrilla warfare or terrorism as a means to overthrow the 
government,” an analyst wrote three years later in a national security estimate. 
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“It has publicly denounced such tactics and indicated its support for the vía pací-
ca or nonviolent approach to revolution.”56 This conservative tendency within 
pro-Soviet parties was, of course, what led Fidel Castro to break from the com-
munist party in Cuba. Similar tensions also tore at communist unity in Ecuador. 
In the meantime, the CIA sought to undermine the legitimacy of the PCE by 
forwarding a narrative that rather than responding to domestic conditions it 
relied on foreign support to advance its radical agenda.
54
Ch a pter 4
Moscow Gold
U nited States officials and members of the domestic ruling class have long claimed that outside agitators rather than unequal and exploitative class structures are to blame for political unrest in Latin 
America. Both pointed to foreign support to explain the rise of militant move-
ments. This included a fabled search for “Moscow gold,” even though neither 
was ever able to provide any concrete evidence to prove their charges. These 
investigations were ultimately misguided as they failed to comprehend the 
domestic roots of radical critiques of society. Even so, stereotypes of commu-
nists as stooges of a foreign power persisted and served as an eective tool to 
undermine the le’s eorts to propagate its message.
The Ecuadorian communist party grappled with a variety of problems in ad-
vancing its political agenda, and confronting charges of foreign funding was only 
the beginning. The party faced continual obstacles with the publication of its 
newspaper El Pueblo, including convincing party members to take the distribu-
tion of the paper seriously and to pay for copies that they received. The party also 
encountered diculties in maintaining its bookstores and newsstands where it 
could distribute its propaganda. Despite these challenges, the PCE engaged in 
a variety of other endeavors including promoting the projection of movies from 
the Soviet Union in local theaters. In order to move forward, the party would 
have to overcome many barriers to its success.
Funding Sources
An almost pathological urge to uncover external sources of funding for sub-
versive activities runs throughout United States surveillance of the le. These 
notions persisted for decades, and were even prevalent among what would oth-
erwise be considered a well-informed population. In his book on communism in 
Latin America, Robert Alexander states, “The Communists never have lacked 
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for money.” He claimed that they had 
een to twenty full-time workers in 
Guayaquil in the 1940s, an obviously inated number. He similarly reported 
bloated 
gures for party expenditures on labor congresses and elections.1 Thirty 
years later, the renowned political scientist (and former career Foreign Service of-

cer) Cole Blasier asks how small and impoverished communist parties in Latin 
America could “have continued to function all these years without Soviet help?”2
Rumors of “Moscow gold” would never die.
In line with attempts to undermine legitimate political activism, CIA o-
cers regularly included unsubstantiated or uncon
rmed information on exter-
nal backing in their reports. Further complicating eorts to corroborate these 
details is the agency’s practice of redacting the names of their informers. In one 
case, the CIA reported without comment the opinion of one person who was 
“usually very well informed on Communist activities . . . that at the present time 
Pedro Saad ranks third among the leading Communists in America.” Saad trav-
eled frequently, and intended to “attend an important Communist meeting in 
Montevideo.” Since Saad had returned from a meeting in Warsaw, Ecuador had 
become the center of communist activities in Latin America and instructions for 
other parties emanated out of Guayaquil. The ocer expected Saad to receive 
European visitors with instructions and propaganda on a regular basis, includ-
ing the possibility of “a Russian expert in Communist tactics.” Revealing the 
persistent but never veri
ed gossip of “Moscow gold,” Saad allegedly returned 
from Europe with “a considerable sum of money” to advance the communist 
cause in Ecuador.3 A continual problem with surveillance sources was overeager 
informers or even government ocials who were willing to exaggerate or man-
ufacture information in order to justify their activities (as well as the payments 
they would receive for passing on the information).
On the other hand, and seemingly in contrast to this narrative, CIA ocers 
and other United States ocials reported on the party’s continual struggle to raise 
funds, which included resorting to bene
t dances, raes, and parties.4 A military 
attaché in 1947, for example, painted a dismal picture of the party’s 
nances. The 
attaché noted that funding came from individual dues, voluntary contributions, 
party enterprises, and fundraisers. Those with government jobs were expected to 
make additional contributions. The party did not pay salaries for any of its o-
cers, and its principle expenses were rent for party headquarters, travel expenses, 
meeting costs, publication expenses, and medical and legal assistance for those in 
need. Nevertheless, a large number of members were chronically in arrears with 
their dues, which hurt the party’s 
nances. The report closed with the admission 
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that it had been “some time” since the local party had received funds from Mos-
cow. Party leaders were hopeful that Moscow would provide “direct 
nancial 
support,” but no evidence ever emerged that those wishes were realized.5
As the attaché had observed, according to party statutes the PCE was 
self-
nanced with member dues that were supplemented with donations from 
sympathizers and fundraisers. Members were expected to pay 1 percent of their 
income into the party coers, although those who were unemployed or physi-
cally ill could be temporarily exempted. Those with government positions would 
be charged dues at a higher rate. The payments were to be split evenly between 
the local cell and higher-level party organs.6 But the party faced continual dif-

culties in actually collecting these funds. One CIA report indicated “that the 

nancial condition of the party is critical, and that at every cell meeting leaders 
plead for more contributions.” A report from 1949 indicated that only about 
half the cells had contributed funds in recent months as party statutes dictated.7
Another memo a couple of months later bluntly stated, “The Party is urgently in 
need of funds.” The collection of monthly dues had fallen o sharply, with only 
one-third of the members in Pichincha up to date with their payments.8
Financial considerations appeared at all levels of the party in all parts of the 
country, including at a weekly meeting of the party’s Pedro Saad cell that gath-
ered in Quito at a small cafe operated by a person named Oña. Jorge Arellano 
Gallegos presided over the meeting of about thirty members that lasted for only 
half an hour. The main topic was the need to raise 5,000 sucres (about $285 
USD) to establish a cafe to generate revenue for the cell. The cell would raise the 
money through the sale of one hundred shares at 
y sucres each, and Arellano 
had already sold twenty shares. Arellano closed the short meeting with a request 
that all cell members attend a gathering at the party’s headquarters the following 
day to hear a call for political action.9 While the party faced continual 
nancial 
pressure, militants never lost sight of their larger political objectives.
The issue of fundraising was a common topic not only at local party meetings 
but also at national congresses. At the PCE’s 
h party congress in 1952, the 

nance commission characterized the present status of party 
nances as “di-
sastrous,” primarily because of a failure to collect dues. The party’s principal 
sources of income were interest payments from investments with an agrarian 
cooperative at Tigua and with the Rumiñahui press in Quito. The commission 
presented a short report that pledged to educate party members about their 
-
nancial responsibilities; establish provincial controls for party 
nances; develop 
new sources of income from the sale of publications, social functions, book-
stores, and collection of funds from friends and sympathizers; and initiate a 
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broader fundraising campaign.10 The party’s 
nancial diculties presented fun-
damental and seemingly unsurmountable obstacles to the growth of the party.
The problem of dues collection never went away. A congress of the Guayas 
provincial committee in August 1953 dedicated an entire session to party 
-
nances. Most comrades fell perpetually behind in their dues payments, which 
continued to place the party in 
nancial distress. Only the Joaquín Gallegos 
Lara and Pedro Saad cells emerged from the inquisition with clean records.11
Aer the party’s sixth congress in 1957, the CIA pointed to a chronic lack of 
funds as one of the key factors that contributed to the decline of the party.12
Those factors hardly provided evidence for the presence of Moscow gold.
One of the CIG’s 
rst intelligence reports from 1947 discussed the PCE’s col-
lection of funds for the purchase of a printing press to publish a daily newspaper. 
Militants sold bonds for the project, which essentially represented a donation 
to the party. The ocer alleged that the bonds were “a ‘cover-up’ for the receipt 
of funds from abroad.” But the intelligence report hardly served to support this 
accusation. The party had only collected 25,000 of the necessary 70,000 sucres, 
and so looked to other fundraising strategies such as holding dances and other 
social events. The 
rst dance only netted 1,075 sucres, but still the party hoped to 
raise sucient funds to purchase the press by the end of the year.13 This is not a 
reection of a party ush with funds or with access to generous external revenue 
ows. The CIA inadvertently documented that reality as it repeatedly reported 
on the party’s “severe 
nancial situation.”14
Months later, a CIA ocer reported yet again on the party’s ongoing eorts 
to secure the necessary 
nancing to purchase a printing press that would allow 
it to publish their propaganda. At present the communists had a small, man-
ual press that could only be used for occasional handbills. Allegedly the party 
now had 60,000 sucres at its disposal, though the author of the intelligence re-
port questioned this amount. Either it was exaggerated, he concluded, or it was 
an indication that the party had received money from outside of the country 
because “local contributions and other normal sources would not account for 
it.”15 As always, the ocer did not provide any evidence to support that claim. 
Another CIA report outlined the amount of funds (8,000 sucres) it needed 
for propaganda and organizational work at an upcoming CTE congress and 
noted its inability to raise that amount. Party treasurer María Luisa Gómez 
de la Torre planned to initiate a program of voluntary donations from the gen-
eral public to meet that shortfall.16 Instead of external funding sources, what 
emerges evident in these reports was that the lack of funds compromised the 
party’s ability to act.
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In April 1950, CIA analysts in Washington concluded, “Communist leaders 
have ambitious plans for a general strike, but given the present lack of funds 
and the declining enthusiasm of rank-and-
le party members, such plans have 
little chance of realization without considerable 
nancial support from abroad.” 
Aer a redacted sentence, the report continues, “As yet there is no clear evidence 
that the PCE has received 
nancial help from any other foreign source.”17 CIA 
ocers believed that if it were able to document external sources of funding they 
could challenge the party’s legitimacy, but clear-headed analysts removed from 
the immediate pressure of fabricating evidence were not able to do so.
Even with these limitations, CIA ocers were oen all too willing to en-
tertain rumors of funding ows even when they lacked any documented basis 
in facts. The militantly anticommunist minister of government Eduardo Sala-
zar Gómez, for example, alleged that various agents had brought “large sums 
of money” from Russia into Ecuador, possibly through the Mexican and Uru-
guayan embassies. He surmised that the money was intended to launch a leist 
coup against the government. Albert Haney passed this information on to Am-
bassador John Simmons even though he readily admitted that he lacked con
r-
mation of its veracity.18 United States government ocials repeated these types 
of rumors and suppositions ad nauseam even as they implicitly acknowledged 
the absence of such funds. “Although it has been reported that American dollars 
reach the hands of local Communists,” the public aairs ocer (PAO) Reginald 
Bragonier in the Quito Embassy commented in response to a questionnaire on 
Soviet propaganda, “there is no evidence that such funds are used to support 
any publication other than perhaps El Pueblo, Communist sheet, which has ap-
peared irregularly in the past.” Based on nothing more than what would amount 
to legal hearsay, Bragonier proceeded to note that “it has been reported, but not 
con
rmed, however, that a sum of money was received recently from Moscow 
to establish a publishing plant in Ecuador.”19 Even the most remote rumor of 
foreign funding warranted repeating.
Another alleged plan involved raising funds by blackmailing small merchants 
in Quito and Guayaquil with “riot insurance” to protect their shops.20 Even 
though criminal endeavors were not consistent with the party’s operating pro-
cedures, CIA ocers continued to report on similar types of actions. According 
to one informer, the party collected funds from business owners in Guayaquil to 
subsidize their next electoral campaign. This source declared that the payments 
were in cash rather than check to avoid leaving any record of the transactions.21
These statements could either be ideologically motivated to denounce a party to 
which an informer was opposed, or they may have been designed to curry favor 
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with a US government agency by telling ocials what they thought they might 
want to hear.
A curiosity in a con
dential CIA information report on PCE 
nances is the 
redaction of what would appear to be the name of the treasurer of the central 
committee for the province of Pichincha (see 
gure 4.1). This person reported 
to Gómez de la Torre that payment of monthly dues from party members and 
sympathizers had fallen o sharply. Typically, the CIA only redacts the names 
of its ocers and informers before releasing documents, which raises the possi-
bility that the treasurer was on the CIA payroll. It was standard FBI practice in 
the United States to place its in
ltrators in positions of control over a targeted 
group’s 
nances because of the information and possibilities for disruption it 
could generate. A leist distaste for dealing with money facilitated such activ-
ities, and similar factors may have been at play here. If this were the case, the 
report that “only about one-third of the 400 quota payers have paid up to date 
and many of the remainder are as much as three months in arrears” could be 
evidence of active attempts to embezzle money with a goal of disrupting party 
activities, though of course that information could have come from a local police 
operative rather than a CIA agent. If indeed a party treasurer were either on the 
CIA or police payroll, surely the agency would have been aware that its accusa-
tions of external funding sources were simply not true (or, alternatively, provided 
concrete incriminating evidence of such payments that are notably absent from 
the historical record).22
Echoing these persistent searches for “Moscow gold,” an OIR report sought 
evidence for the source of funding for a massive mobilization of Latin American 
students to the Berlin Youth Festival in August 1951. The report noted that the 
Ecuadorian party “receives a small amount of outside direction and 
nancial 
assistance,” though it failed to provide any speci
c details.23 CIA analysts in 
Washington expressed similar concern with how communists had funded the 
attendance of nine communist and le-wing socialist delegates from Ecuador at 
the festival. According to their intelligence, the Quito and Guayaquil city coun-
cils, the ministry of education, the Casa de la Cultura, and the government’s de-
velopment fund Corporación de Fomento all had contributed funds. The report 
included a comment (author redacted) that the donation from the Guayaquil 
city council was “not surprising since Communists have recently been able to 
obtain inuential positions in Guayaquil municipal aairs.” Quito’s mayor had 
made the contribution “on a cultural basis,” but the CIA analyst found that 
explanation less than convincing “since the Quito city council is predominantly 
Conservative and the Mayor is allied with a violently anti-Communist group,” 
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Figure 4.1. A CIA information report on PCE 
nances with the name of  
the treasurer of the central committee of the province of Pichincha redacted.  
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “PCE Finances,” May 16, 1949,  
CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom 
/document/cia-rdp82-00457r002700520008-1.
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the CFP. Rather, the report concluded that the “Communist-dominated” FEUE 
had misrepresented the nature of donations from the ministry of education and 
the Casa de la Cultura. The conniving students had drawn on the council’s na-
iveté to hide the communist nature of the festival. Finally, while acknowledging 
that “some money was evidently raised locally,” the CIA claimed without pro-
viding any documentary evidence that “little doubt” existed “that the larger part 
of the delegates’ expenses is being 
nanced from abroad.”24 The obvious intent 
was to delegitimize the validity of progressive mobilizations.
These (failed) attempts to document external sources of subversive activity 
continued for decades. In a 1956 State Department report on communism in 
Latin America, an estimation of Soviet control over Latin American communist 
aairs remained more an issue of supposition than one of documented evidence. 
The department maintained that external support was “essential to the main-
tenance of the Communist apparatus in Latin America” even though it lacked 
concrete evidence to prove that point.25 A 1973 CIA national security estimate 
persisted in these allegations, without ever presenting any documentation to 
back up its claims, that “The PCE continues to be dependent on the Soviet 
Union for 
nancial aid.” The agency proceeded to point to “other kinds of aid” 
such as “payment of passage for PCE leaders attending meetings in the East 
European Communist countries and scholarships for students to study in the 
Soviet Union.”26 If this were the extent of “the known Soviet 
nancial support,” 
it is not that dierent from academic associations providing assistance for schol-
ars from the Global South to attend international congresses when they could 
not otherwise aord to do so, or governments and foundations providing schol-
arships to students for university degrees. The gestures could be seen in turn as 
propagandistic, manipulative, altruistic, or simply self-serving in terms of raising 
the level of discourse and debate by bringing diverse perspectives into meetings.
El Pueblo
Complicating the party’s 
nancial situation was the fact that members owed the 
party a signi
cant amount of money for copies of the party newspaper El Pueblo. 
The distribution of El Pueblo was a persistent problem for the party, and one 
that leaders sought to address by urging members to distribute unsold copies.27
The Guayas provincial committee was responsible for about half of this debt. In 
1952, leaders decided to require payment of all of these debts within a month of 
the party’s 
h congress or they would impose sanctions on the laggards. Rather 
than buying on credit, the congress recommended that local parties purchase 
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copies of the paper and retain any pro
ts from their sale. That way the cost 
of the paper and impetus for making eective use of limited party resources 
would be shied from the central committee to local organizations and cells. 
Furthermore, the congress urged members to use the paper as an opportunity to 
engage in political education as that would ensure future sales as more people be-
came interested in the communist message. The newspaper administrator Pedro 
Ortiz Aldas claimed that the newspaper would be forced to suspend publication 
if the problem of payments was not promptly solved.28 Lack of secure funding for 
the party’s newspaper was a persistent problem that never went away.
The historian Hernán Ibarra postulates that oen copies of the paper re-
mained in party oces or private houses, which limited its ability to advance 
a political agenda.29 This theme emerged repeatedly in the paper’s pages. One 
editorial commented on the weekly’s long tradition of struggle and its impor-
tance in pressing working-class demands, but expressed concern that the party 
had not dedicated sucient resources to assure that issues were sold and that the 
money was collected. Financial diculties frequently required that the paper 
suspend publication. The newspaper was critical to the party’s anticonservative 
and antifascist struggles, and party leaders pleaded with their members to work 
to assure its success.30
A preoccupation with 
nances was an ever-present matter in party gatherings. 
The primary topic of discussion at a February 11, 1953, meeting of the PCE’s pro-
paganda committee held at the oce of Alfonso Quijano Cobos in Guayaquil 
concerned this issue of raising funds for El Pueblo. One tactic was to oer free 
subscriptions for various communist publications as a prize to the individual 
and cell who sold the most copies. The committee held a second meeting the fol-
lowing night at the home of Franklin Pérez Castro to schedule future meetings 
for local cells. At that meeting, Pérez Castro distributed bonds to raise funds 
for El Pueblo.31 Similar points appear in a circular that the propaganda com-
mittee distributed later in the year. Party leaders urged cell members to sell the 
paper because otherwise the publication would be forced to close, and members 
needed to take their duty to distribute the party organ seriously. The circular 
also highlighted the need to promote a pamphlet that denounced the granting 
of contracts to pave Guayaquil streets to private contractors.32
Half a year later, CIA ocers continued to report that the paper was “in 
imminent danger of being discontinued for lack of funds.” Its closure “would be 
a very serious setback for the Party.”33 In 1957, the embassy’s public aairs oce 
claimed that “a PCE sympathizer” had bequeathed a house to the party in his 
will that was sold for 300,000 sucres, about $16,000 USD. Paredes had refused 
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to turn the money over to current “leaders for fear that it will be uselessly dissi-
pated.” Instead, he advocated investing the money in real estate and using those 
pro
ts to fund projects. “The Party is badly in need of the money to 
nance 
El Pueblo,” the information ocer Cliord Adams related, “but all eorts to 
convince Paredes of this need have to date been unsuccessful.”34 Assuring the 
survival of El Pueblo was a long-term concern for the PCE, and something that 
would not have been an issue if it had access to a secure revenue stream.
Although the economic realities of publishing a newspaper were always fore-
most in the agency’s recounting of these discussions, party leaders never lost 
track of the importance of having an organ in which they could advance their 
political agenda. CIA surveillance helps document both the party’s attention to 
internal study as well as eorts to propagate their ideology. The party urged a 

ght for freedom of the press and victory for the demands of workers at San Car-
los, Servitransa, and Hacienda Bola de Oro. Cells were to prepare wall posters 
featuring slogans advancing their struggles.35 The party needed money to oper-
ate, but generating revenue was not the purpose of the party. Notwithstanding 

nancial diculties and internal conicts, the 
ght would go on.
Newsstand
Despite a persistent belief that “Moscow gold” funded communist activities in 
Ecuador, the CIA continued to report on the PCE’s “acute 
nancial situation” 
and the party’s eorts to raise money. The Guayas provincial committee de-
cided to sponsor several raes in which the winning numbers would be the 
same as those of the Guayaquil city lottery. One of the raes was for an “elegant 
and authentic Chinese robe, completely embroidered by hand” that the Guayas 
committee had on display at the newsstand that it maintained at the main post 
oce in Guayaquil. The party was selling 250 tickets for 5 sucres each, which 
would net the committee 1,250 sucres, or about $75 USD. PCE leaders asked 
party members in the Guayaquil area for more suggestions about the most eec-
tive method to raise funds for the party.36 Franklin Pérez Castro convinced his 
brother Ismael, the manager of El Universo, to post 3,000 sucres as a guarantee 
to the Guayaquil lottery for use of their numbers. When Ismael discovered that 
he was liable for the entire amount and that the rae was to bene
t the PCE, 
he became “extremely angry with his brother.”37 Such subterfuge would not have 
been necessary if the party had access to a reliable stream of funding.
On the night of July 1, 1953, someone attempted to burn down the PCE’s 
newsstand. The attack destroyed some of the party’s propaganda material stored 
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at the stand and damaged the stall’s walls and oor. The PCE blamed their right-
wing opponents in the ARNE for the attack, and the CIA admitted knowledge 
of its involvement. ARNE members, whom the communists derogatorily labeled 
as “gallinazos” or buzzards, had printed counterfeit tickets for the PCE rae. 
The communists noti
ed the police commissioner of the falsi
cation, and Pérez 
Castro denounced the fraud in his family’s newspaper El Universo. The agency 
noted that “the counterfeit tickets was a topic of the day in Quito,” but gave no 
indication whether the CIA was implicated in this subversion.38 In any case, 
the ARNE appeared to be quite capable of acting on its own and possessed the 
motivation to do so without external encouragement.
The attack on the newsstand was part of a larger pattern of politically moti-
vated assaults on the party. One example was a 1951 robbery at PCE Headquar-
ters in Guayaquil. According to Saad, at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, June 26, 1951, six 
unknown individuals carrying knives and guns broke into the party headquar-
ters. At the time, the only people in the building were the young communists 
Carlos and César Muñoz. The assailants locked the two up in the party’s book-
store. The attackers proceeded to rue through papers on Saad’s desk and took 
several documents. Saad declared that the assault was not one of common crime 
because they did not take anything of value, even though typewriters, bicycles, 
and other items were present in the oce. The communist leader charged that it 
was a political attack carried out by either Ecuadorian or international reaction-
ary elements who sought to appropriate party documents. The party leadership 
planned to meet and release a formal statement on the attack.39 That occurrence 
highlights the constant threats under which the party operated. CIA surveil-
lance oen provides eective documentation of the nature of these attacks and 
the conditions under which the communists operated.
During the end of June and beginning of July 1953, the newsstand sold be-
tween 20 to 200 sucres worth of material a day. The most popular publications 
included those sent from abroad (Unión Soviética; Por una paz duradera, Por 
una democracia popular; La Mujer Soviética; Tiempos Nuevos; Historia del Par-
tido Comunista de la URSS), as well as the party’s newspaper El Pueblo. The 
CIA reported that aer July 9 newsstand sales had fallen o signi
cantly, and 
currently did not exceed 1.60 sucres a day. “This sudden and sharp drop in sales 
was caused by the shortage of propaganda material,” the agency noted, “and was 
interpreted by the PCE as a sign that the government interception of propa-
ganda in the Guayaquil post oce was becoming even more eective.”40 A year 
later, the foreign minister Luis Antonio Peñaherrera proudly told Ambassador 
Sheldon Mills that while previously serving as minister of government he had 
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ordered the burning of communist material and that now very little was reach-
ing those to whom it was addressed.41 The CIA report provides no indication 
as to whether the agency may have been complicit in the interdiction of that 
material, but given the agency’s turn toward covert action under the Eisenhower 
administration this might have been the beginning of direct intervention in 
Ecuador’s internal aairs. Communists blamed a similar disruption in the de-
livery of printed materials in Quito not on the CIA but on the conservative 
and famously anticommunist minister of government Camilo Ponce Enríquez 
who had his own motivations for taking such actions. In light of Peñaherrera’s 
comment, they were probably not entirely wrong in their identi
cation of the 
domestic roots of their troubles.
The problems facing the newsstand were not easily solved. In late February 
1954, the PCE decided to suspend operation of the newsstand as well that of 
its bookstore. According to the CIA, “The newsstand would be turned over to 
any comrade who desired to assume the business and could pay the rent, with 
the understanding that he would continue to sell the PCE newspaper El Pueblo 
there, as well as bits of Communist literature remaining in stock.” Meanwhile, 
the party took steps to assure that its endeavors would be more commercially 
successful. Rafael Echeverría’s wife Ana Bartonova de Echeverría reportedly 
stated that the party’s executive committee decided that the style of the humor 
magazine Don Pepe that party member Mentor Mera published was “too mark-
edly pro-Communist and that an eort will be made in future issues to soen 
the tone of the ‘satire’ so that the magazine will have a more general appeal.” 
El Pueblo, however, would maintain its explicitly communist political line.42
A declining base of support was a growing problem for the communists and 
contributed to their mounting 
nancial diculties even as members sought to 
expand the party’s inuence.
Movies
As CIA surveillance eectively demonstrates, some subversive activities that in 
the heat of the moment might seem prescient could appear in retrospect to be 
a tactical error, and party leaders would quickly attempt to distance themselves 
from such enterprises. In one case, students disrupted a Saturday-night show-
ing of the anticommunist movie Iron Curtain with the release of foul-smelling 
chemicals. According to press reports, “A shameful and outrageous event hap-
pened yesterday to a large audience that attended the special function at the 
Bolivar Theater shortly aer the movie ‘Iron Curtain’ started.” The articles 
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described a situation in which “Unknown elements threw lunette substances at 
the public that gave o an unbearable smell of asafetida and hydrogen sul
de, 
forcing most spectators, especially the ladies, to leave the theater.” This mention 
of the threat to women appears designed to appeal to traditional gendered norms 
and how communist actions jeopardized the stability of society. The police de-
tained three students for their actions.43
Curiously, US vice consul Benjamin Sowell was present at the opening night 
of the 
lm, perhaps because the State Department had already advised its em-
bassies to be on watch for such acts of sabotage. Sowell observed the absence of 
an adequate police presence for a 
lm that might be expected to face political 
opposition. On the other hand, he also noted the lack of street demonstrations 
or eorts to block the sale of tickets. Rather than police, Sowell maintained, it 
was the minister of defense Manuel Díaz Granados who was present at the show-
ing who personally arrested the three students. That a similar disruption took 
place at the 
lm’s opening in Guayaquil le Ambassador Simmons convinced 
that the vials with the oending substance had come from outside the country. 
He believed that the communist party was following orders it had received, but 
party leaders did not make an issue out of the disruption because they did not 
want to precipitate a break with Galo Plaza Lasso’s government.44
According to the CIA, the central committee of the PCE had instructed six 
students to disrupt the showing of the movie by making catcalls and releasing 
the chemical substances into the theater. Only three students were able to follow 
through on the instructions because a theater usher prevented the others from 
acting. Guillermo Lasso (whom the agency described as a “Communist lawyer”) 
managed to gain the students’ release through his personal connections with a 
friend in the ministry of government. The CIA ocer reported, “Later the same 
evening at a meeting at Communist Party headquarters it was decided to refrain 
from further action against the showing of this movie in order to avoid reprisals 
from the authorities.”45 Seemingly that should have been the end of the story.
The CIA presents the students as operating under the instructions of the 
party’s central committee, but it is equally possible that the students acted on 
their own and that party leaders reprimanded them for their irresponsible be-
havior. Aer all, their actions garnered very negative press coverage. El Comercio 
denounced the students in an editorial. “By their fruits you will know them,” 
the editorial read. It proceeded to declare that the world had been divided in 
two: “those who are with democracy, that is, with America, and those who are 
with communism, that is, with Russia.” In the newspaper’s mind, actions such 
as that in the movie theater demonstrated that the communists “cannot really 
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be reconciled with the republican and democratic duties imposed by our insti-
tutions.” The editorial proceeded to ask if the communists were acting inde-
pendently or as agents of a foreign power. In a dig seemingly designed to hurt 
party leaders the most, the paper declared that the communists had behaved no 
better than the falangists who were the archenemies of the le.46
Another possibility is that the entire event may have been staged to harm 
the party. Ambassador Simmons admitted as much when he acknowledged that 
press reports had not identi
ed the troublemakers as communists. Simmons 
quoted the socialist newspaper La Tierra that those whom the police arrested 
had not done anything, and the stink came from the 
lm itself. In fact, vice 
consul Sowell complained about the presence of a rowdy Saturday-night crowd 
in the cheap seats in the balcony, and the entire commotion may have been an 
attempt to regain control over the theater.47 In any case, releasing the chemicals 
did not gain the party any adherents, or raise its pro
le or reputation—much less 
advance communist policies or ideologies.
If anything, the negative fallout from the incident in the theater pushed the 
communists away from pursuing extraconstitutional actions to achieve their 
political objectives. But it did not lead them to shy away from using movies to 
advance a progressive agenda. Several months later, the CIA reported that the 
party had purchased a projector and planned to bring in Soviet 
lms for pro-
paganda purposes in small coastal communities.48 Several years later, the PCE 
sought to acquire distribution rights for Soviet 
lms, and Saad planned to dis-
cuss the matter personally with Soviet ocials on an upcoming trip to Moscow. 
Not incidentally, the 
lms could also provide the party with a much-needed 
revenue stream.49
In contrast to the protests against Iron Curtain, when party leaders learned 
that the Soviet 
lm El Gran Concierto would be projected at the Central Theater 
in Guayaquil they urged party members to attend. The party contrasted the 
“healthy, artistic spectacle” of this 
lm with “morbid Yankee movies.” The party 
hoped for the 
lm’s success, “so that more Soviet pictures will be shown, thus 
breaking the imperialist encirclement” of cultural activities in Latin America. In 
communicating this news to CIA Headquarters, a case ocer added the com-
ment that “Guayaquil newspapers have carried sensational advertisements for 
the 
lm,” and that the price for orchestra seats for this 
lm had been raised from 
the normal price of 7.80 sucres to 10.80 sucres.50 Soviet 
lms continued to real-
ize commercial success. They were particularly popular in poor neighborhoods 
and some theater owners preferred them over Hollywood movies.51 The Soviet 
Union also sponsored 
lm festivals, including a well-publicized one in Ecuador 
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with high-caliber productions that “were well attended and received favorable 
reviews.”52 The agency feared that it was losing a battle for the hearts and minds 
of the Ecuadorian people.
What emerges in the examination of these various examples is that the 
United States government’s 
xation on “Moscow gold” was overblown. The ac-
cusations emerged from a paranoia fear of external intervention in the region, 
a paternalistic notion that disadvantaged peoples could never mobilize on their 
own behalf and therefore the stimulus for actions must come from elsewhere, 
an attempt to undermine legitimate political activities, and a direct counterat-
tack to leist challenges to United States hegemonic control over the rest of the 
hemisphere. Government ocials rarely if ever reected on their motivations in 
the extant documentation, and these dierent factors are not necessarily con-
tradictory or mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the discussions of Moscow gold 
indicate the types of impediments that leists confronted in their struggles for 
a more just and equitable world.
Communists faced endless challenges as they sought to advance their agen-
das, and ultimately 
nances were the least of their worries. Communists op-
erated in an antagonistic environment, both domestically and internationally, 
as they sought to promote their visions for building a new and dierent world. 
Anticommunist sentiments ourished in a variety of political and cultural envi-
ronments and were expressed through various venues. Financial challenges were 
oen just an external manifestation of these larger dynamics. Documentation 
from an assortment of public and con
dential sources indicates the depth of 
opposition that the le needed to tackle. As if that were not enough, divisions 
within the PCE continually frustrated the party’s attempts to present a united 
front against persistent problems of exploitation and marginalization.
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Divisions
I n August 1949, the PCE held its fourth party congress, the rst of three that it would convene over the next decade. These meetings were part pag-eantry and part internal debate, and provide scholars with opportunities to 
examine the public and private faces of what otherwise could be a secretive party. 
Throughout this entire time, the CIA monitored communist party activities, at 
times leaving us with the only records to which we have access of internal discus-
sions and party congresses. A result is the ability to observe how a party responds 
when powerful forces rise against it. Those challenges exacerbated already exist-
ing divisions within the party.
The communists held their congress in the midst of a shi in CIA surveil-
lance tactics. Aer more than two years in Ecuador, the CIA case ocer Albert 
Haney le in mid-1949 for a new post in Chile and it is unclear who replaced 
him. A continued ow of information does indicate the presence of the agency’s 
personnel, even though the quantity of material slowed and the quality dete-
riorated. As with all interpretations extrapolated out of the available records, 
it is dicult to know whether a complete image of communist party activity 
emerges and how much lost or withheld material distorts our understandings 
of internal debates and tactics. As an indication of these competing narratives, 
an examination of the resolutions that came out of the congress and the party’s 
response to a powerful earthquake that tore through central Ecuador during the 
course of their meeting provide a dramatically di
erent depiction of the PCE’s 
message and priorities from that which the CIA advanced.
What does become evident from the available documentation on the congress 
are the roots of a conict between moderate and militant wings of the party 
that led to a split in the 1960s. Examining in detail each of the party congresses 
and the forces present in them, beginning with the fourth congress in 1949, 




By the late 1940s, longtime communist leader Ricardo Paredes had made appar-
ent his desire to resign his position as secretary general of the party and return 
to his medical practice in Manta on the coast. That decision brought diculties 
and tensions within the party to a head, particularly between the two wings 
as represented by Paredes and his counterpart Pedro Saad. Paredes’s departure 
necessitated a party congress to select a new leader, and those elections threat-
ened to trigger the exodus of his followers from the central committee. But that 
outcome was by no means certain. The US assistant military attaché Adelbert 
Boggs surmised that Paredes’s withdrawal might strengthen the party since it 
would remove a source of internal friction.1
Paredes was born in 1898 in the central highland town of Riobamba and 
trained to be a physician at the Central University in Quito. He founded the 
socialist party in 1926 and two years later was a delegate to the sixth Comintern 
congress in Moscow. In 1931 he converted the PSE into a communist party and 
served as its secretary general on multiple occasions over the next several decades. 
Paredes worked closely with Indigenous communities, including assisting them 
with organizing rural syndicates and cooperatives. He helped found the FEI in 
1944, and that federation selected him as their representative to the 1944–45 
Constituent Assembly that draed a new and progressive constitution. Through 
those activities, he gained a reputation as a dedicated and sincere activist.2
In June 1948, United States consul Perry Ellis visited Manabí to check on 
communist activity in the region. He reported little action and few members 
among the agricultural workers who comprised the majority of the local popu-
lation. Since moving there, Paredes had not made many public appearances, and 
most of his political participation was limited to contacts with other doctors and 
lawyers.3 If Paredes was inactive at rst, he did not remain that way for long. In 
November 1949, he was the featured speaker at a celebration of the thirty-second 
anniversary of the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution.4 At the end of the 1950s, 
William Moreland, Ellis’s successor as consul in Guayaquil, reported that Pare-
des was an active political organizer in the city. Under his guidance, “the Com-
munist movement had acquired alarming proportions.” Manta was “being con-
verted into the principal Communist agitation center in Ecuador.”5 Whether 
or not he was in the leadership of the party, Paredes would continue to ght to 
advance his communist beliefs.
Saad emerged out of a quite di
erent trajectory. He was born in Guayaquil 
in 1909, a decade aer Paredes. He was the son of Lebanese immigrant parents 
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who ran a moderately successful textile and clothing business. He worked as an 
accountant with the family business, and hence was nancially independent. 
Saad studied at the prestigious Vicente Rocafuerte High School and then for 
a law degree at the University of Guayaquil. Saad honed his speaking and de-
bating skills at the university, which subsequently served him well both with 
mobilizing workers as well as petitioning for their rights as labor representative 
in the federal congress. Saad did not submit his thesis for his law degree because 
apparently he thought establishing himself as a lawyer would hamper his work 
with the labor movement. Instead, he dedicated his life to advocating for the 
rights of impoverished and marginalized peoples. When his father died in 1953 
Saad closed the family’s clothing store and devoted all of his energy to ghting 
for social reforms as the secretary general of the communist party. Although 
Paredes had founded the party, Saad spent more years in leadership positions 
and ultimately had a larger inuence in dening its character and priorities.6
As with many disputes, the divide between Paredes and Saad was in part per-
sonal and in part ideological. The two leaders represented two di
erent genera-
tions, two di
erent parts of the country, and two di
erent political orientations. 
Paredes was from the highlands and rooted his conception of the struggle in the 
demands of rural Indigenous communities, whereas Saad came from the coast 
and was much more closely attuned to the needs of the urban working class. 
Tactically, Saad was more likely to engage in elections and political negotiations 
in congress, whereas Paredes preferred to root his struggles in grassroots social 
movements. As the historian Hernán Ibarra notes, the ascendancy of “Saad rep-
resented a generational shi,” in part due to “his leading role in the 1944 revo-
lution, along with his career as a labor leader and senator for coastal workers in 
congress.” While acknowledging that “the role of ‘personality’ is always prob-
lematic” as a mechanism of historical interpretation, Ibarra observes that Saad 
possessed “open expressive features and e
ective management of oratory” that 
was very unlike “Paredes who had a reserved personal nature.”7 In fact, an FBI 
informer had earlier said that Paredes “rarely appears in public demonstrations 
because he is a poor speaker, lacking in personality and force” even though he 
was one of the “better educated Communists in Ecuador.”8 These leaders had 
di
erent strengths and weaknesses.
Party statutes required that the secretary general reside in Quito, and an open 
question lingered as to whether Paredes would return to the capital or whether 
someone would replace him. In his absence, Saad assumed designation as acting 
secretary general, even though he remained in Guayaquil and would not for-
mally adopt that title until the 1952 party congress. With Saad’s emphasis on 
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labor struggles, his ascendancy would require a di
erent kind of party. These 
changes led to a struggle for succession in the party, with Paredes hesitant or 
perhaps unwilling to give up his leadership role.
Some party members supported Saad as the new party leader because they did 
not think that the alternative, Primitivo Barreto, was “forceful enough to direct 
Communist activities,” even though just several days earlier a CIA ocer had 
reported growing support for Barreto because he would be more representative 
of workers than Saad. Because he was not a manual laborer, Saad always faced a 
certain amount of resistance to the high positions in the PCE and CTE that he 
held. Some of Saad’s supporters in Guayaquil were concerned that the promo-
tion from regional to national leader would provide him with “more prestige but 
less authority.” Despite insistence that as secretary general of the PCE he relocate 
to Quito, Saad resisted doing so. He did not believe that anything of importance 
would happen in the capital that necessitated his presence there.9 Rather, as a 
labor leader maintaining his presence in the commercial center of Guayaquil 
was more important to him. Regionalism was a strong political, economic, and 
cultural force in Ecuador, and it was present as much inside the party as outside.
Part of Saad’s resistance to moving to Quito was that if he did so Enrique Gil 
Gilbert, the secretary general of the coastal region, would gain more strength 
locally. The two had their disagreements, and Saad could emerge from the move 
in a weakened position.10 Gil Gilbert was a novelist best known for his 1940 
book Nuestro pan, which critiqued problems that the working class faced, espe-
cially rice growers in Milagro. The book won several prizes, including honorable 
mention in a literary contest that led to its publication in English in 1943 as Our 
Daily Bread.11 Gil Gilbert worked actively with labor unions and on antifascist 
committees. He won election to the 1944–45 Constituent Assembly as a repre-
sentative of the province of Guayas, and subsequently served as a member of the 
tribunal de garantías constitucionales (tribunal of constitutional guarantees), a 
provision of the 1945 Constitution designed to place a check on executive power. 
During the war he collaborated with US government ocials on antifascist cam-
paigns, but aerward both the CIA and State Department actively trailed him 
and reported on his activities.12 In November 1948, Secretary of State George 
Marshall asked the US Embassy in Caracas to verify that Gil Gilbert was trav-
eling through Venezuela en route to Mexico and to report on his activities.13
On the way to Venezuela he stopped for a week in Colombia where both the 
local police and the CIA kept tabs on his activities. Gil Gilbert claimed that 
his travel was under the auspices of the Ecuadorian Casa de la Cultura, but US 
ambassador to Colombia Willard Beaulac reported (drawing on material from 
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a “controlled American source”) that he spent little time visiting with cultural 
institutions—or with communists either, for that matter.14 A CIA information 
report—probably the source for Beaulac’s telegram—provides more details on 
Gil Gilbert’s time in Colombia, including his complaints to the police about 
surveillance of his activities.15 In Venezuela, Ambassador Walter Donnelly in-
dicated that Gil Gilbert’s publicized activities also only involved meetings with 
intellectuals and writers, including the renowned author Waldo Frank. As in 
Colombia, Gil Gilbert claimed that he represented the Casa de la Cultura and 
was in Venezuela to prepare for the forthcoming Congress for Peace and Democ-
racy. Rather than continuing on to Mexico, Gil Gilbert returned to Quito at 
the conclusion of his visit.16 The following year CIA agents similarly trailed Gil 
Gilbert during a trip to Peru and an ocer led a lengthy and detailed report on 
his activities.17 Investigations of communist activists never stopped at a country’s 
borders. Notwithstanding Gil Gilbert’s conicts with Saad, he was an important 
party leader and apparently warranted the investment of signicant resources 
into investigating his activities.
In response to challenges to his authority, Saad informed the PCE central 
committee that he would remain in Guayaquil because the party was more active 
and numerous there than in Quito.18 CIA information reports reveal intimate 
knowledge of the communist party’s inner workings and highlight the presence 
of disputes and conicts that led to Saad’s resistance to make the move to Quito. 
The PCE had received a directive (the reports do not say from where) to re-
structure its activities, and the agency summarized the resulting changes in the 
Guayaquil branch of the party. The directive had called for “a reorganization 
and purication of labor syndicates,” which “practically assures the elevation 
to power of Gil Gilbert’s followers and the demotion of Saad.” This led to a 
discussion within the party of sanctioning incompetent leaders. According to a 
CIA informer, “Saad admitted that he had made errors, but at the time they had 
been made in good faith.” He claimed that he had not personally gained from 
his actions, nor had that ever been his intent.
In contrast, Gil Gilbert’s faction criticized Saad for emphasizing labor or-
ganization “without imposing Party adherence on labor members,” which had 
resulted in a weakened party. “If he had obliged all syndicate members to join 
the Party,” the criticism went, “these organizations would now be valuable aux-
iliaries.” Instead, the party was smaller than it should or could have been. The 
conict created a good deal of unrest in the party, and provided an example of 
comrades pointing ngers and looking for culprits to explain their shortcom-
ings.19 A month later, a CIA ocer reported that “Elías Muñoz, an ardent young 
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Communist and intimate friend of Enrique Gil Gilbert, has been appointed 
Secretary General of the Guayaquil Local Committee.”20 Muñoz was a rising 
star in the party, and Gil Gilbert’s wing was in ascendancy.
Part of the tension in the party concerned how aggressive communists should 
be in advancing their political agenda. The CIA reported that Saad allegedly re-
ceived a mimeographed circular from the Latin American section of the French 
communist party that suggested that for the time being Latin Americans “adopt 
a policy of ‘passive resistance.’” Engaging in aggressive activities “would not pro-
duce desired benets and could only result in a
ecting their long-range interests 
and the interests of the world cause.” The CIA operative (presumably Haney) 
noted that local party leaders had followed this policy of passive resistance for 
the past two months. “They are satised with the incumbent political admin-
istration as they are not being molested and are comparatively free to carry on 
their penetration activities among labor and the military classes.”21 This mod-
erate approach to political action is what eventually would lead to a split in the 
party, with younger and more militant members pressing their cautious leaders 
to engage in more aggressive actions.
In March 1949, United States consul Ellis reported that he had gained access 
to the local communist party’s work program. He summarized the document’s 
main points, which included strengthening the FPTG, maintaining the Pop-
ular Alliance coalition that had performed well in the previous November’s 
local elections, creating new party cells, fortifying existing ones, expanding the 
distribution of the party’s newspaper El Pueblo, and increasing attendance at 
party meetings. Ellis’s concluding remark was that “interest had fallen so low 
that attendance was poor and even cell leaders were not showing up for regular 
meetings.” Party leaders recognized their shortcomings and were working hard 
to address them.22 This was hardly the description of a party worthy of surveil-
lance, but that did not slow down US government inltration e
orts.
The following day, a CIA case ocer submitted a report to his superiors in 
Washington that drew on the same information as that from the consulate. 
Since (as with all declassied reports) the agency redacted details on the prove-
nance of the information, it is dicult to ascertain whether it originated with a 
source in the consulate or CIA, or whether it represented a collaborative e
ort. 
Although both communiqués summarized the same document, the CIA report 
includes data not contained in the dispatch from the consulate. The CIA ocer 
stated that the present work program was not as extensive as a previous one from 
November 1948, and furthermore repeated parts of that plan. A “close check” re-
vealed that recruitment goals in the previous directive had failed. Among other 
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details, the CIA ocer reported plans to continue discussion groups (the cur-
rent reading was the Communist Manifesto) and expand propaganda campaigns, 
including the distribution of literature.23
With this growth of communist activities in Guayaquil, the CIA increased 
its surveillance activities in that part of the country. The CIA case ocer Haney 
purportedly was based in Quito, and that is the origin of most of the informa-
tion he initially collected. With Saad assuming more control over the party, most 
of the material now came from Guayaquil. In the absence of better documen-
tation, it remains unclear whether Haney moved his base of operations to the 
coast or whether another ocer joined him in the agency’s surveillance of the 
Ecuadorian le. In any case, whomever it was, a CIA case ocer maintained 
access to good sources of information on the party in Guayaquil.
A report on the work plan for the rst part of the year was followed with the 
next one for March 21 to June 20, 1949. Unfortunately, an enclosed photostatic 
copy of the report is missing from the declassied documentation, although an-
other CIA memo from several days later summarizes its contents in English. 
According to the case ocer, the main points of the plan included the recruit-
ment of ve hundred new members, the monthly collection of 3,500 sucres ($220 
USD), the establishment of a library, the purchase of a mimeograph machine 
and other equipment for spreading propaganda, the expansion of labor activities, 
support for the Popular Alliance electoral coalition, publication of a condential 
weekly bulletin for party cells, and the organization of public assemblies and 
other educational activities to advance communist objectives. The case ocer 
indicated that when party leader Franklin Pérez Castro presented the current 
goals he “made no reference to the success or failure of the [previous] work plan,” 
even though “the fact that many of the same objectives are cited in the new work 
plan would indicate that little success had been achieved toward increasing the 
Party strength.” Furthermore, at this secret meeting Pérez Castro emphasized 
the importance of boosting party membership. At the same time, he complained 
that too many members were opportunists rather than loyal adherents, and that 
too many of the party cells had ceased to function.24 Despite enjoying conditions 
that seemingly would contribute to its growth, the party faced continual chal-
lenges in realizing its objectives.
Although by 1949 most of the CIA surveillance concentrated on communist 
activities in the coastal city of Guayaquil, they occasionally ventured beyond 
that narrow locus. One information report, for example, concerned the reorga-
nization of party cells in the central highlands. The evaluation noted that “the 
cells were in a very poor state of organization and that their activities amounted 
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to practically nothing.” The party’s executive committee received the report, 
but delayed action until Saad would have an opportunity to comment on it.25
Saad had gained de facto control over the party, not just its coastal aliate but 
its organizational apparatus across the country.
If the party in Quito was poorly organized, that was not reected in its abil-
ity to generate propaganda statements. Or perhaps the reorganization of local 
cells had reinvigorated party activity. In either case, in March 1949 the PCE’s 
central committee distributed two thousand copies of a handbill denouncing 
the current economic crisis in the country (see gure 5.1). According to the case 
ocer who forwarded a copy of the leaet to CIA Headquarters in Washington, 
Nela Martínez, María Luisa Gómez de la Torre, Gustavo Becerra, César Endara, 
and Bernardino Andrade, “all prominent members of the Communist Party,” 
draed the text that reected current party thinking.26 Surveillance e
orts ded-
icated to the defeat of communism at the same time served to document their 
ideas and organizational e
orts; a copy of this document likely would not have 
survived were it not for this intelligence agency.
The handbill began with the declaration “Ecuador is going through a crisis 
that is the result of the global situation of capitalism, which is already facing a 
deep depression.” The party denounced the country’s ruling class as unable to 
solve serious problems of unemployment, closed factories, workers thrown out 
into the street, and bankrupt businesses. In the countryside, peasants faced an 
even more severe crisis of low prices for their commodities. Wealthy landholders 
maintained their antiquated forms of production, and technical “experts” from 
the United States imposed policies that handicapped domestic development. 
The result was that farmers were not able to supply local markets, and the coun-
try had to import potatoes even though this was a product originally domesti-
cated in the Andes. These shortcomings highlighted the failures of capitalism. 
In the face of this crisis, the party proposed a series of measures to stem the 
su
ering of the people and launch a process of national reconstruction. These in-
cluded an agrarian reform program to distribute land to peasants, the halting of 
debt payments for farm workers, guaranteed fair prices for agricultural produce, 
credit for the development of domestic industrialization, blocking the importa-
tion of products that displaced domestic production, outlawing speculation, and 
taxing wealthy landowners and industrialists. “We do not think that these mea-
sures mean a denitive solution for all national problems,” the party admitted. 
Those resolutions would only emerge “with a revolutionary transformation of 
our national life” that included a move to socialism. But applying these limited 
measures, the party promised, would provide immediate relief for the present 
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Figure 5.1. A manifesto from the central committee of the Communist Party of 
Ecuador that defends the lives of the Ecuadorian people in the face of an economic 
crisis. Source: Partido Comunista del Ecuador (PCE), “Por la defensa de la vida del 
pueblo: Maniesto del Comité Central del Partido Comunista,” March 1, 1949, 
included in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Handbill of Partido Comunista del 
Ecuador,” April 8, 1949, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document 
/cia-rdp83-00415r002600040002-6.
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situation. The party called for “a great mobilization of the people, of workers, 
peasants and popular masses” to implement this agenda. The party declared that 
it was ready to take the lead in this struggle.27
Despite the PCE’s forceful statements, CIA analysts in Washington consis-
tently noted the party’s lack of “unity, e
ective leadership, and prestige,” which 
prompted the agency to characterize the communists as “ine
ective.” The PCE 
had not managed to improve its situation, and it studiously avoided actions that 
might trigger government repression. As a result, “no serious problems at present 
disturb Ecuador’s international relations,” by which the agency meant perceived 
United States interests in the region. “The current Ecuadoran situation contains 
no elements which cause or immediately portend noticeable change in the status 
of US security interests in the area,” was the CIA’s evaluation.28 The agency 
considered the communist party, and Ecuador in general, to be mostly harmless. 
That assessment, however, did not mean a halt in the agency’s investigation of 
what it was convinced were subversive activities.
Fourth PCE Congress (Guayaquil, August 1–7, 1949)
In the rst week of August 1949, communists gathered in Guayaquil for the 
PCE’s fourth congress. Party statutes stipulated that it was to hold a congress 
every other year, but it never met that oen. Its last meeting was in November 
1946 in Quito, and it would not convene again until July 1952—the closest it 
ever came to its goal of a biannual meeting.29 The CIA had reported on pending 
plans for a party congress ever since the agency’s establishment two years earlier. 
An intelligence report from October 1947 had indicated the possibility for a 
congress in Guayaquil the following month. Among the agenda items were or-
ganizational details such as the naming of a secretary general, the selection of a 
new central committee, and nding new premises for party headquarters. A key 
issue was the attempt of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to break the 
CTE away from the CTAL. Haney alleged, “These measures are being taken 
in an e
ort to strengthen the position of the Party and to advance plans for 
sabotage.”30 Mentioning the threat of violence may have been a lame attempt to 
justify the dedication of resources to surveillance of the party.
Half a year later, Haney once again reported on the intent to hold the con-
gress in July 1948 to implement reorganization plans that Saad and Barreto 
had allegedly received at a CTAL meeting in Mexico.31 Another six months 
passed, and Haney reported that the PCE central committee had met in Jan-
uary 1949 and scheduled the fourth party congress for June 6, 1949. “For two 
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years attempts have been made to set the date for the Congress,” the case ocer 
commented, “but each time that a date had been decided it had to be postponed. 
The PCE needs to hold a Congress to revise its statutes, to legalize numerous 
changes in its administration, and to elect new ocers.”32 Eventually the party 
would have to meet.
Nevertheless, as now seemed inevitable, the party once again missed their 
deadline. Instead, on June 13 a planning commission comprised of Pedro Saad, 
Ana Moreno, Enrique Barrezueta, and Fortunato Safadi met to discuss the 
pending congress. Now their target date was July or August, but insucient 
funds threatened to result in further delays. Local leaders calculated that the 
congress would cost 30,000 sucres, mainly for the travel and hotel expenses for 
the delegates. A CIA informer reported that the party currently had 25,000 su-
cres in its co
ers. Since party statutes stipulated that their bank balance should 
not fall below 10,000 sucres, the party needed to raise 15,000 sucres. Party lead-
ers were optimistic that between fundraising campaigns and relying on those 
delegates who were able to cover their own expenses that they would be able to 
raise enough money for the congress. While 130 delegates had attended the last 
congress in 1946, because of the party’s severe nancial situation fewer mem-
bers would come this time. Furthermore, the reason for meeting in Guayaquil 
was because the largest delegation of party members resided in that city and 
gathering there would hold down on expenses. In any case, the party’s central 
committee proceeded to draw up a program of action for the congress to approve 
and sent out invitations to comrades in other Latin American countries. Nela 
Martínez, en route to a peace conference in Paris, carried an invitation to the 
Latin American branch of the French communist party. The tentative agenda 
included the presentation of reports from central and provincial committees on 
their activities since the 1946 congress, revision of party statutes, approval of a 
new political program appropriate for the current political situation, election of 
new members for the central committee, and the draing of contingency plans 
in case the party were forced underground.33
In the middle of July, a CIA ocer reported that the PCE had “tentatively 
set” the “denite date” for their congress for August, and if it did not meet then 
it would probably have to be delayed until November. The two main agenda 
items for the congress included analyzing international events and examining 
internal problems in the party. On the rst point, the party tasked Pérez Castro 
with explaining the development of world communism and its e
ects on the 
PCE, including the role the party would play in case of war between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Saad was to address internal issues as well as report 
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on the activities of the central party. Saad planned to characterize Galo Plaza 
Lasso as “a rich landowner” who was “dominated by the oppressive Yankee.” 
He would also warn Plaza that the communists expected to be able to continue 
to operate with complete freedom. The party also planned to incorporate more 
exibility into party organization. In part this was to reect reality, as local lead-
ers oen operated quite independently from central command structures any-
way. On a related matter, the CIA had no evidence that the party had received 
any international support or instructions—an admission that conicted quite 
directly with United States attempts to portray local militants as operating as 
part of a vast conspiracy emanating out of Moscow.34 Five days later, the liberal 
El Día similarly announced that the PCE would inaugurate its congress on Au-
gust 1 in Guayaquil. According to the newspaper, the party would address issues 
related to the current political situation and decide on what approach it should 
take to the Plaza administration. Naturally, the announcement made no men-
tion of plans for sabotage.35
Only days before the congress was to convene, a CIA ocer again reported 
that barring a last-minute inability to raise sucient funds it would begin on 
August 1. Saad wanted to delay the meeting until later in the year, but some 
members had pressed him to hold the assembly before the federal congress met 
on August 10. Financial exigency meant that fewer delegates would attend than 
what the party had originally planned. Even so, the coastal regional committee 
issued a condential bulletin to local cell leaders proclaiming that the congress 
would “be of extraordinary importance” for the “study of the conditions of the 
world and our country.” The committee proceeded to lay out suggestions for 
how to organize discussions at the meeting. Each cell should discuss agenda 
items and proposed revisions to the party statutes in order to enhance the over-
all value of the meeting. The coastal committee included recommendations for 
which cells should prepare reports on a variety of topics, including land reform, 
worker organization, cooperatives, and colonization. The committee suggested 
that in their discussions of the party statutes, the cells pay particular attention 
to conditions for entrance into the party, the duties of members, dues payments, 
party discipline, and the youth movement. Finally, and rather ironically since 
this document made its way into the hands of the CIA, these discussions should 
not be made public.36 The CIA had e
ectively penetrated the party.
The communist congress faced an almost complete media blackout. Quito’s 
daily El Comercio did not carry a single article on the congress, and the socialist 
newspaper La Tierra only carried one short story. La Tierra’s piece was buried 
in the inside pages, and reported on the congress’s opening session two days aer 
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it took place. According to La Tierra, “a large public attended the solemn act.” 
Delegates elected Paredes as president of the congress and the audience warmly 
welcomed his comments. Saad presented an eloquent report on communist la-
bors on the coast. The inaugural session ended with other speeches and a reading 
of statements.37 That was the extent of the report, and the paper did not follow 
up on the discussions or conclusions from the congress. A powerful earthquake 
hit Ecuador in the middle of the meeting, which might explain a lack of media 
attention as everyone was absorbed with more immediate and urgent matters. 
Or, perhaps, the newspapers simply believed that the communists played a mar-
ginal role and concluded that the congress was not worthy of their attention.
A biography of party leader Paredes does not provide many more details on 
the congress, except to note that deep divisions ran through the central commit-
tee that eventually split the party between its pro-Soviet wing and a “Trotskyist 
and pro-China” group that became the Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista 
del Ecuador (PCMLE, Marxist–Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador) in the 
1960s. At this point, however, those tensions were expressed as a ri between 
an orthodox Marxist wing grouped around Paredes, and Saad’s tendency “that 
adhered to a conciliatory Browderist thesis.”38 Earl Browder had been the secre-
tary general of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 
during the war and had called for a secession of attacks on capitalist countries 
and instead advocated support for bourgeois nationalist forces to prepare the 
ground for an eventual move to socialism in the distant future. Saad’s embrace 
of Browder’s class-collaborationist policies was very unpopular among dogmatic 
Marxists.39 That split between a moderate and much more militant wing tore at 
the party and complicated attempts to realize common objectives. The congress 
was to select a new secretary general, but apparently Paredes retained that titular 
position with Saad assuming more responsibilities albeit in an acting role. With-
out access to internal debates, it is dicult to ascertain how those discussions 
played out.
United States ocials similarly dedicated little attention to the congress, 
which is surprising considering how committed they were to monitoring com-
munist activities, the frequency with which they repeated announcements of 
the imminent nature of the assembly, and the extent of the CIA’s penetration 
of the party. It is apparent that they were not unaware of the meeting. A week 
before the congress, vice consul Walter Houk in Guayaquil cautioned that at 
the gathering the communists would exploit the country’s current economic 
crisis to attack United States companies and to agitate for workers’ demands 
including calling for wage increases.40 A month later, a report on international 
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communist travels indicated that Pompeyo Márquez, a member of the polit-
buro of the Communist Party of Venezuela, had traveled to Guayaquil for the 
meeting.41 But if Houk or any other US ocials submitted any reports on the 
congress, they have not come to light.
The only US government report available on the congress is a short analysis 
draed at CIA Headquarters in Washington almost three months later. As with 
all CIA intelligence summaries, the agency’s analysts do not cite the sources 
of their information, which as always means that their conclusions should be 
taken with a grain of salt. The CIA report mistakenly refers to the congress as 
the party’s sixth—rather than its fourth—and declared that the meeting was 
plagued by bitter personal disputes between party leaders. As a result, the as-
sembly was signicantly less successful than its previous one in 1946. The con-
gress decided to change the PCE’s organizational structures because rivalries 
were tearing the party apart. It abolished regional committees because they 
had assumed too much power and were acting too independently from central 
committee control. Instead, the congress assigned their functions to provincial 
committees. The CIA, however, contended that these organizational changes 
would not bear fruit unless “the present competition for leadership ceases and 
a widely acceptable group of leaders emerges.” The CIA analysts did not think 
that such a development was likely. “The Communists evidently recognize the 
present low level of the party’s prestige,” the agency’s analysts opined. They were 
too weak to be actively plotting against the government, and it was unlikely that 
they would play a signicant role in any revolt. The agency’s conclusion was that 
the communists were “biding their time until conditions are such that there will 
be greater certainty of an opportunity for unequivocal leadership.”42 If that was 
their evaluation, it might explain the general lack of attention to the congress.
In June as the communists were trying to pull together their assembly, social-
ists held an extraordinary congress to decide on what position the PSE should 
take toward the Plaza government as well as to select a new governing coun-
cil. The US Embassy’s chargé d’a
aires Maurice Bernbaum characterized their 
meeting as “tense and stormy,” which threatened to split the party in two.43 The 
congress saw the resignation of Emilio Gangotena who represented a conserva-
tive tendency in the party. He had been reelected to that post at the last party 
congress only half a year earlier, which at the time the US military attaché in 
Quito had celebrated because he opposed cooperation with the communists.44
Now the former student activist and FEUE leader Plutarco Naranjo assumed 
the leadership position. The assembly proclaimed its strong opposition to the 
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Plaza government, as well as its willingness to collaborate with other progressive 
forces in an electoral front.
While State Department personnel heavily covered socialist activities, the 
CIA dedicated little attention to the socialists, preferring instead to concentrate 
on the communists. The agency’s main concern was with what it saw as com-
munist success in its penetration of its sister party. It reported that of fourteen 
members (including alternates) who were elected to the new directorate, “eight 
are known Communists or Socialists sympathetic to Communist Party poli-
cies.” Despite this alleged level of inltration, the CIA’s informer acknowledged 
that no close working relationship existed between the two parties “primarily 
because the leaders of the Communist Party do not wish to become entangled 
in any agreement which might bring about the outlawing of their party.” While 
the communists “tacitly and morally support Socialist opposition to the gov-
ernment,” they would “remain on the sidelines in matters of national politics.” 
Clearly, the communists were taking a more conservative and cautious position 
than the socialists, but this did not stop the CIA from contending that the com-
munists controlled the party through people they had allegedly placed on the 
directorate.
The CIA report proceeded to list the members of the directorate, together 
with their political aliations (socialist, communist, or communist sympa-
thizer). For those with an understanding of Ecuadorian politics, the results are 
quite laughable. The socialist lawyer Gonzalo Oleas, who a decade later would 
go on to lead a right-wing split o
 of the party, is listed as “Socialist, but Com-
munist sympathizer.” The labor leader Pablo Duque Arias who subsequently 
collaborated willingly with the embassy and on occasion butted heads with the 
communists was a “Communist sympathizer.”45 The designations were at best 
wishful thinking and more likely simply a reection of paranoia, conspiratorial 
thinking, and red-baiting.
The fact that no embassy dispatches or CIA information reports on the com-
munist congress have come to light does not, of course, mean that they do or did 
not exist. Such documents might have been lost, destroyed, misplaced, or simply 
not yet released to the public. Alternatively, if the mainstream media did not 
cover the congress those ocials may not have had access to the publicly avail-
able information on which they relied for ling dispatches. Another possibility 
is that personnel changes may have created a gap in surveillance coverage, or 
other more pressing issues or policy changes distracted ocials from dedicating 
attention to the congress. In May, only a couple months before the congress, a 
84 chapter 5
remarkably high volume of CIA information reports on the communist party in 
Guayaquil climaxed and then suddenly stopped. For whatever reason, the CIA 
eld reports oen came in batches. But this time it is as if a case ocer quickly 
led an entire backlog of reports over the course of a several days before leaving 
and the agency failed to assign another person to continue the surveillance of the 
party. What we do know is that it was around this time that Haney le his post 
in Quito for Chile. The State Department’s Foreign Service list for July 1, 1949, 
still includes Haney as an attaché at the embassy in Quito, but the next quarterly 
installment indicates that he was appointed as an attaché (his cover as COS) 
to the US Embassy in Santiago on August 17 with a promotion from FSS-6 to 
FSS-4.46 The available documentation does not indicate when he le Ecuador, 
but it would not be unusual for a CIA ocer to return to the United States for 
a period of time before proceeding on to the next assignment.
The second curiosity is that even though Haney’s post was in Quito almost 
all of the CIA’s reporting during the rst half of 1949 came from Guayaquil. 
On one hand, that is only logical as the coastal city was now the center of com-
munist activities, and Haney may have moved to that city or cultivated contacts 
there. On the other hand, the uptick in reporting from Guayaquil might point 
to the arrival of another CIA operative (which would be highly likely). If that 
were the case, the Foreign Service list does not immediately shed light on who 
that person might be. That list includes ve people at the Guayaquil Consulate, 
most of whom appear to be career foreign service ocers. The one exception is 
assistant consular attaché Allen Lester who arrived on March 15, 1949, with the 
rank of FSS-8 and may have been a CIA ocer.47 Another possibility, of course, 
is that the CIA ocer was not stationed with diplomatic cover in the consulate 
but operated undercover, perhaps ostensibly as an employee of a United States 
commercial rm.
Another peculiarity is how the CIA’s reporting changed around this time. 
Originally in 1947 with the establishment of the agency, a “controlled American 
source” draed memos that the embassy quoted verbatim in their dispatches to 
the State Department. Those memos soon disappeared from the available archi-
val collection, but embassy dispatches continued to quote the memos in a similar 
fashion. In 1949, this pattern shied to a new format. From February through 
August, a series of sequentially numbered memos from the embassy in Quito 
addressed for distribution to the Division of North and West Coast A
airs at 
the State Department largely mirror information reports that CIA ocers sub-
mitted to their headquarters in Washington (though continuing with a month 
delay as before). No memos appear between May 20 and June 21, which might 
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correspond with Haney’s departure. But then the memos briey resume. This 
sequence of extensive and fairly high-quality reporting on the PCE then once 
again inexplicably stops with a July 28, 1949, memo on the eve of the congress. 
With the unevenness of the release of CIA documentation, of course, those 
dates might mean nothing. Perhaps, alternatively, that was the date of Haney’s 
departure. If that were the case, a simple lack of stang provides a possible expla-
nation for the absence of surveillance of the congress. In either case, a minimal 
amount of documentation on the fourth party congress has surfaced from any 
United States governmental source. It is dicult to ascertain whether this is 
due to a lack of personnel, a failure to release material, the loss or destruction of 
documents, or whether it reects a change in policy priorities.
CIA reports continued throughout the second half of 1949, but they were 
not of the quantity or quality of the rst half of the year. With Haney gone, the 
pace of reporting dropped o
, though that might simply reect a new person 
in the post and the accompanying delays with a novice coming up to speed on 
internal Ecuadorian politics and reporting responsibilities. The emphasis also 
shis from documenting internal discussions within the Guayaquil branch of 
the communist party to larger political issues of military coups and border dis-
putes with neighboring Peru and Colombia. The numbered sequence of memos 
addressed to the Division of North and West Coast A
airs continues through 
the PCE congress before coming to a nal and denitive stop on August 19. 
But instead of discussing that meeting, the memos only relate information on 
Mancheno’s coup plotting against the government and political intrigues within 
Plaza’s government. The available documentation in the CREST database fol-
lows a similar trajectory. The CIA has redacted the location in Ecuador where 
ocers acquired their information in the declassied information reports, but 
it would appear that aer Haney’s departure almost all of the information orig-
inated in Quito and therefore was concerned with political developments in the 
capital rather than leist subversion on the coast. Ironically, the departure of one 
dogmatic and obnoxious CIA ocer may have undercut potential insights into 
the 1949 communist party congress.
Intense CIA surveillance of the PCE resumes in December, once again with 
a particular emphasis on Guayaquil. One information report includes a mimeo-
graphed copy of the party’s bulletin from months earlier that criticized Plaza’s 
earthquake reconstruction plans.48 In response to a State Department request 
for examples of communist propaganda, a CIA ocer provided the embassy 
with samples of political handbills, a mimeographed throw sheet Antorcha, 
the party bulletin, and a handbill from the last municipal election—all from 
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Guayaquil—plus Crisol, a communist sheet from Loja and a communist publi-
cation called Realidad from Quito that apparently the embassy personnel col-
lected earlier in the year.49 Aer a break of several months, once again the agency 
resumed its role as a biographer for the party. Unfortunately, the transitions in 
stang means that we are le with only a minimal amount of information on 
what transpired at the fourth party congress.
For Peace, Democracy, and Progress
The PCE published their political resolutions from the congress, and they paint 
a quite di
erent picture of that from the brief conclusions of the CIA analysts in 
Washington.50 The resolutions were a public statement, and available to anyone 
who might wish to know the party’s current political orientation. Logically the 
declaration would seek to present a positive and empowering image, rather than 
the divisive one contained in the CIA report. As framed in the document’s title 
“For Peace, Democracy, and Progress,” the statement appealed for peaceful co-
existence between capitalist and communist governments. This declaration was 
consistent with Saad’s accommodationist position that reected the continued 
inuence of a Browderist line. At the same time, the resolutions were long on 
rhetoric that denounced imperialist penetration of peripheral economies and 
called for the implementation of policies that would favor the working class, 
peasants, and other poor and marginalized peoples. Those statements indicate 
the presence of more militant participants, likely grouped around Paredes, who 
inuenced their contents. At the same time, the resolutions follow a standard 
(for the time) communist line of opposing palace coups and favoring peaceful 
opposition to the current Plaza government. Underlying the document is an 
orthodox Marxist interpretation of the need for a nationalist bourgeois revolu-
tion to establish the proper objective conditions before a move toward socialism 
could be contemplated as a step toward the nal goal of communism. Although 
the statement does not provide specics, it does acknowledge problems and 
shortcomings within the party, and appeals for the creation of a popular front 
to group socialists and other progressives together into an anticonservative alli-
ance. It applauds those in Guayaquil for having made the most progress in this 
direction.
The lengthy statement begins with an optimistic portrayal of the commu-
nist world. Although the battle was hard, the forces in favor of democracy and 
freedom were overcoming imperialism. The statement celebrated economic ad-
vances in the Soviet Union, its struggle to free the oppressed, and movement 
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toward the establishment of a just and permanent peace. The party extolled 
advances in Eastern Europe and Asia including the Chinese Revolution and on-
going struggles in Greece and Spain. “It is the victorious socialist society,” the 
party declared, “that marches towards communism.” A growing peace move-
ment demonstrated that war was not inevitable, and communist parties had 
taken the lead in that process. Even with these advances, people could not relax 
in the face of imperialist aggression. With the recent formation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Truman was heading back to war in 
violation of the United Nations charter. The spreading of foreign military bases 
around the world and the development of nuclear weapons were part of the shi 
in that direction. The Marshall Plan sought to enslave Europe through the de-
struction of domestic industries that could compete with those in the United 
States. The war had created a formable concentration of power in the hands of 
United States monopolies.
Latin America played a central role in this struggle. United States imperialist 
forces saw the region as a source for raw materials and a location for its military 
bases from which to launch its campaigns. This program had been advanced 
through agreements such as the 1947 Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia 
Recíproca (TIAR, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known 
as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact) that provided for mutual hemispheric defense and 
the formation the following year of the OAS in Bogotá, Colombia. Petroleum 
companies and other industries were attempting to colonize Latin America. The 
United States supported the repressive dictatorships of Anastasio Somoza in 
Nicaragua and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. A rising tide of resis-
tance, however, confronted these imperialist and repressive forces. Sustaining a 
movement in favor of peace, democracy, and progress would require a strong or-
ganization to coordinate the forces of resistance, and the communists contended 
that this is what they could contribute to the struggle.
The global situation of imperialism added to the economic crisis that Ecua-
dor faced, with falling prices for its commodities and rising unemployment rates. 
Plaza’s policies of attracting foreign investment only made the situation worse 
since they converted Ecuador into a producer of raw materials for export to the 
United States rather than bolstering internal economic development. The Plaza 
administration was incapable of solving these problems, and his pro-imperialist 
policies and alliances with reactionary forces presented a danger to Ecuador. 
The result would be ruin for the country’s workers and peasants. The PCE 
called for a democratic bourgeois revolution under the leadership of the pro-
letariat to confront these issues. People needed to organize and mobilize broad 
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democratic, anticonservative, antifeudal coalitions. In Ecuador, this would take 
the form of an anti-imperialist agrarian revolution that would break up the cur-
rent land-holding system with an agrarian reform program that would redistrib-
ute land to the rural masses and agricultural workers. At present the movement 
was weak, the party admitted, and needed to be strengthened. A goal was gov-
ernment control of the economy to encourage diversication and expansion of 
production through industrialization and nationalization of foreign companies. 
Only through the socialization of the means of production could the country 
solve its problems, end exploitation, overcome class divisions, and avoid ruin.
The communist party rejected palace coups as a solution to Ecuador’s prob-
lems. Such activity would only result in more misery and reaction. Instead, the 
party called for a strengthening of democratic institutions. Achieving these 
goals would require the elimination of “feudal obstacles that weigh heavily on 
Indians and peasants” through the conversion of state-owned estates into ex-
perimental farms and cooperatives. Industrialization of the economy would be 
achieved through making better use of the country’s natural resources with a 
goal of providing better products for the people. The communist program called 
for higher salaries, price controls, and an expansion of the social security system 
to agricultural workers. Education should be free and universal, and there should 
be an absolute separation of church and state. Ecuador’s sovereignty needed to 
be defended, which required revisions to the Rio de Janeiro Protocol that in 
1942 ceded half of the country’s territory to Peru. The PCE also demanded the 
severing of diplomatic relations with Francisco Franco’s falangist government in 
Spain, and the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union.
The PCE called for the formation of an anticonservative, antifeudal, and an-
ti-imperialist coalition similar to that which led the May 1944 revolution. They 
appealed to socialists, vanguardists, and other progressives to collaborate with 
them in achieving these objectives. Of primary importance was the preservation 
of the unity of the labor movement, and in particular defense of the CTE from 
attacks that sought to divide and weaken it. A struggle for a better life, for de-
mocracy, progress, and peace should not be stopped but instead would deepen. 
The party placed importance on the mobilization of the “rural masses, Indians, 
montuvios [coastal peasants], salaried agricultural workers, and peasants, in a 
struggle for their lives and land.” A strong worker-peasant alliance was necessary 
to achieve these goals, and the PCE saw itself as the lead organizer of this pro-
cess. Only by strengthening the party, consolidating its ideology, and addressing 
its shortcomings would it achieve this task. The resolution concluded with an ac-
knowledgment that too oen such political statements were not put into action. 
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It called for the party to become “an authentic guide of all oppressed people of 
Ecuador,” and to defend democracy and national sovereignty as it engaged in a 
struggle for “a society without classes, without exploitation, without oppression 
of any type.”51 It looked forward to an optimistic future.
As the PCE acknowledged, party resolutions are aspirational rather than a 
reection of concrete, lived realities. As such, this document tells us more about 
communist hopes and dreams than their current struggles. It also provides a 
dramatically di
erent perspective than that contained in the CIA records. Un-
derlying this statement is an implicit acknowledgment of the party’s roots in 
rural campaigns, and an awareness that the possibilities for a socialist revolution 
remained remote on the distant horizon. This cognizance contributed to the 
consolidation of Saad’s moderate leadership in the party while at the same time 
frustrating more radical militants who would eventually break from the party. 
Those tensions were readily evident in the resolutions that emerged out of the 
fourth party congress.
Earthquake
On August 5, 1949, one of the most destructive earthquakes ever to strike Ecua-
dor tore through the central highlands. Its epicenter was located to the southeast 
of Ambato, the capital of the province of Tungurahua. The violent quake, which 
killed more than ve thousand people and le an additional one hundred thou-
sand homeless, had a magnitude of 6.8 on the Richter seismological scale and 
originated at a depth of forty kilometers below the surface. The convergence of 
three tectonic plates causes frequent earthquakes on the Pacic Coast of South 
America. This earthquake was the second worst up to that time in Ecuador’s 
modern history. It was only exceeded with a 1797 earthquake in Riobamba and 
subsequently surpassed by a catastrophic 7.8-magnitude earthquake in April 
2016 near the small city of Pedernales on the coast. In South America, only 
the 1944 San Juan earthquake in Argentina that killed ten thousand people 
was deadlier.
The 1949 earthquake leveled the small towns of Guano, Patate, Pelileo, and 
Píllaro, though the city of Ambato because of its size su
ering the most amount 
of damage. According to observers, Pelileo, which was constructed largely of 
adobe bricks, “simply disappeared.” Only three hundred of its 3,500 inhabitants 
survived. Landslides changed the course of streams and blocked rivers, adding 
to the destruction and at points leaving the countryside unrecognizable. The 
diversion of the Patate River completely submerged Quero under a newly formed 
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lake. Even the distant cities of Quito and Guayaquil experienced some damage. 
A lack of proper sanitation contributed to the spread of a typhus epidemic while 
the disruption of communication networks hindered recovery e
orts.52
President Plaza personally traveled to Ambato to direct rescue and relief 
work. Aid ooded into the country, including provision of medical supplies and 
the arrival of a Red Cross team stationed at the United States military base in 
the Canal Zone in Panama. Calls came in from around the world and from all 
political corners in support of the victims. These included a statement signed 
by a range of leist parties in the coastal province of Guayas.53 The Cuban com-
munist leader Blas Roca sent his condolences to PCE secretary general Paredes, 
and the World Peace Council sent their expressions of solidarity from France to 
Gómez de la Torre.54
The earthquake temporarily suspended direct attacks on the government as 
the country pulled together with recovery e
orts, and Plaza was able to play this 
good will to his advantage. Nevertheless, as the immediate e
ects of the catastro-
phe retreated into the background, animosity to the government once again rose 
in intensity. According to the CIA, “Although the Communists continue their 
policy of watchful waiting, the Socialist and Liberal parties have resumed active 
opposition to the Plaza administration.” The president’s clumsiness in partic-
ular played “admirably into the hands of leist agitators.” The ministry of de-
fense expressed doubt about the loyalty of several army units to the government, 
which contributed to the administration’s weakened condition.55 Adding to the 
diculties, the British minister John Carvell observed, was that most of the 
immediate relief aid came from foreign missions and was largely squandered 
due to a lack of proper control. Little visible reconstruction actually took place.56
A month aer the quake, the PCE released a statement denouncing the in-
eptness of the government’s response to the tragedy and declaring that the party 
would “ght in defense of the lives of the popular masses.”57 The government 
had presented a proposal to congress for a 250 million sucre loan from the Cen-
tral Bank to pay for reconstruction with a plan to pay it back over the course of 
twenty years with new taxes. Tobacco, liquor, and entertainment events would 
all require a “patriotic stamp” that would cost one sucre. Property taxes would in-
crease 5 percent, and the government proposed a 2.5 percent income tax (though 
labor protests led to a reconsideration of that proposal). The communists Pedro 
Saad and Segundo Ramos, the representatives for workers in the federal con-
gress, led the legislative opposition to this proposal. Together with other leists 
and democrats, they gathered twenty votes against the proposal because of the 
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undue burden it would place on workers. Saad argued that the Central Bank 
did not function as a commercial bank that could loan money, but instead its 
purpose was to set monetary policy. The only way it could raise these funds was 
through the printing of currency, and that would result in inationary pressure 
on the economy that would increase the cost of living and lead to a devaluation 
in the local currency that would be disastrous for Ecuador’s balance of payments.
Saad forwarded a counterproposal that earthquake relief be funded instead 
through taxes on private capital. Specically, the communists proposed a 1 per-
cent tax on wealthy landowners who, incidentally, currently paid nothing, as 
well as on commercial, industrial, and banking ventures; urban property; and 
foreign businesses. Saad claimed that those taxes would garner 10 billion sucres. 
According to Saad, the communist plan would fund reconstruction without 
causing injury to the livelihoods of the working class. In denouncing regressive 
taxation policies and pressing for progressive taxes instead, the PCE presented 
itself as the principle defender of working-class interests, and called on laborers 
to support the communist party.
Although the PCE failed in its legislative attempt to implement an alternative 
proposal for reconstruction, it exploited the natural disaster to advance the par-
ty’s interests. The PCE closed its two-page statement on reconstruction e
orts 
with a series of slogans that highlighted the program that it advocated: no taxes 
on workers’ salaries, and taxation on the capital gains of wealthy landowners. 
Even though the oligarchy rejected their proposals, the PCE promised to con-
tinue to organize a mass struggle to force congress to roll back the new taxes that 
hurt the working class and to search for new solutions to the current economic 
crisis. In contrast to persistent US government claims that the communists were 
only interested in sabotage and violence, party leaders presented themselves as 
reasonable and rational actors who forwarded concrete and proactive policy 
proposals.
Communist exploitation of the failure of reconstruction e
orts for their own 
political ends and their framing of the issues in terms of class struggle deeply 
bothered United States diplomatic ocials. One communication complained 
that when USIE ocers visited Pelileo they discovered “Commies taking advan-
tage [of the] situation.” As evidence of this interference, the ocers brought back 
sample copies of communist publications, including some from Mexico.58 In all 
honesty, US aid programs were hardly more altruistic, but the earthquake does 
highlight how disasters easily become avenues for advancing political agendas 
and how they reveal deep class cleavages in society.
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Debates at the fourth party congress of the PCE highlight the inherent dif-
culties in transitions of leadership. In the case of those grouped around Ricardo 
Paredes and Pedro Saad, the scues also reected di
erent cultural orientations, 
personal styles, and political agendas. The party shied from a concentration 
on rural highland Indigenous struggles to an emphasis on urban working-class 
organizations on the coast. Tensions that accompanied these changes emerged 
in the preparations for the congress, during the congress itself, and in the reso-
lutions that came out of the congress.
Whether for opportunistic or ideological purposes, the communist party 
placed itself at the front of working-class struggles even as it faced deep divisions 
within its own ranks. It strove to remain relevant and visible as political senti-
ments appeared to dri away from socialist solutions to the pressing problems 
that the country faced. Despite diculties and in the midst of many di
erent 
transitions, the party continued ghting for a fairer and more just world. In 
doing so, and in the face of these challenges, activists laid the basis for political 
developments that were to come in the future.
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Transitions
T he 1950s were a period of continual transitions for the communist party in Ecuador. The new and upcoming head Pedro Saad took over the reins from the party’s founder and longtime secretary general Ricardo 
Paredes. With a change in leadership, the party underwent a corresponding con-
version from an emphasis on rural and Indigenous communities to urban labor 
issues. The party’s organizational base also shied from the capital Quito in the 
highlands to the commercial center of Guayaquil on the coast. According to the 
communist author and militant Elías Muñoz Vicuña, “The main characteristic 
of these years was the policy of unmasking imperialism and the action of orga-
nization and struggle of the masses for their immediate demands and rights.”1
Party members continued to ght for a more just and equal world, even when 
such possibilities appeared remote. In the process they laid the groundwork for 
future political advances.
Internal transitions in the party took place in the midst of larger political 
transformations. Most notable was the 1949 Chinese Revolution that brought 
Mao Zedong to power. Much as the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had 
inspired militants to form socialist parties in their own countries, the Chinese 
Revolution similarly triggered heightened levels of activism in Latin America 
and elsewhere in the underdeveloped periphery of the global economy. These 
developments brought both opportunities and challenges. In the 1960s divisions 
between the Soviets and Chinese would break wide open with fractures that ran 
throughout communist parties around the world. The groundwork for these 
changes were laid during this time.
In addition to this global context, CIA surveillance of communist involve-
ment in labor activities along with its other investigations shed light on the 
party’s persistent presence and political actions. Women, with longtime activist 
Nela Martínez in the lead, defended the rights of striking workers and inevitably 
faced sanctions from government ocials for their actions. Communists and 
socialists continued to tangle over what stance they should take toward the Galo 
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Plaza Lasso government, with socialists ultimately accepting positions in his ad-
ministration while the communists retained their status of principled opposi-
tion. While the two le parties oen disagreed over tactics—sometimes ercely 
so—they shared similar goals of advancing the interests of the working class.
Although the communists faced constant obstacles, they also used whatever 
mechanisms they had at their disposal to press their political agenda. The party 
was particularly e	ective at supporting labor movements and encouraging strike 
activity. This ability to provide structure and leadership to working-class de-
mands is what gained it the antagonism of both domestic and international op-
ponents, and in turn resulted in the dedicated attention of surveillance agencies 
that ultimately chronicled the PCE’s actions. With access to that information, 
we can begin to reconstruct histories that might otherwise have been lost or 
forgotten.
China
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China. 
The Communist Party of China was founded in 1921 and initially allied with 
the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang). In 1927, the alliance broke 
down when the conservative leader Chiang Kai-shek gained control of the Kuo-
mintang. The communists retreated to the countryside to build up their local 
bases under Mao’s guidance as head of the Red Army. In 1945 at the end of 
the Second World War and with the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 
communists and nationalists fought for control of China. By the end of 1948, the 
communists had gained the upper hand in the conict and it became apparent 
that they would soon defeat the Kuomintang.
With victory imminent in China, the CIA reported that their Ecuadorian 
counterparts were realizing success in their penetration of the country’s army. 
“They believe the advances in China have made a deep impression in the lower 
echelons of the Latin American armies,” a CIA information report stated, “and 
claim to be in a position where they can now control the lower ranks of the 
Ecuadoran Army.” Even so, the communists were hesitant to test the depth of 
their strength in case their attempts resulted in failure. “Their policy is to await 
coordinated revolutionary activity in Latin America which would be part of 
a world revolution,” the agency declared.2 Saad claimed that the party could 
depend on 60 percent of the noncommissioned ocers in the army, although a 
CIA case ocer thought that number to be inated. According to that ocer, 
it “probably includes many disgruntled persons who would balk at supporting a 
Transitions 95 
Communist movement were it identied as such.” Saad noted that if the min-
ister of defense attempted to undermine the communist presence by moving 
members to another unit, they would just pick up where they had le o	 orga-
nizing their previous unit.3
At the same time, the coastal branch of the party convened several closed 
meetings to plan actions to take advantage of the political openings that com-
munist victories in China provided. In particular, the party looked to increase 
activity among its existing cells, establish new cells among agricultural workers, 
and form a new communist-controlled cooperative in the Milagro area.4 These 
measures underscored the communist desire to build a strong political move-
ment rather than conspiring with meaningless palace coups that would leave 
existing exploitative structures intact. These reports also indicate continued 
aspirations for a global communist revolution that would abolish the entire cap-
italist system, rather than being content with much more limited nationalist and 
reformist movements.
CIA surveillance reinforces a perception that the organizational process was 
more advanced in Guayaquil than Quito. Seemingly drawing on information 
from informers in Ecuador (although source data is redacted in the declassied 
versions), one document reported on the active engagement of the PCE’s Guaya-
quil branch “with both political and military revolutionary elements.” Some cen-
tral committee members allegedly advocated that the time was right “to form a 
revolutionary political front to cooperate with the military in overthrowing the 
government.” According to the CIA case ocer, the communists faced two ob-
stacles in achieving their objective: “the apathy or inertia of the anti-government 
groups; and the reluctance of these groups to participate in any movement with 
the Communists.”5 Despite Saad’s best e	orts, rising anticommunist sentiments 
meant that the party faced increased diculties in nding partners who would 
ally with them in common political struggles.
Another CIA information report indicated that Saad pointed to the situation 
in China as having a positive e	ect on growth in communist party membership. 
In 1948, the Guayaquil branch had received an average of thirty-ve membership 
applications a month, but in the rst twenty-four days of January 1949 (through 
the date of receipt of information for the report) they had received more than 
one hundred. Saad expected interest in the PCE to increase even more aer the 
Chinese communists declared nal victory. In anticipation of this development, 
the party was planning propaganda campaigns to promote the advantages of a 
communist system over a capitalist one. Even so, Saad indicated that the party 
was leery of expanding its membership too quickly. The party accepted new 
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applicants only as sympathizers until they could demonstrate their sincerity to 
the communist cause. He remained alert to the possible presence of inltrators 
who could open the party to disruptive forces.6 The extent of CIA surveillance 
would make it appear that they were not careful enough.
Responses to the Chinese Revolution provide examples of the close collabo-
ration between the CIA and other US agencies, particularly on the ground in 
South America. In February 1949, a “controlled American source,” presumably 
Albert Haney, forwarded a handbill from the coastal communist party to the 
embassy as evidence of the local inuence of communist victories in China (see 
gure 6.1).7 Ambassador John Simmons, in turn, had the handbill translated in 
English and a week later forwarded that translation to the State Department in 
Washington. The yer celebrated “the heroic Chinese people who are in a victo-
rious campaign defeating the militarist Chinese bandits led by Chiang Kai Shek, 
servants of the Feudal Chinese masters and of Yankee Imperialism.” The party 
called for a “popular assembly in favor of a democratic China,” and proclaimed 
that their battles were “showing us the road of our own social liberation” over 
Ecuador’s feudal masters and reactionary capitalists. The gains in China demon-
strated that united the people could achieve national liberation, and that impe-
rialism was not an invincible force. The leaet concluded with a proclamation, 
“For the destruction of imperialism and the social and national liberation of 
Ecuador.”8 The communists expressed optimism that soon victory would be 
theirs as well.
Simmons commented that “such propaganda designed to make political cap-
ital of communist successes in China had been anticipated in reports reaching 
a controlled American source.”9 And, in fact, Haney had been providing Sim-
mons with a continual ow of information, some of which survives in di	erent 
formats at di	erent points in the archives. In one report, Haney added that the 
impetus behind this increased activity was the receipt of a circular from France 
on the subject of communist victories in China.10 A persistent assumption was 
that the party responded more readily to external stimuli and inuences than 
to local factors. Such comments reected both negative attitudes toward the 
organizational capacity of local communists, as well as a primary concern with 
external cold war tensions rather than the domestic roots of rebellion.
The Chinese Revolution continued to have a signicant inuence on the Ec-
uadorian le throughout the 1950s and eventually contributed to a split in the 
party in the 1960s. Throughout this time, the CIA tracked travel between the 
two regions. CIA analysts feared that communist leaders—particularly those in 
Figure 6.1. A yer calling for a “popular assembly in support of a democratic China” 
in celebration of communist victories in China. Source: Partido Comunista del 
Ecuador (PCE), “Gran Asamblea Popular Pro China Democrática,” 1949, BEAEP.
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impetus behind this increased activity was the receipt of a circular from France 
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organizational capacity of local communists, as well as a primary concern with 
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Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica—looked to apply “the methods and 
activities of the Chinese Communist Party to Latin American conditions.”11
Beyond ideological anity, party leaders pointed to parallels between the two 
regions that included foreign economic domination and their semi-colonial po-
litical status. Many members believed that China provided “a better model for 
agrarian Latin America than does the more industrialized USSR.”12 A denitive 
split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese wings of the communist parties did 
not occur until the 1960s, but preliminary indications of those fractures were 
present much earlier.
La Industrial
In 1950, a simmering conict over wages and working conditions at the cotton 
textile factory La Industrial in Quito broke out into a strike. Workers accused 
their boss of abuses and a failure to comply with the stipulations of the 1938 
Labor Code. They demanded that the factory’s owner allow red workers to 
return to their posts, stop revenge actions against labor organizers, and raise 
salaries by 35 percent.13 As the strike dragged on, other factories joined solidar-
ity actions with the laborers at La Industrial. Organizers began to talk about 
launching a general strike.14 Workers took to the streets in protest. The police 
red teargas on the demonstrators, even though the march was comprised pri-
marily of women workers and their children. Three of the workers ended up in 
the hospital with injuries.15 When the strikes and marches did not lead to the 
desired results, labor leaders at the factory launched a hunger strike. They vowed 
to continue the struggle until their demands were met.16
In the middle of this hunger strike, Mariana Carvajal, the ten-month old 
daughter of the factory worker Luz María Corral, died of malnutrition. Her 
mother had spent the last thirty-six days holed up in the plant in support of the 
industrial action, and both her parents were participating in the hunger strike. 
Workers took the baby’s body to the labor union headquarters for a funeral 
wake.17 The next aernoon, workers and their family members accompanied 
the body to the cemetery. Three workers carried the banner of La Industrial’s 
labor union at the head of the procession. Following the banner were supporters 
who collected funds for the family of the deceased to pay for burial and other 
expenses. Aer parading through the city and across the central plaza, the 
mourners arrived at the San Diego Cemetery to bury the baby. At the cemetery, 
a series of labor leaders spoke, including communist militant Reinaldo Miño, 
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CTE president César Humberto Navarro, and FTP president César Florencio 
González.18
The leist student federation FEUE published a poetic statement on Carva-
jal’s death in its newspaper, together with a photo of Corral holding the child 
and the father by their side. The story began,
One Saturday aernoon, we buried a girl, a brief tenant of life. Her fragile 
existence broke like a stem and the earth devoured it in its bottomless face.
The essay continued with the observation that the story of the dead child was 
“at once simple and terrible.” She had been born into poverty to working-class 
parents who wanted to work and improve their lives, but the wealthy factory 
owners wanted to close the plant. This led to the long, drawn out walk out that 
ended with the hunger strike in order to move justice forward. The child was an 
innocent victim of that protest, and a sacrice to save the lives of others. With 
her burial, the article concluded, the strikers planted justice. “And this dead girl 
is the diminutive seed of justice. And the seed will germinate someday. A very 
true and very clear day.”19 The students hoped their passionate statement would 
help advance the rights of the workers.
The death of the child had little e	ect on the factory owner, who called in 
the police to evict the striking workers from the plant—even though the gov-
ernment refused to follow through on his request.20 Finally, aer a forty-day 
strike, the workers peacefully le the factory aer reaching an agreement with 
the owner on the payment of wages. The FTP was not content with the settle-
ment—from their perspective it was a violation of Ecuador’s labor code. The 
federation announced plans for a general strike in Pichincha in order to defend 
all of the country’s workers from such abuses.21 The struggle was intense, and 
communists were in the middle and actively involved with it.
Two days aer Carvajal’s funeral, the Quito police announced that they were 
looking for the communist militant Nela Martínez to question her about the 
amount of money she had collected for the child’s family. Ocers had searched 
for Martínez late into the night without being able to nd her. Police Chief 
Jorge Quintana declared that the child’s parents, Luis Carvajal Ruiz and Luz 
María Corral, had accused Martínez of not giving them all of the money she 
had collected from workers during the funeral procession. A woman named 
Hipatia Nicolalde had told them that 60 sucres and 55 cents could not be the 
total that Martínez had mustered from their fellow workers, and charged that 
she had pocketed the rest. Carvajal Ruiz and Corral denounced Martínez for 
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proting from their tragedy. They also denied that their child had died as a re-
sult of the strike. The police chief Quintana declared that as soon as they could 
nd Martínez he would be able to establish the validity of the allegations against 
her, and that he had requested the collaboration of the provincial police to arrest 
those implicated in this issue.22
The FTP protested against the charges that the police had brought against 
Martínez. Workers gathered at the Casa del Obrero, the workers’ center that was 
a standard gathering point in Quito, declared that the accusations were not true. 
They alleged that the police had distorted the events, and that the 60 sucres that 
Martínez had given the parents was the total amount that they had collected. 
The workers denied that Martínez was even present when organizers handed 
the collected funds over to Carvajal’s parents. The feminist AFE also responded 
with a strongly worded statement that pledged their unequivocal support for 
Martínez, one of the founders of the organization. It called the charges slander-
ous, outrageous, and lacking any basis in fact. The AFE denounced those who 
advanced the indictment as dishonest, and declared their absolute support for 
Martínez who was well known for her honesty and integrity. The police chief 
Quintana responded to these statements with a defense of his actions, stating 
that in questioning Martínez he was simply following through with an inves-
tigation into the accusations that the parents had made based on Nicolalde’s 
allegations.23
Martínez, who was not in hiding, went to the police station when she heard 
that they were looking for her. Together with her friend and comrade María 
Luisa Gómez de la Torre, she presented the police with a statement proclaiming 
her innocence. Aer a short interview with Quintana, Martínez turned to leave. 
Instead, two ocers stopped her and placed her under arrest. When Martínez 
insisted on seeing the arrest warrant, the ocers would only tell her that they 
were following “órdenes superiores,” higher orders. Martínez protested angrily, 
contending that her detention was a violation of her rights and democratic prin-
ciples. The police insisted that the summons she faced had nothing to do with 
political concerns, but rather a criminal charge that she had embezzled funds 
collected for the deceased child’s family. Martínez pleaded her innocence, and 
claimed that she had yet to see the indictments that she was facing. Neverthe-
less, Quintana locked her in a holding cell until the accusations that Carvajal’s 
parents had brought against her could be investigated. Quintana also stated that 
he wanted to conrm how Carvajal had died, whether it was due to asphyx-
iation from tear gas that the police had red on the strikers, as some sources 
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indicated, or whether the child died at home and not in the factory, as her par-
ents claimed.24
The following day, the ministry of government that oversaw the police clar-
ied that the arrest order against Martínez was still in e	ect, which is why she 
was imprisoned. Nevertheless, the ministry ordered her release, a directive with 
which the police immediately complied.25 With that, the entire incident seemed 
to dissipate and be forgotten. Martínez does not even mention the incident in 
her autobiography.26 Rather than an insignicant event, it was just one more 
episode in the long struggle of a committed communist who su	ered repeated 
imprisonments and other repressive reprisals for her actions.
Intriguingly, the CIA archives document local police e	orts to discredit 
Martínez’s successful organizing e	orts “by falsely accusing her of keeping 
money which was collected for the family of a baby who died during the recent 
La Industrial hunger strike.” The CIA report summarizes the same narrative 
that appeared in the media, perhaps the source for their information. It recounts 
how Martínez and other activists solicited material and moral aid for the strikers. 
The women had collected money during the baby’s funeral procession, and en-
trusted Martínez with delivering the collected funds to the family. Media reports 
indicated that she had kept a sizable amount of the funds for herself, and only 
gave 60 sucres to the family. Other witnesses, however, declared that they had 
collected a total of 60 sucres and that Martínez had delivered the entire amount 
to the family. None of these sources ever presented a convincing explanation for 
why Martínez might want to keep some of the money that the solidarity activists 
had collected. If anything, given her history, she was more likely to add funds to 
the pot from her own pocket if the amount collected was insucient.
According to the CIA ocer in Quito, Martínez and others had collected the 
money “in order to gain adherents to the Communist cause among the laboring 
classes,” which led to the police attempts to discredit their activities.27 The way 
the CIA reports the story that the charges were “announced in the press” would 
indicate a planted story and a concerted campaign against the communists. The 
ocer states, “aer the rst accusations appeared in the press, Martínez publicly 
denounced the chief of police,” even though such a statement does not appear in 
El Comercio. According to the CIA, the police chief used her public statements 
as a justication to dra a statement for the dead child’s mother to sign that 
accused Martínez of absconding with the collected funds. Drawing on private 
information from the police, the case ocer reported that the police chief paid 
the mother 50 sucres to sign the statement. With that “evidence” in hand, he 
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then called in Martínez. The communist activist willingly presented herself to 
police headquarters convinced of her innocence, completely unaware of the fab-
ricated charges that she would face. It was on that basis that the police detained 
Martínez overnight, but released her the following day when she promised to 
return if so ordered.
Some crucial parts of this story disappear from the historical record, particu-
larly the actions and motivations of the parents, Corral and Carvajal Ruiz. From 
media reports, it would appear that the baby’s mother Corral willingly partic-
ipated in the hunger strike, but then turned against those who sought to gain 
political advantage from her child’s death, but they give little indication why 
this might be. A reasonable assumption is that a mother’s grief at losing a child 
was intense, and she may not have appreciated having a private event politicized. 
Media and intelligence reports do not indicate whether this was Corral’s rst 
or only child, but in the absence of mention of other children that probably was 
the case. Furthermore, given the demographics of textile factory workers Corral 
may have been a young mother. The picture of her that the FEUE printed in 
their newspaper would seem to conrm that fact. She may have felt embarrassed 
or feared moral or criminal sanction with accusations of being an irresponsible 
mother for letting a child die while engaged in a political action. The authorities 
could have easily taken advantage of her marginalized status to attack the com-
munists. An attempt at denial of culpability, either from the parents who may 
have feared being cast as irresponsible for taking their child to a protest or the 
police who did not want to face charges of killing an innocent baby, may have 
played into the parents’ statement that the baby was at home when she died. 
Finally, we do not know anything about Corral’s political beliefs and attitudes. 
If she were politically antagonistic to the le, or simply apolitical, she may have 
been tempted to take both the 60 sucres from the march as well as the additional 
50 sucres from the police. Presumably with a long drawn out strike in process she 
would be in a dicult nancial situation, and the bribe from the police to pursue 
charges against Martínez may have been too tempting to pass up. Unfortunately, 
with the available documentation it is impossible to determine the thoughts and 
motivations that informed the actions of the two parents.
The CIA report includes other information that was not publicly available, 
which indicates collaboration with Ecuador’s police forces. According to the 
agency, when Gómez de la Torre who had accompanied Martínez to the police 
station became nervous that the police would also detain her, she surreptitiously 
destroyed two letters in her purse. Apparently an informer was able to retrieve 
the correspondence, because the agency reported that one was a subscription 
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to the Revue Partisans de la Paix, a publication of the World Peace Council in 
France, and the other was to PCE secretary general Paredes who was currently 
living in Manta. The CIA provided specic information on the contents of both 
letters. The rst was addressed to the attention of R. Simon at 15 rue Feyseau in 
Paris and included $10 USD for the subscription. The second to Paredes related 
recent communist activities in Quito, including police e	orts to break up com-
munist demonstrations as well as the slander campaign against Martínez in the 
current La Industrial case. The CIA report does not reveal whether Gómez de 
la Torre had not been successful in hiding her communications and whether 
the police recovered their contents, or whether the information came from an 
inltrator in the communist party to whom she may have later related the spe-
cics of the encounter. The level of detail, including the specic address for the 
French periodical, would seem to indicate that police provided the particulars to 
the CIA from information that they had retrieved. If this were the case, it would 
amount to a police admission that they had arrested Martínez on trumped up 
charges, and perhaps the CIA was even complicit in attempts to discredit her 
political activities.28
A month later in a report on “subversive” activities in Ecuador, CIA analysts 
in Washington conrmed that the charges of absconding with funds had merely 
been a pretext to imprison Martínez. Its intent was to warn “the Communists 
that any great increase in their activities may henceforth be countered with 
stronger measures on the part of the government.” Both the Ecuadorian govern-
ment and the CIA were concerned with the leading roles that women played in 
communist activities. Martínez was a good organizer, and she had dedicated her 
e	orts to assembling housewives in Quito into peace committees. Other prom-
inent communist women were actively organizing in Guayaquil as well, which 
led to a strengthened le.29 Surveillance provides evidence of the government’s 
repressive actions, but more importantly chronicles strategies the le employed 
and the challenges they faced in advancing their political agenda.
The CIA’s complicity with Martínez’s arrest in Quito in the midst of the strike 
at La Industrial was part of its broader preoccupation with communist inltration 
of labor groups. This was the case even though according to the agency’s own in-
ternal intelligence estimates the communists held little power in the hemisphere. 
In a March 1950 assessment of communist capabilities in Latin America, CIA 
analysts concluded that parties remained small and activities “continued at about 
the same low level.” Much of their emphasis was on maintaining their inuence 
in labor organizations, even as they fought for their very existence.30 At the same 
time, CIA analysts expressed a fear that even though communist strength and 
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inuence was minor, this trend of declining inuence that had been evident since 
the closing of postwar democratic openings in 1947 might be coming to an end. 
On the one hand, governmental anticommunist actions had led to communist 
losses in Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia, and repressive actions had prevented 
gains in Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. On the other hand, major political parties had 
accepted communist collaboration in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Cuba, which 
reduced their political isolation, made them appear more respectable, increased 
their ability to attract new recruits and collect funds, and in general strength-
ened their political position. While these recent advances were not large, the CIA 
feared that they might portend future communist gains. In addition, communists 
could exploit political and economic instability in Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and 
Ecuador.31 The agency e	ectively capitalized on anxieties over potential commu-
nist advances to justify continued surveillance of their activities.
Socialist Ministers
In 1950 and approaching the halfway point in Plaza’s mandate, coup threats 
began to drop o	 as the president consolidated his control over the country. In an 
annual review of Ecuadorian events, the British ambassador John Carvell sum-
marized 1950 as a largely peaceful year with few signicant events. He credited 
economic improvements and simple luck with Plaza’s unprecedented ability to 
hold on to the presidency, because in his frank and quite derogatory assessment 
Ecuadorians “are as yet neither politically nor ethically tted for the democratic 
way of life as we understand it.”32 Journalist Milton Bracker presented a some-
what more optimistic appraisal in an article in the New York Times. Together 
with Uruguay, Bracker saw Ecuador as a relative anomaly in the region in that it 
had largely been spared from the military governments and extraconstitutional 
changes in administration that had recently plagued other countries.33 From his 
perspective, the future looked bright for Ecuador.
Following up on Bracker’s analysis, in April 1951 veteran Latin American cor-
respondent Herbert Matthews reported in the New York Times that Ecuador 
was “providing one of the most remarkable of all Latin American experiments in 
democracy.” Under the leadership of a “tall, dark and handsome young athlete,” 
Ecuador had achieved a certain amount of stability and prosperity. In glowing 
terms, Matthews described Plaza as having “imposed democracy and stability 
from above” and of maintaining “it by sheer force of personality.” Despite re-
peated attempted coups, Matthews was optimistic that Plaza would manage to 
preserve order in the country. He recognized, however, that one of the president’s 
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largest liabilities was his close identication with the United States. Those impe-
rial connections did not play well in a nationalistic environment.
From Matthews’s perspective, the biggest danger to a continuance of demo-
cratic rule was not the socialist le, but conservatives who had been out of power 
for more than half a century and “at last see a good chance to come back, and 
their traditions are by no means democratic.” Matthews describes Plaza as at-
tempting to organize a progressive coalition for the upcoming 1952 presidential 
elections to prevent the right from returning to power. At the same time, he 
retained profoundly anticommunist sentiments. One of the diculties Plaza 
faced in oce was eliminating communists from his party. From his perspective, 
“democracy is the best answer to communism.” Plaza contended that the “two 
are incompatible,” and he was committed to their removal from positions of 
authority.34 The cold war and red scare were becoming more readily apparent 
in Ecuador.
In an attempt to hold on to power in the face of constant threats, Plaza fre-
quently rotated out cabinet ministers. Among the changes was the appointment 
of ve di	erent ministers of government. In May 1951, Plaza engaged in yet an-
other cabinet shakeup, apparently to bring his government in line with plans 
to form a progressive coalition to contest the 1952 presidential elections. Plaza 
eliminated conservatives and added a liberal and two socialists, Carlos Cueva 
Tamariz at education and Colón Serrano at economy. Of the two, Cueva Tam-
ariz was the more signicant. He was born in Cuenca, and during his public 
life he alternated between academic and political careers. He founded a student 
federation while at the University of Cuenca in the 1920s. In the 1930s he began 
teaching history and law at the university, and in 1944 assumed the post of rec-
tor—a position he held on and o	 until the 1970s. Beginning in the 1920s, he 
served multiple terms on the city council of Cuenca and as a deputy in the fed-
eral congress. In the 1930s, he helped refound the socialist party. He also held the 
position of minister of the interior, and in 1938 was considered for the presidency 
of the republic. He had run for vice president on a liberal-socialist ticket with 
Alberto Enríquez Gallo in 1948, but lost that position to the conservative candi-
date Manuel Sotomayor y Luna. The British Embassy described Cueva Tamariz 
as “a Socialist with tendencies towards the Le of that Party, who was “consid-
ered one of the most qualied for oce.”35 He remained politically active for the 
next several decades. Similarly, Serrano was one of the founders of the socialist 
party and also served in various educational, political, and diplomatic roles.
The appointments resulted from Plaza caving to pressure from the le to 
strengthen an anticonservative front. In exchange for the cabinet posts, Plaza 
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gained socialist support that helped solidify his government’s hold on power. At 
the same time, the nominations sowed discord between the socialist and com-
munist parties. From the socialists’ perspective, access to the cabinet posts was 
an opportunity to gain a seat at the table and have a say in the shaping of policy. 
The communists, however, condemned the selections as a meaningless gesture 
that did little to advance a leist agenda. Underlying communist opposition 
was the recognition that Plaza was successfully marginalizing them as a politi-
cal player.36
In the midst of this cabinet shakeup, the United States Embassy’s chargé d’af-
faires John Hamlin sent a telegram to the State Department highlighting that 
the principal factor underlying the current political crisis was a fear that le-
ist disunity would result in a conservative victory in the 1952 election. Hamlin 
noted that appointment of a leist minister of government might temporarily 
ease the situation, but he did not discount the possibility that a deteriorating 
political situation could still result in a coup.37 El Comercio reported that con-
servatives responded to the shi to the le in the cabinet with the comment 
that “The government tries to deliver the country into the hands of a single 
party, which serves to open a path for the triumph of communism.”38 Hamlin 
relayed this statement to the State Department, adding his additional concern 
that a “Commie triumph . . . will place continental security in danger.”39 Despite 
all appearances and Plaza’s claims to the contrary, the US Embassy feared that 
his policies exposed the country to a communist threat. United States ocials 
had diculties distinguishing between socialists and communists, with some 
embassy personnel contending that no meaningful di	erence existed between 
the two. That confusion was at play with Plaza’s nomination of Cueva Tamariz 
and Serrano.
In a summary of the week’s political events, Hamlin noted that Plaza rst 
o	ered the portfolio of education to Benjamín Carrión, president of the Casa 
de la Cultura and editor of the new progressive newspaper El Sol, and the post 
at nance to Angel F. Rojas, a socialist from Guayaquil. Both declined the posi-
tions, favoring instead to continue their publishing and cultural activities. The 
posts then passed on to Cueva Tamariz and Serrano in exchange for a tacit agree-
ment with the socialist party to stop its opposition to the government. Hamlin 
cautioned that as a result of this development, the socialist cabinet ministers 
would “promote [their] party policies within [the government] while Socialist 
Commie inclined newspapers and cultural org[anizations would] mold public 
opinion.” From Hamlin’s perspective, those negative inuences included both 
El Sol and the Casa de la Cultura as well as the socialist party newspaper La 
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Tierra that oen reported on communist party events and policy statements. 
Hamlin feared that these developments represented a growth in leist strength 
in the country. As a reection of this ascendancy, the VRSE, an “o	 shoot [of 
the] Socialist party, closer to Communism,” that had been inactive for a long 
time had begun to reorganize its provincial committees.40 He feared that leist 
unity could challenge US interests in the region.
The advantages of having socialists in the cabinet to achieve broader leist 
objectives were more apparent to outsiders than to the Ecuadorian communists. 
In June 1951, the United States Embassy in Quito reported on a comment that 
the Chilean communist Juan Esteban García Moreno had made at a communist 
assembly in Guayaquil that Ecuador was one of few countries where communists 
had complete freedom of action. García Moreno claimed that it would be easier 
for the communists to implement their plans with “so many Socialists in the cab-
inet and ministerial positions.” Rather than opposing this development, García 
Moreno urged the communists to exploit the opportunities that socialist par-
ticipation in government provided to them. He spoke of Chile’s own experience 
with the collapse of their popular front government and of Gabriel González 
Videla subsequently outlawing the party, and he wanted his Ecuadorian coun-
terparts to avoid the same fate.41
Although approaching the issue from an entirely di	erent ideological per-
spective, the Oce of Intelligence Research at the State Department echoed 
García Moreno’s sentiments. The OIR complained that the socialist party con-
tained “many pro-Communist elements,” and that “Socialist labor and student 
groups continued to show a strong pro-Communist trend.” Although conicts 
between Plaza’s MCDN and the PCE had complicated the process of building 
an anticonservative electoral front, the OIR cautioned of the potential for in-
creased communist inuence in the June 1952 presidential election. The socialist 
cabinet appointments had further ramications that concerned the State De-
partment. The appointment of a socialist as minister of education strengthened 
the position of “Communist youth-student groups,” including providing ocial 
support for a delegation to the Third World Youth Festival for Peace in Berlin 
in August. Despite evidence to the contrary, the OIR feared a growing leist 
presence in Ecuador.42
For their part, analysts at CIA Headquarters commented, “the recent ap-
pointment of Socialists (one of whom is reported to have had some connections 
with the Communist Party) to two of the eight cabinet posts during the recent 
cabinet reorganization was motivated by a desire to reduce some of the opposi-
tion to the Government and improve the present administration’s chances of 
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serving out its term until 1952.” Ironically, the CIA expressed less concern than 
did the embassy or the OIR about this development since Plaza maintained a 
strongly pro-United States policy and did not delegate broad authority to his 
cabinet ministers. According to the CIA, “he would probably not hesitate to 
remove these men from the cabinet if convinced that they are at any time seeking 
to further Communist objectives.” These factors “should serve as a sucient 
check to prevent the Communist Party from gaining any notable advantage 
through any inuence it may have with the two Socialist ministers.” In this case, 
the CIA accurately viewed Plaza as friendly to United States interests, and con-
tended that his actions should be embraced rather than feared.43
Socialists strongly defended the cabinet appointments from conservative 
attacks, in particular Cueva Tamariz at education who they saw as a bulwark 
against a return to conservative Catholic control. Maintaining free, secular, and 
universal access to education was key to the creation of the type of world that 
they envisioned. The PSE organized a meeting of workers, students, and teachers 
to demonstrate their solidarity and arm their willingness to take to the streets 
in support of a secular education system if necessary.44 Conservatives would not 
easily or readily give up their advantages, which heightened the potential conict 
facing the country.
“No privileged class voluntarily resigns any of its privileges,” the jour-
nalist and labor organizer Albert Rhys Williams observed in the context of the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution. “No class steeped in tradition discards the old and 
gladly embraces the new.”45 This truism repeatedly emerged apparent in Ecuador 
during the 1950s as communist militants appealed to the model that the Chinese 
Revolution o	ered and as they sought to advance labor struggles. Meanwhile, 
party members continued their collaboration with working-class campaigns as 
dedicated activists who toiled to build a better world. The collection of dona-
tions for the parents of a recently deceased child, as Martínez and others had 
done in the midst of the strike at La Industrial, was hardly a radical action. 
Rather, it reected a humane response to an exploitative situation—not entirely 
unlike the types of reforms that socialist leaders attempted to realize with their 
acceptance of ministerial posts in Plaza’s government. The ruling class refused 
to make even these minor concessions.
Throughout all of these transitions, deep divisions ran through the PCE be-
tween those grouped around the labor organizer and coastal communist leader 
Pedro Saad who wanted to collaborate with progressive governments and others 
such as party founder and longtime leader Ricardo Paredes who advocated for a 
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much more militant position of relying on grassroots social movement pressure.46
According to the CIA, former Trotskyists who challenged “the advisability of 
blindly following orders from the USSR” contributed to further discord within 
the party. Bitter debates threatened a split within the communist ranks, but in 
the CIA’s assessment the party could little a	ord divisions when it was “making 
every e	ort to expand and strengthen the organization.”47 Whether or not the 
party could navigate these conicts would dene its ability to survive and our-
ish. Even minor and gradual changes required a great deal of e	ort, and with the 
growth of external populist threats the much more profound transformations 
that many leists desired appeared to recede ever more distantly on the horizon.
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Populism
P opulist politicians provided an equal if not greater threat to the political le than either domestic conservative opponents or external surveillance agents. Populists competed for the allegiance of the same 
working-class base as the socialists and communists, but with quite dierent 
ends in mind. Rather than advancing an ideological agenda of 
ghting for a more 
equal and just society, populists typically engaged in personalistic campaigns 
that advanced an individual leader who portended to embody the interests of 
society as a whole. Their emotional and nationalist appeals that super
cially 
emulated a radical rhetoric of railing against the oligarchy proved to be eective 
at mobilizing working-class support, even if it ultimately worked against their 
own class interests.
Populist e	cacy at launching successful electoral campaigns made it di	-
cult for the le to counter their actions. In general, socialists and communists 
realized most success when organized as social movements that pressed their 
demands as part of a broader campaign for the rights of workers. Nevertheless, 
some communist leaders consistently pushed for the formation of an electoral 
popular front to defeat conservatives and remove populists from political power. 
Ironically, even as United States o	cials condemned leists for their alleged 
subversive activities, it was these conservatives and right-wing populists who 
were much more willing and even eager to resort to military coups that would 
create a break in the constitutional order.
All of these issues played out across the 1950s, and were most visibly on dis-
play in Ecuador in the 1952 presidential campaign. To the surprise of pundits 
and many observers, the perennial populist candidate José María Velasco Ibarra 
won that election. Despite the le’s best eorts to form a coalition to keep con-
servative and populist forces out of o	ce, in
ghting over dierent personalities 
and political ideals thwarted eorts at progressive unity. Anticommunist senti-
ments also meant that liberals and socialists willingly turned against the PCE 
in order to shore up their own electoral prospects. All of these factors not only 
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le the communists marginalized, but also assured that the le would remain 
out of power.
Communist Party Platform
By the time of the 1952 presidential election, the PCE’s secretary general, Ri-
cardo Paredes, was losing inuence in the party even though he still occasion-
ally issued strongly worded statements. In light of the serious problems that 
the country faced, in February 1951 Paredes penned a lengthy statement “full 
of love and emotion” that contended that the party was dedicated to a defense 
of the country’s interests as it charted “the only way that leads to independence, 
progress and happiness.”1 The statement began with a discussion of 
nancial 
and other problems that the country’s social welfare institute and social secu-
rity system faced. Paredes declared that the PCE was the 
rst party to 
ght 
for the establishment of a social security system, was its strongest defender, and 
remained the strongest critic of the abuses within the system, including of gov-
ernment attempts to raid its funds for other purposes. “The Communist Party 

ghts and will continue 
ghting so that the social security bene
ts be extended 
to agricultural workers and Indians,” the statement asserted.
Paredes criticized abuses in the distribution of aid in the aermath of the 
1949 earthquake. He contrasted how that aid served to enrich a few individual 
capitalists with the reconstruction of the Polish capital of Warsaw that was de-
stroyed in the Second World War. “The resurrection of Warsaw is the product of 
the magni
cent work of the socialist government,” Paredes wrote. He compared 
a socialist belief in social justice and the need to meet human needs with the 
crimes that the capitalist government in Ecuador committed in its reconstruc-
tion eorts. Paredes called for the punishment of o	cials who were responsible 
for the neglect, the, and diversion in the distribution of the aid. Instead, worker 
and neighborhood committees should be placed in charge of rebuilding. Similar 
problems of fraud and abuse had occurred with an Export-Import Bank (Exim-
bank) loan for a water project in Quito that only ended up enriching the con-
tractor Harold Smith. That disgrace followed in the footsteps of the humiliating 
experience with the US-based Ambursen Engineering Company that charged 
millions of dollars for the poorly constructed Quevedo-Manta Road. Further-
more, the loan conditions required that the Ecuadorian government contract 
with United States companies rather than local businesses, with the result that 
the development projects bene
ted the United States rather than Ecuador. The 
PCE called for the punishment of public o	cials who were implicated in the 
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the of public funds and “indemni
cation of damages from the imperialist com-
panies that have harmed Ecuador.” As US government o	cials never hesitated 
to point out, the communists exploited every opportunity to blast international 
corporations for extracting wealth from the country.
On top of these structural issues, other problems had increased hunger in Ec-
uador. Flooding had led to poor harvests in the Ecuadorian highlands. To alle-
viate the resulting misery, the PCE called for the implementation of government 
measures against speculation and the provision of basic necessities at aordable 
prices. While the cost of living continued to skyrocket, salaries remained low. The 
wages that workers received were not enough to cover their basic necessities, even 
as transnational companies recorded unprecedented pro
ts. In this context, it was 
the responsibility of labor unions and leist parties to 
ght for the rights of work-
ers, because none of the other political parties would do so. Paredes pointed out 
that the conservative party collaborated with liberal governments to bene
t from 
this situation, thereby highlighting that both represented bourgeois interests. 
Neither provided the type of true alternatives that Ecuador so desperately needed.
More objectionable than the traditional liberal and conservative parties were 
the “traitors” Carlos Guevara Moreno and Rafael Coello Serrano. They had 
defected from the communist party to form the reactionary group CFP that 
exploited popular discontent to impose a ferocious dictatorship. They engaged 
in an intense derogatory campaign that presented themselves as the saviors of 
the country through the organization of a military coup. The CFP was a “mis-
erable fascist group in which there are some deceived people.” That gang had a 
long, dark history of political crimes, the of public funds, and collaboration 
with the Yankees in violations of national sovereignty. More than any other 
bourgeois-feudal political group in Ecuador, Paredes charged, the CFP was po-
sitioned to destroy the country. The communist leader announced that the PCE 
was on guard to counter whatever moves might be afoot to launch a coup against 
the Ecuadorian government and install a reactionary government that would 
aggravate an already bad economic situation.
It was in this situation that the PCE looked ahead to the 1952 presidential 
election, still more than a year away. The current president Galo Plaza Lasso had 
limited his statements to calls for free elections and attempts to unify disparate 
liberal forces in a campaign against a potential right-wing candidate. Neverthe-
less, according to Paredes, his government pursued policies that were paving the 
way for the election of a conservative government. Plaza had not implemented 
a democratic and progressive program, nor was he a person who was capable of 
doing so. This failure was to be expected, because as a wealthy landowner Plaza 
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represented the concerns of a bourgeois-feudal sector of the Ecuadorian popu-
lation. His government had advanced those class interests, including strength-
ening the position of imperialist companies and unconditionally subjugating 
Ecuador to United States businesses that wanted to dominate the world. These 
factors were leading to a third world war.
Following this compelling political analysis, the communist party statement 
concluded on a much more polemical note. In capital letters, the document 
screamed that the only way to avoid the ascension to power of a reactionary 
government was through the construction of a powerful national patriotic front 
comprised of authentic liberals, the socialist and communist parties, other le-
ists, and the broad popular masses. This coalition should dra a democratic 
and progressive platform that forwarded a program of national independence 
in peaceful collaboration with other countries. This electoral front should elect 
as their presidential candidate a patriotic, capable, and honest man who would 
be faithful to the ful
llment of such a program. In the communists’ eyes, the 
nomination of Antonio Quevedo, who some had forwarded as a potential can-
didate, would be a serious mistake. Quevedo was a lawyer who had served in the 
Foreign Service in Great Britain and the United States. In his current position 
on the UN Security Council, he had faithfully followed the dictates of Yankee 
imperialism in support of war and against Ecuador’s needs. Paredes warned that 
his actions disquali
ed him as a viable candidate for a uni
ed le.2
According to Paredes, the communist party had consistently laid out a path 
toward liberation, progress, and happiness for the Ecuadorian people. Funda-
mental to their program was the construction of a democratic and progressive 
government free from foreign imperialist domination, an agrarian reform that 
redistributed land to those who worked it, increases in salaries for workers, 
guarantees for the rights of workers, development of national industries, im-
provements in education, enhancements in communication networks, exten-
sion of credit, and pressure on capitalist and foreign companies to adhere to the 
country’s laws. Paredes argued that in the shadow of the threat of a new global 
war that would destroy the planet, the PCE “rises as the force most consciously 
defending national interests, as the 
rmest champion of the independence, prog-
ress and well-being of its people.” The party “constitutes the 
rmest guaran-
tee for us to achieve a large, free and prosperous homeland.” Paredes invited all 
workers, peasants, Indians, students, artisans, and anyone else who desired a lib-
erated country to join their party. He called on the PSE, the CTE, and liberals 
to unite in a Frente Patriótico de Liberación Social y Nacional (Patriotic Front 
for Social and National Liberation) to realize those goals.3
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The communists remained committed to the formation of an electoral pop-
ular front, and throughout the 1950s advocated for a variously named “Frente de 
Liberación Social y Nacional” (Social and National Liberation Front) or “Frente 
Democrático de Liberación Nacional” (Democratic Front of National Libera-
tion) to build a uni
ed force to march toward a better future. Despite Paredes’s 
earnest pleas for others to join the communists in such a coalition, his call went 
largely unheeded, as the le lost political space in the June 1952 presidential vote 
and succeeding elections. With a turn to the right, the le gained more clout 
as an organized social movement than an electoral force. Notwithstanding the 
statements in this party platform, that reality is something that Paredes had 
long understood.
José María Velasco Ibarra (1952)
The 1952 election returned José María Velasco Ibarra, who had been removed 
through military coups his two previous times in o	ce, to the presidency. The 
vote count was the largest up to that point in Ecuador’s history, even though it 
barely surpassed 10 percent of the population. Surage was limited to literate 
men over eighteen years old and optional for literate adult women. The 1950 
census gave the illiteracy rate at 43.7 percent, although it was probably some-
what higher, which means that many of those who were eligible failed to partic-
ipate. The electoral system was still highly exclusionary with literacy restrictions 
baring the majority of the country’s population from voting, and in particular 
those whose class interests the le represented. The scholars Juan Maiguashca 
and Liisa North calculated that the percentage of the vote equaled the size of 
the urban middle class and concluded that the working class played no signi
-
cant role in Velasco Ibarra’s election. Unlike Argentina’s populist president Juan 
Perón, Velasco Ibarra’s electoral success was not predicated on the mobilization 
of a working-class base.4
Despite these limitations, for the most part the election was peaceful and that 
it happened at all was an accomplishment. Velasco Ibarra emerged with a signi
-
cant margin (153,934 to 118,186) over his nearest competitor, which provided him 
with a clear mandate even though with 43 percent he did not win a majority of 
the total votes cast. The Hispanic American Report applauded outgoing presi-
dent Plaza for managing to conduct the electoral process in a largely peaceful 
and democratic fashion, even as his supporters and preferred candidate faced 
defeat. That publication expressed more hesitation as to the future of Velasco 
Ibarra’s presidency. They questioned whether the new president, “who has been 
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denounced as a disciple of Perón, will cultivate Ecuador’s descamisados [shirtless 
ones] or the employer class” as he had done in his previous terms in o	ce.5 Given 
Ecuador’s tumultuous history, it was a fair assumption that he would probably 
not complete his term.
The Liberal Radical Party had selected the newly elected mayor of Quito José 
Ricardo Chiriboga Villagómez over the independent liberal Eduardo Salazar 
Gómez as their presidential candidate.6 The British Embassy identi
ed Chiri-
boga Villagómez as “a clever and ambitious man” who due to his intrigues was 
“not much favoured by ‘respectable’ Liberals.” Those mainstream liberals backed 
instead the wealthy lawyer Salazar Gómez who had worked for the General Elec-
tric Company for the previous 
een years and enjoyed Plaza’s endorsement.7
When he was passed over for this party’s nomination, Salazar Gómez began 
to build an Alianza Democrática Nacional (ADN, National Democratic Alli-
ance) that grouped Plaza’s MCDN, the PSE, the VRSE, dissident liberals, and 
other groups into an electoral coalition.8 Salazar Gómez chose Clodoveo Alcívar 
Zevallos, a recently resigned minister of social welfare and someone popular 
with the le, as his vice presidential running mate.9 The conservatives nomi-
nated Ruperto Alarcón Falconí, but the British discounted his candidacy be-
cause he was “distrusted by many of his own party, being considered too rigid 
and extremist to stand any chance of obtaining any marginal support outside the 
fairly disciplined ranks of the Conservative Party.”10 As with most presidential 
contests in Ecuador, this was to be a multi-party race where no candidate would 
win majority support.
As political parties debated whom to support, the Pichincha provincial com-
mittee of the PCE claimed an obligation to bring to power men who held the 
people’s con
dence and who had supported a truly progressive and democratic 
program. They denounced all of the presidential candidates as “nothing other 
than lackeys of Yankee imperialism, who once in control of the presidency of the 
republic will tighten even more the chains of oppression.” Instead, they called 
for others to join the communists in their Social and National Liberation Front 
to break the bonds of imperialism with a march toward progress and freedom.11
Their pleas for the construction of a popular front never gained much traction, 
and for the most part were ignored.
In addition to the traditional mainstream candidates, to the cheers and jeers 
of supporters and opponents Velasco Ibarra announced his plans to campaign 
yet once again for the presidency. He had spent the last 
ve years in exile in 
Argentina aer being removed from o	ce in a 1947 coup. According to CIA
analysts in Washington, he had reached an agreement with the “neo-fascist 
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revolutionary Guevara Moreno” of the CFP to launch a coup against Plaza. For 
his part, Plaza sought to counteract those plans, including looking for a pretext 
on which to arrest Velasco Ibarra. Meanwhile, Plaza’s defense minister, Manual 
Díaz Granados, reportedly was planning his own coup, even though such an ex-
traconstitutional move would run counter to the president’s desire to preserve a 
process of democratic succession.12 Despite ongoing concerns about communists 
disrupting the country’s peace, such threats continued to come from the right 
rather than the le.
In this context, John Hamlin, counselor of the US Embassy, presented an 
assessment of which candidate would best serve United States interests. If the 
primary concern were control over communists, Velasco Ibarra would be pref-
erable, followed by the conservative Alarcón Falconí and the liberals Chiriboga 
Villagómez and Salazar Gómez. If other political, economic, military, and cul-
tural concerns were incorporated, Velasco Ibarra moved to the bottom of the list 
leaving Alarcón Falconí as their 
rst choice. Embassy o	cials were particularly 
concerned with socialist and communist support for Salazar Gómez. Velasco 
Ibarra’s “inconsistent and unpredictable nature” together with his populist and 
Peronist inuences made him undesirable.13 Whether weighing in on an elec-
tion conicted with the State Department’s theoretical adherence to noninter-
vention in the internal aairs of another country apparently did not occur to 
Hamlin. Rather, his comments formed part of a much longer history of United 
States attempts to control electoral outcomes in the region.
In the months before the 1952 presidential election, CIA analysts and State 
Department o	cials reported repeatedly on political violence and threats of 
violence. Velasco Ibarra claimed that “a Communist minority of the Univer-
sity party which has no respect for the constitution” had sponsored a meeting 
on February 21 to oppose his candidacy. He accused those who wanted to ex-
clude him from the campaign of acting in a dictatorial fashion.14 On March 3, 
another failed coup took place in Guayaquil. Defense minister Díaz Granados 
announced the arrest of seven naval o	cers and ten civilians, most of whom 
were CFP members. Although both Velasco Ibarra and Guevara Moreno de-
nied involvement, it appeared that the CFP had led the attempt. Sailors tes-
ti
ed that the plan had been to capture the military barracks, arm civilians, 
and seize Guayaquil.15 “Thanks to the clearly de
ned action of the Army, the 
situation created in Guayaquil has been totally controlled and there exists no 
danger of any kind,” Díaz Granados stated.16 Meanwhile, on March 10 a group 
of conservatives stoned the independent liberal candidate Salazar Gómez while 
he was campaigning in Tulcán. Two people were killed in the resulting chaos, 
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while the candidate and others were injured.17 Ten days later, another political 
battle in Quito killed one and injured several more.18 Another 
ght on April 12 
between the adherents of Salazar Gómez and Velasco Ibarra in Cuenca le one 
dead, many more injured, and a radio transmitter destroyed. The bloodshed led 
the United States Embassy to worry that this might be the forerunner of more 
serious disturbances.19 It appeared increasingly unlikely that the election would 
take place.
The violence led Salazar Gómez to withdraw from the race, throwing the 
progressive Democratic Alliance coalition that grouped various socialist and dis-
sident liberal groups into disarray. Salazar Gómez thought that his withdrawal 
would push the liberals to unite around the o	cial Liberal Radical candidacy 
of Chiriboga Villagómez, but instead it drew a less popular candidate Modesto 
Larrea Jijón into the race. The British Embassy noted that Larrea Jijón was “not 
endowed with political talent, but is ambitious and self-seeking.”20 His can-
didacy split the progressive vote and doomed the liberal’s chances of winning 
the election.
The PCE had previously sent an open letter to the PSE asking them to aban-
don the “false position” that the socialist party and the Democratic Alliance had 
adopted in backing the candidacy of Salazar Gómez. The communists proposed 
that instead they form an authentic democratic front to support a candidate 
who could defeat the reactionary forces.21 The socialists rejected the communist 
overture, and instead, from the PCE’s perspective, fostered divisions within the 
democratic movement.22 The socialists retorted that their party was national in 
character, and therefore could never be confused with the PCE “whose direc-
tives of an international character are perfectly known.”23 Now, with Salazar 
Gómez’s withdrawal, the PCE once again raised the issue of creating a popular 
front to confront a growing reactionary force, to defend national sovereignty, to 

ght for better living conditions, and to guarantee democracy. They called on 
the PSE, VRSE, liberals, and other democratic forces to join them.24 Ultimately, 
their eorts were in vain.
As the June 1 election approached, the New York Times reported on the grow-
ing political tensions on an almost daily basis, as did CIA analysts in Wash-
ington. About six weeks out, the CIA noted a fraught political situation and 
persistent rumors of a pending “revolution.” On April 18, university students 
burned Velasco Ibarra in e	gy in Quito’s main square.25 Velasco Ibarra’s entry 
into the contest had upset what had otherwise promised to be a “fairly normal” 
procedure as military and political leaders scrambled to realign themselves in 
light of the new political context. CIA analysts repeated rumors that communist 
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leaders were organizing shock troops while leist students actively engaged in 
propaganda campaigns against the caudillo. A persistent rumor was that the 
minister of defense Díaz Granados would engage in a coup to protect Ecuador 
from bloodshed and stop Velasco Ibarra’s possible election.26
At the end of April, CIA analysts related that “the stormy Ecuadoran elec-
tion campaign” may have reached a crisis point. The agency continued to convey 
rumors of Díaz Granados’s coup plotting. In response, on April 23, Plaza once 
again sacked his cabinet in order to get rid of his defense minister who was best 
positioned to lead a coup, though CIA analysts cautioned that this action may 
not be su	cient to prevent a coup, countercoup, or other repressive actions.27
Rather, the cabinet resignations together with Salazar Gómez’s withdrawal from 
the race “increased the likelihood of serious disturbances.”28 Every day the po-
litical situation became more tense and polarized.
In an eort to calm political tensions, Plaza invited members of the oppo-
sition to participate in the cabinet but none would agree and the ploy failed.29
When Plaza 
nally formed a new cabinet he retained the ministers of defense, 
foreign relations, and public works, but excluded the two socialist ministers 
who had joined the previous year. The PSE secretary general, Luis Maldonado 
Estrada, stated that the president had oered the socialists two portfolios, but 
they refused because the party formed part of the Democratic Alliance coali-
tion that had decided to remain independent of the government.30 Plaza, for his 
part, promised that the new cabinet would represent “absolute political neutral-
ity” in order to oversee “the freest and cleanest election contest” in Ecuador’s 
history.31
On April 26 and in the midst of all this chaos, Velasco Ibarra returned from 
his 
ve-year exile in Argentina for the 
nal month of campaigning for the presi-
dency. A crowd of almost three thousand enthusiastic supporters welcomed the 
caudillo at the airport in Quito, but when they escorted him to his residency 
they clashed with his le-wing opponents. Two people were killed and eight were 
wounded in the melee, even though army and police forces held the city in an 
eective state of siege.32 The following day those numbers were revised to one 
dead and twenty-four injured, with interior minister Enrique Coloma claiming 
that “complete normality” has been restored.33 The embassy reported that the 
socialist leaders Gonzalo Karolys, Hugo Larrea Benalcazar, and Alberto Cabeza 
de Vaca had been imprisoned for the duration of Velasco Ibarra’s visit to Quito 
in response to threatening statements that they had made at an anti-Velasco 
Ibarra assembly.34 The embassy credited actions that the army and police had 
taken with preventing more serious disorders. 35
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With Ecuador swirling downward into a chaos from which it appeared un-
likely to recover, Herbert Matthews published an essay in the New York Times 
that highlighted broader patterns of regional unrest. The article featured a map 
of thirteen coups across Latin America over the past 
ve years, including the Au-
gust 1947 removal of Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador. Among the more recent events 
were Fulgencio Batista’s March 10 coup in Cuba, and the Movimiento Naciona-
lista Revolucionario (MNR, Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) coming to 
power in Bolivia through a popular revolt on April 11. Matthews labeled those 
events as “symptoms and examples, not aberrations” of the problems the conti-
nent faced, and he expected other similar outbreaks before the year was over. At 
the root of these problems was militarism, nationalism, populism, poverty, over-
population, and disease. In addition, Matthews claimed, “Communism plays on 
the extremes of wealth and poverty and on economic distress, and it also oen 
makes a close alliance with nationalism.” Nevertheless, “thus far the Commu-
nists have failed to gain a secure foothold in any country in Latin America.” 
Across the region, they did not have su	cient numbers “to take power anywhere, 
but they are enough to make trouble anywhere.” As a result, “What they can 
do in almost every country is to stir up trouble, discontent, strife, uneasiness.” 
Matthews proposed that more economic and technological assistance from the 
United States, as well as more leaders such as Plaza who were committed to 
democratic institutions, were key to solving these problems.36
Ironically or not, the day aer Matthews’s article appeared, CIA analysts in 
Washington released an intelligence memorandum on increased instability in 
Latin America. Similar to Matthews, and perhaps reecting a sharing of infor-
mation, the CIA noted the violent changes of government in Cuba and Bolivia, 
and warned that military coups were imminent in other countries. The analysts 
identi
ed ination and related economic problems as the source of the unrest in 
addition to populist currents that emanated out of Argentina under Perón’s con-
trol. Notably, in the agency’s internal intelligence evaluation, communism and 
anti-imperialism played lesser roles, once again indicating that political rhetoric 
oen outpaced more measured and rational assessment. The memo proceeded 
to detail the internal situation in the principal Latin American countries. In 
Ecuador, the return “of the twice-deposed rightist demagogue Velasco Ibarra 
and .  .  . the withdrawal of the le-wing coalition candidate, Salazar Gómez” 
had thrown the contest into chaos. Those changes le open the possibility for “a 
bid for power from either the opportunistic Defense Minister, Díaz Granados, 
or the neo-fascist Mayor of Guayaquil, Guevara Moreno.” Even if the election 
were successfully held, the loser might still launch a coup against the winner.37
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Political stability and a peaceful transfer of power appeared to be a remote 
possibility.
With the election only a week away, CIA analysts reported on a gunrunning 
operation in the Caribbean. Among the possible destinations for the weapons 
was “Ecuador, where political conditions are highly unstable with the approach 
of the 1 June presidential elections.”38 Just days before the election, the CIA re-
ported that a majority of voters in Guayaquil who would have supported Salazar 
Gómez “now favor a pre-election coup and a military dictatorship.” Predictably, 
defense minister Díaz Granados also favored a military junta, but had failed to 
act because of a lack of popular support. Salazar Gómez’s replacement candidate 
Larrea Jijón for the Democratic Alliance never gained much electoral backing or 
su	cient support to launch a successful coup. Nevertheless, the CIA cautioned 
that his adherents might attempt such a move if election results indicated that 
the conservatives would win.39
Fears of a military coup continued up until the election. Only days before 
the vote, Guayaquil’s populist mayor Guevara Moreno went into hiding when 
the police issued a warrant for his arrest under charges of contempt for the gov-
ernment for remarks he had made in his newspaper La Hora. When news of his 
pending arrest spread, hundreds of CFP partisans converged on city hall. Two 
of Guevara Moreno’s supporters were killed in the resulting skirmishes with 
the police.40 Plaza said that he believed in freedom of speech, but that Guevara 
Moreno had oended so many people with his statements that public opinion 
forced him to act.41 The government tried to dial back the tension by announc-
ing that Guevara Moreno would not be arrested if he emerged from hiding to 
vote. If he did not vote, which in Ecuador was obligatory for literate adult males, 
he would lose his civil rights, including his right to retain o	ce as mayor of 
Guayaquil.42 Logically, Guevara Moreno feared eorts at entrapment or black-
mail to ush him out of hiding.
By the time the election took place, it had been reduced to a contest between 
the conservative candidate Alarcón Falconí and the independent Velasco Ibarra. 
The liberal vote had been split between Chiriboga Villagómez who was from a 
section of the Liberal Radical Party nicknamed “Los Supremos” and Larrea Jijón 
who was from another faction called “Los Auténticos.” Further confusing to ob-
servers was that everyone except Alarcón Falconí in the four-way race identi
ed 
themselves as liberals, with even Velasco Ibarra claiming to be an independent 
liberal. A last-minute scramble to unify the splintered progressive vote failed, 
which meant that neither Chiriboga Villagómez nor Larrea Jijón stood a rea-
sonable chance of winning.43 According to the British Embassy, many liberals 
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considered Larrea Jijón “too much of a Conservative” to suit their tastes.44 Many 
observers assumed that in this fractured environment Alarcón Falconí would 
win the election, even though conservatives only had minority support. Conser-
vatives looked forward to their best chance of winning an election and returning 
to o	ce in the more than half a century since their defeat in Eloy Alfaro’s 1895 
liberal revolution.
Liberals were particularly upset at clerical interference in the electoral pro-
cess. Priests threatened parishioners with purgatory and hell if they did not vote 
for the conservative party. Plaza’s government lodged multiple diplomatic pro-
tests with the papal nuncio about the Catholic Church’s activities, reminding 
the church hierarchy that under the terms of the Concordat clergy were not 
allowed to interfere in politics. His government threatened priests who engaged 
in electioneering with arrest and prosecution for their activities.45 The papal 
nuncio agreed to issue orders for priests and religious orders to stop their inter-
ventions on behalf of the conservative candidate Alarcón Falconí, although it 
was not entirely clear that their activity had ceased.46
Sam Pope Brewer reported in the New York Times that the army traditionally 
had backed the liberal party in opposition to the conservatives, which height-
ened fears of a military coup if a candidate unacceptable to them won the con-
test.47 Apprehension over a foreboding and seemingly inevitable coup increased 
when on the eve of the election a group of retired military personnel identifying 
themselves “defenders of the fatherland” published a statement calling on Ecua-
dorians to vote for the Liberal Radical candidate Chiriboga Villagómez. Their 
statement cautioned that a conservative resurgence would destroy gains in po-
litical, economic, and social liberties that Ecuador had made. The group warned 
that the army could not remain indierent if fanaticism threatened to return 
to power. In response, Plaza called on the military to respect the constitutional 
order.48 On the eve of the vote, the chief of sta and heads of the army, air force, 
and navy issued an o	cial statement con
rming that the military would abide 
by its oath and support the constitutional succession of power.49 Even with these 
o	cial assurances, tension remained at a high level.
During Velasco Ibarra’s previous mandate as president in the aermath of the 
1944 glorious May revolution he had initially enjoyed the backing of liberals and 
leists, including communists. Now, however, he was engaged in a “bitter feud” 
with those groups, and instead drew support from the “neo-fascist Guevara 
Moreno’s Concentration of Popular Forces and from the militant right-wing 
National Ecuadoran Revolutionary Action.”50 Plaza had denounced both the 
CFP and ARNE for their lack of commitment to democracy and charged that 
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they imitated “totalitarian systems such as international communism.”51 For 
his part, Velasco Ibarra declared that he represented “the people,” and had no 
commitment to the CFP, the ARNE, or any other political party, although he 
admitted that the CFP supported his campaign.52
Despite expectations that the conservative Alarcón Falconí would win, with 
the support of the CFP Velasco Ibarra captured a plurality of 43 percent of the 
fewer than 360,000 votes cast (out of a total population of more than three mil-
lion). Velasco Ibarra crushed his closest rival Alarcón Falconí by almost forty 
thousand votes. The liberals Chiriboga Villagómez and Larrea Jijón placed a 
distant third and fourth place.53 Many voters in Quito supported Velasco Ibarra 
instead of the Democratic Alliance. Apparently when it became apparent that 
Larrea Jijón stood no chance of winning his supporters switched their votes to 
Velasco Ibarra to prevent Alarcón Falconí from emerging victorious, which as-
sured the caudillo’s return to o	ce.54 Most of Velasco Ibarra’s support came from 
Guayaquil where, according to the British ambassador Norman Mayers, “dissat-
is
ed elements from all political groups voted for him.”55 In large part, Velasco 
Ibarra drew his support away from progressive candidates.
Congressional elections held at the same time as the presidential race gave 
conservatives a slight legislative advantage. The senate would have sixteen con-
servatives, nine liberals, seven Velasquistas, and one independent. The house 
would have twenty-one Velasquistas, twenty conservatives, thirteen liberals, 
ve 
socialists, and 
ve independents. While Guevara Moreno was able to convince 
his supporters in Guayaquil to vote for Velasco Ibarra, that support did not carry 
over to his congressional slate. The new president would have to deal with an 
antagonistic congress.56
The election results threw Ecuador’s political establishment into a period of 
deep reection. Given the liberal’s numerical advantage, the conservatives ques-
tioned whether they could regain o	ce through electoral means. Liberals had to 
confront the fatal consequences of their divisions, and were le “pondering the 
charge that the people would not have deserted them if they had not deserted 
the people.” Socialists faced frustration aer entering the election with a coali-
tion that registered at the bottom of the polls.57 Since the communists had been 
excluded from the Democratic Alliance they advocated casting blank ballots 
in the presidential race, which le them even more isolated from the political 
landscape.58
As the British Embassy reported, the outcome “surprised everyone” because 
“on the eve of the polls the result was considered to be as good as decided and 
the Conservative candidate, Dr. Ruperto Alarcón, was already named as the 
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rst Conservative President of Ecuador since 1895.” Instead, as had happened 
previously, the Ecuadorian electorate “voted not for a party but a personality.” 
The embassy observed, “A clear majority of Ecuadorians want to give Velasco 
Ibarra another term of o	ce; not the wisest heads, perhaps, but still the ma-
jority.” Most people gave him a year, two at the most, before he would be once 
again removed from o	ce.59 While Velasco Ibarra’s win prevented a return to 
reactionary conservative rule, it did not mean the ushering in of a period of 
tranquility or progressive governance.
Edgar McGinnis of the O	ce of South American Aairs (OSA) in the State 
Department feared that given the pattern of Velasco Ibarra’s removal from power 
in 1935 and 1947, his election would contribute to political instability. While the 
caudillo repeatedly demonstrated that he could attract and win support at the 
ballot box, questions remained about whether he could retain a su	cient level 
of backing to govern eectively. Reecting the analysis that the Quito Embassy 
had forwarded in March before the election, McGinnis commented that due 
to Velasco Ibarra’s “inconsistent and unpredictable nature” his election was 
“less desirable from the standpoint of US policy than Alarcón’s election would 
have been.” On the other hand, McGinnis was relieved that Velasco Ibarra was 
“de
nitely anti-communist.”60 Echoing McGinnis’s interpretation, the OIR also 
observed that the communists had failed in their attempts to forge eective coa-
litions with other progressives, and the elections had brought to o	ce candidates 
whom the communists opposed. This development had increased their political 
isolation, and this pleased US o	cials.61
CIA analysts expressed a certain amount of relief when the election was held 
with a minimum amount of disruption. “The possibility of an army coup is now 
probably somewhat more unlikely than it has been for the past few weeks,” a 
report stated. “Velasco is believed to have a fair chance of being inaugurated in 
September.” Nevertheless, the agency was concerned with the ties he had devel-
oped with Perón’s government during his years of exile in Argentina.62 Pundits 
repeatedly accused Velasco Ibarra of betraying Peronist tendencies, something 
that the caudillo vehemently denied. Even so, fear of Perón’s inuence over Ve-
lasco Ibarra remained a preoccupation for US policy makers, although a larger 
concern should have been the president-elect’s association with the proto-fascist 
CFP with its Mussolini inuences and the ARNE with its inspiration from 
the Spanish falange.63 International considerations blinded US o	cials to 
local dynamics.
The New York Times welcomed Velasco Ibarra’s victory as “an example of 
democratic electoral procedure of which the whole inter-American community 
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can be proud.” By all indications, the vote was free and fair in so much as it re-
ected the will of literate males who by their very nature were overwhelmingly 
wealthy and urban in their residence. As indication of the election’s fairness, the 
newspaper pointed to Plaza’s opposition to Velasco Ibarra’s candidacy and the 
fact that the outcome fooled pundits and reporters. The newspaper’s support 
came even though the president-elect possessed “a record which is worrisome 
to contemplate” because in his previous two times in o	ce “his impetuosity 
and ambitions led him to turn his regimes into dictatorships—and each time 
the army drove him from power.” The paper feared Perón’s potential inuence 
on his government, as well as his “demagogic” nature. Nevertheless, if Getulio 
Vargas could rule democratically upon his return power in Brazil, perhaps there 
was hope for Velasco Ibarra’s third time in o	ce. Encouraging as well was the 
military’s support for the constitutional process of succession. “This is how Gov-
ernments ought to be changed in free countries,” a New York Times editorial 
concluded, “and one must extend special congratulations to President Galo Plaza 
Lasso, for whom this peaceful and democratic election was a personal triumph.”64
In a postmortem on the electoral process, Brewer who had reported on the elec-
tion for the New York Times congratulated Ecuador on what he characterized as 
the country’s 
rst free election. But he also expressed concern that even if Perón 
had no direct inuence over Velasco Ibarra’s government, worrying “signs that 
his regime may run to the same lines of demagogic appeal to the poorer classes” 
still existed.65 For the socialist le, of course, a more disturbing tendency was 
that the working class responded better to the emotional appeals of a populist 
like Velasco Ibarra than to calls for a class struggle to transform society.
The Hispanic American Report similarly noted the signi
cance of the elec-
tion. Plaza was the 
rst president in more than a quarter century (twenty-eight 
years, to be precise) to serve out the term to which he had been constitution-
ally elected.66 A year earlier, Matthews commented that the country’s current 
stability was “providing one of the most remarkable of all Latin American ex-
periments in democracy.” Matthews credited the New York-born and United 
States-educated president Plaza with the rapid shi from “comic opera revolu-
tions—twenty-seven in twenty-
ve years” to “a genuinely democratic regime.”67
From the perspective of United States o	cials, Plaza was the type of politician 
whom they could embrace and who would advance their interests.
The journalist Lilo Linke pointed out that the socialists were torn between a 
defense of principles and practical politics. “The Socialists, once an inuential 
party, have lost all their former signi
cance,” Linke stated, “in part because for 
years now they have been unable to make up their minds as to how far to the le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they should go.” Their opportunism and vacillating on whether or not to collab-
orate with Plaza’s government cost them support. Much of the socialist backing 
came from university students, “and even there the suspicion seems justi
ed that 
quite a number of so-called Socialist students are at heart Communists.” As for 
the PCE, Linke said that aer thirty years of existence the party had “made little 
headway.” Previously they had held dominance in the CTE, but both the party 
and the trade union appeared to be “quietly fading away.”68 The political winds 
were shiing against the le, but not in a way that particularly favored another 
political party or ideology.
The United States Embassy reported on the negative repercussions that 
echoed through labor and the broader le as a result of the defeat of the Dem-
ocratic Alliance. The embassy stated, “The Socialist-Communist dominated 
CTE and its a	liates hewed to the political line of the Socialist Party, which in 
turn increasingly reected communist ideologies.” Furthermore, the CTE’s re-
gional a	liates, including the FTP, publicly condemned the CTE for its role in 
the alliance. An economic attaché in the US Embassy noted that the FTP “iden-
ti
ed itself more and more with the international communist line.” In particu-
lar, the FTP opposed the bilateral military pact between the United States and 
Ecuador, and supported the formation of pro-peace committees. The embassy 
cautioned that the defeat in the June elections had triggered a radicalization and 
polarization in the labor movement along with a corresponding rise in the power 
of the le. The conservative wing of the socialist party was grouped under three-
time secretary general Emilio Gangotena who denounced communist inuence 
in the party and abruptly resigned his position in August. Manuel Agustín Agu-
irre, who represented the le wing of the socialist party, declared at the ninth 
FTP congress less than a month aer the elections that Velasco Ibarra’s victory 
signi
ed a triumph for the dominant class, and that workers must mobilize to 
meet this challenge.69
The political le emerged both weakened and strengthened from the cam-
paign. The socialists’ political position was signi
cantly marginalized as a result 
of losing their two cabinet posts in Plaza’s government, and then backing the 
wrong horse in the presidential race. The PSE had trouble identifying a strong 
candidate, and then entered into an alliance with a weak contender who 
nished 
last in the polls. The socialists only held two seats in the house, and three in 
the senate. The only communist in congress would be Pedro Saad, the senator 
for coastal labor. At the same time, the OIR observed, similar to Bolivia with 
the recent ascension of the MNR to power and Chile with Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo’s election, the new government was sensitive to ultra-nationalist and 
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leist pressure, which provided the communists with more freedom of action.70
For the le, that pressure came not as an electoral force but through grassroots 
mobilizations.
Despite all of these disturbances and the repeated coup attempts during his 
four years in o	ce, Plaza successfully completed his term and on September 1 
handed o power to his successor. Linke described Velasco Ibarra as “an edu-
cated but highly-strung President of the caudillo type,” who faced a precarious 
and uncertain situation.71 The British Embassy characterized his new cabinet 
“as a system of not too brilliant satellites which would not outshine their sun,” 
with two possible exceptions: Luis Antonio Peñaherrera, previously ambassador 
in Washington, as minister of government, and the future president Carlos Julio 
Arosemena Monroy as minister of defense. Several of his ministers quickly le 
his government, starting with the minister of public works.72 Few expected that 
Velasco Ibarra would remain long in o	ce. It is a witness to the remarkable 
political changes in the country that ultimately he was able to survive the entire 
tenure of his term—the only one of 
ve that he was able to complete.
Although Velasco Ibarra presented himself as a liberal secularist, once in of-

ce he quickly took a conservative turn which, as the British Embassy noted, 
meant “clerical and reactionary.”73 That decision led the Liberal Radical Party 
to instruct their members to resign their positions in his government.74 Some 
refused, which led to the suspension of party stalwarts José Ricardo Chiriboga 
Villagómez, Jorge Villagómez Yepes, and José Vicente Trujillo who served re-
spectively as Ecuador’s ambassadors to the United States, the United Nations, 
and Mexico.75 By the end of 1953, Velasco Ibarra only had one member in his 
cabinet with whom he started the year—the minister of education. Velasco Ibar-
ra’s continuance in o	ce provided a super
cial veneer of stability to a political 
situation that was unmistakably chaotic and transitory.
The most signi
cant resignation was that of his minister of government 
Peñaherrera who held the most powerful appointive o	ce. In his place, Velasco 
Ibarra named the conservative Camilo Ponce Enríquez. In its review of 1953, El 
Comercio de
ned Ponce’s designation as the most decisive political event of the 
year.76 Handing the post that de
ned the administration’s political positions 
to a conservative represented a de
nitive and unmistakable turn to the right. 
Furthermore, naming a doctrinaire right-winger who would not hesitate to em-
ploy a heavy hand in dealing with the administration’s opponents represented a 
signi
cant political realignment.77
The conservative Ponce quickly became the le’s most determined op-
ponent. While the Catholic Church responded warmly and positively to the 
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appointment, Gonzalo Villalba, the secretary general of the Pichincha provin-
cial committee of the PCE, retorted with a burning statement that noted that 
the reactionary and pro-government forces organized into the ARNE and con-
servative party “feel popular rejection of their policies which are contrary to 
the interests of the great majorities, to the interests of the country.” Wealthy 
commercial, 
nancial, industrial, and landholding concerns were imposing pol-
icies that exploited the working class and led to hunger, unemployment, misery, 
and prisons. Villalba condemned Velasco Ibarra for his attempts “to disorient 
the Catholic people in order to pull them into a religious struggle and divert 
them from a daily combat for bread and freedom.” In response to charges that 
communists were opposed to religion, Villalba appealed to a liberal heritage and 
declared that the PCE respected all religious beliefs, and considered freedom of 
religion to be an important democratic gain. He contended that charges that 
communists opposed religion were an attempt to halt a popular struggle for 
a better life. In the face of this threat, the communists called on its members 
to remain alert to fascist provocations that might disrupt their work. Instead, 
they called on people to join them in a democratic front for national liberation 
that would 
ght for higher salaries, lower prices, full employment, land for the 
peasants, and democratic freedoms.78 Achieving these goals would require both 
theoretical reections as well as direct political actions.
As significant as what CIA case o	cers targeted in their investigations 
is what they ignored. Although CIA analysts in Washington kept abreast of 
developments in the 1952 presidential election, no information reports from case 
o	cers stationed in Ecuador on these events have surfaced. It is as if the rise of 
populist candidates held no importance for them. Instead, those o	cers on the 
ground paid more attention to other issues such as communist involvement in 
the labor movement.79 This was the state of aairs even as the PCE prioritized 
an orthodox line of pursuing a peaceful and parliamentary path to power, which 
is seemingly where the agency should have dedicated its energies were it truly 
interested in countering communist advances. It is as if the agency understood 
where the true potential for leist subversion lay better than did party leaders—
and that was not in electoral campaigns, but in mobilizing grassroots support 
for social change.
Velasco Ibarra’s election and the rise of populism represented a setback for the 
le. As the new president assembled his cabinet, it became undeniable that his 
government represented a rightward alteration from Plaza’s previous administra-
tion. With the closing of electoral spaces, the le turned to its reliance on social 
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movement organizing strategies to advance its political agenda. Nevertheless, 
some communist leaders clung to their fantasies of forming an anticonserva-
tive alliance to compete for power through peaceful and parliamentary means. 
Contentious debates over strategy continued to fracture the party. How best to 
confront a populist challenge remained a persistent and perennial challenge for 
the political le. All of those issues and tensions would emerge on full display at 
the communist party’s upcoming congress.
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T he election of José María Velasco Ibarra to the presidency repre-sented a shi in Ecuador toward more conservative policies and more populist and personalistic styles of governance than that of the previous 
Galo Plaza Lasso administration. Parallel to these political changes, the com-
munist party experienced its own internal transitions in leadership styles and 
policy emphases as it sought to confront this rightward dri. As with politics 
on a federal level, disagreements within the PCE divided members over tactics 
and ideology. This sparing included debates over whether to pursue strategies 
that would appeal to broader audiences or to adhere to political lines that were 
more doctrinaire in nature.
Between Velasco Ibarra’s election as president on June 1, 1952, and his inaugu-
ration on September 1 of that year political parties and various other groupings 
convoked assemblies to debate how to respond to the rise of populist candidates. 
One of those was the 	h communist party congress that met in Ambato at the 
end of July. The congress, which party statutes dictated should be held biannu-
ally, came on the heels of their long-delayed third congress in November 1946 
in Quito, and the fourth congress in August 1949 in Guayaquil. Unlike the 
1949 congress, thanks to CIA surveillance we have a detailed summary of what 
transpired at this meeting. Among the monumental resolutions was one to for-
malize Pedro Saad’s designation as secretary general of the party, even as serious 
dissension ran through its ranks over that decision. Delegates also struggled with 
how to proceed in the context of a political system that favored populist politics. 
Decisions at this congress determined the direction that the party would take 
for the next several decades.
Fih PCE Congress (Ambato, July 24–29, 1952)
The central committee of the communist party decided at a December 1951 
meeting in Guayaquil to hold their next party congress in Ambato. The congress 
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would “examine with greater responsibility the role played by our party in de-
fense of national democracy,” and would advocate “for the improvement of peo-
ple’s living conditions, for peace, and for the realization of social and national 
liberation from the grip of Yankee imperialism.” The assembled delegates would 
assess party activities and regroup their forces in order to continue the struggle 
against wealthy landholders who exploited and oppressed the masses. The con-
gress was intended to strengthen the party’s internal democracy as well as impose 
communist discipline. “Collective responsibility does not exclude the individ-
ual,” the central committee declared, “rather they complement and harmonize 
each other.” Delegates would also address organizational problems, revise party 
statutes, and select a new central committee with a goal of elevating the most 
capable leaders who were loyal to the people and would stay true to communist 
ideologies. As part of its ongoing campaign to build a broad electoral coalition, 
the party called on its members to study their statement “Towards a Democratic 
Front for National Liberation” in preparation for the meeting. One intent of the 
assembly was to foster the formation of a party that would provide leadership to 
the working class in its struggle for a more just and equal society.1
The reason for the selection of Ambato as the venue is not immediately ob-
vious. Quito, as the country’s capital city and headquarters for the party, would 
be a more logical choice. As might be expected, Quito was a common location 
for most political party gatherings, as well as those of many other organizations 
and federations. Guayaquil was the de facto center of communist activism and 
the largest city in Ecuador as well as its commercial hub, and hence an equally 
likely option. Occasionally meetings would be held in Cuenca, Ecuador’s third 
largest city, located in the southern highlands. As a provincial capital and at the 
time the country’s fourth largest city, Ambato was a less typical location for a 
national meeting. The selection might have been a compromise between the two 
largest cities, a deliberate decision to search out a geographically central site, or 
a reection of a desire to move the party away from an urban intellectual sphere 
in order to take the struggle to the masses.
In 1944, the FBI’s legal attaché Charles Higdon had identi	ed Quito, Guay-
aquil, Esmeraldas, Milagro, Chimborazo, and Cayambe as the principle cen-
ters of communist activities in Ecuador, but he made no mention of Ambato.2
Perhaps that was now changing. In 1947, the military attaché Adelbert Boggs 
reported six party cells in Ambato with a total membership of four hundred.3
That would have made it numerically speaking the third largest center of com-
munist activity aer Guayaquil and Quito. In an almost throwaway comment 
in the midst of strike activity at two textile mills in Ambato in October 1948, 
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US ambassador John Simmons similarly described the city as “the center of 
Communist inuence in Ecuador.”4 Those developments would have provided 
the party with a local base of support for the congress. Ongoing reconstruction 
eorts in the aermath of the devastating 1949 earthquake oered additional 
symbolic value. In 1951, the CTE (which otherwise con	ned their meetings to 
Guayaquil, Quito, and Cuenca) and the socialist youth had also held their na-
tional assemblies in Ambato for similar reasons, leading United States ocials 
to observe that the destruction from the earthquake “aords [an] excellent site 
[for] Socialist Commie elements [to] exploit unrest and anti-govt sentiment.”5
In fact, the decision to hold these meetings in Ambato may have encouraged a 
political turn to the le in the city.
At the time of the PCE congress, the conservative José Arcadio Carrasco 
Miño was mayor of Ambato. The documentary record does not indicate what 
kind of reception party members received from local residents. Five years later, 
the conservative Quito city councilor José Antonio Baquero de la Calle strongly 
opposed communist use of that city’s municipal theater for their inaugural ses-
sion. Liberals who appealed to notions of freedom of assembly won the day in 
terms of allowing the communists access to that venue, and similar dynamics 
may have been at play in Ambato. What we do know is that before and aer the 
congress the socialist Neptalí Sancho Jaramillo was mayor of the city. He had 
grown up surrounded with a feudalistic system in which wealthy landowners 
controlled social and political structures and Indigenous workers faced extreme 
discrimination and exploitation. Sancho 	rst won oce in 1947, and held that 
position during the 1949 earthquake. His election represented a break from 
traditional conservative power structures, and the advancement of policies that 
sought to empower poor and marginalized people.6 In November 1949 he lost 
the mayoral race to a concerted conservative-liberal coalition that ran Carrasco 
Miño in an election fraught with controversies over the use of reconstruction 
aid. Sancho would subsequently go on to win additional terms as mayor in 1953 
and 1959, as well as election as deputy to the federal congress in 1950 and again 
in 1956. His supporters spoke of him in glowing terms. “Seldom has a man incar-
nated the will of the people, of his people, like this simple and honorable Neptalí 
Sancho, a sincere man of great will and great heart,” one commemoration read. 
For that reason, the people fervently and enthusiastically backed him, and his 
electoral victories represented not only a triumph for Ambato but also for all 
Ecuadorians.7
Sancho came from the le wing of the socialist party, and in the 1960s joined 
the faction that formed the Partido Socialista Revolucionario del Ecuador 
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(PSRE, Socialist Revolutionary Party of Ecuador). He was not opposed to 
collaborating with the communists, and in the years before the congress had 
worked closely with Saad on various occasions. In his role as a deputy in the 
federal congress, he joined Saad in September 1950 in an interpellation of the 
treasury minister over accusations of misappropriation of earthquake relief 
funds.8 The following month, the two participated in an assembly that the FTP 
had organized at the Casa del Obrero in Quito to discuss legislative proposals 
concerning social services and bus fares.9 Aer holding its congress in Ambato 
in 1951 the CTE once again gathered there in September 1961 during his last 
term in oce, apparently to encourage political engagement among the local 
residents. That meeting attracted the CIA’s attention and made the electoral 
defeat of the socialist mayor a priority for the agency.10
Although Sancho was a socialist rather than a communist, he may have in-
vited and encouraged the communists to come to the city. Considering the 
general inability of United States ocials to distinguish between socialists and 
communists, his election may have led Ambassador Simmons to consider the 
city to be the center of communist activity. That might also explain why at the 
time of the last party congress, a CIA operative reported
It is known that the communist mayor of Ambato, Neptalí Sancho, has 
little regard for Saad, Gil, Barreto, or the rest of the communist leaders. 
Saad said that although he knows Sancho does not obey party instructions, 
and the communist organization in Ambato is primarily one of Sancho’s 
personal development, the party should not abandon the syndicate move-
ment there, since from an ideological point of view so much progress has 
been made.11
Obviously since Sancho was not a communist he would have little need to follow 
party dictates. On the other hand, the PCE probably would have liked to have 
brought a successful politician such as Sancho into its fold, and that would have 
inevitably caused a dance around competing political interests. Holding the con-
gress in Ambato may have been an attempt to piggyback on other organizational 
developments already in process.
Quito’s El Comercio newspaper, oen treated as the paper of record in Ecua-
dor, did not carry a single mention of the communist congress, although they 
published front-page articles on the socialist and other party congresses as well 
as long stories with large banner headlines on the Democratic and Republican 
parties congresses in the United States that were held at the same time. Even 
UFO reports warranted more column inches than did communist activities. 
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That seemingly misplacement of priorities subsequently fed conspiracy theories 
that the CIA or other intelligence agencies planted stories of aliens in order 
to distract the population from more signi	cant and pressing political matters.
For its part, the United States Embassy made some minor passing references 
to the congress in its weekly updates from Ecuador. Drawing on information 
published in El Pueblo, in March the embassy mentioned the upcoming meet-
ing.12 At the beginning of the congress, the embassy noted that the socialist 
newspaper La Tierra printed a letter from Saad inviting its editor to attend the 
inaugural session. For Ambassador Paul Daniels, “this open display is further 
indication of sympathy between so called Socialist paper and Commies.”13 The 
ambassador’s repeated use of the derogatory term “Commies” is signi	cant. The 
CIA operative David Atlee Phillips notes that while conservatives employed 
it, “the typical ocer selected his political sobriquets more carefully, making it 
clear whether he was speaking of a Communist, Marxist, or Socialist (because 
the distinction could be important, if not vital, in writing intelligence reports 
as well as planning and conducting most operations).”14 Those distinctions ob-
viously escaped the ambassador. Either he ignored the fact that political par-
ties routinely invited the media and other public and political 	gures to their 
inaugural sessions, or he could not resist the dig at the le. In either case, this 
comment reveals a failure to understand divisions on the le. At the end of the 
congress, Daniels dismissively characterized the congress as “vociferously pro 
peace, anti-US, anti-Plaza, anti-Velasco Ibarra and pro-Soviet.”15 That reaction-
ary portrayal reveals more about the ideological assumptions of the embassy and 
says nothing about the congress, and could have been written before the meeting 
or without any surveillance of the event.
In contrast to the mainstream media’s disregard for the communist party 
congress and the embassy’s limited appreciation for its dynamics, CIA ocers in 
Ecuador ignored the socialists and other political activities, and instead draed 
an unusually lengthy and detailed memo that chronicled discord within the 
PCE. The congress came aer Albert Haney’s departure in 1949, and with the 
available evidence it is dicult to parse out who might have conducted the sur-
veillance and how the information was gathered. One possibility is that this 
memo is the work of Howard Shetterly who by all indications was a CIA ocer. 
He was from Des Moines, Iowa, was a navy pilot during the Second World War, 
and graduated from the Ohio State University. Shetterly joined the Guayaquil 
Consulate as vice consul in March 1950 with the rank of FSS-11.16 In April 1952 
he transitioned to vice consul at the Quito Embassy with a promotion to FSS-9, 
which is where he would have been stationed during the PCE congress. The 
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following year he moved to public aairs assistant in the embassy with another 
promotion to FSS-8. In November 1954 Shetterly le Ecuador for a similar post 
in Mexico City and eventually proceeded on to Porto Alegre and Brasilia, Brazil 
and 	nally Barcelona, Spain.17 Shetterly retired in 1976, and two decades later 
moved to Albuquerque, New Mexico not only “to be near three of his children” 
but also “to be surrounded by the Hispanic and Native American culture he 
so much appreciated.”18 Latin America typically leaves a profound imprint on 
people, and CIA ocers would be no exception.
The CIA report played up long-standing divisions and conicts that were 
on full and open display at the congress. Dwight Eisenhower had not yet been 
elected, and the agency had not yet taken its turn from an intelligence agency to 
what the dissident CIA operative Ralph McGehee denounced as “the covert ac-
tion arm of the Presidency” that overthrew democratically elected governments 
and backed right-wing dictators.19 The CIA obviously had ocers in place in Ec-
uador, but it is not apparent that they intervened in the assembly’s proceedings. 
Furthermore, without more and better sources of information, it is dicult to 
ascertain whether the intelligence agency’s assessment was an accurate represen-
tation of the congress, or whether CIA informers and case ocers skewed their 
portrayal of events to match preconceived notions of how communists would 
act. As was common practice, sources of information for the memo were either 
not included in the original or are redacted in the declassi	ed version that the 
CIA has released to the public. Variances in information, however, would seem 
to indicate that it drew on multiple sources and that none of these was an eye-
witness account by the report’s primary author. That alone should hardly be a 
surprise, as a typically young, clean-cut, European-descent, linguistically chal-
lenged, Ivy League–trained US ocial would hardly pass unnoticed at a leist 
meeting whether or not it was a public aair. Despite these limitations, the CIA 
information report is one of the few extant contemporary accounts of the PCE 
congress and as such provides a rich source of documentation with valuable in-
sights into internal party debates.20
The congress began with a preparatory session in the auditorium of the Liceo 
Juan Montalvo on the aernoon of Thursday, July 24, 1952, with the attendance 
of about 150 to 160 communists, including 105 delegates apparently divided be-
tween either eighty-two or eighty-eight cell delegates, two foreign fraternal del-
egates, and either 	een or twenty-one alternative delegates. The party’s interim 
secretary general Saad presided over the preparatory session. In what surely must 
have been an ironic gesture, Saad warmly thanked Ambato’s conservative mayor 
for allowing the party to use the auditorium. Others were less generous. Some 
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at the meeting complained about anticommunist grati that ARNE members 
had plastered on the walls throughout the city. Saad urged delegates to take the 
high road and ignore the provocations. His gracious gestures are in part what 
gained him support for his leadership role in the party, particularly during these 
dicult years as political spaces for the le slowly closed.
Delegates at the preparatory session elected the presidium for the congress, 
with Saad as president. Joining him on the daises were Enrique Gil Gilbert, 
the secretary general of the party in Guayas; Hernán Acebedo, a party leader 
from Loja; Jaime Galarza Zavala, the secretary general of the party in Azuay; 
Aquiles Valencia, PCE member from Manabí; Oswaldo Albornoz Peralta, the 
secretary general of the party in Pichincha and future leading communist histo-
rian; and José María Dávalos, the secretary general of the party in Tungurahua. 
Even though the presidium already demonstrated a broad geographic reach, a 
delegate proposed the inclusion of representatives from Cañar, Imbabura, and 
Esmeraldas because of party gains in those provinces. Delegates did not approve 
the motion, although the report does not indicate the reasoning behind their 
exclusion. The preparatory session also established a presidium of honor that 
included the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong, the 
Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, the Brazilian Luís Carlos Prestes, as well as other 
communist leaders from China, France, and Italy.
In addition to the organizational and ceremonial activities, the preparatory 
session engaged in several substantive discussions. Among the resolutions ap-
proved were a protest against United States intervention in the internal aairs 
of other countries, support for the CTE, opposition to the United States 	rm 
Morrison-Knudsen holding a contract to build the Quevedo-Manta Road, and a 
salute to other communist parties. The discussion that most naturally attracted 
the CIA’s attention was one that Alfredo Vera led on the threat of a global war. 
According to the CIA, “Vera bitterly blamed the United States for causing the 
as yet undeclared World War III. He further blasted the American banana com-
panies for ruthlessly exploiting Ecuadoran labor, especially in the Province of 
Esmeraldas.” Attacks on the economic interests of United States corporations 
always attracted the agency’s attention.
With the conclusion of the preparatory session, congress participants moved 
to the Teatro Inca for the inaugural session that began at 9:00 p.m. that same 
evening. The theater was packed with one thousand attendees—hardly an indi-
cation of a small and insigni	cant meeting. A large portrait of Stalin hung in the 
back at the center of the stage, anked by the Ecuadorian and Soviet ags. Mem-
bers of the presidium for the congress as well as the fraternal delegates Rubén 
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Calderón from Cuba and Jaime Barrios from Colombia joined party leaders on 
the stage. The CIA indicated that Calderón had previously been in Ecuador 
as an advisor to the PCE. The case ocer identi	ed him as a relative of the 
Cuban party leader Blas Roca, and that he used the pseudonym “Calderio” when 
traveling.
Gil Gilbert opened the inaugural session, which featured a mixture of pag-
eantry, incendiary speeches, and party resolutions. Ambato’s municipal band 
was the 	rst musical act, reecting the civic embrace that the communists re-
ceived from local political leaders. In the middle of the introductory remarks, a 
Juventud Comunista del Ecuador (JCE, Young Communists of Ecuador) relay 
team arrived from Quito with a burning “torch of peace.” The group carried a 
large communist ag, and two members, one dressed as a worker and the other 
as a farmer, crossed a hammer and a sickle on the stage to sustained audience 
applause. A JCE chorus sang the Ecuadorian national anthem, the “Interna-
tionale,” and other revolutionary songs. Individuals also recited revolutionary 
poems and sang revolutionary songs. Organizers opened up signi	cant cultural 
spaces for youth at the congress.
Signi	cantly, the 	rst speaker at the inaugural session was Olga Muñoz in 
representation of the Juventud Comunista Femenina (JCF, Young Communist 
Women). Muñoz praised the work of young women in the party. Both contem-
porary surveillance operatives as well as subsequent historians largely ignored 
the role of women, as well as gender relations more generally, in the party. What 
we do know, however, is that while all of the other parties—including the so-
cialists—were the exclusive domain of literate, urban, European-descent men, 
the PCE somewhat more closely reected Ecuador’s demographic diversity. 
The involvement of women, as well as rural peasants, Indigenous peoples, and 
Afro-Ecuadorians, never approached their proportion in society, but it would 
also be a mistake to dismiss their presence as mere tokenism as critics have com-
monly done. Instead, the participation of Muñoz in the inaugural session indi-
cates an attempt to foster and encourage new forms of leadership.
PCE founder and outgoing secretary general Ricardo Paredes followed 
Muñoz. According to the CIA, Paredes “bitterly attacked the United States and 
singled out the Military Pact that the United States and Ecuador had recently 
signed as his principal target. He mouthed standard Communist phrases about 
world peace and Yankee Imperialism.” What the case ocer did not mention 
in the report was that in January of the previous year, United States immigra-
tion ocials had incarcerated Paredes at Ellis Island as he returned to Ecuador 
through New York from a peace conference in Warsaw, Poland even though he 
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had the proper travel documents. A rapid mobilization of solidarity networks 
gained his freedom, but understandably the unjusti	ed detention would have 
le him with an unpleasant attitude toward that country.21 The Cuban delegate 
Calderón also spoke briey against United States imperialism, and urged his 
counterparts in Ecuador to oppose military pacts because of how they would 
compromise national sovereignty. The CIA reported that Calderón was an ef-
fective speaker and the audience responded warmly to his comments.
Rafael Echeverría then addressed the assembly in the name of the JCE. He 
criticized the party for its lack of decision, discipline, and valor. The CIA had 
tracked Echeverría for several years, and reported that he was not a good speaker. 
Two years earlier, Echeverría had been elected to the executive committee of the 
IUS at the Second World Student Congress in Prague, Czechoslovakia, infor-
mation that made its way through an Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) 
report to the CIA.22 Similar to Muñoz, Echeverría’s participation in the inaugu-
ral session was a reection of the party’s goals to include what would otherwise 
be disregarded or overlooked voices.
Finally, Saad spoke for almost two hours on a variety of subjects, including 
the threat of a global war, United States support for reactionary coups and gov-
ernments in Latin America, the need to nationalize foreign businesses in Ec-
uador including the petroleum industry, the importance of an agrarian reform 
program that would turn land over to those who worked it, and the subjuga-
tion of Ecuador’s domestic economy to United States interests. Saad criticized 
right-wing socialists who had allied with the Plaza government and highlighted 
the need to oppose conservative populists including Velasco Ibarra and Juan 
Perón in Argentina. His targeting of Perón is particularly interesting considering 
that in the immediate postwar period United States opposition to communism 
was only rivaled by the fear that Perón’s popular appeal fostered anti-imperialist 
sentiments throughout the region. If United States policy analysts had bothered 
to step back and examine these political issues in their broader political context, 
they would have understood that there was no love lost between communists 
and populists as they competed for the allegiance of the same working-class base 
of support.
As indication of the reality that internal battles oen surpassed interna-
tional political considerations, ARNE and CFP thugs attacked the theater in 
the middle of Saad’s speech and cut electric power to the building. Outside, a 
group of 	y opponents shouted anticommunist slogans and damaged a car that 
belonged to Franklin Pérez Castro. Meanwhile, Saad continued his speech by 
ashlight. Eventually the police quelled the disturbance, and restored power to 
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the theater. While local authorities welcomed the communist congress, others 
were determined to make their hostility loudly known. The session ended at 
midnight with more music and other cultural acts.
The 	rst plenary session opened the following morning, July 25, at the Liceo 
Juan Montalvo where the party had held its preparatory session the previous 
aernoon. For the next four days, delegates gathered in three plenary sessions 
each day. While the inaugural session was an open and public event, the plenary 
sessions were restricted to the 105 credentialed delegates with others escorted 
outside of the auditorium. Nevertheless, the CIA report continued with infor-
mation on speci	c rules including the time allotted for discussion of each point 
on the agenda. The level of detail indicates either an in	ltrator in the meeting 
or access to published proceedings, and in the absence of party archives to verify 
internal organizational minutiae it is dicult to say which might be the case. 
The CIA reported that the principal characteristic of the congress was “bitter 
personal strife among the leaders and the delegates present.” And, in fact, the 
balance of the CIA’s report extensively cataloged internal conict in the party, 
information that would not have been included in published proceedings. Nat-
urally it would be in the United States interest to highlight such disputes within 
a communist party, and it is dicult to ascertain whether the report accurately 
communicates the tone of the meeting. The report gives no indication as to 
whether the CIA fostered these disputes, as Agee famously related a decade later 
in his book Inside the Company. Whether or not the CIA report is faithful to 
the level of internal conict, it does provide useful insights into divisions and 
ideological disputes that had long run through the party.
Paredes and Saad
Front and center at the congress was the long-running conict between Paredes 
and Saad. Paredes continued to live in Manta on the coast where he had his 
medical practice, even though party statutes stipulated that the secretary gen-
eral should reside the capital. Already in July 1950, party leadership had given 
him a year to return to Quito, and that time was up. Paredes faced the choice of 
resigning his position in the party or moving back to the capital. A CIA case of-
	cer reported that his wife, Zoila Flor, “who is not a Communist, wishes him to 
give up the position because it demands so much of his time and eort that it is 
impossible for him to support his family properly.” Furthermore, Saad was “the 
actual leader of the Party,” which created internal tensions. According to an ear-
lier CIA report, the suspected Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) 
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agent Roberto Morena had elevated Saad to nominal head of the party although 
he would need the formal approval of a party congress to make that designation 
ocial.23
Regionalism is an overwhelmingly powerful force in Ecuador, but signi	-
cantly divisions did not fall out along such straightforward geographic nor other 
easily discernible lines. Coastal labor leader and secretary general of the FPTG 
Segundo Ramos nominated Paredes for the political commission at the con-
gress. Ramos claimed that Paredes was rightfully the party’s secretary general, 
and that Saad had usurped the position. Saad retorted that the PCE’s executive 
committee elected him to the post aer Paredes had asked for an inde	nite leave 
to move to Manta. Whereas personal, ideological, and regional factors may have 
underlain the discord at the congress, delegates did not address them directly. 
Instead, divisions in the party were expressed in other ways.
Following the debate over who should lead the party, Paredes faced a urry 
of charges. Foremost among them and apparently the most serious was that of 
entering into direct contact with foreign communist leaders without advising 
the party’s executive committee. Echeverría accused Paredes of writing to Mao 
Zedong to solicit scholarships for two comrades in Manta of Chinese descent. 
Paredes had handed Mao’s response in Moscow to Echeverría for him to carry to 
the central committee in Ecuador, but instead Echeverría gave the letter to Saad. 
According to the CIA report, the letter read:
Comrade Ricardo Paredes, Secretary General of the PCE, I answer your 
kind letter in which you ask me to facilitate the further study of the Chung 
Jurado brothers in Peking. I send you my best wishes and inform you that 
they may come when they consider it convenient, Mao Tse Tung [Zedong].
The letter was vague and noncommittal, and included no indication of speci	c 
dates or 	nancial assistance. Nevertheless, the simple fact that Paredes had writ-
ten the letter apparently caused extreme concern among the delegates. Many 
Latin American communists held up the recent Chinese Revolution as an inspi-
ration, and one that they might emulate in their own countries. No indication 
exists that the dispute was political or ideological in nature, but rather one of a 
violation of organizational norms and protocol. On the other hand, Saad’s parti-
sans simply may have exploited the issue to attack a competitor in the party. Rela-
tions between Chinese and Latin American revolutionaries is a signi	cantly un-
derstudied topic due in part to language barriers and a lingering Euro-centrism, 
but this exchange indicates underlying tensions well before the Sino-Soviet split 
in the 1960s that led to the emergence of avowedly Maoist parties.24
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In addition to his contact with the Chinese, the Colombian delegate Jaime 
Barrios accused Paredes of providing a Colombian communist named Suárez 
with a signed and notarized letter stating that Suárez was an anticommunist 
conservative. The Colombian press printed the letter, and Barrios brought a copy 
with him to the congress. Suárez had attended the Warsaw Peace Congress, and 
allegedly Paredes’s support allowed him to reenter the country. Paredes denied 
the entire aair, and the CIA failed to provide a logical explanation for why a 
communist leader would provide such a safe conduct pass and how it would carry 
any weight in the neighboring country, which calls into question the agency’s 
ability to convey those internal discussions accurately. If anything, the letter may 
have been a plant, an anticommunist ploy to denigrate the leader of the party. 
The CIA report does not include information on the resolution of these charges, 
but it might be that Barrios had brought the letter either to clear up the issue or 
to make the party aware of the types of disinformation campaigns it faced.
In addition to these international concerns, delegates also accused Paredes 
of violating democratic centralism by attempting to publish a party newspaper 
in Manta and of collecting money from the FEI to pay for his trip to the Soviet 
Union. The FEI’s secretary general Modesto Rivera led the charges that Pare-
des solicited funds from the Indigenous federation, and particularly from the 
Kayambis with whom he had a longstanding relationship, and then raised 8,000 
sucres more from the federation upon his return. As with the other charges, the 
CIA does not include information on a resolution. That did not seem to be the 
agency’s interest or concern. But the reference to the FEI is notable in that it was 
one of few mentions of Indigenous peoples in the CIA’s report on the party’s 
congress. The CIA observed “that no delegates of Indian cells were present at 
the Congress, nor was any mention made of the existence of such cells.” If that 
were the case, it would represent a change in the party. Famously, the commu-
nists had long made space in their ranks for Indigenous militants. Most notably, 
the long-time Kayambi activists Jesús Gualavisí, Dolores Cacuango, and Trán-
sito Amaguaña played key roles in the party, with Gualavisí participating in its 
founding congress in 1926, Cacuango more recently serving on the party’s cen-
tral committee, and Amaguaña subsequently being an active member including 
traveling internationally on behalf of the party.
The general absence of Indigenous voices in the CIA report either reveals 
a blindness to those who did not match demographic assumptions about who 
would be a communist leader, or is an indication of a disinterest in or ignorance 
of rural struggles. Subsequent observers and scholars have oen assumed that 
one could not be both an Indigenous person and a communist militant or leader, 
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and the silences in the CIA record may reect those presumptions. In fact, even 
the information that the CIA ocers included contradicts their conclusions 
about the lack of Indigenous participation in the party. According to Rivera, the 
FEI “will soon be run entirely by Indians, members of the PCE.” He claimed 
that the FEI has made “considerable progress” in establishing Indigenous unions, 
including eight in Otavalo, three in Riobamba, and one in Sangolquí in addition 
to those in Cotacachi and Cayambe that already had a long and well-established 
history. As a male of European-descent, Rivera’s comments may have registered 
with the CIA ocers or their informers in a way that the presence of subaltern 
voices at the congress might not have.
In addition to attacking Paredes for exploiting Indigenous federations for 
his own personal gain, Rivera also condemned María Luisa Gómez de la Torre 
for having “abandoned her work with the Indians.” According to Rivera, aer 
working so hard and long with Indigenous schools in Cayambe, Gómez de la 
Torre had “retired to a position of bourgeois luxury at her comfortable home in 
Quito.” In Ecuadorian leist circles, Gómez de la Torre is legendary for having 
set up these schools.25 And in fact, Paredes shared a similar reputation for his 
long-term interest in, and petitioning for, Indigenous rights. Rather than con-
demning Paredes and Gómez de la Torre, Rivera may have been attempting to 
hold them accountable to their responsibilities as longtime communist militants 
and party leaders. An outside observer may have mistaken—or intentionally 
misconstrued—a communist tradition of self-criticism for open and irreconcil-
able splits in the party.
On the other hand, the in	ghting may have simply reected political im-
maturity. At least this is how it appeared to the Colombian communist leader 
Barrios. He described for the congress the torture and repression that his party’s 
members confronted. Given the intense wave of violence that was washing over 
Colombia, Barrios criticized the Ecuadorian delegates for gathering only to hurl 
insults at one another rather than to work together around a common agenda. 
He found it colossally stupid to 	ght when they faced “propitious circumstances 
for the triumph of Communism.” Particularly considering the relative advan-
tages that the Ecuadorians enjoyed, the Colombians appeared to be more po-
litically advanced than their counterparts in the neighboring country. From his 
perspective, the Ecuadorians should pull together rather than engage in such 
incendiary 	ghts. If Barrios were correct, these internal disputes would explain 
in part why the Ecuadorian le lost so much ground in the 1950s.
On the surface, a 	nal complaint against Paredes appears to be much more per-
sonal than political in nature. This charge concerned making false accusations 
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against his fellow comrade Nela Martínez. Paredes and Martínez famously had 
an aair in the late 1930s that resulted in the birth of a child named Leonardo. 
Martínez subsequently married the French communist Raymond Mériguet and 
had several more children with him. Apparently Martínez had cut o contact 
with Paredes, which had led to the spat. Once again, such an open airing of 
personal laundry may have embodied the weaponization of seemingly trivial 
matters, or it might indicate the mature reconciliation of personal issues so that 
comrades could eectively continue their work around a shared political agenda. 
If that were the case, it would reect the party’s strength and ability to overcome 
diculties and rally around a common cause.
The CIA reported that Paredes railed for three hours against his accusers, and 
in particular against Saad, Echeverría, and Rivera. “His speech reportedly had no 
coherence,” the CIA stated in their account, “and he was several times warned by 
the Presidium to get back to the point,” indicating that the author was not pres-
ent at the meeting but drew on secondhand evidence. Paredes responded to the 
charges with a description of his revolutionary activities and years of service to the 
party. The CIA’s account continued, “It has been reported that the general con-
sensus was that he made a complete fool of himself and did not eectively refute 
any of the charges made against him.” Given Paredes’s long history of activism, 
the accusations had repercussions throughout the party. Allegedly, many dele-
gates concluded “that Paredes has degenerated completely as a revolutionary, but 
that he should be ‘put out to pasture’ by a Party which must recognize his valuable 
service in the past.” It would, of course, also serve United States imperial interests 
to eliminate a long-standing communist militant from the political scene.
Paredes was not the only party member to face charges at the congress. Del-
egates criticized Vera for his “rightist deviations” stemming from his stint as 
minister of education in Velasco Ibarra’s government aer the May 1944 revolu-
tion. At that time, US ambassador Robert Scotten identi	ed Vera as “known to 
be closely identi	ed with the extreme Le” and reportedly “aliated with the 
Communist Party.”26 According to the FBI, Vera had formally resigned from 
the communist party aer accusations surfaced that his brother-in-law was a 
Nazi, even though he personally remained sympathetic to communist principles. 
Velasco Ibarra forced both Vera as well as the socialist minister of social wel-
fare Alfonso Calderón Moreno out of oce on January 30, 1945, claiming that 
the ministers were incompetent, although his actual reason was to lessen leist 
inuence in his government. A day aer the dismissals, the PCE accused the 
administration of moving to the right and announced that it would no longer 
collaborate with the government.27
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Vera also faced charges that he had failed to act with proper revolutionary 
vigor in his interactions with the CFP leader Carlos Guevara Moreno and his 
allies with whom he served on Guayaquil’s municipal council, and that he had 
acted in an opportunistic manner. Vera later grumbled of the party’s failure to 
support his leadership on the council. A CIA ocer commented that aer the 
party congress Vera had “continued his carping criticism of the PCE leadership 
without let-up.” In particular, Vera protested that the PCE was losing the initia-
tive in opposing Guevara Moreno’s actions on Guayaquil’s municipal council.28
These divisions tore at the party and threatened to lead to defections among 
those who were not committed to a long-term struggle.
Leading the attack on Vera was Primitivo Barreto, whom the executive com-
mittee had sent from Quito to Guayaquil to address problems in the coastal 
regional committee, and a young communist named Bolívar Sandoval from 
the coastal province of Los Ríos. A group of longtime militants including 
Ana Moreno, Segundo Ramos, Cesario Valverde, Ricardo Paredes, and Nela 
Martínez all came to Vera’s defense. According to the CIA, this group claimed 
that Vera’s opponents were simply attempting “to make him the scapegoat for all 
of the errors of the PCE.” Paredes considered Vera to be “the most intelligent and 
loyal of all the members of the PCE.” Notably, those who came to Vera’s defense 
represented the le wing of the party even though he had been accused of rightist 
deviations, but this was also a group who opposed Saad’s leadership of the party. 
Multiple factors intertwined to de	ne conictual and contradictory alliances.
Similar to Vera, Manuel Medina Castro also faced criticism for his rightist 
deviations. Medina Castro had led the 	ght against the Grace Line’s dispute 
with the Port of Guayaquil, but party members complained that he had done so 
without advising party leaders of his plans. Grace had held a contract since 1943 
to transfer cargo from ships docked at Puna Island near the mouth of the Guayas 
River to the city of Guayaquil. The Ecuadorian government now requested that 
the United States send an engineer to examine proposals to dredge the Guayas 
River to circumvent the additional transportation costs of o-loading the ship-
ments. The Truman administration included improvements to the Ecuadorian 
port in its “Point Four” technical assistance and economic development pro-
gram.29 In March 1951, the Ecuadorian congress passed a resolution to cancel the 
Grace Line contract to handle cargo at Puna Island. Grace and Chilean Lines 
threatened to stop service if they were not permitted to unload at the island, 
arguing that it was unsafe to bring their ships directly into the Guayaquil harbor. 
Opponents retorted that the transshipment simply provided an opportunity to 
inate costs.30
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The Grace contract became a common topic of discussion for the PCE, and 
provided a convenient battering ram with which to attack United States impe-
rialism. Medina Castro frequently spoke on the topic, and in particular empha-
sized the advantages of dredging the Guayas River and constructing a new port 
at Guayaquil. A year and a half earlier, a CIA ocer had complained that as a 
“prominent member of the PCE and member of the Guayas Provincial Coun-
cil,” Medina Castro had denounced the government’s contract with the Grace 
Company in a speech at the Casa de la Cultura in Guayaquil.31 Another speech 
at the University of Guayaquil resulted in the publication of a book that placed 
pressure on the government to cancel the contract and upgrade Guayaquil’s 
port facilities.32 Medina Castro’s vocal opposition led Dario Astudillo, a pro-
fessor of civil law at the university and the father of several workers at the Grace 
Line, to complain to US Consul Perry Ellis about undue communist inuence 
at the university.33 In December 1951, the FPTG, the communist-dominated 
coastal aliate of the CTE, invited Medina Castro to address their congress 
on the topic. Medina Castro complained that the United States government 
and 	nancial interests wished to conduct work that would not be needed for 
navigation of the Guayas River, and that laborers and farm workers would be 
stuck with the bill. He claimed that Grace refused to allow its ships to enter the 
Guayaquil harbor only because it could make more money by unloading the 
cargo at Puna and charging extra for transporting the freight up the river on 
barges.34 In response, the 	nance minister Alfredo Peñaherrera announced the 
government’s decision not to renew its contract with the Grace Line because it 
was harmful to Ecuadorian interests, which inuenced the company to threaten 
to terminate its service to Ecuador because the river lacked sucient depth for 
safe navigation.35 The New York Times reported “from a reliable source that the 
Grace Line had not been interested in renewing the contract,” but that “leist 
political and labor circles” had latched onto the issue as a topic of agitation.36
In this case, communist appeals to nationalist sentiments contributed to an 
alliance with the Ecuadorian government against the economic penetration of 
a foreign company.
CIA surveillance of the party congress calls into question how united the 
party was in its opposition to the Grace contract, and whether Medina Castro 
was simply using the party to advance a pet cause. While Moreno, Ramos, and 
Valverde had come to Vera’s defense, now they accused Medina Castro of acting 
on his own rather than adhering to party discipline. Medina Castro, for his 
part, reportedly said that he was fed up with party discipline, and encouraged 
members to abandon the party if it would not personally bene	t them to remain. 
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The CIA reported that the accusations against Medina Castro were particularly 
bitter, and almost led to a 	st	ght between Vera and Medina Castro.
The CIA’s report does not indicate to what extent the conicts with Vera 
and Medina Castro were personal or political, and what underlying issues might 
have contributed to the disagreements. Those on the party’s le may have had 
their disagreements with Vera’s relatively more moderate political positions, but 
they appeared to recognize and admire his commitment to socialist struggles. 
Medina Castro similarly had a trajectory on the le, including working with 
the FEUE while a student, winning a seat in the 1945 constituent assembly as an 
elected delegate from the province of Los Ríos, and subsequently serving on the 
Guayas provincial council. As with many militants, he was imprisoned multiple 
times for his activism, including later being exiled to Cuba aer the 1963 mili-
tary coup. Even so, apparently Medina Castro’s perception of his role in the party 
did not match that of his comrades. Rather than clear ideological divisions, the 
issues appeared to concern matters of commitment and opportunism.
Nela Martínez stressed the need for criticism and self-criticism, and whether 
ironic or not she subsequently became the victim of what the CIA ocer char-
acterized as “violent tirades of criticism.” She had prepared a political report for 
the congress, and other delegates condemned it as plagued with “serious political 
and ‘personalist’ errors.” The CIA summarized Martínez’s report as contending 
that the executive committee of the PCE, and not Vera, had pledged support 
to the liberal J. Federico Intriago for mayor of Guayaquil in the recent munic-
ipal elections, a statement that led to strong criticism from Vera’s detractors.37
Martínez also criticized Paredes for signing a letter that had appeared in the 
Colombian press. Her insistence that Paredes be investigated and punished if 
found guilty prompted a strong response from Paredes’s defenders.
Delegates also complained that Martínez encouraged young women to join 
the PCE directly without 	rst going through the JCF, thereby leading to the 
decline of that feeder organization into the main party. Martínez was a noted 
feminist and founder of several women’s organizations, so it would seem unlikely 
that she would oppose young women forming their own group particularly given 
the patriarchal nature of society that bled over into the party. This criticism 
was especially ironic given that Martínez encouraged more party support for 
the JCE, the young communist group, including pressing for the appointment 
of a youth member to the PCE’s executive committee. She also advocated for 
the party to create and support a JCE newspaper. Others echoed Martínez’s 
comments on the JCE and urged that the party dedicate more resources to the 
promotion of the organization. Efraín Alvarez Fiallo from the JCE in Guayas 
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promoted the establishment of youth groups in each province. Saad responded 
to the criticism by stating that in the future more attention would be paid to de-
veloping the JCE. Martínez’s overt support for the JCE naturally led to criticism 
for her failures as head of the JCF. The documentation is frustratingly silent on 
why she would not be more supportive of the JCF.
Martínez, in turn, criticized her fellow communists for not raising their chil-
dren in accord with the party’s line. In particular, she called out Alfonso Qui-
jano Cobos for sending his daughters to a convent. Religious education had long 
been an issue for anticlerical liberals given the assumption that students would 
emerge from Catholic schools thoroughly indoctrinated into conservative ideol-
ogies. For a communist like Martínez, it was completely unthinkable that leists 
could willingly send their children to a parochial school even if it meant taking 
advantage of a higher quality education.
Martínez raised many more issues at the congress, many of them quite per-
sonal. For example, she advocated providing funding to Ernesto Rossi Delgado 
so that he could travel outside of Ecuador to seek medical treatment. One crit-
icism owed into another, with the tension building up to a crescendo. As was 
perhaps to be expected, divisions also ran through the JCE. Patricio Cueva Jara-
millo, the son of the socialist Carlos Cueva Tamariz who had recently held the 
portfolio of minister of education in Plaza’s government, asked the congress to 
expel Jorge Maldonado Renella because he spent all his time selling the Com-
inform newspaper For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy rather than 
dedicating himself to more important JCE activities. The British Embassy noted 
that Cueva Jaramillo had recently returned from what it described as “a year’s 
Communist education at Prague University.”38 Both Cueva Jaramillo and Mal-
donado Renella, who had also studied in Prague as well as Warsaw, had attended 
the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)–sponsored Berlin Youth 
Festival the previous year, which probably had drawn them further into commu-
nist circles.39 According to the CIA, Cueva Jaramillo was also one of Martínez’s 
principal accusers, even though he was young and had been in the party for only 
eight months. The CIA report does not indicate on what authority he made his 
complaints, or whether in such an open and democratic environment he even 
needed any special standing other than being a formal delegate to the congress 
to do so. Nor does the agency indicate how other delegates responded to his 
demands. Perhaps he had taken Martínez’s call for the need for self-criticism 
too seriously.
A year later, Cueva Jaramillo was named president of the JCE, and one of his 
principle concerns in that position was the upcoming elections for control of 
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the FEUE. JCE leaders indicated that they were “getting along well” with the 
socialist student leaders, and were hoping for expanded cooperation.40 Several 
years later he traveled to Moscow for the Sixth World Festival of Youth and 
Students.41 At the same time, he was slowly driing away from the PCE and did 
not subsequently play a signi	cant role in the party. Instead, he went on to work 
with the political periodical La Calle that secular intellectuals founded in 1957 
to press a liberal, anticommunist agenda.42 He later became known as a journal-
ist, including working with Granma in Cuba, and as a painter.
In an earlier session Ramos had supported Paredes for the post of secretary 
general over Saad, and now he continued his attack against Saad for his short-
comings in leading the communist labor movement on the coast. Underlying the 
criticisms was the fact that Ramos was to have held the post of senator for coastal 
labor in the federal congress, but instead the position went to Saad. Ramos ac-
cused Saad and his allies of cheating him out of the position. Rightfully, Ramos 
claimed, the post belonged to him because he was a true worker, whereas Saad 
had “never worked a single day in his lifetime.” This charge led to signi	cant de-
bate. According to the CIA, “the few delegates belonging to the laboring class” 
supported Ramos, while “the ‘intellectual’ majority” defended Saad. His backers 
denounced Ramos as “a degenerate drunkard,” and claimed “that only Saad has 
the necessary Party background and political acumen to hold such an important 
post in the National Assembly.” This debate had long been present in the party, 
with considerable anti-intellectual and proworker sentiments prevalent in the 
coastal committee. Saad’s supporters maintained that having a person of his 
stature and skills in a leadership position was in the party’s best interests. An 
undercurrent of opposition to intellectuals such as Saad (and the socialist Man-
uel Agustín Aguirre, who earlier had served as senator for highland workers) 
was broadly present among the labor rank and 	le. The argument was that as 
intellectuals rather than manual workers they did not meet the constitutional 
quali	cations to represent labor in congress, even though they continued to 
enjoy the support of CTE leaders.43
Ramos allegedly also insulted the visiting emissaries Barrios from Colombia 
and Calderón from Cuba, which triggered a negative reaction from other dele-
gates and elicited an apology from Saad. The party leader then asked for a vote of 
con	dence for Barrios and Calderón, which prompted prolonged applause that 
forced Ramos to retract his statements. Barrios asked for a committee to inves-
tigate Ramos’s charges so as to reassure the assembled delegates of the visitor’s 
legitimacy. The CIA reported that it was later revealed that Calderón had par-
ticipated in the executive committee meeting in which party leaders had decided 
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to support Saad rather than Ramos as labor senator, and in fact Calderón had 
voted for Saad as the more valuable of the two postulants. Political debates easily 
bled into personal disputes.
Vera then launched an attack against Pérez Castro, the wealthy son of the 
founder of El Universo. Pérez Castro had a complicated relationship with both 
his family and the Ecuadorian le. In its earlier investigations, the FBI claimed 
that Pérez Castro had become involved in the communist party due to his re-
bellious nature rather than a commitment to “any particular political ideology.” 
The bureau quoted an unnamed “prominent Socialist leader” who characterized 
Pérez Castro as “young, rich, crazy, imprudent and uncontrollable, and who is 
used by the Communist Party since he has money and since his family runs the 
newspaper El Universo.”44 At the party congress, Vera accused Pérez Castro of 
“leist deviations” that had contributed “to the virtual destruction of the PCE 
in Guayaquil.” Allegedly Pérez Castro had made no eort to adhere to the party 
line and thereby harmed communist support for building an international peace 
movement. His actions had led to political confusion in the party at both the cell 
level and in the Guayas provincial committee. Pérez Castro also faced charges of 
physically assaulting Gil Gilbert, and of abandoning his party duties to move to 
Salinas “where he lives like any other bourgeois.” As with other party members, 
Pérez Castro also had his defenders. Juan Pío Narváez claimed that Pérez Cas-
tro was “the most faithful, hardworking PCE member in the coastal area,” and 
“had poured all his personal funds into Party work.” Narváez returned Vera’s 
accusations, charging that Vera had sabotaged the party’s peace movement in 
order to discredit Pérez Castro. Other delegates also defended Pérez Castro and 
welcomed his work in organizing the party in Tungurahua. He may have been 
impetuous, but they valued the work he did.
Next, José María Roura Cevallos accused Paredes, Gómez de la Torre, 
Martínez, and Mériguet for their “rightist deviations” that had compromised the 
party’s eectiveness. Roura had joined the communist party while studying at 
the Central University in Quito a decade earlier, and represented university stu-
dents in the 1945 constituent assembly. A decade later the PCE expelled Roura, 
together with Jaime Galarza and Nela Martínez, from the party for their leist 
“divisive activities.”45 In between those events, in November 1955 Velasco Ibarra 
sought to transfer Roura from his teaching position at Colegio Mejía in Quito 
to a new girls’ school at Guaranda in an attempt either to exile an opponent or 
to force him to resign. The students at Colegio Mejía responded to the news 
with protests and demonstrations that quickly spread to other schools. Those at 
the Normal Juan Montalvo barricaded themselves in their school and refused to 
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leave. The police and military attacked the school with tear gas and rie 	re and 
in the process killed a student, severely wounded numerous others (including a 
thirteen-year-old girl), and arrested others. The murdered student, Isidro Guer-
rero, subsequently became a cause célèbre for the le.46 Predictably, rather than 
granting legitimacy to the protests, Joseph Costanzo, the United States consul in 
Guayaquil, complained that it was “clear as daylight that the PCE is responsible 
for keeping the strike going” for none other than the nefarious purpose to cause 
trouble for the government.47
Given this militant history and an apparent ability to inspire others to action, 
in 1952 Roura launched his complaints against his fellow comrades. According 
to Roura, these leaders in Pichincha had “converted the Party into a scheming 
group of gossips and rumor-mongers,” and he asked the congress to censure their 
actions. Roura noted that these “old-timers” enjoyed considerable prestige in the 
party, and that either they needed to change their behavior or they should be ex-
pelled before they corrupted a younger generation. If the CIA’s recording of the 
internal conicts is accurate, Roura grouped these historical leaders together as 
a common problem for the party even though they had earlier attacked one an-
other on other issues. Or, perhaps, it was the bickering among themselves that so 
bothered him. Roura also advocated for an intensi	cation of propaganda among 
the working class. He promoted the nationalization of foreign businesses as “the 
only practical way to rid Ecuador of foreign imperialists.” Those members he 
had just denounced represented the party’s le wing, and probably would not 
have disagreed with him on these points.
Both of the visiting communist leaders from Colombia and Cuba had an 
opportunity to address the congress. Barrios spoke for three hours during which 
time he detailed the history of the Partido Comunista de Colombia (PCC, 
Communist Party of Colombia). The CIA highlighted in particular his crit-
icism of Yankee imperialism. Barrios claimed that “the repressive measures of 
Colombian conservatives, backed by Yankee Imperialism, have served only to 
strengthen the PCC, causing more persons to join the cause.” Barrios discussed 
the upcoming Peiping [Beijing] Peace Conference, and the opportunities that it 
would provide for the Ecuadorian party. The PCE could send twelve delegates, 
and Barrios encouraged the party to assemble a delegation comprised of capable 
intellectuals. Taking advantage of this opportunity would help them advance 
their struggle.
The anonymous CIA author was less charitable in an assessment of the con-
tributions of the Cuban representative Calderón. The intelligence ocer dis-
regarded his speeches as “more repetitions of the usual Party line.” Calderón 
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advised the PCE to purge “its ranks to weed out the weak and vacillating, as well 
as the in	ltrated agents of the ‘imperialist powers,’” though apparently, he did 
not indicate who those agents might be and if an informer for the CIA was one 
of those. He encouraged the establishment of schools to train new leaders. Given 
what he had seen at the congress, that was perhaps not bad advice.
The party devoted its closing session to reports from various commissions. 
According to the CIA, the organization commission’s report “marked the tem-
porary end of the bitter personal accusations which had heretofore been the 
principal activity of the convention delegates.” Barreto read the report that 
laid out the party’s new political line, which the assembled delegates approved. 
Among the recommendations was a new system of party identi	cation cards to 
be distributed to all members, the establishment of schools to train new leaders, 
the formation of new working-class and peasant cells, the recruitment of new 
members, an intensi	cation of a campaign for peace and against military pacts, 
opposition to decadent imperialist literature, fundraising, creation of a peasant 
federation, and development of a women’s movement and federation. Party lead-
ership planned to dra a new document on party organization for distribution 
aer the congress.
The discipline commission explained charges against several party members, 
and expelled four: Pedro Barba, Héctor Pazmiño, Ecuador (aka Manuel) Jaya, 
and Manuel Arenas Coello. Barba had previously been a political prisoner, and 
was released in June 1946 under an amnesty program.48 Arenas Coello had been 
elected to the Guayaquil municipal council on the Popular Alliance ticket. Lit-
tle information is available on the other two and the CIA report does not de-
tail complaints against them, which indicates that the party targeted marginal 
members rather than major leaders for sanction. The discipline commission also 
accused Vera and Medina Castro of “rightist deviation,” and instructed them 
never to promise electoral support for political candidates without 	rst gaining 
approval from the party’s executive committee. Vera would subsequently receive 
additional charges of being a “renegade” for his work with the municipal council, 
and eventually he too was expelled from the party.49
The 	nal issue facing the congress was election of party leadership, which 
according to the CIA led to a new wave of angry debates because many nominees 
“have proven in the past that they lack the necessary attributes of revolutionary 
vigor.” Pérez Castro urged that Saad be elected unanimously as secretary general. 
Narváez seconded the motion, but revealing divisions in the party Ana Moreno 
nominated the JCE leader Echeverría instead. Moreno stated that even though 
Echeverría was young, he was the most outstanding, loyal, and capable member 
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of the party. Others also indicated that Echeverría was a “rising star” in the 
party, and that members had a great deal of faith in his ability to push the party 
forward.50 It was apparent that more would be heard from this youth leader.
For his part, Paredes endorsed Saad in the interests of “harmony within the 
Communist family,” but also declared that his counterpart had committed se-
rious errors. Ramos nominated Barreto, but subsequently voted for Saad with 
considerable reluctance. In the end, only Moreno withheld her vote for Saad. 
The CIA document does not indicate whether Calderón or Barrios played a role 
in this process, but if they had determined a preference for Saad over Ramos as 
labor representative in the federal congress, it would be reasonable to assume 
that they had come to the meeting to assure that Saad be installed as the party’s 
new leader. If that were the case, his elevation can be understood as an exter-
nal imposition rather than the result of an internal democratic process. Under-
standably, that outside pressure would only have rankled militant members of 
the party.
The position of secretary general now had formally passed from Paredes to 
Saad, and the latter remained the head of the party for the next thirty years. 
With his election, not only did the center of control over the party shi from 
the highlands to Guayaquil, but also the historic leaders including Paredes, Nela 
Martínez, María Luisa Gómez de la Torre, César Endara, Dolores Cacuango, 
Enrique Gil Gilbert, and Gustavo Becerra became marginalized.51 Further-
more, divisions in the party continued to deepen. A decade later Saad expelled 
Echeverría who Moreno wanted to elevate to secretary general over the issue 
of whether communists should seek power peacefully through parliamentary 
means, as Saad advocated, or take a much more radical turn and prepare for a 
violent revolution as Echeverría was preparing to do. Echeverría in turn formed 
a new Maoist party, the PCMLE, although it never gained the strength or pres-
ence of the original pro-Soviet PCE. The roots of this division between “bu-
reaucratic” members who opposed engaging in guerrilla activity and generally 
lacked daring and initiative, and their counterparts who the old-line party lead-
ers criticized as being too headstrong, undisciplined, and foolhardy was already 
apparent at the 1952 congress.52
The delegates’ attention then turned to the selection of a central committee. 
In the name of party solidarity, Vera asked that his name be withdrawn from 
nomination. He asked to say a few words, and then proceeded to unleash a series 
of accusations against party leaders in Guayaquil, in particular against Pérez 
Castro and Medina Castro. Vera denounced Pérez Castro as an irresponsible 
drunkard and repeated the long-held accusation that the party tolerated his 
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presence only because his familial connections to El Universo allowed him to 
contribute signi	cant sums to the party’s 	nances. According to the CIA, this 
attack came in the context of attempting to rebuild party unity that prompted 
a reaction against Vera and support for Pérez Castro. Vera’s outburst impelled 
the Cuban representative Calderón to denounce him as a “populist,” something 
that would be understood in this context to be quite an insult.
Echeverría, Barreto, and Gil Gilbert were elected unanimously to the central 
committee. In an apparent egotistical move, Martínez “asked that her election 
be unanimous as well, since the Central Committee desperately needed her 
services,” although she did not indicate exactly what those services might be. 
The CIA report does not indicate whether delegates granted her the request, 
but in any case she did retain her post. Other party members elected to the 
central committee were Oswaldo Albornoz (Quito), Modesto Rivera (Quito), 
Marco Tulio Oramas (Guayaquil), Aquiles Valencia (Manabí), José María Roura 
(Quito), Hernán Acebedo (Loja), José María Dávalos (Ambato), Jesús Guala-
visí (Ambato), Segundo Ramos (Guayaquil), Neptalí Pacheco León (Milagro), 
Pascual Palomino, and Franklin Pérez Castro (Guayaquil). Alternatives were 
Guillermo Cañarte, Eduardo González, José Villacreses, Nelson Segura, and 
Tirso Gómez.
Two years later, the State Department presented a somewhat dierent list of 
party leaders. According to their 	les in Washington, Saad, Echevarría, and Bar-
reto had been elected to the party’s national secretariat. The State Department 
also listed a seven-person executive committee, with Saad as secretary general, 
Echevarría as secretary of organization, Roura as secretary of 	nances, Albornoz 
as secretary of press and propaganda, Martínez as secretary for political educa-
tion and the pro-peace movement, Barreto as secretary for labor, and Rivera as 
secretary for peasants and Indians.53 The correspondence does not indicate the 
source of this information, whether it is from embassy reports that have been 
lost or otherwise have not emerged, or whether it came from another agency 
such as the CIA.
Equally if not more notable than who was elected to the new central commit-
tee is who was excluded. Particularly conspicuous by their absence were the long-
time militant and Indigenous rights activist Cacuango and the educator Gómez 
de la Torre, both of whom had previously played prominent roles in the party. 
Earlier when they had wanted to drop out of the party Paredes urged them to re-
main, contending that a true communist never gives up and stays in the struggle 
come what may.54 Martínez was the only woman le on the central committee, 
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and her time with the party would soon come to an end as well. If the CIA’s list 
is accurate, not even Paredes retained a seat on the central committee.
One curiosity on the CIA’s list of central committee members is the name of 
Jesús Gualavisí from Ambato. It is unclear from the documentation whether this 
is the same person who was a longtime Kayambi militant who had participated 
in the party’s founding in 1926.55 If so, it is curious that he was now listed as from 
Ambato and that the agency stated that no Indigenous peoples attended the con-
gress, although both statements could be in error. Alternatively, given the uid 
nature of ethnic boundaries, the identity of individual delegates may not have 
been immediately apparent to a foreign observer. Gualavisí was literate, uent 
in Spanish, and a leader in his community, all of which may have marked him as 
mestizo rather than native. If Gualavisí had been at the congress, it would have 
been unusual that he did not register in the CIA’s accounting of the proceedings 
since in previous gatherings he had played such a prominent role. By the 1950s, 
the aging Gualavisí was no longer as active in political struggles as he had once 
been, and he may not have attended the congress. Furthermore, he would not 
have had to be present to be elected to the central committee, and he may have 
been nominated because of his legendary contributions to the party and social 
movements in general. Otherwise, except for Pacheco León, the peasant leader 
from Milagro, most of the rest of the committee were men of European descent 
who lived in urban areas. Under Saad, party leadership became less rather than 
more diverse.
The CIA reported that otherwise quali	ed and “highly valuable” commu-
nists were barred from the central committee due to a party rule that its mem-
bers must have at least four years of “uninterrupted militancy.” Jaime Galarza 
(Azuay) and Juan Arias (Imbabura) were denied positions for this reason, even 
though they were both “promising young Communists.” Galarza, for example, 
had joined the party in 1948, had quickly risen to the position of secretary gen-
eral of the local party in Azuay, and had served on the presidium for the con-
gress. At the time of the congress he was only twenty-one years old (and, in fact, 
turned twenty-two on July 28, the 	nal full day of the congress). He would sub-
sequently go on to engage in a lengthy career as a communist militant, although 
he became vocally critical of Saad for his adherence to a dogmatic pro-Soviet 
line. He helped found the militant Unión Revolucionaria de la Juventud Ecuato-
riana (URJE, Revolutionary Union of the Ecuadorian Youth) in the early 1960s, 
which contributed to his expulsion from the PCE. He became best known for 
books he published on agrarian issues and the 1970s petroleum boom, as well as 
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an interview he conducted in London in 1975 with Agee.56 As with many mili-
tants, Galarza suered imprisonment and exile for his activism.
In the months leading up to the congress, Galarza had authored several 
broadsheets denouncing political violence against leists. These publications 
provide a reection of his ideas at the time and the contributions he made to the 
communist movement. In advance of the June presidential elections, Galarza 
blamed political violence in Cuenca and the spreading of anticommunist pro-
paganda for the unpopularity of the government’s candidate Salazar Gómez 
and the provocations of Velasco Ibarra’s supporters who attempted to present 
themselves as victims. Galarza accused all sides of being political reactionar-
ies who represented wealthy capitalist, landholding, and banking interests. He 
criticized the honest but misled conservative socialists for collaborating with 
Plaza’s government that had led to a three-fold increase in poverty, a rise in 
unemployment, and more corruption. Galarza called on people regardless of 
political aliation or religious conviction to join the communists in a uni	ed 
struggle against misery and oppression. Rather than putting their hopes in can-
didates or electoral promises, the masses should rely on the immense force that 
their numbers would represent once they were united in a struggle for bread, 
peace, and liberty.57
A second yer denounced an anticommunist campaign in Cuenca that sought 
to smear the party’s good name. Someone, presumably the ARNE and the CFP, 
had distributed leaets signed by the communist party with slogans in favor of 
Plaza and Russia and against religion. Those agitators had also painted similar 
slogans of “Viva Plaza, Viva Rusia, Muera la Religión” on the city’s walls. In light 
of these harmful acts, Galarza sought to clarify the party’s position on Plaza, 
the Soviet Union, and religion so that everyone would be aware of the types of 
malicious activities in which the ARNE and the CFP engaged.
As for Plaza, Galarza pointed out that the PCE was the 	rst to denounce 
his election, and warn that his ascension to oce represented the triumph of 
the enemies of the people, in particular United States capitalists who oppressed 
Ecuadorians. Subsequently, and in contrast to the socialists, the PCE had never 
stopped denouncing Plaza’s antipopular and antinationalist actions, including 
the the of aid destined for the victims of the 1949 earthquake. They continued 
this campaign by unmasking the wealthy candidate Salazar Gómez as symbol-
izing a continuation of Plaza’s policies. In short, far from supporting Plaza, com-
munists had denounced his government as representing wealthy landholders and 
functioning as an agent of United States interests that hurt workers.
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Galarza declared that communists respected and admired the Soviet Union 
as a workers’ and peasants’ state that one day they hoped to emulate in Ecuador. 
The USSR was a country in which factories were in the hands of the work-
ers, land was in the hands of the peasants, and culture was open to all people. 
The USSR represented a future of peace and brotherhood, in which war would 
only be a bad memory from the past. Galarza then proceeded to declare that a 
true patriotism involved a struggle for a truly free country. “The communists 
deeply love the land of heroic Indians, bravely resisting Spanish rule,” he wrote 
in tracing out the country’s history as one of struggle for a better future. Com-
munists fought to free Ecuador from new conquistadores, the Yankee colonists 
who subjugated the country to their neocolonial control. Galarza denounced 
military pacts for placing the country’s youth and its wealth at the hands of 
imperialist forces engaged in a war against the heroic people of Korea. Commu-
nists were strong nationalists, but they were also internationalists who supported 
working-class struggles around the world against capitalist exploitation.
On the third point, Galarza stated that communists “respect religious be-
liefs.” Simply put, people could embrace whichever religious faith they so choose, 
or none at all. They favored an absolute separation of church and state. What 
communists opposed was the pernicious tendency to use religion as a political 
weapon to subjugate working-class interests and halt their struggles for a better 
life. Particularly objectionable was the actions of some priests and landowners 
who used religion as a smokescreen to blind people to a true understanding of 
their class interests and hindered their ability to identify their true enemies: 
Yankee imperialists and their local allies, reactionary landowners and capitalist 
speculators who thrived o of the poverty of the people. Galarza denounced the 
conservative candidate Ruperto Alarcón Falconí in the 1952 presidential race 
for his desire to return to the days of Gabriel García Moreno who draed a 
constitution that denied citizenship to those who were not Catholics. On the 
other hand, Galarza celebrated priests such as Juan Morales y Eloy who aer 
visiting communist countries declared that the accusations against communists 
were completely false. Galarza contended that the PCE opposed the exploitation 
of people, but still maintained a profound respect for religion. He maintained 
that this was true for all communist parties in the world. Galarza denounced 
anticommunists for acting under cover of night to try to convince Catholics 
in Cuenca that communists were something that they were not. Rather than 
	ghting fairly and cleanly, they resorted to lies and deceit. Galarza pledged that 
communists would continue their battle against all those who impoverished the 
156 chapter 8
country, and those who were complicit in such crimes. Galarza closed the pam-
phlet with a call for liberation of the people.58 It is not dicult to understand 
how and why Galarza’s fellow comrades would 	nd him such a compelling and 
inspiring militant for the communist cause.
The PCE congress formally adjourned at 5:00 a.m. on Tuesday, July 29, 1952, 
aer an all-night session. The CIA closed its lengthy report on the congress 
with a summary of the “extensive and bitter personal enmity among numerous 
leaders of the Party.” The agency included a chart (see table 8.1) that listed the 
divisions that the report had recounted in great detail. An alternative reading 
of the chart is that it summarizes healthy and dynamic debates that revealed an 
ability to articulate diering perspectives without them becoming entrenched 
into a toxic split that would otherwise divide people over unrelated issues.59 For 
example, according to the CIA, Martínez opposed Paredes on one issue, but 
allied with him on others. Furthermore, what was also remarkable was how the 
congress concluded on a note of unity with the longtime leader Paredes reaching 
out to his opponents. The PCE emerged stronger from the congress thanks in 
large part to their ability to air these issues in an open forum and come together 
around a common political platform.
The mainstream newspapers in Quito failed to carry news of the congress, 
though at its closure the New York Times published a short note that Saad had 
been elected the party’s secretary general, and that the party would oppose Vel-
asco Ibarra’s government that was to be inaugurated a month later.60 It is ironic 
that a foreign paper paid attention to Saad’s assumption of leadership when a 
domestic paper of record did not. Similarly, the CIA was so 	xated on internal 
dissension in the party that its ocers and informers had not bothered to record 
the contents of political resolutions that emerged out of the meeting. Or perhaps 
actual policy initiatives were irrelevant to their surveillance operations. This 
mismatch in interests and emphasis between the PCE and the CIA also emerges 
in Agee’s account of his eorts to subvert the political process in Ecuador. He 
notes that the party attempted to keep internal disputes quiet even as the agen-
cy’s objective was to broadcast this unrest as broadly and loudly as possible.61
Several weeks aer the conclusion of the congress, El Comercio printed a 
front-page story in which it noted that both Velasquista committees and the 
ARNE had met in Guayaquil and agreed to support the recently elected presi-
dent and vowed to battle communism. While the paper had failed to cover the 
PCE congress, now it reported that the Velasquistas pledged “unity in struggle 
against the communists who, in their recent congress in Ambato, had resolved to 
combat the regime of José María Velasco Ibarra.” The ARNE similarly promised 
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to join the Velasquistas in their opposition to the PCE and to support Velasco 
Ibarra unconditionally in order to assure that he would be able to complete his 
four-year term in oce.62 The ARNE and the CFP soon entered into an intense 
rivalry for inuence in Velasco Ibarra’s government, and proceeded to throw 
barbs at each other.63 Meanwhile, CFP legislators presented a bill in congress to 
outlaw the PCE. Saad retorted that doing so would only solidify the communist 
movement in Ecuador.64 Pressure to proscribe communist activities continued 
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even though the legislature did not ban the party, while both the ARNE and the 
CFP periodically threatened coup attempts against the government.
Even without media coverage, the echoes of the communist congress could 
be felt for months aerward. Discussion of tensions within the PCE continued 
unabated in CIA information reports. One such document conveyed statements 
that Wilson Durango López, who the CIA identi	ed as a “prominent Com-
munist leader in the University of Guayaquil,” had made in September 1953 on 
conicts and deep divisions in the party. Durango highlighted in particular the 
“diversionist tactics” of Vera who advocated allying with any group opposed 
to Guevara Moreno. According to Durango, “Vera has forgotten his loyalty to 
the PCE and has undertaken a campaign of hate and mud-slinging.” The PCE 
planned to expel Vera, as well as his supporters, Ana Moreno, Elías Safadi, Vi-
cente Iturralde Rivera, and others.65
Several years later, Vera reected on his expulsion from the PCE in La Calle. 
Vera asserted that he was more of a Marxist than ever and remained 	rm in his 
“scienti	c conviction” that socialism would ultimately prevail. But, he stated, he 
could not in all honesty belong to a “party that is the exclusive property of such 
mediocre and small-minded men as Pedro Saad and Enrique Gil.” They had 
done him a favor by expelling him in 1953 for having committed “the crime of 
having fought relentlessly against the fascistic CFP domination of Guayaquil’s 
municipal council.” According to Vera, only the Chilean, Brazilian, and per-
haps the Venezuelan parties were doing well. As for the Ecuadorian party, aer 
reaching a high point in the aermath of the May 1944 revolution, it was falling 
apart “thanks to the petulant fatuity, opportunistic incompetence, and clumsy 
sectarianism of Saad and his cronies.” Vera criticized Saad for holding on to the 
seat of labor senator in the federal congress through his speaking ability but 
without using it to advance the interests of the working class. Furthermore, Vera 
complained that Saad never supported him when he held the post of minister 
of education for six months aer the May revolution. What goes around comes 
around. From his perspective, it was not so much that he had le the communist 
party but that it had le him.66
The monumental decisions at the 1952 congress determined the direc-
tion the party would take for the next generation. Not only did Saad assume 
formal control over the party, but doing so laid the groundwork for a militant 
wing to splinter from the main organization a decade later. Despite all of the 
internal conict, a CIA ocer reported, “The PCE has been transformed and 
‘revitalized’ as a result of the publication of the resolutions of the Fih PCE 
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Congress.”67 The outcome of the congress was mixed, but by no means a defeat. 
It is therefore ironic and unfortunate that at the time media outlets did not 
recognize its importance and dedicate more resources to covering the event. The 
primary source of information we have on the congress is a CIA surveillance 
document, and ultimately that artifact tells us more about US imperial inter-
ests than it does about working-class demands. Inadvertently, in concentrating 
on internal dissent within the ranks of the party the CIA also shed light on 
how activists might negotiate conict and disagreement. Those struggles grew 
ever more dicult across the 1950s, but the communists remained committed to 
their cause and were determined to continue onward. They understood that they 
would not immediately realize their goals, but through engagement with every-
day forms of organization they demonstrated their resolve to 	ght for steady and 
important advances in society.
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Everyday Forms of Organization
W hile many might now fondly reect back on the 1950s as a period of peace and prosperity, at the time observers saw this decade as anything but that. For example, in its retrospective 
review of political events of 1953, El Comercio observed that few years in the his-
tory of the republic had been as turbulent. According to the newspaper, nothing 
was permanent on the continually shi	ing political landscape where intense pas-
sions could destroy anything and everything. Even respectable institutions came 
under scrutiny, and important leaders fell from their high pedestals when their 
feet were shown to be made of clay. The newspaper editors were not convinced 
that politicians were taking the country in the right direction.1
Labor strikes, coup attempts, and other visible manifestations of unrest and 
protest gained public attention, including coverage in the newspapers. Mundane 
and less spectacular practices were less apt to register in the media, but more 
accurately reected the ongoing organizational processes. Covert surveillance 
proved to be particularly useful in charting these everyday eorts to build a 
strong and viable le	. Evidence that emanates from CIA records demonstrates 
that far from disappearing, in the face of overwhelming opposition militants 
continued to build their organizations across the 1950s. Even more signicant, 
intelligence gathering reveals the types of conversations and debates that took 
place within the le	. What emerges evident is a form of praxis—political action 
that was informed by serious intellectual reections.
For the communist party, its most high-prole activity in 1953 was the inter-
pellation that communist party leader and labor senator Pedro Saad conducted 
in congress of José María Velasco Ibarra’s conservative minister of government 
Camilo Ponce Enríquez. Although Saad lost the censure vote against the per-
son who had become the le	’s primary opponent, the concerns laid bare in the 
midst of those debates highlight the issues that were of primary interest to the 
communists. Furthermore, as became unmistakably apparent, the surveillance 
and repression of le	ist activities did not only come from outside of the country. 
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Many times, socialists and communists encountered a more ferocious hostility 
to their activities from domestic opposition. In order to advance their struggles, 
the communists would need to overcome those exacting challenges.
Theory and Action
On August 25, 1952, a month a	er the 	h PCE congress, the local committee 
in Guayaquil held an extraordinary meeting at communist headquarters to re-
ceive reports from party leaders.2 CIA monitoring of that event indicates that 
the agency’s surveillance of the PCE did not end with the party congress but 
continued at an intense pace. The agency maintained a particular concern with 
investigating coastal activities where the party unquestionably now had its base 
of operations. As with the 	h congress, it is not immediately apparent who con-
ducted the investigations or how the documentation was compiled, but detailed 
information reects a dedication of signicant resources to the surveillance of 
the party.
Faulty coordination in advertising the August 25 meeting resulted in the 
attendance of only fourteen members. Party chief Enrique Gil Gilbert was in 
Quito, so Marco Tulio Oramas presided. Oramas informed those present of 
plans to reorganize communist cells. The Guayas provincial committee aimed 
to send delegates to visit all of the cells to verify that they were operating prop-
erly. Each cell was to hold regular meetings in a dened location. All members 
were expected to attend and to be current with their dues payments. Leaders in-
structed cells to emphasize a campaign against the military assistance pact that 
Ecuador had recently signed with the United States, and to denounce the treaty 
through public events, distribution of handbills, and collection of signatures 
for their peace campaign. According to Lilo Linke, the pact provoked less resis-
tance in Ecuador than elsewhere in the hemisphere “because the Communist 
Party is so weak.” Further hindering their eorts, the government presented the 
agreement as a logical continuation of the provision of naval bases on the Pacic 
Coast and Galápagos Islands during the Second World War.3 While that may 
be the case, the CIA surveillance reveals the presence of concerted and ongoing 
eorts to build a campaign against imperial penetration of the country.
At the local committee meeting, Segundo Ramos, the secretary general of 
the FPTG, discussed labor unrest at the Witting Shipyard. Ramos blamed the 
problems on the United States supervisor Francis Vincent Coleman. The work-
ers had gone on strike and needed communist support in order to achieve their 
goals of better pay and working conditions. The strikers’ legal representative 
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Jorge Maldonado Renella, who Patricio Cueva Jaramillo had wanted to expel 
from the party at the previous month’s congress because of his shirking of party 
responsibilities, cautioned “that the new Velasco administration would attempt 
to wipe out all labor unions and federations.” Perhaps he had taken the criticisms 
to heart, because now he advocated that the PCE needed to work energetically 
to mobilize the unions in defense of their interests. A CIA case ocer added a 
comment that the party leadership described the FPTG as “their federation,” 
as if it were an adjunct of the PCE. The economic challenges that labor unions 
presented to United States hegemonic control over the hemisphere remained at 
the forefront of the minds of those in the intelligence agency.
Even as the party organized political actions, cadres also engaged in study and 
theoretical reection in order to gain a better understanding of their current en-
vironment. Jorge Arellano Gallegos held a series of classes in his house in Quito 
for members of his cell. In addition to Arellano, seventeen cell members attended 
the meeting, of whom the CIA was able to identify twelve. The rst session lasted 
for about an hour. Arellano traced the history of the Bolshevik Revolution and 
explained dierent theories of how a revolution would emerge, including a discus-
sion of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin’s arguments that a revolution could only 
be victorious through the combined force of the peasants and an urban proletar-
iat. Arellano compared Russia before the revolution to Ecuador’s current neoco-
lonial status under Yankee control, and proclaimed “that Ecuador should follow 
the example set by Lenin and Stalin in throwing o the bonds of capitalism.” He 
pointed to the USSR as the center of a global proletarian revolution. The gath-
erings were part of a concerted eort to fashion a more dedicated and eective 
core of party members to advance their revolutionary agenda. The CIA, for its 
part, dismissed the study sessions as nothing other than political indoctrination.4
In addition to charting the contents of the discussions that militants had 
inside the party, CIA surveillance also serves to record ongoing organizational 
eorts at local, regional, national, and international levels. CIA ocers had a 
natural tendency to exaggerate internal conicts—the same discord that party 
leaders wanted to keep under wraps—but more useful are the insights that in-
formation reports provide into how the party structured itself. For example, the 
CIA reported that the party’s Pichincha province central committee sought to 
strengthen its organizational structure “by insuring that each local cell is di-
rected by energetic well-qualied individuals.” To realize this goal, the commit-
tee transferred Simón Pérez, a member of the Pichincha executive committee, 
from the Pedro Saad cell to the new Goya cell (apparently named a	er the Span-
ish painter Francisco Goya who through his artwork denounced Napoleon’s 
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invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807), with the hope that doing so would 
strengthen the Goya cell. The provincial committee also instructed each cell to 
select a complete slate of ocers, including a secretary of propaganda.5 A forti-
ed cell structure was key to advancing the party’s ideological agenda.
On the coast where the party was stronger, on August 8, 1953, the Guayas 
committee of the PCE held a provincial conference in Guayaquil at the home 
of Franklin Pérez Castro.6 Gil Gilbert presided over a preparatory session with 
sixteen members who established an agenda for the conference that would begin 
that same evening. Twenty delegates attended the inaugural session that com-
menced with a history of the PCE before proceeding to an examination and 
critique of the activities of the thirty cells that existed in the city. Of those thirty, 
only six or eight were truly active, and even among those attendance was spo-
radic. The session devolved into a long and heated debate late into the night with 
exchanges of accusations as to wh Narváez o was to blame for the shortcomings. 
Many of the allegations and underlying conicts followed along lines similar to 
those at the previous year’s party congress.
The discussions continued the following morning. Cesario Valverde of the 
Jesús Menéndez cell who had attacked Manuel Medina Castro at the 	h party 
congress now faced particularly harsh criticism for accusing Pérez Castro of brib-
ing supporters to vote for him in order to retain his position on the provincial 
committee. In particularly, Valverde had accused Juan Pío Narváez and Marco 
Tulio Oramas of being blind followers of Pérez Castro, and who had gained their 
loyal support by providing them with free meals in his home. From interpersonal 
conicts, debates swung toward international issues with much broader politi-
cal implications. Some party members moved from criticizing Valverde for his 
statements against other party members to denouncing him for claiming that 
the USSR had ordered Trotsky’s assassination and declaring that the expulsion 
of deputy premier Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria was unjust. Valverde acknowledged 
having made these statements, and defended his position with the claim that 
he was not the only one who held those views. He contended that Oramas had 
raised the same issue at a FPTG meeting. As for naming Narváez and Oramas 
as lackeys of Pérez Castro, Valverde said that if they felt guilty perhaps it was 
because there was some truth to the rumors. As with other conicts, it is dicult 
to determine how much of the attacks could be traced to interpersonal tension 
and how much might be due to political or ideological dierences. Rather than 
the doctrinaire imposition of a party line from outside or above, these debates 
reected an environment in which members did not hesitate to articulate their 
dierences of opinion.
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The CIA report notes that the meeting then turned on Bernardino Poveda 
and Abelardo Santos from the Puerto cell. They faced charges of receiving 300 
sucres from J. Federico Intriago to support him in his election to the Guayaquil 
municipal council in exchange for his support for the formation of an agricul-
tural colony. Poveda and Santos allegedly pocketed the money and did nothing 
to support Intriago, nor did Intriago help the Puerto cell secure the land they 
needed to form the cooperative. Julio Olmedo Muñoz faced additional accusa-
tions of campaigning for Intriago behind the back of the PCE, the same issue 
that had divided Nela Martínez and Alfredo Vera at the previous year’s party 
congress. Olmedo allegedly told his clients that they did not need to pay their 
bills if they would vote for Intriago. Opportunism appeared to be a problem on 
all sides. Although Intriago emerged out of the liberal party, the conservative 
Ponce later named him as minister of economy a	er his election as president 
in 1956. Intriago faced additional charges of involvement in other scandals in 
that post.7 It was not without good reason that communist party militants ques-
tioned involvement with such a shady character.
Even with all of the complications that involvement in electoral campaigns 
introduced into party organization, delegates at the conference selected Alfonso 
Quijano Cobos and Enrique Gil Gilbert to head the ballot for the Guayas pro-
vincial council in the upcoming November 1953 elections. Oramas and Olmedo, 
despite the complaints against their actions, would be the candidates for the 
Guayaquil municipal council. The meeting concluded with elections for the pro-
vincial party committee. A delegate asked the assembly to analyze the activities 
of each nominee so that only those with clean records would be selected for 
leadership positions. This led to further acrimonious sparring that eliminated 
many nominees. Finally, the meeting elected a committee with the labor leader 
Guillermo Cañarte as the secretary general.
CIA surveillance allows scholars to peer deeply into the organizational struc-
tures of a local party. What the agency’s information gathering eorts reveal are 
sincere militants engaged in critical and open debates over how to advance their 
struggles. As with making sausage, the process was not always pretty but what 
emerges apparent is a small but devoted group of communists who remained 
committed to realizing their vision for a more just and equal world.
Interpellation
When Paredes was secretary general the PCE actively engaged with rural strug-
gles in Indigenous communities. Under Saad’s leadership, the party turned 
Everyday Forms of Organization 165 
instead toward strengthening its alliances with labor unions and participating 
in parliamentary maneuvers. Saad excelled at using his position as labor repre-
sentative in the federal congress to advance a working-class agenda. He eec-
tively used that space to engage in sustained attacks on the le	’s archenemy and 
current minister of government Camilo Ponce Enríquez. One of the most noted 
examples of Saad’s use of parliamentary maneuvers came with his interpellation 
of Ponce in September 1953.8
Opposition to Ponce extended well beyond the le	, and in fact the inspiration 
for the interpellation came from dierent quarters. The previous December, Ve-
lasco Ibarra had exiled his previous ally and CFP leader Carlos Guevara Moreno 
to Peru under charges of plotting to overthrow his government. On September 
12, 1953, Guevara Moreno announced that he would return from Lima to Guay-
aquil, but Velasco Ibarra bared him from entering the country. Hundreds of 
Guevara Moreno’s supporters gathered at the airport in Guayaquil to welcome 
him, but when they learned that the government would deny him entry they 
began to throw rocks at the police. In the melee, one person was killed and 
sixteen police ocers and an undetermined number of civilians were injured. 
Ocials arrested more than thirty people, including four minors. Undersecre-
tary of interior José Bucheli said that “professional agitators” had planned the 
protest. He attributed the disturbances to the CFP, communists, and elements 
representing other ideologies.9
The decision to bar Guevara Moreno from returning to Ecuador along with 
shuttering two opposition newspapers led to political pressure to censure Velasco 
Ibarra’s government. Finally, on September 19 a	er a marathon thirteen-hour 
session the Ecuadorian congress voted seventy-three to 	een against a motion 
of censure of Ponce.10 Conservative domination of congress, which El Comercio 
described as “a docile instrument of the executive” that blindly followed the 
president’s orders, made the outcome a foregone conclusion.11 Nevertheless, 
while the motion failed it provided the le	 with a visible venue in which to high-
light their complaints about the government’s rightward dri	. It also oered 
the public an opportunity to observe a direct confrontation between politicians 
with extremely divergent views.
Rumors had circulated for months that Saad wanted to present a series of 
charges against the government minister. At the end of August, Saad had told an 
assembly of workers that the indictments were in the pipeline, although he was 
vague on details.12 Over the next several days, the media reported on his plan to 
bring charges.13 On Friday, September 11, Saad together with the congressional 
deputies Joel Cevallos Cedeño, a socialist from Manabí, and Guillermo Grijalva 
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from Carchi presented eight questions to which they wanted Ponce to respond. 
The government’s decision the following day to bar Guevara Moreno’s return 
provided the legislators with the political impetus to bring the accusations in 
front of the entire body.
The list of complaints against the administration was eclectic, and reected 
the range of enemies that Velasco Ibarra had made during his rst year in the 
presidency. The rst question asked under what legal authority Ponce had closed 
the opposition Guayaquil newspapers La Nación and La Hora. The wealthy 
banana exporter Simón Cañarte owned both papers and had nanced Velasco 
Ibarra’s electoral campaign. His support had assured his victory by building 
a bridge between the caudillo and Guevara Moreno’s populist CFP. When 
political dierences led to a falling out between Velasco Ibarra and Guevara 
Moreno, Cañarte’s newspapers supported the CFP. In revenge for this betrayal, 
Velasco Ibarra ordered both papers shuttered. Their closure and the arrest of 
their reporters had led to international condemnation, including from the In-
ter-American Press Association’s Freedom of the Press Committee.14 The British 
ambassador quipped that the closing of La Nación and La Hora was not without 
merit, but still that “Ecuador is one of the few democratic countries le	 in South 
America and the suppression of a newspaper gives a shock to the body politic.”15
Both papers remained closed for four months until Velasco Ibarra nally al-
lowed them to reopen.
The second item questioned Velasco Ibarra’s violation of the autonomy of the 
Central University in Quito. The third raised the issue of illegal detentions. The 
fourth concerned Ponce’s intervention in other ministries to act against worker 
interests. The 	h touched on the issue of an August 6 massacre of agricultural 
workers on the Merced hacienda in the parish of Pintag just outside of Quito. 
The sixth inquired into a loan for the colonization of the Amazon. The seventh 
concerned the conscation of material sent from Europe to the bookstore Libre-
ría Ecuador. And, nally, the eighth asked why Ponce had ordered the ministry 
of public works to intercept mail sent to Librería Ecuador.16 In relation to the 
third item, one of the petitioners attached a lengthy list of illegal detentions 
starting with an attack on Evangelicals in Cotocollao on March 8, 1953, and 
concluding with the arrests in Guayaquil on September 8, 1953, of the student 
Eduardo Flores, president of the Unión Democrática Universitaria (UDU, Uni-
versity Democratic Union) and Franklin Pérez Castro. The list detailed eleven 
more alleged violations between those two events, including the illegal detention 
of labor leaders, political activists, student radicals, journalists, and many more. 
Miguel Macías Hurtado, a deputy from Guayas and one of Guevara Moreno’s 
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closest and most trusted supporters in the CFP, added a ninth question asking 
what right Ponce had to evict Guevara Moreno from the country and to prevent 
him from returning.17 Opposition to Ponce’s policies had momentarily united 
a diverse range of politicians who otherwise would not have collaborated and 
even might have been mortal enemies. The United States Embassy reported that 
Ponce was nervous because he knew “that some of his acts were without good 
legal justication.”18 He had a valid reason to be anxious.
Telegrams owed into the senate from around the country, some back-
ing Ponce and others Saad.19 A committee in defense of democracy in the 
working-class neighborhood of San Roque in Quito distributed a handbill in 
which they announced their support for the interpellation. “Ponce Enríquez 
has imprisoned and tortured students, workers, and simple citizens, and has al-
lowed the murder of Indians,” the statement read. He “has closed newspapers, 
seized books, and imprisoned trade union leaders. His government has led to an 
increase in the misery of the people.” In contrast, “the democratic legislators have 
defended the interests of the people, ghting against new taxes, for an increase 
in wages and salaries, for price controls on food, for democratic liberties, and 
for national independence.” The interpellation was not against religion, as some 
opponents had claimed. Rather, “it is the struggle of men and women who live in 
misery, who have no bread or shelter, against the exploitative landholders headed 
by Ponce Enríquez.” The committee called on all people regardless of political 
or religious beliefs to support the interpellation and the permanent struggle for 
democratic freedoms and better life conditions that it represented.20 Saad hoped 
to advance his political struggle through such popular expressions of support.
In what strains the limits of credulity, the United States Embassy reported 
a rumor that communists were considering murdering Saad and blaming the 
minister for his death. According to this theory, the party leader and deputy’s 
death would trigger a “Bogotazo” similar to the protests that occurred on April 
11, 1948, with the assassination of the Colombian populist Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. 
The PCE responded with a handbill charging Ponce with planning to kill Saad 
to avoid the interpellation.21 These competing narratives indicate the height-
ened level of tension that coursed through the current political environment.
Finally, on Friday, September 18, 1953, the day arrived on which Ponce would 
have to face the charges leveled against him. El Comercio published an editorial 
in support of the questioning:
Today the interpellation will be made of the minister of government, which 
is a legal and democratic act that in no case can be allowed to become cause 
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for scandals or much less to provoke acts of force or agitation without a 
civic sense of any kind.
The editorial proceeded to note that it was well known that the government 
held a majority in congress and undoubtedly the body would vote in favor of the 
minister. Nevertheless, the paper defended the right of the legal process to pro-
ceed forward for the betterment of the country. The editorial called for the in-
terpellation to be conducted in a respectful and measured fashion.22 Meanwhile, 
telegrams in support of Saad continued to ow in from labor and other groups.23
The joint session of congress convened at 5:15 in the a	ernoon. El Comer-
cio reported that the visitors’ gallery was full of spectators who chanted against 
communism, socialism, liberalism, and the CFP, and cheered in support of the 
minister of government. The conservatives had packed the hall, and Saad would 
be facing an antagonistic audience. Alfredo Chiriboga Chiriboga, the country’s 
vice president who presided over the session, asked for quiet in the chamber, 
and stated that the gallery would be cleared if the visitors did not remain silent. 
The secretary then read out the constitutional provisions that allowed for the 
interpellation and the charges that the minister faced. Article 55 of the 1946 
Constitution granted a joint session of congress (congreso pleno) the right to “ex-
amine the ocial behavior of the ministers of state, and censure them if there is 
a reason.”24 Legally, Saad could not be denied his day in court.
Saad proceeded to lay out his reasons for initiating the charges against Ponce. 
He proclaimed that the government’s policies and violations of the constitution 
had brought political unrest and an economic crisis to the entire country. The 
government had engaged in undemocratic measures. Imprisonments and viola-
tions of peoples’ rights continued without end. The country faced the choice of 
remaining under the current autocratic system, or returning to the rule of law. 
Saad declared that those who brought the charges were simply complying with 
their responsibilities as representatives of the people. He asserted that this inter-
pellation grew out of respect for the constitution. The communist leader denied 
that any political interest underlay the interpellation, or that they were seeking 
political advantage through this process. They were not engaging in the interro-
gation as members of a political party. In fact, he noted, those who brought the 
questions came from dierent parties. Rather, the interpellation reected the 
will of the Ecuadorian people, a defense of the constitution that the government 
had violated countless times, and an act in support of democratic rule.
A	er a lengthy debate over procedural issues, Ponce began a defense of his ac-
tions. He presented an overview of the history of Ecuador’s political development, 
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highlighting that for much of its existence the country had followed a path of 
anarchy and demagoguery. Saad stopped the minister to thank him for the history 
lesson, but asked him to limit his comments to the questions currently under con-
sideration. Despite the interruption, Ponce continued his exposition, synthesizing 
the dates of the various constitutions that had been promulgated in Ecuador. The 
minister contended that Ecuadorians lived under an abstract idea of freedom, 
something granted by a deity that could be lost if care was not taken to defend 
those rights.
The minister then proceeded to respond to the charges one by one, starting 
with the closure of the newspapers La Nación and La Hora. Ever since he had 
assumed his cabinet post on February 18, the papers had launched virulent and 
personal attacks against him, and over the following months this had risen to the 
point of inciting rebellions that presented a serious threat to the stability of the 
government. Whereas Saad had charged the minister with having violated the 
constitution, Ponce countered that the government had taken the step of closing 
the papers to preserve public order. The minister contended that the constitu-
tion not only defended the rights of free speech, but also placed responsibilities 
on those who made public statements. The problem existed only with certain 
papers that acted in an irresponsible manner, and therefore was not a systemic 
issue. When the media operated responsibly, the minister declared, the govern-
ment respected them, but when they acted in a criminal fashion the government 
would sanction their activities.
Ponce then read his correspondence with the Central University’s rector in 
response to the second question concerning the alleged violation of the univer-
sity’s autonomy. He asked why a government minister could not correspond 
with a university rector without risking violation of the law. Furthermore, the 
accusations concerned the FEUE, which Ponce maintained was an organization 
that was neither related to the university nor comprised of university students 
but instead was a political group with its own agenda that attacked the ministry 
of government on a daily basis. That the FEUE acted in such a fashion was 
unacceptable, he declared. Ponce also criticized the UDU at the University of 
Guayaquil that was associated with the IUS based in Prague. Its only concern 
was to spread Marxist propaganda with the goal of undermining Ecuador’s con-
stitutionally established government. As evidence of the UDU’s communist 
orientation, the minister pointed to a telegram he had received from the IUS 
demanding the release of the student leader Luis Arcentales. Ponce said that 
as an Ecuadorian and a member of the government, he would ght to prevent 
Ecuador from falling under Moscow’s domination and being trapped behind 
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the “iron curtain.” He contended that the government had to act to counter the 
subversive threats emanating out of the university, and was justied in doing so 
because Ecuadorians were a Christian and Catholic people.
The third issue concerned allegations of illegal detentions, and Ponce said 
that he would provide the congress with documentation to respond to each ac-
cusation. The minister began with the rst charge concerning the arrest of Evan-
gelical preachers in Cotocollao. In March, local Catholics attacked Protestant 
Evangelicals who were proselytizing in the northern suburb of Quito. Police 
had to intervene to reestablish order.25 Ponce justied their arrest as a response 
to an attack on the Catholic religion that violated Article 168 of the constitu-
tion that sanctioned actions that contributed to public unrest. Conicts with 
Evangelicals had been going on for some time, and communist support for their 
rights can be interpreted as either a principled defense of freedom of religion or 
an opportunistic exploitation of an issue to attack an extremely Catholic and 
conservative minister.
The second case concerned Nelson Chávez, the secretary general of the rail-
road union, who for years had been ghting for the rights of those workers. 
Chávez gained heightened animosity from conservatives when he traveled to 
Beijing in October 1952 to attend the World Peace Congress. Upon his re-
turn Ponce charged him with subversive activities, which led the head of the 
government-owned railroad company to re Chávez under accusations “of fo-
menting disorder for political reasons.” Chávez had organized a strike in op-
position to the government’s rigorous antilabor measures that included a plan 
to reorganize the railroad and eliminate jobs with the intent of purging le	ist 
workers. Ponce charged that the strike was part of a communist plot and ordered 
the labor leaders arrested and other workers red in an attempt to undermine 
their union.26
At this point, the congressional leadership ruled that the documentation re-
garding the multiple charges that Saad had raised was well known, and that 
there was no need for Ponce to respond to each one, and therefore they would 
pass on to the fourth point. Cevallos Cedeño, one of the four deputies who had 
brought the charges, objected and insisted that the congress should hear a full 
response to each item. Although several deputies supported Cevallos Cedeño, 
the procedural vote went against him. Saad protested that the congressional 
leadership was impeding the interpellation process. Despite these protestations, 
Ponce proceeded on to the next question.
Ponce denied that he had intervened in other ministries to act against worker 
interests, including the ring of railroad workers and teachers. Since all of the 
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ministries were part of the same executive branch, Ponce argued, the complaint 
of intervention in other branches of government logically made no sense and 
therefore did not violate any constitutional provisions. In terms of the specic 
issue of separating the leaders of the railroad union from their employment, the 
minister contended that the government had simply recognized the decision 
that the company had made in order to maintain internal peace and order in 
the face of a threatened general strike. In a second case of a red journalist, the 
action was justied for security concerns because he had engaged in open oppo-
sition to the government.
The 	h question addressed the massacre at La Merced. A long history of 
exploitation on the estate had led to rising tensions with the Indigenous workers 
nally forming a union to press their demands for better treatment. On August 
6, the workers attacked a particularly abusive overseer when he broke from the 
tradition of providing women with a portion of the potatoes that they were har-
vesting for their own domestic use. When the owners called in the police to put 
down the protest, the ocers responded with lethal force leaving three workers 
dead, fourteen injured, and twenty-ve imprisoned.27 The minister justied 
the use of violence with the contention that the owners of the hacienda had 
requested that the police intervene to reestablish order. It was only for that rea-
son that the government had sent a squad of seven police ocers. Furthermore, 
the protesters had injured the police as well as a local priest who accompanied 
them in the hopes of appeasing the workers. Ponce contended that the violence 
the ocials faced justied the armed response, and that the issue was one of fol-
lowing judicial procedures rather than an administrative matter. In fact, Ponce 
expressed surprise that only two days earlier a judge had ordered the release of 
the protesters who had been detained. This action had been taken even though 
those charged had set re to a granary on the hacienda and damaged more than 
1,200 quintales of wheat.
In terms of the loan for the colonization of the Amazon, the sixth question 
on the list, the minister justied his actions based on security concerns, that the 
Amazon was a symbol of Ecuadorian nationality and that the region represented 
the country’s future. The people who lived in the area needed access to transpor-
tation, and since the ministry of public works lacked funds the president of the 
country had requested the loan. As an Ecuadorian and a patriot, Ponce claimed 
he could not refuse to help his compatriots when they needed his assistance. 
Furthermore, he did not act alone but with the unanimous support of other 
administrators. In fact, he maintained, the loan had already been repaid and 
therefore that no damage had been done.
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The minister responded simultaneously to the seventh and eighth questions 
concerning the conscation of printed matter from the mail. He denied that he 
had ordered the ministry of public works to intervene with postal deliveries. In 
any case, Ponce justied government action in seizing communist propaganda 
that could damage the country’s international relations, claiming that doing so 
was legal and legitimate. Ecuador was a Western democratic republic, Ponce con-
tended, and needed to defend itself from foreign communist aggression. Upon 
investigating the existence of the Librería Ecuador, the authorities discovered 
that the bookstore only existed as a collection of communist propaganda in the 
house of María Luisa Gómez de la Torre. Although the mail service could have 
destroyed the books, instead they had returned them to Moscow from whence 
they had come. The minister argued that he was fully within his constitutional 
rights to take the action that he did. British ambassador Norman Mayers simi-
larly challenged Gómez de la Torre’s claim that the “books were purely literary 
works and not propaganda material.” He maintained that the items “provide 
the channel for subsidising the Communist party funds, the proceeds of sale 
not being remitted back,” even though the press had not reported their pur-
pose as such.28 Arguably, one person’s propaganda is another person’s art, and 
in either case disruption of mail delivery was a blow to the communist party’s 
political agenda.
A	er responding to Saad’s eight questions, Ponce warned that communist 
penetration had reached an unprecedented level in Ecuador. He asked how peo-
ple could remain calm in the face of this threat. It was for this reason that the 
government would not tolerate the corrupting inuence of communist propa-
ganda. Ponce pledged that as minister of government he would apply the coun-
try’s laws with all of its rigor and might in order to save the country from for-
eign inuences. Anticommunist sentiments ran deeply through his presentation. 
Le	ist sentiments presented the greatest challenge to his conservative politics 
and Catholic faith.
It was then Saad’s turn to interrogate the minister. He began with the closure 
of La Nación and La Hora. As CFP publications, they were not sympathetic 
to a communist agenda. Saad’s defense of them can be interpreted as either an 
opportunistic gesture to seek allies in a campaign against a common enemy, or a 
principled stance in support of freedom of the press. Saad took this second tack. 
He asked Ponce whether the government had evidence that the newspapers were 
engaged in seditious activities. Again, the minister defended his actions with 
references to the current 1946 Constitution, which led to debates regarding what 
current legislation regulated press activities and who had the right to interpret 
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constitutional provisions. Saad accused Ponce of leading the government toward 
a dictatorial regime that would freely engage in arbitrary acts of repression. Ref-
erencing specic constitutional articles and other legislation, Saad asserted that 
Ponce had violated the freedom of the press. The minister, naturally, was not 
willing to concede this point.
Saad stated that he would leave the second and third questions of violations of 
the Central University autonomy and of illegal detentions to his colleagues Cev-
allos Cedeño and Grijalva. Instead, as the senator representing labor, he turned 
to the fourth question concerning Ponce’s intervention in other ministries to 
act against worker interests. Saad began with the ring of Chávez and 	een 
other labor leaders and workers from the railroad under accusations of organiz-
ing a strike. The government had denied the workers their constitutional right 
to strike, Saad asserted. He stated that he had repeatedly asked the ministry of 
government for copies of documents related to this case but the ministry had 
never sent them. Fortunately, he received documents from the railroad com-
pany that demonstrated collusion between the government and the company to 
remove the workers. Saad also raised the case of Humberto Vacas Gómez who 
had been red from his teaching position at the Colegio Nacional 24 de Mayo 
for his opposition to the government. Saad produced documents that supported 
his charges, and asked the minister how it was possible to deny his accusations 
of collusion between the ministry and those autonomous entities. Saad charged 
that Ecuadorians had been le	 subject to the government’s political whims. The 
outcome, he asserted, was a violation of constitutional free speech rights.
In his questioning of Ponce, Saad apparently skipped over the 	h question 
regarding the massacre of workers at La Merced, or at least neither the ocial 
record of congressional debates in the legislative archive nor the newspaper re-
ports in El Comercio make mention of any comments he might have made on 
that topic. In part that absence was predictable, and reects a long-held division 
in the PCE between those in the highlands banded around Paredes with an 
interest in rural peasant and Indigenous communities, and those on the coast 
grouped around Saad with their base in urban labor movements. Even in both 
of these camps, the communist reach was limited, which le	 the PCE open to 
charges of exploiting other peoples’ struggles when the party called attention to 
their oppression and exploitation. Even if that were the case, it is surprising that 
Saad would not raise the issue in his interpellation, if for no other reason than 
to weaken his political opponent.
On the other hand, perhaps that documentary record is in error. In his 
history of Indigenous struggles, the communist historian Oswaldo Albornoz 
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Peralta highlights Saad’s interpellation of Ponce as putting responsibility for 
the massacre directly at the feet of the minister of government.29 Furthermore, 
Ponce made a similar acknowledgment in his annual report on the ministry’s 
activity. “The upheaval at La Merced immediately preceded the interpellation 
that senator Saad and others brought against the minister of government,” Ponce 
stated in a summary of his activities, “and coincided with an intense campaign 
of insults and incitements made in Quito against the minister of government.” 
According to Ponce, the interpellation “was not about isolated events, but on 
the contrary, planned and directed towards the achievement of an end.” Ac-
cording to Ponce, all of this emerged manifestly apparent in newspaper reports 
at the time.30 It could be that the ethnocentric attitudes that deemed rural In-
digenous struggles not worthy of attention were not those of Saad but rather of 
the congressional recorder and media outlets. Alternatively, in the absence of 
an advocate such as Paredes who had long pressed for the rights of Indigenous 
communities, all sides may have been just as happy to let the issue slide.
Saad then turned to the seventh and eighth questions concerning the consca-
tion of material from the postal service, and again raised allegations of violations 
of constitutional rights and other laws. Saad reviewed the legislation regulating 
the handling of the mail, and declared that no provision existed to conscate 
material transmitted through the post oce. Furthermore, Saad denied that the 
publications in question challenged the country’s peace and tranquility. Rather, 
they addressed topics such as philosophy, science, biography, and literature. Saad 
repeated previous statements that the minister could not demonstrate that the 
books violated the country’s harmony.
Saad attempted to use Ponce’s own actions again him. On July 19, 1944, when 
serving as foreign minister in Velasco Ibarra’s second government he had signed 
Decree 302 that denounced those implicated in the disastrous 1941 war with 
Peru. That action underscored the inalienable rights of people. At this point, the 
liberal senator from Esmeraldas César Plaza Monzón angrily protested Saad’s 
statement, declaring that these were personal rather than political issues. Saad 
responded by saying that he would publish the charges in the press, and ended 
his statement by once again underscoring his argument that the minister had 
violated constitutional guarantees.
Cevallos Cedeño and Grijalva then took their turns at bringing charges 
against the minister, including underscoring points that Saad had already made 
and touching on other issues that Saad had not addressed. In his responses, 
Ponce returned to the theme of a fear of communist inltration, particularly 
in educational institutions. He declared that the government enjoyed popular 
Everyday Forms of Organization 175 
support, and would continue to do so regardless of the charges brought against 
him. He also stated that because of his belief in his god and country the gov-
ernment would not fall. It was those nationalistic and theocratic attitudes that 
demonstrated a wide gap between Ponce and his communist opponents.
It was almost midnight when the CFP deputy Macías Hurtado nally had 
an opportunity to raise his question of the expulsion of his party leader Gue-
vara Moreno, which again sparked debates concerning constitutional rights 
and threats to the country. Furthermore, Ponce charged that in exile Guevara 
Moreno had maintained contact with Peruvian exiles, which demonstrated the 
danger he presented to the country. Once again, the minister resorted to nation-
alistic and xenophobic sentiments to defend his actions.
Numerous representatives came to Saad’s defense. Benjamín Carrión, a so-
cialist and senator representing media interests, began his comments by defend-
ing the Casa de la Cultura, which he had founded, from the minister’s charges 
that it was a center for communist indoctrination. He emphasized that Ponce 
had completely evaded the questions placed to him, and failed to provide a con-
stitutional basis for the closure of La Nación and La Hora. Alfredo Pérez Guer-
rero, also a socialist and senator for higher education, similarly defended the 
universities and the CTE from the minister’s attacks. Both senators represented 
a unied le	 opposition to the conservative minister’s political stances.
At 1:45 a.m., Ponce le	 the chamber and the congress entered into debate 
over the charges. Saad argued that what they had just witnessed was the reality 
that the country was currently experiencing. He observed that the minister ef-
fectively dodged the questions that they had brought. Saad criticized Ponce for 
steering the discussion in a doctrinaire direction when in reality the charges 
had little to do with those issues. The communist deputy denied that he had 
interviewed Guevara Moreno in Lima as Ponce had charged. Saad pointed out 
that the PCE had always been opposed to the CFP, and that the minister was 
only trying to denigrate the legitimacy of his party. Ponce had eectively played 
at cleavages between his opponents.
In an attempt to refocus the conversation on a united attack against the min-
ister, Saad charged that Ponce had not been able to respond with arguments, but 
only used sophistry to hide from the charges. If the congress accepted Ponce’s 
contention that a minister could determine whether or not a law was constitu-
tional, Saad contended, Ecuador would be living in a frank and open dictator-
ship. He accused the minister of attempting to control Ecuador through a re-
pressive political police. Saad closed his statement with a declaration that he was 
condent that the congress would vote to censor the minister of government. 
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Despite demands from some deputies to continue the debate, at 4:20 a.m. the 
chamber moved to a vote on the motion. Despite Saad’s best eorts, with a con-
servative majority in the congress the outcome was a foregone conclusion. The 
motion failed with seventy-two votes against and 	een in favor. Elections mat-
ter. At 6:20 a.m., the marathon session nally came to a close.
Mail Intercept Operations
The conscation of communist propaganda from the mail that Saad denounced 
in the interpellation relates to larger issues of CIA surveillance and the obsta-
cles that the PCE had to overcome to advance their political agenda. From the 
beginning of CIA operations, information reports point to the presence of un-
dercover agents in the Ecuadorian government. One example is the interception 
of an airmailed circular with the return address of a commercial rm in Paris 
that Saad received via a Syrian business in Guayaquil. The CIA case ocer was 
aware of the contents of the circular, which denounced the Marshall Plan and 
outlined the special conditions that Latin America faced in countering a United 
States imperial agenda.31 Subsequent CIA reports reference instructions that 
Saad received “from Europe through clandestine channels” that indicate the 
ongoing presence of a successful spy operation despite communist attempts to 
evade surveillance.32 PCE treasurer Gómez de la Torre also received a letter from 
Moscow concerning the provision of paper supplies. The correspondence was 
the result of a conversation that Paredes had during a recent trip to Warsaw. 
The particulars in the CIA report, including the date of letter (December 11, 
1950) and a description of the letterhead (Mezhduna Rodnaja Kniga, Moscow), 
in addition to the contents of the letter points to the presence of an intercept in 
the Ecuadorian post oce.33 All indications are that these operations had been 
in place for years and probably predated the CIA—most likely as a continuation 
of FBI and other previous investigations that included collaboration with Ecua-
dorian state security forces.
In his exposé of CIA operations in the early 1960s, Philip Agee describes the 
intercept operation in which an agent in the central post oce in Quito pro-
vided the agency with the incoming airmail pouch. A CIA ocer opened, read, 
and photographed letters of interest, and returned the letters to the post oce 
on the same day for delivery. The ocer reported the contents of the most rel-
evant correspondence to CIA Headquarters in Washington and perhaps other 
stations.34 Although intelligence ocers did not always understand the informa-
tion they acquired and were willing to exaggerate its importance to satisfy their 
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superiors, these operations provide historians with access to a level of detail on 
communist activities that otherwise would not be available.
Naturally, communists sought ways to counter this surveillance. A CIA re-
port from 1948 on international communist movements acknowledged that 
parties only sent routine communications through the mail, preferring instead 
to communicate important orders verbally. When that was not possible, cou-
riers might carry written instructions, but with the additional protection of 
codes and secret ink. When the mail was used, correspondence was typically 
sent to cover addresses, or hand carried across borders and posted domestically 
to prevent surveillance of international mail. In Ecuador, a communist cell had 
inltrated the post oce and extracted mail addressed to their comrades for per-
sonal delivery. That the CIA was aware of this level of communist penetration 
of the mail service highlights the detail of information that the agency was able 
to acquire. Recognizing an awareness that opponents were reading their corre-
spondence, the agency admitted, “documents purporting to contain ‘orders’ or 
‘instructions’ from one Party to another have thus far been generally found to 
be forged.”35 While fake documents could be useful for propaganda purposes, 
they are less valuable as intelligence or historical sources. If the most crucial in-
formation was only communicated orally, that also means that some of the most 
important records of communist activities have been lost to history.
A CIA informer cautioned that Colombian communists could be using greet-
ing cards to communicate with their counterparts in Ecuador. A condential 
information report identied Ana Moreno as a “prominent Guayaquil Commu-
nist” who received a New Year’s card from PCC leader Gilberto Vieira White. 
The card appeared innocuous, but on careful examination Moreno informed 
her comrade Medina Castro that a courier would come from Colombia with 
instructions for the party. Indeed, secretary general Vieira White did presently 
arrive in Quito by plane from Cali. This sequence of events led the CIA to con-
clude that the communists were using the mail to communicate surreptitiously 
with one another. What the CIA report does not explain is how they were able 
to acquire intimate details on Moreno’s actions, or why they were now conduct-
ing surveillance on a militant whom they had previously largely ignored.36
Similar CIA operations intercepted information from other communication 
systems, including telegrams. One example concerned a decision to send Nela 
Martínez to the World Peace Congress in Paris. That congress in 1949 and the 
World Peace Council (WPC) founded the following year was part of the social-
ist bloc’s “peace oensive” or peace campaign designed to build global political 
resistance to US “warmongering” and aggression against socialist countries. 
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Under the guidance of the French physicist and activist Frédéric Joliot-Curie, 
the WPC advocated for universal disarmament, sovereignty, independence, and 
peaceful co-existence. It campaigned against imperialism, weapons of mass de-
struction, and all forms of discrimination.37 In an information report on this 
development, a CIA case ocer noted “that Martínez had received a personal in-
vitation from Madame [Irène] Joliot Curie to attend the Congress.” The source 
of that intelligence “had seen the cablegram but had not noted the name of the 
cable company.” When the case ocer investigated further, he discovered that 
the All American Cable Company had not transmitted such a cable. This led 
to the conclusion “that the cable was forged in order to account for Martínez’s 
sudden decision to attend the Congress.”38 The use of the passive voice makes it 
unclear as to who would have forged the cable and why. Did Martínez take this 
step to justify her travel, or did the CIA’s agent do so in order to have something 
to report to the agency? And if the person in question indeed did see a cable, 
was this person a friend of Martínez’s, an informer in the cable company, or was 
this the result of some other surveillance operation? Unfortunately, the available 
documentation is silent on these issues.
Even though the CIA monitored a variety of correspondence, the agency was 
particularly concerned with the importation of printed materials. In one curious 
case, someone had mailed multiple copies of the Russian-language publication 
Prazhskie Novosti from Prague addressed (in English) to “The Legation of the 
USSR, Quito,” even though the Soviet Union did not currently have a diplo-
matic mission in that country. Apparently the Ecuadorian government gave the 
mailing to the embassy, and the CIA ocer, military attaché, and public aairs 
ocer all independently forwarded a copy of the periodical to their correspond-
ing headquarters in Washington.39 In February 1951, a case ocer reported that 
A. D. Bolaños, a local agent in Quito, had received 	y copies in Spanish of 
the weekly newspaper New Times from the USSR. The party had also received 
periodicals in French and English, including a bi-monthly magazine La Femme 
soviétique for circulation among PCE members and Ecuadorian women in gen-
eral.40 Not incidentally, this interference in the delivery of material to Quito 
corresponded to similar meddling in Guayaquil that the CIA had reported as 
an example of the government’s heightened eciency in the interception of pro-
paganda material.41
The mail intercept operations continued throughout the 1950s and beyond. 
In 1956, the embassy’s PAO Walter Bastian reported that a limited amount of 
printed material reached Ecuador. Before the dissolution of the Cominform 
earlier that year, about one hundred copies of its periodical For a Lasting Peace, 
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For a People’s Democracy was mailed to twenty people weekly who were then re-
sponsible for further distribution. Other regularly mailed material included the 
monthly Czechoslovakia Today and the World Student News. Not much of this 
material reached its intended recipients because “Ecuadoran postal authorities 
regularly and successfully intercept the bulk of the shipments of communist and 
satellite periodicals mailed into this country, at the rate of ten or twelve sacks 
the size of diplomatic pouches.” Bastian estimated that the conscations repre-
sented a loss of about $500 USD per month for the communists.42 In 1957, the 
United States Embassy reported that the ouster of Czech diplomats closed the 
possibility of receiving funds, propaganda, and messages through that mission. 
According to the CIA, the communists then turned to the CTE as a venue 
for the receipt of international messages, and the party received “14 to 16 large 
mail sacks of communist propaganda” every month via that route. Even so, the 
current Ponce administration was realizing success in “intercepting and destroy-
ing large amounts of incoming communist propaganda,” and that made United 
States ocials happy.43
The PCE faced overwhelming opposition, both domestically and interna-
tionally, to the realization of its political agenda. Ironically, CIA surveillance 
chronicles communist awareness of the challenges that they faced and the mea-
sures that they took in an attempt to overcome these barriers. Even in the face 
of these challenges, the committed activists were determined to continue their 
struggles.
Legislative Defeat, Propaganda Victory
The Pichincha provincial committee of the PCE responded to the attacks on 
Saad that emerged out of the interpellation with a pair of statements condemn-
ing Ponce and the ARNE. The communists denounced reactionary attempts 
to silence Saad, and called their leader the best opponent against fascism and 
the strongest supporter of democracy and freedom.44 The PCE pointed out 
that during Saad’s time in congress he had been the rmest and best defender 
of popular interests and most steadfast opponent of corruption and the viola-
tions of human rights and democratic guarantees. The party denounced gov-
ernment charges that the communists opposed religion, repeating what they 
had proclaimed on multiple occasions that they favored freedom of religion, 
consciousness, and thought. Furthermore, the communists fought against hun-
ger and misery that resulted from government policies. The PCE pointed out 
that the government did not discriminate between Catholics and nonbelievers 
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when it engaged in massacres of Indigenous communities or enacted polices 
that hurt workers. Everyone, regardless of religious beliefs, suered the conse-
quences of wealthy landholder and capitalist policies. The party also rejected 
allegations that they were collaborating with the CFP in their attacks on the 
government. This was an absurd charge, the statement declared, as it repeated 
Saad’s proclamation that communists had long been the rmest opponents of 
Guevara Moreno and his fascist forces. All of the terrorist attacks on the com-
munists could not stop the forward march of the people. The PCE called on all 
democratic organizations and political parties to join them in a struggle against 
fascism.45
Although Ponce concentrated most of his re on the communists, he was 
equally opposed to the socialists. In his ministerial report the following year, he 
attacked the socialist party for its opportunistic defense of the interpellation. He 
accused their members of twisting the truth when they championed the actions 
of “a distinguished socialist, comrade Joel Cevallos, who advanced the accusa-
tions of beaten and massacred workers and peasants.” Ponce charged that such 
statements were political nonsense that included assertions devoid of logic and 
failed to adhere to ethical standards of political behavior.46
The socialists responded to Ponce’s attacks with a statement that proclaimed 
that their party was engaged in a long-term struggle against the government’s re-
actionary and totalitarian actions, and especially against the minister’s vain and 
scandalous deeds. Their statement denounced among other things “the wealthy 
landholders’ open complicity with the police murder of defenseless Indians.” 
At the same time, the party sought to distance itself from communism. The 
PSE denied that it was under the control of Moscow, that it was part of any 
international movement, or that it received “Moscow gold.” Rather, it was an 
autonomous organization that fought for the rights of the Ecuadorian people. 
Similar to the communists, the socialists declared that they were not opposed to 
religion. Instead, they called on workers, students, members of other democratic 
parties, and all progressive forces to stand up and ght decisively and energeti-
cally for the right to remain free rather than to become miserable slaves.47
For his part, British ambassador Mayers belittled Saad’s leadership in the in-
terpellation as nothing more than a communist move toward the construction 
of a united front. He acknowledged that Ponce was guilty “of various arbitrary 
acts and measures of the last six months which were considered to be derogatory 
to the freedom of the press, of speech and of opinion.” Ponce’s adversaries called 
him “reactionary and illiberal, probably not without reason.” Some of the min-
ister’s actions, such as the banishment of Guayaquil mayor Guevara Moreno, 
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“were urgently necessary, though unconstitutional.” Others, such as the arrest of 
El Comercio’s editor Jorge Mantilla Ortega, “were unnecessary and inexcusable.” 
Unfortunately, his behavior led to a united opposition among liberals and social-
ists. Opponents selected Saad to lead the attack because “he was the best orator 
available,” and because the passion that Ponce stirred was such that his enemies 
“cared little who led the attack.” Mayers concluded that “Saad did not dominate 
the debate as was expected of him,” but nevertheless “he got somehow to the 
spearpoint of the attack.” In providing leadership, Saad gained “well-wishers in 
quarters where sympathy with Communism is never thought of.” But this was 
also a double-edged sword, and led to the failure of the interpellation because 
of “the very fact of the improvised communist leadership.” Mayers pointed to 
this as the primary reason why the opposition did not realize more success in 
their attack. “The spectacle of a Communist, however eloquent and master of 
debate, declaiming against dictatorship (the alleged dictatorship of the present 
government of Velasco Ibarra) and demanding the freedom of the press was a bit 
too much of a good thing.” Even so, the interpellation was a propaganda victory 
for the communists because it was undeniable that Saad led a democratic attack, 
and he would be remembered for doing so.48 The interpellation represented a 
political gain for Saad and his supporters.
The United States Embassy had a similar evaluation. Although Ponce avoided 
the vote of censure by almost a ve to one margin, chargé d’aaires Thomas 
Maleady commented that from a legal or constitutional perspective Ponce did 
not perform well. The minister dodged the larger and more important ques-
tions rather than confronting them directly, and his answers tended to be vague 
and inconclusive. Maleady inferred that “while the embassy naturally is fully 
in favor of scotching Communism,” the nationalist and authoritarian tenden-
cies of Velasco Ibarra, Ponce, and the ARNE was not a preferable alternative. 
“One extreme could be as bad as the other,” the chargé declared. He feared that a 
temporary period of political peace was evaporating in this perennially unstable 
country.49
On October 3, the communists held a meeting in Cotocollao to celebrate 
Saad’s success. The party sold tickets for twenty sucres a piece, which included 
food and drink. A CIA ocer commented that the meeting was more of a suc-
cess than Saad’s interpellation given that the censure vote lost by a large margin. 
An informer noted that some PCE leaders considered Saad’s poor showing to 
be a major defeat for the party, and that Echeverría and Barreto were making 
moves to replace Saad as the party’s secretary general.50 But both sides missed 
the point of the interpellation. At best censoring Ponce might have removed an 
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unpopular minister, but it would not have fundamentally changed the country’s 
rightward dri	. In contrast, Saad’s strong showing helped brace against rising 
anticommunist sentiments.
A subsequent CIA information report highlighted the participation of Car-
los Cueva Tamariz and Mario Veintimilla at the esta. Cueva Tamariz, the so-
cialist party member, rector of the University of Cuenca, and senator, attended 
with his two sons, Patricio, the communist who had lashed out at fellow mem-
bers in a self-criticism session at the previous year’s party congress, and Mariano. 
Both in this document and in others, the CIA indicated their concern with 
the elder Cueva Tamariz’s “pro-Communist activities.”51 The British Embassy 
articulated a somewhat more measured assessment of Cueva Tamariz. Their 
report characterized him as “a Socialist with tendencies towards the Le	 of that 
Party.” He was “one of the most qualied for oce,” and had demonstrated this 
through his performance in several governmental posts, including as deputy 
in congress, minister of government and education, and as socialist candidate 
for vice president in 1948. The British Embassy concluded that Cueva Tamariz 
was “a respected Socialist but dicult to place.”52 It was Saad’s ability to build 
alliances with such prominent political gures that so worried government 
ocials.
Veintimilla, the other person the CIA ocer mentioned in the report on 
the fete for Saad, had been an alternate for Ponce’s seat as senator for highland 
agricultural interests. Veintimilla was “an elderly man from Cuenca” who said 
“he was too old to take an active part in the Communist movement, but that he 
anticipated the coming of a world-wide Communist revolution, and he hoped 
that it would come soon.” Veintimilla also said that he had two sons who were 
members of the PCE.53 While that may have been the case, neither the father 
nor his sons otherwise appeared in the CIA surveillance or played a signicant 
role in the party. His presence, though, does point to the array of forces allied 
against Ponce.
Communist deputy Pedro Saad’s interpellation of Velasco Ibarra’s con-
servative minister of government Camilo Ponce Enríquez provided the le	 with 
an opportunity to place their political agenda on public display for all to see. 
Even though Saad lost the vote in congress, he gained respect because of his 
conscientious and serious engagement with important issues. That strategy also 
underscored his embrace of a peaceful and parliamentary path to power. Even 
so, a rising anticommunist tide in the midst of growing cold war tensions created 
signicant obstacles for the le	 to advance its agenda. CIA surveillance provides 
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scholars with an opportunity to peek inside communist party structures to un-
derstand how militants organized themselves to advance their political agen-
das. That surveillance reveals that party members understood that their struggle 
would be long and hard, and despite the forces allied against them they were 
committed to staying in it for the long haul.
184
Ch a pter 10
Communist Threats
T he conservative minister of government Camilo Ponce Enríquez not only survived near constant attacks from his liberal and leist oppo-nents, but he also won the 1956 presidential election—though with the 
smallest plurality of the vote in Ecuador’s history. Even so, he pressed forward 
in an unrelenting fashion with his conservative agenda, which in large part was 
designed to marginalize those on the le. Despite those challenges, his years in 
oce corresponded with a resurgence in leist strength. Among indications of 
rising communist fortunes was the party’s ability to hold its sixth congress a year 
aer Ponce’s election.
Ponce’s election and the PCE congress took place in the aermath of the 
death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953, and his replacement with Nikita 
Khrushchev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). Khrushchev undertook a program of liberalization, and famously de-
nounced Stalin’s crimes at the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956. 
Among Khrushchev’s complaints was Stalin’s cult of personality, his excessive 
concentration of power in the hands of one individual, and his use of author-
itarian and repressive measures to maintain societal control. Following on the 
heels of the CPSU congress, an October 1956 uprising in Hungary threatened 
to topple that country’s communist government. A large Soviet military force 
crushed the protests and returned the communists to power. Aer ve years as 
United States ambassador to Hungary, Christian Ravndal departed on the eve 
of the uprising to take up his new post in Ecuador. Ravndal said that during his 
time in Hungary he had observed a move toward liberalization, with a relaxation 
of political control and more latitude for people to express their views. The up-
rising did not surprise him, but he had not expected it to happen so quickly.1
This sequence of events—Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s denunciations, and 
the repression of the Hungarian uprising—sent shockwaves around the world 
and eventually led to splits in communist parties as some clung to a Stalinist 
line while others advocated for more openness. Furthermore, a deterioration of 
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relations between China and the Soviet Union eventually led to the Sino-Soviet 
split. As elsewhere, all of these issues played out inside the Ecuadorian commu-
nist party with dissidents complaining of Saad’s bureaucratic and reformist line 
and demanding that the party take more aggressive and militant action. All of 
these factors in addition to the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 con-
tributed to the rise in the 1960s of what came to be known as a “new le” that 
rejected dogmatic approaches to Marxist theory.
Throughout this entire time, CIA ocers and other United States gov-
ernment ocials maintained their surveillance of the PCE. A result is a rich 
documentary record that oers glimpses into how militants responded to these 
changing landscapes. In confronting the twin challenges of rst José María Vel-
asco Ibarra’s populist government and then the open hostility of his conservative 
minister Ponce followed with his subsequent reign as president, the PCE contin-
ued to organize along both electoral and social movement axes. Underneath and 
countervailing what the election of a conservative president would seem to in-
dicate, United States surveillance points to a rising tide of social mobilizations.
CIA Ocers
The election of President Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and his nomination of 
Allen Dulles as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) represented a shi 
in the CIA from its original purpose as an intelligence-gathering and coordi-
nating agency to one that engaged in covert operations designed to advance the 
president’s political agenda. Harry Rositzke who worked with the CIA during 
its rst quarter century and nished his career as a senior ocer in the agency’s 
clandestine services describes this turn to covert action in the mid-1950s. This 
activity included “distributing propaganda, supporting non-Communist stu-
dent congresses, sponsoring or subsidizing anti-Communist publications,” and 
creating youth, student, and labor groups that would extend those objectives.2
During the rst years of the Eisenhower administration, CIA information re-
ports continued to trickle out of Ecuador but at a slower rate and with a dierent 
emphasis than earlier. Much of the material that the CIA has released discusses 
mundane topics characteristic of State Department dispatches, such as details 
on mining operations, wages, roads, and ports.3 By the mid-1950s, these reports, 
which initially provided keen insights into internal communist party dynam-
ics, disappear from the cache of documents that the CIA has made available. 
Oblique references in the diplomatic correspondence to “an ocer of the Em-
bassy’s sta representing another agency” indicates the continued presence and 
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activity of CIA case ocers.4 What we do know from Philip Agee is that in the 
early 1960s he continued to dra reports for consumption in Washington, and 
that the agency’s penetration of the PCE resulted in ve or six per week.5 It is not 
clear if these records were lost, destroyed, or still remain to be declassied. Per-
haps with a turn from an intelligence to a covert action arm of the government, 
the CIA is reticent to release material that would document its illegal activities. 
If and when their information reports come to light, they will provide a boom 
for a study of the Latin American le. Meanwhile, a lack of access to this sur-
veillance limits our ability to gain a fuller understanding of communist actions.
Aer several years in the early 1950s during which it is dicult to pinpoint 
the identities of individual CIA ocers in Ecuador, beginning in 1954 once 
again their identities emerge out in the open even though we currently have less 
access to the memos that they draed than we do for their predecessors. Even so, 
recognizing who conducted surveillance allows for a fuller and deeper investiga-
tion of agency actions. CIA Chief of Station Ned Holman arrived in Quito in 
November 1954 and his deputy Comer Wiley Gilstrap followed in March 1955. 
Holman served under the cover of attaché in the embassy, and subsequently 
went on to similar posts in Argentina, Uruguay, and Guatemala. Aer his ap-
pointment to Argentina, in March 1960 he appears in the Foreign Service List as 
assigned to the State Department in Washington, apparently his ocial cover 
while at CIA Headquarters, but then he disappears from the publication al-
though other CIA ocers continue to be listed.6 Gilstrap, whose cover in Quito 
was political ocer, later served in Brazil, Uruguay, El Salvador, Guyana, and 
ultimately as COS in San José, Costa Rica. With the available information, it 
is dicult to say whether Holman and Gilstrap were the only two operatives in 
Ecuador until the expansion of the post in the aermath of the Cuban Revo-
lution, and who besides Howard Shetterly was present between Albert Haney’s 
departure in 1949 and their arrival.
Holman collaborated closely and seamlessly with the United States Embassy. 
As one example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles requested that each em-
bassy designate a liaison ocer to work directly with local government ocials 
to exchange information on communist activities.7 Ambassador Sheldon Mills 
immediately named “Political Attaché Holman” to this position.8 His counter-
part in the Ecuadorian government was Jaime Sánchez, an ocial in the police 
department and a private secretary to the minister of government.9 Holman was 
a logical choice, and his designation allowed him to continue his surveillance 
operations that were already in place. Shortly aer his designation the embas-
sy’s counselor William Wieland asked for Holman’s assistance in digging out 
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information on “known communists,” and requested his cooperation in check-
ing the names of those who were reportedly involved in communist activities.10
Wieland, in turn, passed this information on to Ambassador Mills.11 Dulles 
approved of this collaboration, and instructed diplomats to coordinate their 
anticommunist activities with “CAS” (that is, the CIA station), the PAO, and 
military attachés in the embassy.12 The USIA similarly instructed its PAOs to 
provide the liaison, which in the case of Ecuador was Holman, with copies of an-
ticommunist propaganda.13 Dierent branches of the government collaborated 
extensively around a shared anticommunist agenda.
As a CIA ocer, Holman supplied the embassy with services that others 
could not or did not want to undertake, even to the point of engaging in un-
pleasant and even illegal activities. One example was when the embassy’s PAO 
Walter Bastian met with two young communist party defectors, Mario Cárde-
nas and Luis Vargas. Both had joined the party in high school and were active 
members. Several years earlier, Holman’s predecessor had listed Cárdenas as the 
nance secretary of the JCE.14 Now both were on the verge of graduating from 
university and were concerned that their communist aliation would hinder 
them in their job searches. Not only were they “outcasts of good society,” but 
their fellow communists also regarded them with suspicion. Bastian surmised 
that they could “both be bought, probably fairly reasonable.” The United States 
Information Service (USIS), however, was “most eager to get out from under this 
type of operation.” Either recognizing the danger of conceding that propaganda 
endeavors bled over into covert operations or wishing to keep the two tasks sep-
arate in a division of labor that might have also reected a certain amount of 
turf battles, Holman changed the text from “get out” to “stay out of this type 
of operation.”15 Rather curiously, a year later Holman’s successor James Noland 
included both Cárdenas and Vargas on a list of delegates to the Sixth World 
Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow. He listed both as communists, but 
provided no indication of their earlier contact with the embassy.16 In retrospect, 
it is unclear whether the two were attempting to inltrate an anticommunist 
operative, had changed their minds about defecting, were now working for the 
CIA as agents reporting on communist activities, or simply did not want to pass 
up the opportunity to travel to Moscow. Agee subsequently worked under Hol-
man in Uruguay and described him as incompetent.17 His failures in recruiting 
the two may be an indication of those shortcomings.
Although it could serve the interests of those on many dierent sides to exag-
gerate the level of communist support and strength, it is also notable when vari-
ous parties refused to do so. One example came in the aermath of an interview 
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that José Ricardo Chiriboga Villagómez, Ecuador’s ambassador to the United 
States, had with State Department ocials in Washington. Chiriboga Villagó-
mez had recently returned from a visit to Ecuador aer an absence of three years 
since his failed presidential run in 1952 to test the waters for another attempt in 
1956. He recounted “an amazing increase in communist inuence in university 
and school circles,” and described the socialists as “tools of the communists.” He 
lamented that the government was “powerless to check such activity.”18 Wieland 
responded to the memo with a quite dierent assessment. While Chiriboga 
Villagómez “is entitled to his own ‘impression,’” Wieland wrote, “that is not 
the feeling of the Embassy.” Wieland said he had double-checked his view with 
“CAS” (presumably Holman or someone in the CIA station) and the PAOs who 
worked closely with those issues. While they acknowledged “substantial Com-
munist inuence,” they denied that any “appreciable increase” in communist ac-
tivity had taken place, “much less an ‘amazing increase.’” Chiriboga Villagómez 
may have exaggerated a communist threat in an attempt to concur favor with 
United States ocials by leaving them with the impression that he alone could 
rise to the challenge, but if that was his aim, he failed at it. Wieland declared that 
Chiriboga Villagómez was “in error” in his assessment that socialists were “tools 
of the communists.” United States ocials estimated ve thousand communists 
in Ecuador, but there were at least six times as many socialist party members. 
Furthermore, two-thirds of those socialists came from the moderate wing of the 
party and wanted nothing to do with the communists. While the remaining ten 
thousand socialists represented the le wing of the party, they were “by far the 
weaker section” and in no sense dominated the party. In fact, Wieland predicted 
that the socialist party might split in two.19 The CIA typically exaggerated com-
munist threats, whereas State Department ocials dedicated more attention 
to the much larger PSE. Particularly in private internal correspondence, more 
rational and less sensationalistic reporting could emerge out of United States 
surveillance.
Minister of Government
British ambassador Norman Mayers described 1953 as “one of continual change, 
contention and upset, with no apparent benet to anyone.” In large part, this 
chaos was due to Velasco Ibarra who was “changeable, violent, but not un-
likeable.” As president, he called “eloquently for national unity and mutual 
comprehension,” even as he was largely responsible for shortcomings in those 
areas. Mayers found the “Extreme Right” and the “Extreme Le” to be equally 
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dangerous, and urged the country not to desert “the sound political conceptions 
of an older time . . . to follow strange creeds,” whether falangist or communist.20
As a representative of a country with a long imperial and colonial tradition, he 
felt situated and entitled to ponticate on what it would take for an impover-
ished and unequal country to solve their problems.
Mayers contrasted 1953 in Ecuador, which “was a year of continual change 
and public dissension,” with 1954 that provided “a period of consolidation, in 
which President Velasco Ibarra made himself master of the country, nally set-
tled into the saddle and assured apparent stability of government.” Notable for 
Mayers was the general absence of signicant and frequent cabinet changes that 
had characterized the previous year.21 Mayers’s successor F. Herbert Gamble ob-
served that his predecessors had described Velasco Ibarra as “masterful, dicult, 
self-willed, changeable, violent, not unlikeable, mercurial, unpredictable, incor-
rupt, most patriotic, imperious,” and he added “courageous and indefatigable.” 
Gamble remarked that such a person as head of state would inevitably lead to 
“some excitement, and we have indeed had some exciting moments in 1955.” Ve-
lasco Ibarra had managed to ride out these diculties, and “at the end of the 
year he was fully in control of the situation and head and shoulders over those 
who surround him.”22 While previously these characteristics had led to Velasco 
Ibarra’s removal from oce, this time it assured that he would complete his 
four-year term—the only one of his ve times in oce that he was able to do so.
In large part, Velasco Ibarra’s minister of government Ponce was responsible 
for imposing strong-armed control over the country that assured his continu-
ance in oce. In a report on his ministerial activities, Ponce launched into an 
extended attack on leists and their opposition to Velasco Ibarra’s government. 
He made a distinction between an idealist or utopic socialism and the “scien-
tic” socialism of communists who followed a Bolshevik line. He claimed that 
this division was reected in the types of people who were attracted to each 
ideology. He derogatorily referred to those in the second group as “comunis-
toides” who tried to inltrate labor and peasant organizations. As a result, the 
interests of workers and peasants suered because of the manipulation of out-
side agitators who pressed revolutionary ideologies that deprived people of their 
personal freedoms.
Ponce noted that from before his elevation to minister of government, leists 
had declared a frontal attack against Velasco Ibarra’s government, oen without 
a clear purpose or political agenda. Rather, they forwarded ideas developed in 
the context of European industrial economies that were entirely inappropriate 
for Ecuador. They embraced abstract economic and social theories interpreted 
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through a European literary framework that engendered polemical discourses 
with little relevance for Ecuador’s lived realities.
Ponce pointed to the hypocrisy of socialists who previously collaborated ac-
tively with Galo Plaza Lasso’s government, including holding cabinet posts in 
education and economics. He asked whether the socialist party that had allied 
with Plaza was dierent from the one that now engaged in open combat with 
Velasco Ibarra. Ponce challenged a statement in a PSE manifesto that “Velasco 
Ibarra is the man who has caused the most damage to Ecuador.” The social-
ist statement compared Velasco Ibarra to Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and 
Francisco Franco, and declared that he had delivered his government into the 
hands of the most reactionary elements in Ecuador as represented by Ponce, the 
conservative party, and the ARNE. This led Ponce to inquire whether Plaza’s 
government was any more democratic or popular than the current one. Had 
it done anything more to foster economic development, or had it paid more 
attention to the most marginalized sectors of society? The socialist manifesto 
concluded with a call for workers, students, intellectuals, popular organizations, 
and other political forces to “to occupy its position of struggle against the ob-
scure conservative-ARNE forces that have seized the country, which threaten to 
bloody it and reduce it to greater misery and slavery.” Ponce warned what they 
were advocating was a social revolution that would lead to a “dictatorship of 
the proletariat” with all of its negative manifestations as was currently the case 
in Moscow.23
Ponce then turned his ire against the communists. Beginning in July 1953, “a 
malaise could be felt, connected with the continuous mobilizations of certain 
leaders,” and he noted that from August through October of 1953 “communists 
were especially active.” Their exploits had caused disruptions in rural commu-
nities, as seen in the “serious disorders and lamentable bloody acts” that culmi-
nated with massacres at the Galte hacienda in Chimborazo, and the La Merced 
and Guachalá haciendas in Pichincha. Earlier in 1953, a new owner of the Galte 
hacienda had tried to expel thirty-nine Indigenous workers, which triggered an 
eight-month strike that the police put down with considerable force.24 A January 
1954 protest at the Guachalá hacienda over a lack of pay and other abuses simi-
larly resulted in the police killing four unarmed workers and imprisoning many 
more.25 All of these protests ended “with the same consequences and without 
any benet.” Ponce complained that at both La Merced and Guachalá the press 
distorted the truth in search of sensationalism and reported the news “so that 
it does not coincide with legal declarations and procedures.” In other words, 
the mainstream media had spread “fake news” about his actions. The minister 
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claimed that a concerted campaign to discredit the government lay behind the 
protests, and an unfortunate result was “more victims with no public or private 
benet for anyone.” He particularly blamed the FEI, what he denounced as “for-
eign elements of the workers federations,” and communist party members for all 
of these troubles.
Ponce contended that in contrast to the charges from labor leaders, Velasco 
Ibarra’s administration was not hostile to the working class. Rather, as it had 
demonstrated on repeated occasions, it supported workers’ right and just de-
mands and sought to elevate their “moral and economic level.” At the same time, 
Ponce justied repressive actions against communist agitators. He contended 
that the government took such measures not because of their labor activities, but 
because of their violations of the law and their attacks on authorities. “A por-
tion of the Ecuadorian working class are victims of political deception,” Ponce 
claimed, “of international communism’s dialectical seduction.” Even though 
revolutionary activity had not reached the extreme levels that it had in some 
other countries, the minister observed, workers still suered the same negative 
consequences of revolutionary incitements from unscrupulous leaders. He con-
tended that legal labor union organizing was one thing, but that permanent 
communist agitation disguised as syndicalist action was something else entirely. 
Ponce argued that legal sanctions were necessary to preserve order.26
While the political prospects for both Velasco Ibarra and Ponce appeared to 
be improving, those for the communists proered the impression of heading 
in the opposite direction. Saad warned a communist youth meeting, “We are 
getting weaker.” He complained that communist militants were “spending too 
much time in cafes” when “victory is to be found in the streets, at the head of 
the proletariat and the Indians.”27 According to Albert Gerberich at the OSA 
in Washington, Saad, “allegedly admitted privately that 1953 was a bad year for 
the Communists in Ecuador and that the party’s nancial situation is worse, 
coupled with apparent dishonesty on the part of some members handling party 
funds.” Furthermore, the local committee in Guayaquil faced internal dicul-
ties, including ones related to personal conicts. Nevertheless, Saad anticipated 
“a vigorous campaign in 1954” that would include “attacks on the Velasco Gov-
ernment and the U.S., and by the fermentation of strikes where they will have 
most eect.”28 In order to achieve its goals, however, the party needed to be bet-
ter organized.
Ponce’s anticommunist policies appeared to be having their intended eect. 
In November 1955, a CIA analyst in Washington described the PCE as “poorly 
organized” with only about ve thousand members—the same number that 
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US ocials had reported for years. The party held “little inuence,” but at the 
same time its secretary general Saad was “a member of the Ecuadoran Senate 
and has considerable prestige among Latin American Communist parties.” Per-
haps its small size and marginal inuence would explain why “The Ecuadoran 
government does not view Communism as a clear and present danger either to 
the country or to the continent.” The agency complained of Velasco Ibarra’s 
“third way” orientation that “characterized the cold war as ‘a struggle between 
two materialistic powers.’” As further evidence of the president’s insuciently 
anticommunist credentials, he had “allowed unrestricted freedom of activity to 
some 45 Communist exiles from Guatemala” who had le that country aer the 
right-wing military coup against the progressive Jacobo Arbenz administration 
the previous year. Even with Ponce’s opposition, CIA analysts feared that unless 
the government were willing to take even more aggressive and concerted action 
a communist threat could grow.29
The USIA painted a similarly dismal picture of communist strength. In April 
1956, it asked its local posts to provide an assessment “of the nature and extent 
of the communist propaganda program.”30 The embassy’s PAO Bastian replied 
that “the communist press is quite minor in Ecuador.” The party’s nominally 
weekly newspaper El Pueblo was deeply in debt, which compromised it ability 
to publish on a regular and consistent basis and as a result only appeared sporad-
ically. Cultural activities were “almost nil.” Despite these problems, “in Ecuador 
communism nds an economic system which with its great inequalities and its 
underdevelopment oers an opportunity for exploitation found in few other 
Latin America countries.” As a result, the possibilities for communist subversion 
surpassed its currently limited nancial resources, particularly in terms of its 
potential ability to mobilize students, workers, and intellectuals.31
Local and Midterm Elections
Despite concerted anticommunist campaigns, progressive forces appeared to be 
strengthening in the lead up to Ponce’s election in 1956. In addition to pres-
idential elections held regularly every four years on the rst Sunday in June, 
throughout the 1950s Ecuador convoked other ballots on a consistent basis. In 
June of every other year, the country held congressional elections, and every No-
vember voters elected representatives for municipal and provincial oces. In 
addition to the sequence of presidential terms, the consistency of these local 
and legislative elections that were largely held without interruption reinforced 
an impression of a period of political stability. Underlying these votes, however, 
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lay political unrest and discord that highlights ongoing debates over the direc-
tion the country should take. These elections provided multiple opportunities 
to ponder and debate how to advance political agendas, and they contributed to 
the construction of alliances and the setting of agendas for approaching pres-
idential races. Furthermore, while public attention tends to be drawn toward 
presidential races, it was on a local level where the le realized most of its gains. 
Concentrating only on the presidency exaggerates the impression of a weak le 
and resurgent right.
As an example, a reconstituted Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN, Na-
tional Democratic Front) coalition of liberals and socialists scored a substantial 
victory over the conservatives in the November 6, 1955, municipal and provincial 
elections. In fact, the conservatives won in only one city, Riobamba, where the 
FDN had not run a candidate. Furthermore, the FDN only lost in one city, and 
that was in Portoviejo where a Velasquista candidate had emerged victorious. 
United States Embassy ocials identied the November 1955 election as “one 
of the least turbulent and most honest of recent years.” Voters were “acquiring 
greater condence in the constitutional process” with assurances that voting 
outcomes would be respected. Wieland closed a detailed ve-page analysis of 
the election results with the observation that “Ecuador stands in direct con-
trast to its neighboring countries, still in the grip of dictatorships, or having just 
undergone the turmoil of revolution and counter-revolution.” In comparison, 
“Ecuador could well be described as an island of relative democratic and in-
stitutional stability virtually surrounded by the angry seas of dictatorship and 
revolution.”32 Furthermore, the outcome of the Guayaquil municipal elections 
cheered United States consul Joseph Costanzo because “the Communist party 
evidently got nowhere.” The PCE had only run candidates in Guayaquil, and in 
that city their list E “had no success to speak of.”33 Wieland bluntly characterized 
their performance as “a miserable showing.34 The communist contribution to 
the rise of a progressive alternative never manifested itself in the electoral realm, 
but it could be felt elsewhere.
The 1955 local elections appeared to place the liberals in a strong position to 
win the June 1956 presidential elections half a year later. The Catholic Church 
hierarchy had worked intensively on behalf of conservative candidates to the 
point where they faced a backlash with liberals charging that it was engaging in 
undue interference in the electoral process.35 The outcome resulted in a weak-
ening of the political inuence of the Catholic Church, and the conservatives 
feared that they would again face defeat unless they were able to identify and 
unify around a suitable candidate. From Wieland’s perspective, if the June 1956 
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election proceeded as planned, “Ecuador may well become one of the most po-
litically stable countries in Latin America.”36 The future appeared bright for 
the country.
Camilo Ponce Enríquez (1956)
A three-way division among progressive political parties opened a path for the 
election of the Social Christian Camilo Ponce Enríquez in 1956 with only 29 
percent of the vote, the lowest percentage of any winning presidential candidate 
in Ecuador’s history. Conservative support continued to drop across the 1950s, 
and in the end, Ponce barely polled three thousand more votes than his near-
est competitor. A record-breaking six hundred thousand people participated, 
though they still represented only about 15 percent of the country’s almost four 
million people even with many (literate) women voting for the rst time. Ob-
servers noted that almost three-quarters of those cast their ballots for noncon-
servative candidates, but suicidal divisions among liberal candidates handed 
victory to the right that was opposed to the social and political gains achieved 
during the last half century of liberal governance.37 Furthermore, it was never 
clear that Ponce had won in a clean and fair contest. It became a common trope 
on the le that the FDN had triumphed but was the victim of a brazen fraud.38
Even the traditional conservative leader Mariano Suárez Veintimilla accused 
Ponce of only managing his minor victory through massive electoral chicanery.39
The right faced as much fractious inghting as did the le, but with the reins of 
power it could advance its political agenda.
As in previous elections, liberals, leists and other progressives had sought to 
form a broad anticonservative alliance to keep the right out of power, but with 
no more success than with other attempts. Once again, divisions among liberals 
provided conservatives with their narrow margin of victory. Aer failing to gain 
nomination as the ocial liberal party candidate, Chiriboga Villagómez com-
peted as an independent. The FDN unied other liberals, socialists, and inde-
pendents in support of liberal stalwart Raúl Clemente Huerta. In addition, the 
populist Carlos Guevara Moreno ran as a candidate for the CFP. He had his best 
showing in that election, which further split the anticonservative vote. Le-wing 
unity could theoretically prevent a conservative victory, but attempts to build a 
coalition were fraught with fractures and splits. Furthermore, the liberals, so-
cialists, and communists all suered from internal divisions within their ranks, 
and these ruptures became even more pronounced in the 1960s. Conservatives 
took advantage of these cleavages to win elections, which created the impression 
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of a weak le and an ascendant right, even though they never enjoyed majority 
backing. Underlying all of this were intense debates over socialist ideologies and 
strategies that point to the presence of a vibrant and dynamic le.
As with all electoral coalitions, the formation of the FDN required a compli-
cated dance around competing interests, which eventually resulted in the exclu-
sion of the communists. As before, the socialists attempted to gain respectabil-
ity and support by joining an anticommunist chorus. The PCE reacted quite 
negatively to their exclusion. The communist party denounced the liberal and 
socialist leaders Augusto Durango, Juan Isaac Lovato, Fernando Chávez, and 
Oswaldo Tamayo as “four insignicant people, members of the FDN board” 
who had “declared open war on the PCE.” According to the party, the four “re-
vealed their voracious, greedy policy of seeking power for power’s sake, without 
any concern for the interests and the needs of the people.” The party accused the 
FDN leaders of acting as “instruments of wealthy economic interests, which do 
not appear because of their blatant ambition of prot and exploitation. They 
are interested more than anyone in maintaining the conditions of injustice in 
our country.” The communists claimed to have had loy expectations for the 
FDN, but they denounced Huerta as an “instrument of high nance and ex-
ploitative merchants in Guayaquil.” His election would represent a victory for 
coastal bankers and gamonales, the wealthy landowners who fed o the poverty 
and misery of the people.
According to the PCE, the FDN’s vice presidential candidate José María 
Plaza Lasso was a tool of imperialism who had a long history of acting against 
the interests of the people. They accused him of urging his older brother, the 
former president and modernizing landowner Galo Plaza Lasso, to hand the 
entire country over to the United States. Furthermore, and most disturbing, “the 
vilest conditions of slavery and exploitation of the Indigenous masses continue 
to persist on his haciendas.” The statement claimed that the younger Plaza had 
even proclaimed arrogantly to his journalist friends that poor people should not 
have the right to vote. Rather than leading to the liberation of the people, such 
bourgeois politicians only contributed to their exploitation and misery.
The PCE attacked both the presidential and vice-presidential candidates for 
their insuciently radical positions, but they saved their strongest ire for the 
leaders of the FDN. The PCE denounced them as “the same old reactionary ex-
ponents” who had declared that “between communism and democracy there is 
an abyss.” The PCE retorted that the “democracy” of the FDN was “the democ-
racy of injustice, of slavery, of lies and exploitation. TRUTHFULLY THERE 
IS AN ABYSS BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND THIS PERVERSION 
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OF DEMOCRACY,” their statement shouted.40 The communists sought to 
turn the rhetoric of a defense of democracy back on the liberals with the con-
tention that their version was exclusionary and failed to advance the interests 
of the working class and other marginalized communities. At the same time, 
turning their ire against other progressives contributed to disunity on the le 
that permitted victories on the right.
In response to its exclusion from the FDN, the PCE published a sixteen-page 
pamphlet with its own electoral platform.41 The cover featured a graphic of a 
communist worker breaking the chains of African descent and Indigenous peo-
ples with a hammer and anvil (see gure 10.1). The statement began with a dec-
laration that “a profound mobilization of the entire Ecuadorian people” had 
created a “hope that these elections will serve to transform the harsh realities we 
now endure.” Reecting the dominant political line that Saad currently cham-
pioned, rather than calling for an armed struggle the party appealed to the peo-
ple’s “democratic and patriotic spirit” to solve the country’s problems. While 
advocating for peaceful coexistence, the PCE also denounced imperial penetra-
tion of the country’s economy. It directed its call to workers, peasants, artisans, 
teachers, students, industrial workers, and all men and women who suered 
under the oppression of large United States monopolies that extracted the 
wealth of the country—petroleum, bananas, sh—and le the country’s inter-
nal economy underdeveloped. The party charged that the entire country had 
become subjugated to foreign economic interests. Even the military had fallen 
under imperial control through the military pact that the government had 
signed with the United States. “In a word,” the statement declared, “an acceler-
ated process of colonization of Ecuador is underway.” In contrast to the FDN, 
the communists sought to break free from foreign domination of the country.
According to the PCE, the current administration of Velasco Ibarra had an 
equally dismal domestic record compared to what the FDN would implement 
were it to gain power. Wealthy feudal landowners occupied most of the coun-
try’s fertile land and oppressed their Indigenous and montuvio [coastal peasant] 
workers with an exploitative regiment descended directly from the Spanish co-
lonial system. Their actions caused the country to remain underdeveloped, both 
agriculturally and in terms of industrial advancement. Those reactionary groups 
were constantly violating the liberties that the people had struggled so hard to 
advance. The party condemned Velasco Ibarra as being responsible for the sys-
tematic destruction of democratic rights, the persecution of labor and peasant 
leaders, and the murders of students and Indigenous peoples. His government 
had imposed restrictions on the freedom of the press and pursued disastrous 
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OF DEMOCRACY,” their statement shouted.40 The communists sought to 
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economic policies that impoverished the country and undermined its national 
sovereignty. The statement condemned conservative candidates in the current 
election who promised to continue those criminal policies. The June election 
would be a battle that could either mark a fundamental shi in the country’s 
direction, or a deepening of all of these problems if the reactionaries won. It 
was not merely a matter of changing leaders, the communists declared, but of 
the need for a fundamental change in policies to benet workers, peasants, the 
popular sectors, and progressive capitalists.
As with most mainline communist parties of the era, rather than pressing for 
class struggle and a violent revolution the PCE advocated pursuit of a peaceful 
and gradual path to socialism in coalition with other progressive forces. To that 
end, the PCE proposed a seven-point platform. The leading issue was democ-
racy, and the party emphasized the importance of preserving existing liberal 
constitutional guarantees, particularly freedom of the press and assembly, and 
separation of church and state. The second item proposed economic changes 
that were necessary to improve the lives of workers and other poor people. This 
included lowering taxes, raising wages, establishing price controls on basic goods, 
strengthening social security laws, providing adequate housing, and improving 
access to healthcare. The third point called for an agrarian reform that would 
grant land to those who worked it, as well as raising the salaries of agricultural 
and other Indigenous workers. Fourth was a call for a new economic policy that 
would restrict foreign companies and implement measures to benet the coun-
try’s internal economic development. The program also called for the expulsion 
of United States technical missions that “direct our economy, our education, our 
agriculture, health, and the military in a manner contrary to legitimate national 
interests.” In terms of education and culture, the h point, the communists 
called for free and universal education with the goal of eliminating illiteracy. Re-
alizing this objective would require wealthy estate owners to provide schooling 
for the children of their workers. Furthermore, students should be guaranteed 
employment upon completion of their studies. The sixth point concerned the 
implementation of scal policies that would benet poor people, including an 
increase in funding for education and healthcare and a cut in military and police 
spending. The implementation of such an economic policy would require the 
restriction of foreign investments and the encouragement of domestic develop-
ment. The seventh and nal point called for a peaceful foreign policy, including 
the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries. This would entail a change in United Nations pol-
icies that were too oen subjugated to the concerns of United States imperial 
Communist reats 199 
interests. The communists appealed for a defense of national sovereignty, in-
cluding revision of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol that ceded half of Ecuador’s 
territory to Peru, a cancelation of plans to hold the Eleventh Inter-American 
Conference in Quito, and a refusal to host any foreign military bases in Ecuador. 
The PCE acknowledged that its program would not denitively resolve all of 
the country’s problems, but it would represent a decisive step toward the dis-
covery of solutions. The party called on the Ecuadorian people to ght together 
for this program through the election of a government that would implement 
these measures.
Notable is how relatively moderate the demands were in this communist 
party platform. It does not include any calls for expropriation of industry or 
changes in the capitalist mode of production, or even for empowering the work-
ing class. In fact, it makes an appeal to progressive capitalists to join a program 
of national development. While it does attack conservatives, it does so for their 
reactionary and feudalistic policies that hindered the capitalist economic prog-
ress of the country. In keeping with an orthodox Marxist understanding of 
Ecuador’s current stage of economic development, it advocated for bourgeois 
national development rather than a class struggle. Instead of appealing to acts 
of violence or armed struggle, as the United States government feared, it called 
for peaceful participation in electoral contests and achieving reforms through 
a parliamentary process. At the end of the document, the party returned twice 
more to appeals to stand rm against military coups, regardless from where they 
came, because such a step would “circumvent our right to choose our leaders 
freely and to apply this program of urgent measures for national salvation.” The 
communists did not believe that extraconstitutional changes in power would be 
in either their interest as a party, nor in that of the country as a whole. This was 
largely a social democratic platform that party leaders had designed to appeal to 
as broad of an audience as possible. There was little in it that other leists and 
even many liberals would oppose. Furthermore, other than denunciations of for-
eign economic enterprises and military pacts, it is dicult to understand what 
precisely United States government ocials would nd objectionable about this 
statement, except that it came from the communists. An ever-present anticom-
munist knee-jerk rejection was at play, as was of course hostility toward any cri-
tique of United States economic penetration of Latin America.
Despite the FDN’s exclusion of the PCE from their alliance, the conservative 
ARNE newspaper El Combate still engaged in extensive redbaiting. It attacked 
the coalition as operating under communist control. Despite communist state-
ments to the contrary, the newspaper declared that the PCE leaders had imposed 
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Huerta as the presidential candidate, “surely fullling international communist 
slogans.” El Combate proclaimed that the alliance’s eorts to distance them-
selves from communist control were not fooling anyone. “They verbally repudi-
ate communism with false and misleading statements,” the paper declared. “But 
these only happen to be statements to attract the unwary.” It presented what it 
contended was irrefutable proof that communists had worked to undermine 
the nominations of Galo Plaza Lasso and Eduardo Salazar Gómez whom they 
accused of being agents of United States imperialism and of working instead to 
promote Huerta’s candidacy.42
United States ocials made similar types of claims, beginning even before 
Huerta declared his candidacy.43 Allegedly the FDN “openly included known 
communists and communist sympathizers in the entourage which has been ac-
companying Huerta in his campaign tours of the country.” Drawing on infor-
mation from El Combate, embassy ocials reported that top FDN leaders in 
Manabí were active communists, and that “six well-known Quito communists” 
met with FDN leaders at their headquarters. The CIA similarly asserted that 
communists supported Huerta’s candidacy, including hanging posters on his be-
half. Saad allegedly declared that Huerta’s nomination “represented a resounding 
victory for the PCE, which has actively campaigned for him.” According to this 
source, “Huerta would doubtless permit the PCE freedom of action, since his 
political beliefs coincide with the Party in many respects.” Young communists 
were “working long and hard in behalf of Huerta,” including traveling around 
the country to rally support for his candidacy. These militants “dismissed Huer-
ta’s public rejection of Communist Party support as mere campaign strategy, 
stating that in reality Huerta is sympathetic to the policies of Communism.”44
Whether or not the PCE actively campaigned for or covertly supported Huerta, 
what does emerge apparent in these discussions is the complicated terrain that 
the communists tread as they attempted to advance their political agenda.
Even aer the election, the CIA continued with its assertions that the com-
munists were behind the Huerta campaign. In May, party members allegedly 
traveled “throughout Guayas Province to distribute campaign literature and pro-
paganda material in favor of Front Presidential candidate Huerta to the farm 
workers and residents of small towns.” Local communist cells formed commit-
tees in support of Huerta and continued to do so up until the June 3 election 
even in violation of electoral regulations. The CIA quoted communist leader 
José María Roura Cevallos as stating that it was less important that the party was 
supporting a bourgeois candidate like Huerta because “the important point was 
to defeat reactionary candidates in order to insure a favorable atmosphere for 
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the Party in the next four years.” His hope was that a Huerta presidency would 
facilitate realization of “various aspects of the socialist revolution.” According 
to the agency, party members continued campaigning throughout election day 
for the FDN and gathered at their headquarters to await electoral returns. Af-
terwards, the communists were more eager to protest Huerta’s defeat than were 
the FDN leaders themselves.45
Aer Ponce emerged at the top of the June 1956 presidential contest, some 
opponents were determined not to let him take oce. These shenanigans in-
cluded a June 29 coup attempt in Riobamba, an abortive military uprising on 
August 8 in Manabí, and a boycott of congress on August 10 to prevent the body 
from certifying his election. A week later, the conservative majority in congress 
defeated an opposition motion to recount the votes and instead declared Ponce 
president elect.46 José María Plaza Lasso, the losing vice-presidential candidate, 
was later arrested and charged with involvement in the Manabí revolt.47 CIA an-
alysts in Washington concluded that Ponce feared that anticonservative groups 
would organize a general strike on August 31 to prevent him from assuming the 
presidency the following day. Even so, according to the CIA, “The small Ecua-
doran Communist Party apparently has not made any signicant contribution 
to recent political unrest.”48 The agency inadvertently acknowledged what the 
communists had long maintained—that they were committed to orderly soci-
etal transformations rather than resorting to palace coups that only resulted in 
temporary and meaningless disruptions of the political order.
The PCE made its political position clear in a series of statements it produced 
during the three-month period between the June 3 election and Ponce’s inaugu-
ration on September 1. The party repeatedly denounced his fraudulent election 
and condemned a progression of steps that the supreme electoral council and 
congress had taken to certify his designation as president. The party reminded 
the public of Ponce’s previous actions as minister of government in Velasco 
Ibarra’s administration where he revealed his “retrograde spirit,” his systemic 
opposition to the constitution and the rule of law, “his virulent hatred of public 
liberties,” and his complete disregard for the democratic advances that Ecuador 
had made in the sixty years since the liberal leader Eloy “Alfaro raised the peo-
ple against tyranny and the infamy of [Gabriel García Moreno’s] conservative 
regime.” The statement pointed to the Manabí uprising and the boycott of con-
gress as evidence of public repudiation of Ponce’s criminal attacks on democracy. 
In this context, the PCE as the “party of the working class and people” called on 
all Ecuadorians who yearned for progress regardless of whom they supported in 
the election to join together in an anticonservative coalition and to take to the 
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streets in opposition to Ponce. Through such a mobilization, the people could 
open a “path to progress and democracy, to national independence, and to the 
benet of the masses who today suer the devastating economic consequences to 
which the Velasco regime has led them.” It no longer mattered whether one had 
voted for Huerta, Guevara Moreno, or Chiriboga Villagómez, because together 
they represented the majority and together they would make the dierence be-
tween reaction and democracy.49 Despite the heightened rhetoric, notably absent 
in these party documents was an embrace of extraconstitutional measures to 
prevent Ponce from taking oce.
Upon Ponce’s inauguration, the PCE declared that his “conservative-fascist 
government” was “nothing other than the fruit of a monstrous unholy alliance 
between the former government of Velasco Ibarra, certain sectors of the na-
tional and foreign clergy, imperialism, feudal castes, and fascist advance guards 
such as ARNE.” Together, these groups had conspired against democracy and 
perpetuated a scandalous electoral fraud on the country. Once again, the party 
recounted the “crimes and outrages” that Ponce had committed “against demo-
cratic freedoms and the rights of citizens and against worker, peasant, popular, 
and student organizations.” These included the massacres of Indigenous peoples 
on the La Merced and Guachalá haciendas. Ponce had trampled on the constitu-
tion and rule of law. The party warned that if he had done all that as minister of 
government, logically his actions would be much worse as president. He would 
attempt “to destroy every principle of liberty, democracy and human dignity, 
guarantees for which our people have struggled and which they have partially 
gained since that unforgettable year of 1895,” the momentous date of Alfaro’s 
liberal revolution. Ponce’s program was comprised of nothing other than “the 
starving of the popular masses and the most brutal repression of men of free 
thought.” His government threatened to undo all of the political and social gains 
that people had achieved over the past sixty years and would lead to the surren-
der of Ecuador’s natural resources to foreign companies.
The PCE acknowledged that Ponce had threatened to outlaw their party but 
stated that this was only logical because he was well aware that communists 
would never compromise with him. Instead, the party would continue to struggle 
even under the worst of conditions “for the maintenance of democratic freedoms 
and in defense of the rights and aspirations of the people.” The party would con-
tinue its battle “until the slavery and exploitation under which the people suer 
comes to an end, and until the chains of imperialist oppression are forever bro-
ken.” In sum, the communists would ght “until an authentically popular and 
democratic government is installed in our country and our homeland becomes 
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completely independent and sovereign.” The party declared that it was not afraid 
of fascist threats and would continue to ght with more rm resolve than ever 
before. “We have profound faith that history never marches backward and we 
know how to comply, with revolutionary honor, the task of socially and nation-
ally liberating our country.” The party called on all Ecuadorian democrats, both 
men and women, to join in their ght against Ponce’s “conservative-fascist re-
gime” and in support of common objectives. It was time for struggle and action, 
the statement declared. Together, united and organized, the party optimistically 
declared, the people would destroy reactionary forces.50 The embassy considered 
this statement to be of sucient importance to translate it in its entirety, even as 
it denigrated the party for attacking “Ponce and ‘imperialism’ in the usual Com-
munist terms.” Other than highlighting the statement that the PCE expected 
that the new administration would drive the party underground, the embassy 
made no comment on the party’s proposed strategies to address Ecuador’s long-
standing problems.51
At the end of August 1956 on the eve of Ponce’s inauguration, Reginald Brag-
onier at the OSA in the State Department prepared a report on communism 
in Ecuador. In the late 1940s Bragonier was the rst secretary and PAO of the 
Quito Embassy and had only recently started at his current position in Wash-
ington aer serving at posts in Peru and Germany. He drew on United States 
intelligence sources in Ecuador including those from the embassy, CIA, and 
military attachés for his analysis. Bragonier noted that while previous estimates 
had given the size of the PCE at ve thousand members, an army attaché report 
from April had dropped that gure to 1,500, a number that had “remained static 
in spite of the setbacks received by the party during the past year.” Communists 
were “numerically insignicant” and “internal bickering and an apparent short-
age of funds” prevented the party from wielding more power than it otherwise 
might have. The army attaché had no evidence of communist penetration of 
the Ecuadorian military, but its inuence continued strong among workers, stu-
dents, teachers, and intellectuals. It was in those realms, particularly in labor 
strikes and student protests, where communists made their presence known. 
“The greatest vulnerability,” Bragonier warned, was “the absence of a widespread 
popular conviction that the activities of the Communists in Ecuador present a 
danger to the country.”52 This was a concern that other United States ocials 
expressed, and it endlessly bothered them that Ecuadorians did not take the 
communist threat more seriously.
United States consul Costanzo once expressed his frustration that “people 
tend to believe that home-grown Communism is a harmless sort of political play 
204 chapter 10
which will never get very far.”53 Bragonier was therefore optimistic that Ponce’s 
new conservative government, and the Catholic Church’s opposition to the 
le in general, would provide a barrier to the growth of communism. Whereas 
previously some United States ocials had criticized conservatives for trapping 
Latin America in a feudal backwardness that blocked any eorts at moderniza-
tion, now under the Eisenhower administration diplomats openly cavorted with 
conservatives in their anticommunist campaigns.54 Bragonier looked forward to 
strengthening relations with Ponce’s government. Depending on how those col-
laborative eorts developed, they could extend to providing him with “ammu-
nition” that included details on inltration of the Casa de la Cultura and other 
USIS operations that have been “active, imaginative and eective.”55 Despite 
Bragonier’s optimism and the new president’s promises, Ponce actually took few 
concrete steps in the direction of curbing communist activity or circumscribing 
the party, a reality that continued to frustrate embassy ocials.56
A year aer Ponce’s election, liberals were still engaged in an earnest post-
mortem in an attempt to come to terms with their loss. In a lengthy article in El 
Comercio, Huerta denied charges that international communism directed the 
FDN as Ponce had contended. As evidence, he pointed to the coalition’s rejec-
tion of the communists’ application to join. Instead, Huerta attacked Salazar 
Gómez and his other opponents in the liberal party. He declared that Chiriboga 
Villagómez was guilty of treason for dividing the democratic opposition and 
handing victory to Ponce.57 In a condential comment on Huerta’s statement, a 
US Embassy ocial noted that Huerta did reject an alliance with communism, 
but that the communists supported the front anyway.58 Both United States o-
cials and Ecuadorian politicians were eager to see a hidden communist hand at 
play and were determined to do anything they could to stop it.
As the opposition to Ponce coalesced into an anticonservative front, the em-
bassy’s rst secretary Walter Dustmann warned that the communists may be 
providing the spark that would lead to its consolidation.59 A PCE manifesto 
presented contradictory statements on the party’s relationship to the previous 
year’s electoral campaign and its aermath. On one hand, according to the em-
bassy’s summary of a June 14, 1957, proclamation, Ponce had “charged that in-
ternational communism was behind the front in order to weaken and divide it.” 
On the other hand, the PCE claimed credit for the “organization and success” 
of the FDN even though they had been denied entry. “We initiated action for 
anti-Conservative unity from the very moment Ponce took power,” the commu-
nists declared.60 The party never hesitated to exaggerate its ability to inuence 
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and lead such a coalition, and United States ocials actively encouraged that 
narrative even as their own surveillance documented communist weakness.
After a period of fairly insightful reporting during the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the frequency and quality of CIA reporting on domestic events in Ecua-
dor dropped o signicantly during the second half of the 1950s, and that limits 
the conclusions we can draw about communist activities. A preponderance of 
the initial items in the CREST database from Ecuador are intelligence or in-
formation reports that case ocers sent from the eld to agency headquarters 
in Washington. By 1952, that coverage became much spottier. One of the few 
reports for that year is the usually lengthy evaluation of the communist party’s 
h congress at Ambato. In fact, that twelve-page report is an outlier in the 
entire run of available documentation in terms of its detail and depth of exam-
ination, and it proves to be particularly useful in the absence of other sources on 
that meeting. Aer 1954, these regular reports from case ocers that provide 
a fascinating fount of information on domestic leist organizing eorts disap-
pear entirely from the agency’s declassied records. Even nished intelligence 
in the form of daily and weekly reports produced in Washington that mention 
Ecuador are largely missing from the archive, although their absence could be a 
result of the priorities and vicissitudes of the Eisenhower White House. This is 
the case even as diplomatic ocials in the United States Embassy continued to 
generate a constant ow of reports on domestic political developments. The lack 
of CIA surveillance underscores just how useful the information the agency did 
create is to documenting leist organizing eorts.
Even without full access to CIA records, a series of contradictions becomes 
readily apparent in the material that the agency has declassied. On one hand, 
ocials contended that the PCE was determined to engage in sabotage even 
as it adhered to peaceful and parliamentary paths to power, and on the other 
those same ocials denigrated the party’s small electoral footprint even though 
a highly exclusionary political system excluded the vast majority of its potential 
supporters from voting. Fears outstripped realities, even as communist militants 
struggled to make their presence known in the political realm.
Even with all of this tension and attacks and counterattacks from multiple 
sides, political scientist Robert Alexander commented, “The eect of Ponce’s 
election was to tighten the unity among the Liberal, Socialist, and Communist 
parties.” While it had been dicult to rally diverse forces in support of a single 
candidate or electoral platform, it proved easier to mobilize progressives against 
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a government that all opposed. A result of this harmony, according to Alexan-
der, was that the PCE “remained one of the most successful Communist groups 
anywhere in the continent as a manipulator of ‘fellow travelers,’ though it had 
failed to gain much of a mass base for itself.”61 Out of its apparent weaknesses 
emerged a continual strength that laid a basis for advances that the communists 
would make over the next several years, as was to become apparent in its sixth 
party congress.
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Resurgent Le
A fter repeated delays, in May 1957 the PCE gathered in Quito for its sixth congress, its 
rst since meeting in Ambato in 1952 in the 
nal days of the Galo Plaza Lasso administration. The congress came 
a year aer the election of the conservative Camilo Ponce Enríquez, and high-
lighted the challenges that the le faced. Divisions among liberal and leist 
forces had opened the path to his victory. Despite a recognition of the impor-
tance of progressive unity to prevent a conservative triumph, di	erences had 
proven to be too great to overcome. Furthermore, communist leaders faced a 
growing le-wing insurgency within their own party. Reactions against the le’s 
ine	ectualness as an electoral force contributed to a rise in these protest actions.
The 1957 party congress received more press attention than did the previ-
ous one that faced an almost complete media blackout. As with the 1949 party 
congress, in 1957 the communists met as the CIA station in Quito was going 
through a change of personnel. This transition a	ected the agency’s coverage of 
communist activities, but that does not mean that the surveillance stopped—
only that its hand became more hidden. Traces of the agency’s reporting emerge 
in other sources, particularly in dispatches that diplomatic ocials sent to the 
State Department in Washington. These and other sources allow for a recon-
struction of the nature and content of discussions that swirled around the as-
sembly and the party in general.
One of the most signi
cant aspects of the sixth party congress were the dis-
cussions regarding revisions of the statutes that governed the PCE. Despite 
common assumptions that political lines were dictated from above or from out-
side of the local party, surveillance and other documents indicate that rewriting 
the statutes and the congress itself provided space for vigorous internal debate 
over the direction that the party should take. In particular, those deliberations 
highlight the continued presence of a countervailing current that maintained 
that the party should root itself in rural Indigenous and peasant communities 
and dedicate itself to advancing working-class struggles rather than pursing an 
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accommodationist position that deferred a transition to socialism to some in-
determinate point in the future. These and other issues that delegates thrashed 
out in the 1957 communist party congress laid the stage for subsequent ruptures 
that characterized the fractured political landscape of the 1960s.
James Noland
In 1957, both COS Ned Holman and his deputy Comer Wiley Gilstrap le Ec-
uador for other posts—Holman to Argentina and Gilstrap to Brazil and even-
tually as COS in Chile in the 1970s.1 James Noland arrived in Quito in July 1957 
to replace Holman. In contrast to Holman, who Agee characterized as not “one 
of the more outstanding Chiefs of Station,” Noland was “one of the best-liked 
COS’s” in the agency.2 All of the other ocers that Agee names arrived aer 
the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, and it is not immediately apparent who 
if anyone initially accompanied Noland in the Quito station.
Much like Holman, Noland worked closely with embassy ocials. In 
one case, the embassy’s counselor Perry Culley asked Noland for a list of 
communist-sponsored travel for assistant secretary of state for Inter-American 
A	airs Roy Rubottom. Noland generated a three-page list that documented the 
actions of many of the party’s top functionaries. Secretary general Pedro Saad 
along with at least seven others traveled to Moscow for the fortieth anniver-
sary celebrations of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Some stayed on for other 
meetings, trainings, or presentations. The document also contains the names of 
twenty-four members of the Ecuadorian delegation to the Sixth World Festival 
of Youth and Students in Moscow July 1957 together with their political alia-
tions, as well as four labor leaders who traveled to a WFTU congress in Leipzig 
in October 1957.3 If nothing else, CIA ocers cataloged the extent of travel 
and the nature of the party’s international connections. That is not to say that 
these interagency relations were without conict. The embassy’s political ocer 
George Jones said that he had his “
rst run in with CIA” in Quito, apparently 
with Noland who was convinced that Plaza would win the 1960 presidential 
election when José María Velasco Ibarra instead emerged on top in a landslide. 
This was the 
rst of “lots of conicts and lots of run-ins with the CIA over the 
years.”4 The close working relationship was not without its tension.
Noland pressed hard on the Ecuadorian government to implement anticom-
munist measures, and his actions bore fruit. Several months aer his arrival, No-
land reported that “the recent ouster of the Czech mission in Quito was a ‘blow’ 
to the Ecuadoran Communist Party.” According to central committee member 
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Oswaldo Albornoz Peralta, “the departure of the Czech diplomats will hurt the 
Party because it has received ‘considerable aid, both 
nancial and otherwise,’ 
through the Czech Legation.” Reporting on a private conversation that Albor-
noz apparently had with a CIA informer, Noland indicated that “the degree of 
cooperation between the Party and the Czech mission was not as pictured by 
the Ecuadoran Government and was insucient reason to expel the Czechs.” 
Rather, “the ousters were due to ‘Yankee pressure.’”5 That reality, nevertheless, 
did not halt attempts to circumscribe communist actions.
In a memo to Ambassador Christian Ravndal, Noland outlined the agency’s 
success in denying visas to Soviet journalists as well as other communist groups 
and representatives including labor and student activists and a Puerto Rican na-
tionalist. Noland also highlighted President Ponce’s action in ousting the Czech 
legation and the repercussions that doing so had across the region, including 
resulting in the closing of its missions in Peru and Bolivia. No other Latin Amer-
ican country, Noland proclaimed, had cooperated more fully than Ecuador with 
such anticommunist campaigns. Ravndal proudly passed the memo on to the 
State Department with all identifying markers removed except to note that it 
was “prepared by CAS at my request.” Ravndal declared that he “strongly en-
dorse[d] the CAS statement,” and called for the State Department to extend 
the Ecuadorian government “some kind of special recognition.”6 And, indeed, 
Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter responded with a note expressing 
the department’s grati
cation “over the recent actions taken by Ecuador against 
international Communism.”7 CIA ocers collaborated closely with diplomatic 
ocials to advance United States policy objectives, which suggests the need 
for caution in exaggerating the distinctions between the competing agencies in 
providing intelligence on communist party activities. More oen than not, the 
CIA and State Department—as well as the military and other branches of the 
government—shared the same policy objectives.
Sixth PCE Congress (Quito, May 24–30, 1957)
The communists had been planning their sixth congress for some time, and 
rumors of the pending assembly swirled throughout the intelligence commu-
nity in the years leading up to the meeting. Already in April 1954, a CIA o-
cer reported information obtained from Albornoz that the PCE was making 
arrangements for another assembly. According to the party’s bylaws, the party 
was due for its biannual meeting since it had held its last congress almost two 
years earlier in Ambato in July 1952. In keeping with a goal to extend the party’s 
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geographic reach, some party members mentioned Cuenca in the southern high-
lands as a possible site for the next congress. According to the case ocer, “Al-
bornoz gave the impression that a considerable purge of Party ranks was being 
contemplated,” although the ocer did not indicate how, where, or from whom 
he obtained this information.8 The year 1954 came and went without the party 
holding a congress. A list of upcoming communist meetings from July 1955 in the 
CIA archives indicated that the PCE intended to convene the congress in Guay-
aquil on April 30, 1956.9 In February 1957, recently arrived Ambassador Ravndal 
reported, “the Embassy has learned reliably that Ecuador’s Communist Party 
plans to hold its 6th annual Congress on March 8, 1957, in Quito. The proposed 
Congress has been postponed time and again during the past year, reportedly 
due to lack of funds.”10 That situation had not changed, because once again the 
party delayed the opening of the meeting.
Probably drawing on the same source of information as the embassy, CIA an-
alysts in Washington also reported that the PCE planned to convene its congress 
on March 8. Notable for the CIA, the Ecuadorian meeting would be the 
rst 
communist congress in a Latin American country since the Soviets crushed the 
revolt against the Hungarian People’s Republic government the previous No-
vember. The agency was eager to examine the political fallout of European con-
icts in the American hemisphere.11 Rather than dedicating their attention to 
domestic issues and how they might inform local political actions, United States 
ocials were primarily preoccupied with the rami
cations of East-West tensions.
In addition to the Hungarian uprising, “certain echoes” of the previous year’s 
CPSU’s twentieth congress ran throughout the PCE assembly.12 When Nikita 
Khrushchev’s accusations became public in June of that year, the PCE published 
a statement in its party newspaper El Pueblo that acknowledged the criticisms of 
the cult of personality and embraced the importance of collective leadership, but 
remained silent on the issue of political repression.13 In April 1957, an unsigned 
article in the center-le political periodical La Calle complained that Joseph Sta-
lin’s portrait still hung next to that of Vladimir Lenin in the PCE headquarters, 
which indicated that destalinization had not yet arrived to Ecuador. In a recent 
speech Saad discussed the position of intellectuals in the current political situa-
tion, which the anonymous author took to indicate a change in the cultural line 
in the party, particularly in terms of a dogmatic and sectarian attitude toward 
socialist realist art.14 Decades later, the communist author and militant Elías 
Muñoz Vicuña continued to put a positive spin on these events. According to 
Muñoz, the Soviet’s twentieth congress showed “the possibility of new ways of 
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achieving socialism, including a peaceful path.”15 Support for a Stalinist position 
never completely dissipated.
According to CIA analysts, the party would hold its congress “in an atmo-
sphere of political isolation, unusual governmental hostility, and considerable 
party dissension.” The agency estimated that the party had about two thousand 
members, which was down from the 
gure of 
ve thousand that it had earlier 
given, plus twice as many sympathizers, but its presence was multiplied with 
“its strong inuence in leading labor, student, and intellectual organizations in 
Ecuador.” Reective of its apparent strength was Saad’s involvement in the fed-
eral congress as the labor representative. On the other hand, Ponce’s election as 
president the previous year and his continued threats to outlaw the party pre-
sented the PCE with its most serious danger. The party lived in constant fear 
of the possible loss of its legal status, so that was not necessarily a new concern, 
although attacks from Ponce’s conservative administration had heightened that 
possibility. Worsening the situation, liberal party leader Eduardo Salazar Gómez 
had organized the Juridical Committees for the Defense of Western Democ-
racy, a hemispheric anticommunist group that contributed to the isolation of 
the party.16 The publishers of La Calle similarly expected little of signi
cance to 
come out of the congress.17 Even so, both US ocials and Ecuadorian politicians 
did everything in their power to suppress the party’s activities.
An additional blow to the communists was the concerted e	ort of conserva-
tive students to gain control of the FEUE and withdraw its aliation with the 
IUS. A lingering conict over a decision at its 1953 congress to associate with 
the IUS came to a head at a student congress at the end of 1956 when dissident 
students decided to break away from the leist FEUE.18 US Embassy ocials 
concluded that while communist control of the FEUE had “been building up 
stronger and tighter for the past several years” that was no longer the case. The 
split was a great setback for leist elements in the student federation. Now the 
anticommunist faction appeared to be gaining strength at a cost to the com-
munists. “The Embassy is giving full attention to the movement of the dissi-
dent groups,” the embassy’s cultural a	airs ocer Michael Karnis stated, “and 
will lend them our program support through the various channels during the 
coming months.” Karnis admitted that “making the best use of this university 
student split stands as one of our primary short term objectives.” The embassy 
promised to keep the State Department informed as they proceeded with their 
intent to intervene in the internal a	airs of the student federation.19 It was thus 
with a bit of duplicity that a CIA analyst in Washington stated that “the party 
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is confronted with a split in one of its major front organizations” as if that devel-
opment was completely independent of United States intervention.20
A greater threat than either Salazar Gómez’s anticommunist organization or 
the FEUE dissidents was Ponce’s intent to outlaw the party once his political 
position was strong enough to do so. The president allegedly intended to exile 
or imprison Saad and sought a pretext to break relations with Czechoslovakia, 
the only communist country with diplomatic representation in Ecuador.21 Such 
an action, a CIA analyst concluded, “could both damage the PCE’s prestige and 
sever its most available direct link with international Communism.” For this 
and other reasons, the CIA presumed that the congress would concentrate its 
attacks on Ponce, including opposing “his unpopular economic austerity pro-
gram.” According to the agency, a goal would be to persuade other parties to join 
the PCE in an “attempt to overthrow the government by violence,” even though 
the party repeatedly had made clear that it would not move in that direction. 
The agency predicted that delegates would “receive indoctrination on the pres-
ent Soviet line from Saad, who reportedly attended conferences in Prague and 
Peiping [Beijing] in late 1956.” The secretary general’s statements might “fore-
shadow some of the new international policies which may be considered by the 
Argentine and Brazilian Communist congresses reportedly to be held in the 
near future.”22 While Ecuador may have been of marginal interest to policy-
makers, local developments were worth monitoring because of their broader re-
gional rami
cations. The agency’s analysis of the threats facing the PCE was not 
entirely o	, even though they framed their discussion in terms of international 
factors and exaggerated fears of the party turning to armed struggle.
In December 1956, the party’s central committee announced the impending 
congress, without setting a speci
c date. The agenda for the assembly included 
receiving a report on the party’s activities from the central committee, draing 
a program of action, updating the party’s statutes, and electing a new central 
committee. In preparation for the congress, the current central committee called 
on all members to study documents that the party had prepared, and to engage 
in an open debate on the party’s a	airs including a broad examination of “all of 
the problems related to the activity of the party and its future performance.”23
Rather than imposing a line from above, the implication was that the party 
needed an honest discussion to fortify its base as a necessary precondition to 
advance its agenda.
One of the most important topics was a revision of the party’s statutes, and 
in preparation for those discussions the PCE leaders published their proposed 
changes in the party newspaper El Pueblo.24 The statutes began with a proud 
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statement that the PCE “is the political party of the working class, its conscious 
and organized vanguard, its highest form of class organization that resolutely 
defends the interests of the Ecuadorian nation and its broadest masses to which 
it must be closely linked.” The party comprised “the voluntary and militant 
union of the Ecuadorian communists.” Following a pattern that José Carlos 
Mariátegui had established in neighboring Peru decades earlier, the party was 
“guided in all its activity by the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism as applied to the 
national reality.” The PCE followed in a long tradition of struggle, and sought 
to “educate its members in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.” The par-
ty’s current task entailed unifying broad anti-imperialist and antifeudal forces 
in their “Great Democratic Front of National Liberation” that would be based 
on a worker-peasant alliance. The goal was to overthrow the wealthy feudal 
landowners, imperialist forces, and their local agents. In their place the party 
would “implement a progressive democratic regime of national independence as 
a preliminary step towards the construction of socialism, the 
rst stage in the 
building of a communist society in our country.” The party remained dedicated 
to an orthodox Marxist orientation of requiring the establishment of the proper 
objective economic conditions of a fully developed capitalist economy before 
attempting to move toward a socialist mode of production.
According to the statutes, the organization of the party was structured 
around the model of democratic centralism. Cells comprised of at least three 
members formed the base of the party, and the party congress was the top 
decision-making body, which was to meet every other year—although in prac-
tice it never met that oen. Between congresses, the central committee held 
responsibility for the party’s actions, and that body would select an executive 
committee and secretary general to administer daily a	airs. Members elected 
the leaders, but those members were also expected to adhere to party decisions. 
Discipline was important and would be applied “not with a sense of punish-
ment, but with the spirit of educating the sanctioned militant, as well as cor-
recting the defects in the work of the party’s organizations and militants.” The 
statutes sought to protect the party from antagonistic individuals who might 
damage it. Not only were members to be ideologically and politically committed 
to adopting the principals of Marxism-Leninism to their national reality, they 
were also to be honest and sincere in all aspects of their personal lives. Members 
were to engage actively in internal debates in the party, including criticizing er-
rors and presenting proposals and suggestions to strengthen the party’s work. In 
the period leading up to a party congress, party members enjoyed “the broadest 
rights to reopen the discussion on any point of party policy.” It was in that spirit 
214 chapter 11
that party leaders presented issues for members to debate in anticipation of the 
pending congress.
Before the congress even started, the PCE faced intense conservative opposi-
tion to meeting in a public space. Quito’s liberal mayor Carlos Andrade Marín 
had granted the communists use of the municipal Espejo Theater for their in-
augural assembly on May 24, 1957. On the eve of the gathering, José Antonio 
Baquero de la Calle, a hardcore conservative member of Quito’s municipal coun-
cil, called for an emergency session to challenge the mayor’s decision. Baquero 
was no stranger to these types of battles, and he was well known to United States 
ocials. Almost a decade earlier, while serving as sub-secretary of foreign af-
fairs, Baquero had exploited the political chaos following the assassination of 
liberal leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán during the ninth 
Pan-American Conference in neighboring Colombia to press an anticommunist 
agenda with the United States Embassy in Quito.25 Then as now, Baquero ex-
pressed a greater fear of communism than did embassy ocials.
In his exposé of CIA operations in the early 1960s, Philip Agee describes 
Baquero as a “long-time agent,” which makes it within the realm of possibility 
that in 1957 he was already collaborating with the agency to prevent communist 
access to public venues.26 We do know that as leader of the conservative party 
he had ongoing and intimate conversations with embassy ocials concerning 
local political developments.27 And, in fact, this was broadly the impression that 
his opponents had of him. At the time of the communist congress, the socialist 
newspaper La Tierra identi
ed Baquero as “a paid agent of imperialism” who 
followed instructions from the United States in his anticommunist campaigns.28
Reading between the lines of embassy dispatches would seem to con
rm that 
indeed he was a CIA informer.29 In the early 1960s, Baquero was a leader of the 
right wing of Velasco Ibarra’s political movement and had presidential aspira-
tions. Velasco Ibarra named him minister of labor and social welfare, and the 
Quito station paid him a salary and expenses to provide political intelligence on 
the government. The CIA hoped that Baquero could strengthen noncommunist 
labor organizations, but his closeness to the conservative Catholic Church hier-
archy limited those possibilities. Nevertheless, Agee referred to Baquero as “our” 
minister, as if he responded to imperial rather than domestic concerns. When 
in October 1961 Velasco Ibarra forced him out of his government, Agee quipped 
that he had “been an ine	ective minister and not a particularly e	ective agent 
either.” The Quito station then faced the task of removing him from the agency’s 
payroll.30 Baquero’s inability to convince his colleagues on the Quito city council 
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to join him in opposition to communist use of the municipal theater was just one 
of his many failures to advance his conservative, anticommunist agenda.
At the municipal council meeting on the evening of Wednesday, May 23, 1957, 
Mayor Andrade Marín explained that he had made his decision to permit use of 
the municipal theater based on the precedent that the council had established 
the previous year in allowing any political organization to use the facilities for 
their meetings.31 Baquero retorted that the “so-called” Ecuadorian communist 
party was neither a political party nor Ecuadorian. He contended that only three 
political parties existed in Ecuador (the conservatives, liberals, and socialists), 
but unlike the others the communists did not defend the country’s interests but 
rather received orders from Moscow with the objective of destroying the coun-
try and its democratic institutions. Rather than a local party, he denounced the 
PCE as in reality the “Partido Comunista Soviético, Sucursal del Ecuador,” the 
Ecuadorian branch of the Soviet communist party.
Baquero declared that Ecuadorians could never agree with communist tactics, 
particularly given recent events in Hungary where the communist party asked 
for arms and tanks to repress its own people. “We should not and cannot allow 
this in Ecuador,” Baquero declared. He protested that in communist countries 
no freedoms existed for workers, students, or others who were not communists, 
and likewise Ecuador should restrict the actions of communists. Granting the 
party use of the theater would provide it with a level of respectability and legiti-
macy that it did not deserve and with which he was not willing to be complicit.
The socialist Pablo Duque Arias retorted that given Baquero’s political sen-
timents, it was no surprise that he would oppose communist party use of the 
theater. Duque Arias pointed out that the ARNE was not a political party and 
received its marching orders from Madrid, but yet it and other political group-
ings such as the CFP had met in the theater. Duque Arias saw no problem in 
extending the same right to the PCE. Although United States ocials made no 
mention of Duque Arias’s comments, they must have been particularly troubling 
for the embassy as he was a labor leader who was willing to meet with diplomatic 
ocials and had worked to break the CTE free from communist control.32 At 
the same time, later in the year Duque Arias traveled to Leipzig for a WFTU 
congress, so apparently he saw no problem in collaborating with communists 
and perhaps had dried in that direction.33 Similarly, the liberal counselor Jaime 
Mantilla Mata underscored that the council should extend use of its facilities in 
a spirit of liberty, justice, tolerance, and peace. Mantilla Mata asked when the 
PCE had been declared illegal. He argued that all political organizations should 
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have the right to use the theater. The communists made e	ective use of a liberal 
embrace of freedom of expression to advance their political agenda.
Baquero declared that he did not wish to turn this issue into a political de-
bate. He claimed that he did not disagree with the communist party’s right to 
meet; he only opposed their use of the municipal theater that he considered to 
be their own house. While he acknowledged that the PCE had not (yet) been 
declared illegal, neither did it have formal standing and recognition as a regis-
tered political party. He added that communists had “cavernous ideas” that were 
a negation of all democratic principles. If liberals defended them today, Baquero 
charged, tomorrow they would be the 
rst ones hanging from the lampposts 
on Plaza Grande. Mantilla Mata retorted that he supported the liberal party’s 
position. While he rejected any form of totalitarianism, he still supported the 
communist party’s right to meet. Since the municipal theater belonged to the 
people, all parties whether conservative, social Christian, or communist had a 
right to gather there.
The socialist Juan Isaac Lovato observed that all council members agreed that 
the mayor had the right to grant the theater to groups for political meetings, 
and that this should not be a topic of debate. Lovato’s defense of the commu-
nist use of the municipal facilities was perhaps ironic because only a year earlier 
in the hard-fought June 1956 presidential election the PCE had attacked him 
quite personally for excluding the party from the FDN electoral alliance that 
backed the liberal candidate Raúl Clemente Huerta. At the time, the commu-
nists denounced Lovato and other FDN leaders as “insigni
cant,” “voracious,” 
and “greedy” who functioned as “instruments of wealthy economic interests” 
and sought “power for power’s sake, without any concern for the interests and 
the needs of the people.”34 The communists launched this attack even though 
in the past party leaders had collaborated quite closely with Lovato. Or maybe 
they had responded in that fashion because they felt that his refusal to cooperate 
in the electoral campaign was a betrayal of their previous attempts to advance a 
common political agenda. If that were the case, his defense now of the commu-
nists may have simply been a return to the practice of a long-standing tactical 
alliance. Or perhaps Lovato’s support in the municipal council should just be 
taken at face value, and that granting the PCE use of the theater was a simple 
bureaucratic matter of allowing all organizations access to the venue and that 
politics should be le out of such decisions.
In any case, Lovato acknowledged Baquero’s honorable and brilliant defense 
of his position, even if he disagreed with it. With this comment, the discussion 
came to an end and the council voted on Baquero’s resolution to rescind the 
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communist party’s permission to use the theater. Despite Baquero’s complaints, 
aer “an elevated and serene debate” in front of a large audience, the council re-
armed the mayor’s decision. Comandante Miguel Espinosa Páez, who had not 
previously participated in the debate, justi
ed his vote against Baquero’s resolu-
tion with the argument that ideas should be confronted with ideas, and that the 
communists should be allowed to use the theater so that they could be exposed 
for who they were and what they thought. The council’s vice president Wilson 
Córdova Moscosa could not attend the meeting, but he sent a note in which he 
declared that as a liberal he was eminently anticommunist and antifalangist, 
but he also deeply disagreed with denying the communists the right to use the 
facilities. In a telegram to the State Department the following morning, Ambas-
sador Ravndal succinctly summarized the outcome as Baquero being “outvoted 
by liberal socialist majority.”35 Outside of United States ocials, he had gained 
little support for his position.
Having recently arrived from Hungary, Ravndal highlighted Baquero’s con-
tention that the “world has looked with horror on Communist slaughter [of] 
Hungarian children and on how [the] Hungarian Communist Party called in 
Soviet tanks, arms ‘to smash [their] own country.’” The ambassador reiterated 
the conservative council member’s assertion that the permit placed the com-
munists in the category of being a “respectable party.”36 Ravndal complained, 
“One of the [PCE’s] main accomplishments was obtaining the municipal Espejo 
High School theater for the opening session, thereby giving the Party and the 
Congress ocial city recognition and approval.” Although Baquero “vigorously 
sought to have the permit revoked, arguing that the Party was a branch of inter-
national communism,” he could not swing the rest of the council to his position. 
Instead, the ambassador related, “The city council approved a resolution giving 
the theater on the grounds the Party was legal and therefore entitled to it as other 
parties have been.”37 From the ambassador’s perspective, Baquero’s defeat was a 
blow for the diplomatic mission’s anticommunist agenda. Even more distressing 
to the ambassador was a CIA report that the mayor had told the party “you have 
the good wishes of a majority of the council and also my own.” This response 
surprised Ravndal because “in the past the Mayor has not been overly sympa-
thetic to communism but has gone out of his way to be friendly to the American 
Embassy and Americans generally in Quito.”38 He feared that the United States 
was losing its hegemonic control over ideological battles in the region.
The archival record does not mention whether the CIA or embassy sta	 had 
encouraged Baquero or otherwise taken steps to disrupt the party congress. Nor 
is the documentation complete enough to know whether the communists always 
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faced such opposition to their use of public facilities, and whether the United 
States government previously had a hidden hand in such subversions. But in 
this case, there is no mistaking the embassy’s active anticommunist agenda. Just 
as the congress was starting Maurice Bernbaum, who had previously served as 
deputy chief of mission in the Quito Embassy and was currently director of 
Inter-American A	airs at the State Department in Washington (and a future 
ambassador to Ecuador from 1960 to 1965), returned to the country aer an 
absence of seven years.39 In an interview with El Comercio, Bernbaum stated:
As for the Ecuadorian communist party, it is an internal matter of your 
country. In general, I can tell you that world communism is not an ideology 
but it represents a subversive apparatus everywhere. It divides people and 
sows hatred.40
Publicly, Bernbaum articulated the double discourse that typi
ed most diplo-
matic statements: The United States government formally embraced policies of 
nonintervention in the internal a	airs of other countries, but was also unrelent-
ingly opposed to the presence of any communist activities. It was a fundamental 
logical contradiction that liberals in Ecuador understood but that apologists for 
United States imperialism never acknowledged or could justify.
Regardless of the United States government’s position toward communism, 
domestically winds were blowing against the communist party. Ponce’s conser-
vative minister of government Enrique Arroyo Delgado announced his desire to 
outlaw the communist party, particularly in light of what he contended was an 
increase in the ow of international communist leaders and propaganda into the 
country.41 At the same time, Arroyo made what the US Embassy interpreted as 
a contradictory statement regarding communist participation in local elections. 
The minister said that “all parties with a national character are recognized,” 
but the administration would “not recognize those parties that receive instruc-
tions from abroad to the detriment of Ecuadorian sovereignty.” The embassy 
was only “mildly impressed” with the government’s “apparent sincerity and 
earnestness” in pursuing anticommunist measures. According to the embassy, 
“Arroyo’s apparent pussyfooting on the local communist issue may indicate the 
Government has not yet come to a 
rm decision on whether to crack down on 
them, despite repeated indications to this e	ect from various high ocials,” per-
haps a reference to Baquero.42 Typically, “creole” anticommunist statements were 
stronger and more aggressive than those from United States ocials. Obviously, 
despite what diplomatic ocials had stated for public consumption, they wanted 
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Ecuadorian government ocials to take even more strident measures against 
communism than what they were already contemplating.
A month aer the congress, the communist success at gaining access to the 
municipal theater still ate at embassy ocials and they were determined to get 
to the bottom of the issue. A lengthy dispatch summarized information that 
they had already reported and outlined new information diplomats had uncov-
ered. Apparently, the communists had been attempting for quite some time to 
gain access to a municipal building for the congress. Saad persuaded city council 
member and socialist party secretary general Lovato to ask permission for use of 
the Espejo Theater at a special council meeting when he knew Baquero would 
be out of town on business. The embassy characterized Lovato’s maneuver as 
“ramming” the resolution through the council, which was met with Baquero’s 
“angry” denunciation of the action at a subsequent “stormy” session. Baquero 
denounced Andrade Marín as “a political weakling who is afraid of o	ending 
anyone,” whereas others described him as “‘a meathead’ and ‘a muddled liberal’ 
who has never been successful at anything.” Salazar Gómez “thought the action 
was taken primarily to ‘attract attention’ and in e	ect to show that the Coun-
cil majority was not subservient to United States interests and independent 
enough to make its own decision in the matter.” These comments led embassy 
ocials to conclude that the mayor was “not too mature politically and probably 
was led into a trap by Lovato and Saad, veteran political Machiavellis, when 
politically-wise Conservative Baquero was not present to dissuade him.” An-
drade Marín’s willingness to “put into writing a note of good wishes to the com-
munists” further underscored “the Mayor’s political naiveté.” The comments 
of both the conservative Baquero and liberal Salazar Gómez led the embassy 
to recommend that in response the State Department not consider Andrade 
Marín for a leadership grant to visit the United States, and that it has been a 
mistake to invite Central University rector and council member Alfredo Pérez 
Guerrero because of his refusal to kowtow to Salazar Gómez’s anticommunist 
line.43 Salazar Gómez presumed, and perhaps hoped, that Andrade Marín’s ac-
tions would result in his defeat in November’s mayoral election. To his surprise 
and disappointment, the mayor won reelection. The United States Embassy, 
however, pointed to this outcome as a result of “the successful communist in-

ltration of the Quito city Government,” and supposed that his victory would 
mean that the mayor would be further beholden to the socialists and commu-
nists.44 United States ocials did not willingly accept their defeats in Latin 
American elections.
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With the municipal council’s rearmation of its use of the space and despite 
conservative opposition, the communist party congress began as planned on the 
evening of Friday, May 24, traditionally celebrated as Ecuador’s Independence 
Day. In fact, right next to the front-page article in El Comercio that reported the 
municipal council’s decision to allow the party to use the theater appeared an of-

cial proclamation from President Ponce commemorating the 135th anniversary 
of the 1822 battle of Pichincha that secured Ecuador’s separation from Spain.45
Inadvertently, Baquero had drawn more attention to the communist congress 
than it otherwise might have enjoyed.
In a lengthy article, El Comercio reported that the communists had 
lled 
the Espejo Theater when it gathered for its inaugural session.46 In a detailed 
summary of the congress, Ambassador Ravndal noted that around one hun-
dred delegates and four hundred sympathizers from across the country were in 
attendance, in truth a respectable turnout despite his tendency to understate its 
signi
cance.47 Former leader Ricardo Paredes presided over the assembly, pre-
sumably in an e	ort to smooth over divisions in the party aer he had been 
ousted as secretary general in the previous congress.48 Ravndal incorrectly re-
ported that Paredes had been expelled in 1952 (Saad had simply replaced him as 
secretary general), and included a rumor that “he recently gave some $15,000 to 
the Party he had been withholding from [the] sale of a Guayaquil house willed to 
the Party.”49 Current party leaders Pedro Saad and Enrique Gil Gilbert together 
with provincial delegates joined Paredes on the stage. The plenum read notes 
of congratulations that it had received from communist parties in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, and Germany, as well as a message from the CPUSA that crit-
icized the Eisenhower administration for its policies toward Latin America. The 
audience responded to the CPUSA greeting with shouts of “long live the people 
of the United States and down with the imperialists.”50 The assembly voted to 
send a note of acknowledgment to Mayor Andrade Marín as well as the other 
Quito council members for allowing their use of the theater.
As was common in such assemblies, representatives from other sympathetic 
political forces joined the communists in their opening pageantries. Gonzalo 
Oleas addressed the congress in the name of the PSE. Echoing what had long 
been a communist goal, he advocated joining all anticonservative forces into a 
front to restore democratic freedoms. Referring to Baquero’s charge in the mu-
nicipal council the previous evening that communists had “cavernous ideas,” 
the socialist leader countered that “the cavernous are those who are part of the 
falangist fold where they learn to be servile to dictators,” a not-so-subtle jab at 
President Ponce. Oleas declared that free people had the right to meet on any 
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national holiday, whether it was August 10 (Quito’s 
rst declaration of inde-
pendence in 1809), May 24 (the 1822 battle of Pichincha that gained Ecuador 
its independence), or October 9 (Guayaquil’s independence in 1820), to cele-
brate their freedoms. CTE leader Víctor Zúñiga proclaimed a need to unify all 
workers in the country to struggle for the restoration of democracy. Finally, the 
Indigenous leader Tránsito Amaguaña spoke in the name of highland peasants. 
She denounced the indignities to which they had been subjected.
Ravndal summarized these opening comments in a telegram to the State 
Department that largely matched the narrative arch of the standard media cov-
erage. Since inaugural assemblies are staged pageantry designed for maximum 
public relations bene
t, that parallel should not be surprising, particularly since 
El Comercio probably was the source of his information. Ravndal added that 
Oleas had told the congress that despite the fact that the socialists and commu-
nists had “profound di	erences” in their conceptualization of how to transform 
the country socially and politically, they should unite in an anticonservative 
front because the parties shared the “common task” of saving Ecuador from 
pain and misery. Oleas predicted that Ponce’s “fraudulent” government would 
“not last another year against [the] will [of] 4 million Ecuadorans.”51 In a sub-
sequent weekly summary of political developments, Ravndal mischaracterized 
Oleas as a “leist” who “harangued the gathering” even though he came from 
the conservative wing of the socialist party. Ravndal feared that his presence 
underscored “the continued split between moderate and leist Socialists” that 
would strengthen the communists’ hand. The ambassador seemingly confused 
political rhetoric with policy positions. While he noted Zúñiga’s call to unify 
workers “to safeguard democracy,” he completely ignored Amaguaña’s presence. 
Such neglect contributed to writing Indigenous peoples (as well as women and 
people of African descent) out of history.52
Aer these preliminary greetings, party leaders read a resolution that recog-
nized the origins of the party in the May 23, 1926, socialist assembly in Quito. 
That date was also linked to the anniversary of the May 24 battle of Pichincha 
that represented social liberation for the Ecuadorian people. Secretary General 
Saad then read his report that examined the country’s political situation and laid 
out the party’s future goals. He presented an analysis of the Democratic Front’s 
errors in the electoral campaign the previous June that led to Ponce’s victory. His 
report denounced Ponce’s conservative government as representing feudal reac-
tion and declared that the president presented an enormous danger to democracy 
and the country’s sovereignty by bringing it under the subjugation of Yankee im-
perialism. Every day discontent rose along with the cost of living, the communist 
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leader contended. He called for the formation of a “broad, anti-Conservative co-
alition against the Government of oligarchs, reactionaries, and plutocratic trusts, 
supported by imperialism” that won by election fraud.53 Ravndal characterized 
Saad’s comments as “a typical communist-line speech with little or nothing new 
in it,” and his charges of Ponce only winning through electoral fraud as a “thread-
bare argument.” The ambassador was not convinced with the assertion that the 
“ferocious Social-Christian-Conservative rulership” was destroying the coun-
try.54 Despite the ambassador’s reaction, underlying Saad’s radical rhetoric was 
a continued adherence to an evolutionary and parliamentary path to socialism 
that over the next several years would lead a radical le wing to break away from 
the party in search of more militant solutions to Ecuador’s problems.
El Comercio reported that mounted police along with others in motorized 
vehicles surrounded the theater while the communists met inside. A group of 
leist students charged that authorities had arrested them upon leaving the 
theater, although the ocers claimed that those who had been detained were 
released immediately aer providing their declarations.55 Despite the city coun-
cil’s decision to allow the party to occupy the space, the state’s repressive forces 
still engaged in attempts to disrupt the meeting. That fact was an indication 
of the political realities that the communists confronted as they sought to ad-
vance their political agenda. For his part, Ravndal noted that the police had 
briey detained the students “for information” but otherwise he had no dis-
orders to report.56 Aer the 
rst two days of the congress the police withdrew 
their forces. The embassy characterized the public reaction to the congress as 
“complete apathy,” with a religious population more interested in simultaneous 

rst communion pageantry than leist agitation.57 Ravndal reported with some 
apparent relief that “some prominent Communists” including youth leader Jorge 
Arellano Gallegos had boycotted the congress due to “internal bickerings.” The 
ambassador described attendance as “small, unenthusiastic,” and advised that 
even though the congress was scheduled to last through May 28 it might close 
the following day, May 27. Plans that anticommunist students at the Central 
University had to protest the congress failed to materialize. Even so, according to 
Ravndal, the party’s ability to hold the “congress aer [a] year of attempts, par-
ticularly in [the] municipal building, is [a] moral, legal victory for [the] Commu-
nists despite reputed continued split.” He anticipated, however, that these gains 
would be o	set if the meeting 
zzled as he expected. A lack of media attention 
also cheered the embassy.58
In a subsequent summary of the week’s events, the ambassador reiterated his 
impression that the congress was more of a moral victory than a political advance 
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for the communists. Rather than reporting a full auditorium as the press had 
done, Ravndal pointed to the presence of “around one hundred delegates.” This 
was instead of referencing the entire attendance, although later in the same dis-
patch he acknowledged a total number of “some 500 delegates and sympathiz-
ers.” He repeated his previous observations that in terms of press coverage, “The 
Congress su	ered from [a] severe lack of publicity which appeared to be almost a 
boycott by the liberal dailies of Quito and Guayaquil. Only [the] leist Socialist 
La Tierra gave the Congress page 1 play.”59 It was with a sense of relief that he 
reported that aer the original brouhaha over access to the municipal theater 
that the remainder of the congress passed with little attention.
At 5 p.m. on May 26, Ravndal noti
ed the State Department that the congress 
had reportedly met only for half an hour that day “in [a] poorly attended public 
session [at] party headquarters which accomplished little, then hierarchy moved 
[to a] private home for strategy talks.” The newspaper carried little to noth-
ing on the meeting, “possibly because [it] made little news.” Ravndal reported 
that Quito appeared normal with no signs of anticommunist demonstrations, 
which he credited to the extra police presence and a lack of publicity around the 
congress, not to mention general public apathy. “Religious Quito appears more 
interested [in] dozen 
rst communion ceremonies with girls parading [in the] 
streets [with] beautiful communion gowns,” the ambassador concluded.60
In part, Ravndal’s report on press coverage was correct, though he somewhat 
understated its signi
cance. Indeed, El Comercio, the newspaper of record, pub-
lished only two stories on the congress. The 
rst was a lengthy front-page story 
regarding debates in the municipal council over whether to allow the party use 
of its municipal theater. The second the following day reported on the opening 
session of the congress. The ambassador characterized that article as “buried 
in [the] back pages.” True, the story was on page eleven out of an eighteen-page 
edition, but it was lengthy and detailed. Furthermore, El Comercio described the 
theater as packed and gave the impression of an energetic and upliing meeting. 
The ambassador also ignored, or did not understand, that it was not uncom-
mon for the press and broader public to attend opening sessions with all of the 
pageantry before party militants retreated into smaller gatherings for intense 
and private deliberations that were not intended for public consumption. The 
embassy cast the assembly in as negative of terms as possible.
Several days later, Ravndal reported that much to his surprise the PCE was 
still meeting in secret sessions, despite his earlier report that the congress would 
conclude early due to a lack of interest. Obviously, he had underestimated or 
misunderstood the level of the militants’ dedication to their discussions so he 
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had to backtrack on his previous assessment. Now, according to his intelligence, 
the assembly would wrap up on May 31 with the reelection of Saad as secretary 
general. The ambassador noted that there was a complete media blackout on the 
congress, including the socialist newspaper La Tierra that US ocials had re-
peatedly accused of being a communist mouthpiece.61 That newspaper had only 
given the congress any real publicity on the 
rst day of its meetings. The sole 
published editorial on the meeting was also in La Tierra, and that was “some-
what weak” although it labeled the inauguration as “remarkably successful” and 
noted that the “relentless anti-communist campaign” and “tremendous police 
deployment” had not intimidated Saad.62 Without media reports, the embassy 
had no access to reliable information to report to Washington, which indicates 
both the source and limitations of their surveillance operations.
It is therefore curious that only a day later the ambassador submitted a report 
on the party’s “secret strategy sessions.” A subsequent dispatch that summarizes 
the highlights and accomplishments of the congress inadvertently indicates 
that new information from “CAS sources,” or, in other words, CIA inform-
ers provided the intelligence that altered the ambassador’s reporting patterns.63
While earlier Ravndal had denigrated what he considered to be the inaugural 
session’s small size, now the party found its headquarters to be too cramped for 
the forty-seven delegates who participated in the discussions. Despite ongoing 
interparty tensions, the socialist party granted the communists access to their 
headquarters to continue the meetings, except for private discussions that took 
place in individual homes. The ambassador conveyed his concern that commu-
nist use of the socialist headquarters “may indicate that the moderate wing may 
be veering to the le.” Rather than indicating a merging of the parties, the ges-
ture could be better understood as one of collegiality and camaraderie.
The party drew up plans to publish a daily newspaper and a monthly maga-
zine, hopefully with socialist collaboration, in addition to the current weekly El 
Pueblo, which appeared irregularly due to a chronic shortage of funds. Embassy 
personnel had previously expressed apprehension of the potential for a collabora-
tion between the PCE and the CFP, and Ravndal stoked those fears in his report 
with the mention of a delegation representing Carlos Guevara Moreno’s party. 
Ravndal highlighted Saad’s comment that the CFP was “a great group that has 
managed to get along despite the demagoguery of its directors.” Guevara Moreno 
continually denied charges that he was a communist, “and this action therefore 
appears to be playing directly into Ponce’s hands.”64 These discussions foreshad-
owed a momentous change in political attitudes and policies, both for the PCE 
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and the CFP, and one that culminated in the two previously antagonistic forces 
collaborating in an anticonservative alliance in the 1960 elections.
Ravndal agged what he considered to be an interesting aspect of the meet-
ing: “It was reported that throughout the sessions, Communist China repeat-
edly was pointed to as the great example of world communism, particularly on 
land reform, rather than the Soviet Union.”65 CIA analysts in Washington ex-
pressed similar concerns that Latin American communist leaders were turning 
to China as a model for revolution. This was reected in the size of the delega-
tions to the Chinese communist party’s eighth congress in September 1956. The 
CIA pointed to Saad’s attendance at that congress as possibly having “inspired 
the laudatory discussions on China.” Delegates at the Quito congress “report-
edly praised Communist China rather than the USSR as an example for world 
Communism, making speci
c reference to land reform—a socio-economic 
problem in Ecuador which the PCE attempts to exploit in its domestic political 
program.”66 Party leaders faced growing discontent with an adherence to a rel-
atively moderate political line, and mounting pressure to move in more radical 
directions.
Among the actions taken in the PCE meeting, “the Congress tightened 
party discipline, suppressed internal critics who have long badgered the party 
ranks and punished two of its severest critics: Nela Martínez, suspended for six 
months; and Primitivo Barreto, expelled.” Martínez was once again removed 
from the party at its next congress in 1963, although the historian Tatiana 
Salazar Cortez states she had never rejoined aer her 
rst expulsion.67 In her 
autobiography, Martínez simply states, “Although I ocially suspended my 
communist militancy, in the 
ies and sixties I was still immersed in strong 
feminist activism.”68 Martínez always represented the le wing of the party, and 
repeatedly tangled with the current leadership’s more moderate and conciliatory 
attitudes. She subsequently became sympathetic to, and closely associated with, 
the Cuban Revolution.
Ravndal concluded his report on the congress with a con
dential comment 
that the party’s “success in 
nally holding the Congress, particularly in a munic-
ipal building, is considered a moral and legal victory for the party.” He observed 
that Saad and other party leaders were “elated over ‘the great success,’” and ac-
knowledged that they had “a point, in so far as the Party apparently overcame 
its internal troubles, tightened party discipline, moved closer to the Socialists 
with an opening wedge for further in
ltration through the projected newspaper 
and magazine and increased party morale with these ambitious plans.” Overall, 
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Ravndal concluded, “the Congress was successful and will undoubtedly help 
reinvigorate the Party.”69 That outcome, of course, was not in the best interests 
of the United States.
Four months aer the congress and toward the end of 1957, the embassy con-
ducted a thorough survey of the party and came to a somewhat di	erent con-
clusion than what Ravndal had earlier stated. Now, the embassy described the 
PCE as “weaker at the present time than at any period in recent years, although 
its potential always is present to a greater or lesser degree in poverty-ridden, still 
largely feudal Ecuador, with its predominant but downtrodden Indian popu-
lation.” In large part, that assessment was due to viewing the party through an 
electoral lens rather than as a social movement force. The CIA estimated party 
strength at one thousand (down from the 
ve thousand that it had regularly re-
ported earlier in the decade) along with three thousand sympathizers. The party 
could count on eight thousand votes, but out of a total voting population of six 
hundred thousand this was insigni
cant. CIA and embassy sources attributed 
the decline to internal splinters in the party, dissatisfaction with Saad’s intel-
lectual leadership that ignored the party’s working-class base, a chronic lack of 
funds, confusion over what party to support in elections, the failure of a general 
strike, the ouster of Czech diplomats who provided the party with international 
connections, and a loss of support from Indigenous communities. Furthermore, 
communist inuence in the Casa de la Cultura declined, and divisions in the 
labor federation CTE and student federation FEUE undermined the party’s 
strength. Intriguingly, the survey pointed primarily to domestic rather than 
international factors such as the revelations that emerged out of the twentieth 
congress of the CPSU that were echoing throughout the communist world to 
explain the party’s current situation. The embassy concluded, “The Party as such 
is too small and ine	ective to pose any threat to the stability of Ecuador but it 
must always be regarded as a potential threat to stability through its capability 
to in
ltrate and exploit other political parties or to exploit strikes and disor-
ders.”70 Despite public attempts to exaggerate communist threats, internal and 
more careful assessments painted a quite di	erent picture. It would appear that 
anticommunist paranoia and fears were largely misplaced.
Socialist Congress
Both United States ocials and the mainstream press gave more and better 
coverage to a regional socialist congress held in Riobamba May 25–26 that met 
at the same time as the PCE congress. Delegates attended the congress from the 
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central highland provinces of Bolívar, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo, and Tungura-
hua. The party’s secretary general Juan Isaac Lovato as well as other members 
of the national executive board from Quito along with representatives from 
youth groups, students, workers, and women’s groups also participated. The 
purpose of the congress was to discuss the current political situation and to 
study laws that the conservative Ponce government was seeking to implement, 
particularly those related to labor. A goal was to build a united anticonservative 
front, a continuously contentious and dicult goal for the le.71 As had always 
been the case, socialist party goals were not that di	erent from those of the 
communists.
The socialist assembly’s inaugural session on May 25 received greetings from 
various individuals and groups, including, as the United States Embassy was 
keen to point out, from the communist congress that was meeting at the same 
time.72 Raúl Clemente Huerta, the losing Democratic Front presidential can-
didate in the previous June election, also sent his regards. He said he could not 
attend but wished the assembly success. The congress approved a series of resolu-
tions, including applauding the country’s democratic and progressive media that 
contributed to the betterment of the working class. The assembly appealed for 
the creation of an anticonservative front for participation in the November 1957 
municipal and provincial elections, and recommended holding future regional 
party conferences to advance its struggle. In this spirit, the assembly passed a 
resolution to continue the party’s “relentless and belligerent opposition to the 
Government of Camilo Ponce.” Finally, the evening concluded with a celebra-
tion to recognize and celebrate Lovato for his work on behalf of the party, as well 
as the labors of Gonzalo Oleas and José Jaramillo.73
The two meetings did not operate in isolation from each other. The socialist 
assembly received a fraternal message from the communist congress, which led 
Walter Dustmann at the US Embassy to express concern that the communists 
might be planning “to continue their prior e	orts to in
ltrate and dominate the 
Socialist Party, already divided into moderate and leist factions.” Dustmann 
worried that this in
ltration may be succeeding, as evidenced by Lovato’s collab-
oration with Saad to gain access to the Espejo Theater for the opening assembly 
of the communist party congress.74 On the other hand, while both parties called 
for a united front against the government, both wanted to provide leadership 
and neither wanted to play second 
ddle, which inevitably and ultimately hurt 
their e	orts at collaboration.75 These internal divisions were as much of a barrier 
to their success as were anticommunist policies, whether they originated inside 
or outside the country.
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Communist Party Platform
What was missing in both the mainstream media reporting on the Ecuadorian 
party congress as well as the United States intelligence investigations was a dis-
cussion of the substance of the communist party’s platform. When the central 
committee announced plans for the sixth congress half a year earlier, it pub-
lished a dra program in El Pueblo.76 The party followed this publication with a 
thirty-two-page pamphlet containing the same lengthy, detailed program with 
a note highlighting two small but signi
cant corrections to the text that it had 
published in its party newspaper. First, the party blamed what it claimed to be a 
“printing error” that the version in El Pueblo “appears as approved by the party 
congress when it is nothing but a PROPOSAL.” The central committee empha-
sized that this was a dra, and they sought feedback on it before presenting a 
revised version for 
nal approval. Second, toward the end of the document they 
had omitted a key phrase “under the leadership of the working class in close 
alliance with the peasantry” when referencing the formation of their proposed 
Great Democratic Front of National Liberation that would group “all Ecua-
dorian patriots, all of us who su	er today under the rule of foreign monopolies 
and large feudal landowners.”77 The party leadership wished to underscore that 
workers and peasants remained at the heart of their political project, rather than 
it being guided by an urban intellectual vanguard. We may never know whether 
these were honest mistakes, or “corrections” that resulted from internal push-
back against Saad’s command of the party.
A common assumption that United States government ocials held and that 
most cold war historians subsequently shared was that these party documents 
were imposed from above and outside to serve Soviet aims that were divorced 
from local realities. Strict Stalinist control would leave no room for debate or dis-
sension, and those who dared question the party line faced a threat of expulsion 
(or worse). A new generation of scholars have challenged these interpretations. 
While the party sought to present a uni
ed public face, internally more room 
for discussion existed than critics have wished to acknowledge. Intense debates 
at party congresses demonstrates that, and the draing of this program provides 
another case in point. Several weeks before the party congress, Indigenous lead-
ers met at party headquarters and proposed various changes to the proposed pro-
gram. Some of their suggestions were rather cosmetic, such as adding references 
to Indigenous peoples in a discussion of the feudal exploitation of the peasantry. 
What is noteworthy, however, is their proposal to add a new section on social 
classes with a special mention of “Ecuadorian Indians who occupy a special place 
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within the peasant masses.” Their statement asserts that “this Indian mass un-
questionably has a series of national elements, a language, Kichwa and other 
autochthonous tongues, a tradition, their own cultural manifestations.” They 
were denied education in their own language, and the right to vote through the 
imposition of literacy restrictions. These small changes added up to altering a 
document from one that minimized the importance of Indigenous struggles to 
one that made an Indigenous consciousness central to the communist struggle. 
If previously communists had inuenced Indigenous discourse, now the reverse 
was true with Indigenous activists shaping a leist agenda.78
The party congress approved the revised text appropriately titled “Democ-
racy, Independence and Peace for the People of Ecuador.”79 Unlike the electoral 
platform that the party had draed a year earlier in the run-up to the June 1956 
elections that was quite moderate in tone, this document is radical and militant, 
both in terms of its rhetoric and political analysis as well as its speci
c policy 
proposals. The contrast may have been due to a di	erence in audience, with an 
electoral platform facing outward in an attempt to convince others to join them 
in a popular front campaign while this document was designed to solidify inter-
nal cohesion among already committed militants. It may also be an early sign of 
the strengthening of radical tendencies in the party.
The party platform begins with a description of Ecuadorians’ dicult lives 
that were full of su	ering, insecurity, and uncertainties. The party asked why 
people confronted so many problems if Ecuador was a rich country with many 
possibilities for developing its wealth in a way that would dramatically bene
t 
the entire population. As a “party that examines the national reality in light of 
the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism,” the statement read, “we believe that if we 
proceed with a realistic analysis of Ecuador’s characteristics, the forces that drive 
its development and those that halt it, we can reach conclusions that will serve 
to modify the face and life of the country and allow future transformations that 
lead to the complete liberation of the people.” Rather than describing short-term 
goals that included intermediary steps of embracing a nationalist bourgeois rev-
olution, it mapped out larger and longer-term objectives of a communist revolu-
tion with a sense of how to achieve them.
The document then followed with a series of key points to address the dif-

cult issues that the country currently faced. First was the problem that only a 
small privileged minority of the population bene
ted from the country’s eco-
nomic growth. In fact, from 1950 to 1954, the working class’s share of national 
income had dropped from 49 to 47 percent even as the size of the working class 
had grown. Workers earned insucient and shrinking salaries. Peasants and 
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Indigenous peoples su	ered under subhuman living conditions. Unemployment 
was high, housing was inadequate, and infant mortality rates were among the 
highest in the world, while at the same time oligarchs, feudal landowners, and 
foreign businesses took the lion’s share of the country’s wealth. In a common 
refrain, the statement declared, “We are facing a situation that is making the rich 
richer while the poor get poorer and poorer.” Under the current conservative 
political regime, the country was sliding backward rather than moving forward.
That 
rst point set the tone for the entire document. From there it moved on 
to a critique of how feudal landowners had underdeveloped the entire country, 
with the peasant and Indigenous masses subjected to barbarous exploitation. 
In addition to this semifeudal situation, the United States colonized Ecuador 
through its large capitalist monopolies such as the United Fruit Company and 
Standard Oil. International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies bene
ted United 
States companies to the detriment of those based in Latin America. That im-
perial intervention extended to education and training programs, as well as at-
tempts to intervene in labor and student organizations such as the CTE and the 
FEUE, with the intent to destroy their unity and strength. All of these factors 
limited democracy, with half of the population excluded from voting because 
they were not literate. Women and young people did not enjoy equal rights. 
Despite these problems, the Latin American masses, the statement proclaimed, 
were rising up against imperial domination in a struggle for national sovereignty 
and independence. On one side were the wealthy landowners and bourgeois oli-
garchy allied with imperial forces that sought to defend their privileges as they 
handed the country over to the Yankees, and on the other side were the workers, 
peasants, and poor people who had not sold their souls to imperialism. It was 
clear on which side the communist party stood.
The party recounted the country’s recent history that led to Ponce’s current 
conservative government. Plaza represented landowners and bourgeois sectors, 
and even though he appeared to respect formal democracy, he ruled in favor of 
Yankee imperialism. Popular discontent with his government led to the election 
of the demagogue Velasco Ibarra who allied with feudal sectors of the conser-
vative party. While the 1956 election should have opened a path to a progressive 
democracy, the most reactionary sectors of the country took control with Ponce. 
Instead, the PCE advocated for the establishment of a democratic coalition gov-
ernment comprised of workers, peasants, and members of the middle class who 
had not sold out to imperialism. The working class in alliance with peasants 
would take a leading role in the formation of this new administration that would 
guide the country forward.
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The party declared that it did not hide its position in a global communist 
movement. The scienti
c doctrine of Marxism-Leninism guided its actions, and 
its 
nal goal was the establishment of a communist society. In such a world, 
workers would control the means of production and distribution, which would 
eliminate “the exploitation of man by man.” Wars would disappear, and com-
plete equality would emerge without special privileges for anyone. The party 
fought for socialism, the 
rst stage on the path to communism comparable to 
that which had already been achieved in the Soviet Union where class exploita-
tion and slavery had disappeared. The party acknowledged that these triumphs 
would not be immediate but required a lengthy historical process. Here the 
statement turned back to an orthodox interpretation of how that goal might 
be achieved. The 
rst step was the establishment of a democratic coalition gov-
ernment that would 
ght for national independence. To lay out concretely what 
such an administration would look like, the party o	ered a summary of the 
rather moderate electoral platform that it had presented a year earlier. Broadly, 
this program called for democracy, agrarian reform, economic policies that 
would develop the country, improvements in living conditions, advances in 
education and culture, and an independent foreign policy. The party expressed 
con
dence that this program would bene
t the great majority of the country’s 
population and lead to a free, sovereign, and prosperous country.
Throughout the country’s entire history, the Ecuadorian people had been 

ghting tirelessly for democracy and independence, and the party argued that 
this program was achievable. The PCE placed itself at the head of this struggle. 
It acknowledged that the battle would be dicult, because the wealthy would 
never give up their privileges willingly. As the famed abolitionist Frederick Dou-
glass had observed in the United States, “Power concedes nothing without a de-
mand. It never has and it never will.”80 But struggling together men and women 
could achieve these gains, and their future depended on doing so.
A quarter century later, the communist militant Elías Muñoz Vicuña re-
ected fondly on this statement as representing a key step in the progression of 
the Ecuadorian communist party. Muñoz asserted that as part of a democratic 
struggle, the PCE played an “outstanding role in the organization of workers, 
peasants, teachers, artisans, and professionals.” A key point of the document 
was its identi
cation of “imperialism as the primary enemy and the national 
liberation front as the instrument of victory.” According to Muñoz, it was “a 

rst-class historical document for the development of Ecuadorian democracy.”81
For the historian Hernán Ibarra, the proclamation reected Saad’s inuence on 
the party. Similar to Muñoz, Ibarra highlights its emphasis on the imperialist 
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penetration of Ecuador, but also ties its analysis to the lingering negative e	ects 
of domestic feudalism that drug the economy down. Local oligarchs were com-
plicit with this foreign imperial penetration. The solution required the uni
ca-
tion of a working-class struggle with that of the peasantry, the middle classes, 
and a progressive bourgeoisie. Together, they would carry out a democratic trans-
formation that would lead to social and national liberation. As an indication 
of the importance that Ibarra places on this statement, it is the only document 
from a sixteen-year period between 1944 and 1960 that he included in his mas-
sive compilation of Ecuadorian communist thought.82
The 1957 PCE platform contributed to an accelerated growth in communist, 
and more broadly leist, activity in Ecuador. Beginning in 1958, social move-
ments gained more visibility and their strength only grew in 1959. No longer 
were conicts con
ned to local areas, and as they increased in size they inu-
enced public opinion. The importance and resilience of rural mobilizations from 
1959 to 1963 eventually forced promulgation of agrarian reform legislation.83 It 
was in this context that defense minister Alfonso Calderón Moreno asked the 
United States Embassy for assistance in training his ocers in counterintelli-
gence activities. He claimed to be no alarmist, but stated that he was completely 
convinced that Ecuador had become a prime communist target in Latin Amer-
ica.84 Such comments only fed CIA fears as well as those of other United States 
government ocials that they were losing an ideological battle as the entire re-
gion tilted leward.
Surveillance documents indicate the direction that the le was taking, not 
only in Ecuador but also across Latin America and throughout the world. 
Rather than moderating their demands, a militant wing pushed the PCE to take 
ever more radical action. These actions laid the groundwork for the emergence 
of a more combative and aggressive le in the 1960s. External events provide 
a broader context necessary to understand those advances and contribute to a 
proper appreciation of internal developments. At the same time, that “new” le 
did not emerge out of a vacuum or only as a result of the Cuban Revolution, 
but built on a longer trajectory of sustained domestic grassroots organizing that 




O n January 1, 1959, Cuba’s authoritarian leader Fulgencio Batista ed into exile with a personal fortune of more than $300 million USD that he had amassed through years of corrupt dealings. e Argentine 
guerrilla leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara had just defeated Batista’s military forces 
at the battle of Santa Clara, signaling the end of the regime. Guevara was part 
of Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement that had landed insurgent forces in the 
eastern Sierra Maestra Mountains two years earlier. A week aer the battle of 
Santa Clara, the rebel army rolled victoriously into the capital city of Havana to 
the cheers and open embrace of the general public. e guerrillas occupied key 
military posts and called for a general strike to put down any remaining sup-
port for the dictatorship. eir new government quickly implemented policies 
to transform society, including an agrarian reform law, a literacy campaign, and 
the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses with the goal of creating a more 
equal and just distribution of resources.
Symbolically, 1959 and the Cuban Revolution represent a turning point in 
Latin America. The triumph of revolutionary forces in Cuba is arguably one of 
the most signicant political events of the twentieth century. If insurgent forces 
could remove an entrenched pro-United States military dictatorship just o the 
shores of Miami, then leists surely would be able to do likewise anywhere in the 
world. To aid in this endeavor, Guevara penned a how-to manual called Guer-
rilla Warfare that described how you too could overthrow your government. All 
it would take is a dedicated cadre of revolutionaries to trigger a mass insurrection 
that would lead to a fundamental transformation of society.1 The entire world 
appeared to be on the cusp of revolutionary change.
The Cuban example inspired leists across the hemisphere to engage in sim-
ilar guerrilla campaigns against established administrations in their countries.2
Disillusioned with a gradual, peaceful road to socialism that orthodox commu-
nist parties had long backed, a new and younger generation of activists advo-
cated for more immediate and direct action to achieve what the Cubans had 
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just realized. This wave of revolutionary activity has drawn signicant public 
and academic attention to what has come to be known as the “global sixties.” 
Not only in Latin America but also around the world workers, students, and 
others took to the streets and the mountains with the ambition of realizing a 
new and dierent world. Both those mobilizations and the predictable con-
servative, cold war, anticommunist reactions against them have led to a sizable 
literature.
Despite heightened hopes and aspirations, none of the attempts to emulate 
the Cuban Revolution through a violent uprising proved to be immediately suc-
cessful. Exiles returned to their home countries only to be crushed by superior 
military forces. In perhaps the most high-prole debacle, a guerrilla force that 
Guevara led into Bolivia with the vision of turning the Andean Mountains into 
the Sierra Maestra of South America failed to gain traction with the local popu-
lation. Instead, in October 1967 US-trained counterinsurgency troops captured 
and executed Guevara. Other guerrilla leaders had met failure and death before 
him, but Guevara’s defeat called into question the entire Cuban model of shoot-
ing one’s way into power.
Three years later, Salvador Allende won election in Chile, the rst Marxist to 
gain the presidency through peaceful, democratic means—precisely the model 
that revolutionaries had rejected in following the Cuban example. That achieve-
ment together with the failure of a sequence of guerrilla insurgencies led activists 
and scholars to ponder whether they had fundamentally misunderstood what 
had brought about the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Castro had led his 
troops in a seemingly rapid and unexpected ascension to power. But what that 
presupposition ignores are the decades of organizing that had laid the ground-
work for the triumph, much as a long history of labor movements precipitated 
Allende’s election a decade later.3 Armed insurrections naturally incite emotions 
and draw attention, but ultimately the specic path to success—whether armed, 
electoral, or a general strike—was less signicant than that victory itself. And 
such victories were only the result of long and dicult struggles.
All of these larger issues of how best to gain that elusive triumph for the le 
that were playing out across Latin America—and, indeed, around the world—
were at work in Ecuador. The triumph of the Cuban Revolution succinctly 
placed the contrast between orthodox Marxist assumptions that Latin America 
did not yet possess the objective economic conditions for a transition to social-
ism and much more militant aspirations for immediate revolutionary action into 
dramatic relief. As elsewhere, these tensions that had long underlay internal de-
bates within communist parties now spilled out on the open stage for all to see.
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The social protest and violent governmental repression of radical desires that 
swept across Ecuador in 1959 represented the end of an unusual period of insti-
tutional stability that had reigned since Galo Plaza Lasso’s inauguration as pres-
ident in 1948. A full exploration of the transformative importance of that one 
year could probably and usefully ll an entire book. Highlighting only a couple 
of key points illustrates and summarizes how the 1950s laid the groundwork for 
the transformative decade that was to follow. As long-term surveillance of the 
PCE makes readily apparent, those heightened levels of protest did not emerge 
out of a vacuum.
Eleventh Inter-American Conference
1959 was as active and dynamic in Ecuador as anywhere in the hemisphere, and 
as elsewhere the shockwaves emanating out from Cuba could most denitely 
be felt. The year began with a bang on January 7 with a police massacre of ve 
Otavalos and the injuring of others and the damaging and looting of several 
homes at Lago San Pablo in the northern Imbabura Province. Rural community 
members at Pucará Bajo de Velásquez had been protesting plans to build a tour-
ist hotel and casino on their land in preparation for the eleventh Inter-American 
Conference of American states planned for Quito the following year. Víctor 
Alejandro Jaramillo, a conservative senator to the federal congress and the pres-
ident of the city of Otavalo’s municipal council that intended to build the hotel, 
justied the bloody repression. He and other members of the white ruling class 
wanted to pursue the project as a mechanism to encourage tourism and create 
jobs. Others, including activists with the FTP and lawyers for the CTE, came 
to the community’s defense, and demanded the dismissal of ocials who were 
responsible for the massacre.4
The tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela in 1954 had 
named Quito as the site for the eleventh conference. Preparations began slowly, 
and by 1959 they were in full swing. For the Ecuadorian government, it was to be 
an opportunity to let the country shine. The government received a $2.5 million 
loan from the Export-Import Bank to build new airport terminals in Quito 
and Guayaquil, a new hotel (the Quito Hotel) to house the delegates, a new 
building (subsequently used as the legislative palace) to host the sessions, and 
for the installation of radio and other equipment. Even the government palace 
and ministry of foreign aairs buildings underwent extensive renovation. All 
of these projects were intended to present the image of a modern and devel-
oped country. The extensive construction faced repeated delays, and ultimately 
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the conference was never held. The planned conclave encountered many other 
problems that contributed to its breakdown, including ongoing border tensions 
with neighboring Peru that led to that country’s withdrawal from the meeting.5
The failure of the Quito conference was due in part to the success of leist 
organizing against its imperialist trajectory. The ninth conference in Bogotá, 
Colombia in 1948 had seen the birth of the OAS as well as a pledge by member 
states to ght communism in the Western Hemisphere. The tenth conference 
at Caracas six years later armed and extended that declaration, particularly 
as it targeted the progressive Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala. Com-
munists denounced the conference as only serving “U.S. imperialist aims in the 
struggle against the democratic movement.” The communist party in neighbor-
ing Colombia launched a campaign to highlight the exploitative nature of the 
eleventh conference, and at the same time called on the meeting to “speak out in 
favor of world peace, disarmament and against the nuclear weapon tests.” The 
Colombian party welcomed opposition to the conference as marking “another 
step in the growing resistance of the Latin American peoples to North Ameri-
can imperialism.”6 Opponents mobilized grassroots resistance against a meeting 
that would only benet the ruling class and their imperial masters to the harm 
of the workers.
Both government ocials and media outlets responded to opposition to the 
conference with fear and trepidation. The New York Times published a report 
that the PCE was “preparing a campaign to discredit and if possible disrupt 
the conference.” The paper claimed that it had access to “a secret resolution of 
the party’s Central Committee” that detailed plans to attack the meeting. The 
campaign against the conference was “one of the top current Communist objec-
tives in the hemisphere.” That goal was “accompanied by increased Communist 
activities in Ecuador in recent months,” including “a clandestine but substantial 
ow of Communist propaganda into the country.” Weapons and “four Cuban 
Communist leaders” had also arrived. In light of these developments, Presi-
dent Camilo Ponce Enríquez charged that Ecuador had become “one of com-
munism’s prime targets in South America.”7 His administration pleaded with 
United States government ocials for aid to confront this menace.
This New York Times article should be immediately seen for the exagger-
ations, paranoia, and scaremongering that it represented. To be sure, “Cuban 
Communist leaders” had indeed visited Ecuador. In fact, their arrival in Quito 
on February 25 received extensive media coverage, including on the front page 
of El Comercio. The New York Times even reported on their visit. The “bearded 
revolutionaries” were in the midst of a tour of the Americas, not to overthrow 
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other regimes but to communicate the truths about the programs their new 
government planned to implement.8 The United States government responded 
to this diplomatic initiative with a psychological disinformation campaign that 
included the distribution of materials to the Ecuadorian government designed 
to undermine the communist stance with explicit encouragement to confront 
opposition to the Inter-American Conference.9 Theoretically, United States dip-
lomats claimed adherence to the tenets of nonintervention, though how these 
ideas played out in practice could be quite at odds with those declarations.
Despite its overt propagandistic intent, or perhaps because of it, El Comercio 
in Quito and El Telégrafo in Guayaquil translated and republished the New York 
Times article on the alleged communist plot to sabotage the Inter-American 
Conference.10 The publication led to a ery retort from the PCE, asserting that 
the media did not need to resort to hidden conspiracies because their position 
on the conference was not a secret. Their “rm and tenacious political line of 
opposition to imperialist aggression of which the inter-American conferences 
were a part” was public and well known. Instead, the party favored policies that 
would lead to world peace, disarmament, and the suspension of nuclear tests. It 
also denounced military pacts, defended the sovereignty of Ecuador and other 
Latin American countries, opposed the anticommunist declarations from the 
last Inter-American Conference that propped up right-wing military dictator-
ships, and condemned the United States for plundering the wealth from Latin 
America. More than anything, the party called on the eleventh conference to 
revise the 1942 Rio Protocol and return the land that had been taken away from 
Ecuador. Expanding out from this overtly nationalistic position, the PCE pro-
ceeded to denounce the imperialist penetration of Latin America and those 
members of the domestic ruling class who collaborated with these endeavors. 
The party denied that it had received any weapons, and declared that the only 
arms that owed to Latin America were the ones that the United States sent 
to local governments. The statement joked that the communists did not need 
to discredit the Inter-American Conferences because the organizers discredited 
themselves with policies that led in Bogotá in 1948 to the assassination of the 
progressive populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and the resulting violence of the 
conservative administration in Colombia, and in Caracas in 1954 to the over-
throw of Arbenz’s democratic government in Guatemala. From this pattern, the 
PCE extrapolated that the intent of the Quito conference was to bring down 
the Cuban Revolution, and communist activists promised to stand rm against 
such ventures. Rather than a conference in which dictators such as Luis Somoza 
from Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo from the Dominican Republic, and Alfredo 
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Stroessner from Paraguay attended, they called for an open and democratic en-
counter of workers, students, and intellectuals that represented freedom and 
independence.11
Communist assertions of innocence did not receive much public attention, 
particularly in the context of rising anticommunist sentiments and cold war 
fears that made the media susceptible to propaganda. In fact, the New York 
Times repeatedly returned to its conspiratorial reporting. The following year, 
the paper once again detailed the assertions of diplomatic and intelligence 
sources that Cuba and Ecuador were developing closer ties intended to undo 
hemisphere solidarity. United States government ocials fanned these anticom-
munist sentiments. Once again, they claimed to have intercepted communist 
party documents indicating plans for “major violence at the conference in order 
to discredit the inter-American system.”12 Ecuador’s ambassador to the United 
States José Ricardo Chiriboga Villagómez pressed similar issues with the State 
Department. In one meeting he asserted that Ponce was “extremely concerned 
over the Communist situation and the possibility that the Communists might 
take action to interfere with the Inter-American Conference.” Chiriboga Vil-
lagómez claimed that the Ecuadorian government was not equipped to confront 
the communist challenge, and exploited this perceived weakness as an excuse 
to request assistance from the United States—a common ruse that diplomats 
employed.13 Similar charges of communist plans to disrupt the meeting of for-
eign ministers had been raised fourteen years earlier in Bogotá. Then as now, 
the accusations of communists organizing riots fed fear and an anticommunist 
narrative rather than reecting political realities. Leists indeed opposed the 
meeting and planned to use their opposition to it to advance their agenda, but 
as had been the case for the previous decade they had no intentions of resorting 
to violence to achieve their political goals.
Political strife in Ecuador continued at a similar pace for the rest of the year. 
In February, one thousand dockworkers went on strike in Guayaquil to protest 
the ring of eight union leaders. That industrial action brought commerce to a 
standstill in the port, which led Ponce’s government to declare the strike ille-
gal and to send in military troops. Workers in other industries responded with 
sympathy strikes, and the demonstrations spread as far as the law school at the 
Central University in Quito under the leadership of future president Rodrigo 
Borja. In what by now had become a common trope, Ponce charged that com-
munists had instigated the strike to sabotage the upcoming conference of Amer-
ican states.14 United States ocials in Guayaquil responded positively to the 
president’s “prompt and drastic measures against communist leaders.” According 
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to consul general William Moreland, this action represented “an entirely new 
chapter in the current administration.” Until this point, communists had “be-
come increasingly brazen and proud of being communists,” and the administra-
tion’s action “undoubtedly have lost to the Ecuadoran communists a tremendous 
amount of prestige.” The consul anticipated that the repression would make it 
more dicult for the communists to mobilize their forces.15
At the same time that dockworkers faced repression on the coast, Indigenous 
workers on the Chaupi hacienda in Pesillo in the northern highlands success-
fully convinced the labor inspector to address their concerns of low salaries, mis-
treatment, and abuses.16 Ponce accused the communists of “under the pretext of 
raising the Indians’ condition, abusing their ignorance and turning them into 
cannon fodder.” Ecuador, he claimed, had become “one of communism’s prime 
targets in South America.”17 Since he did not believe Indigenous peoples could 
struggle for themselves, their demonstrations must be the result of “actions in-
stigated by ‘expert communist agitators.’”18 Both CIA ocials as well as their 
counterparts in Latin America were unable or unwilling to recognize that peo-
ple were capable of organizing themselves to improve their own lives without the 
intervention of “outside” agents. What Ponce and the CIA faced and feared were 
these heightened levels of mobilization that echoed across the country.
June Protests
At the end of May, military conscripts at Portoviejo mutinied against their abu-
sive commanding ocer, Captain Galo Quevedo. One of the conscripts, José 
García Macías, committed suicide aer attempting to assassinate Quevedo. In 
reaction to his death, the other draees proceeded to lynch Quevedo and to-
gether with local civilians attacked the army garrison. Five people, including 
two students, were killed and y wounded in the exchange of gunre.19 Para-
troopers from Quito arrived to put down the mutiny, but rather than quelling 
the unrest the revolt spread. On June 2, police broke up a student demonstration 
held in solidarity with the Portoviejo conscripts at the Vicente Rocafuerte High 
School in Guayaquil, killing six people in the process. Ponce imposed martial 
law, a twenty-four-hour curfew, press censorship, and sent in the army to restore 
order. The following day, the inhabitants of Guayaquil’s poor neighborhoods 
joined the protests by burning and looting stores, resulting in the deaths of 
twenty-ve more.20 The government responded to the vandalism and robber-
ies with indiscriminate violence, including issuing orders to shoot to kill at the 
masses. By the end, at least thirty-seven people were dead, 150 wounded, and 
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ve hundred more held for questioning, although the numbers may have been 
much higher.21
The protests at Portoviejo and Guayaquil came in the context of growing 
student unrest. In May, demonstrations shut down three high schools in Loja, 
Machala, and Guayaquil. The US Embassy monitored those developments and 
reported that the Loja situation was “potentially dangerous” because commu-
nists were active in the school system and strove to take advantage of legitimate 
grievances to advance their own political agenda. “Although strikes are rarely 
instigated by Communists,” the embassy commented, “they usually leap into 
[the] conict for [their] own purposes.”22 These troubles were unlikely to end 
any time soon. The level of repression the government used to put down the 
protests only caused them to spread. In Quito, university students marched on 
the presidential palace to demand Ponce’s resignation although the absence of 
their leaders in Loja for a FEUE convention limited the success of their demon-
stration. The CTE also announced plans for a general strike in sympathy with 
labor leader Segundo Ramos who had been imprisoned in Guayaquil.23
Despite a lack of any factual evidence, Ponce immediately blamed commu-
nists for the unrest and proceeded to implement draconian anticommunist and 
antilabor policies. The president claimed that he needed to act to defend the 
republic from “foreign Communist aggression.” In order to justify his action, 
he released two documents, one from a plenary meeting of the PCE in Guaya-
quil in December 1958 and a second from the Pichincha provincial committee 
of the PCE from April 1959. The documents called for a concerted campaign 
against the forthcoming Inter-American Conference, which was already the 
party’s public stance and therefore no great news.24 Even so, it is dicult to 
know whether these were fabricated or planted documents. The senior clandes-
tine services ocer Harry Rositzke describes the CIA’s operations in Ecuador 
as “typical” for the agency, including inltrating the communist party, work-
ing with diplomatic ocials, supporting the propaganda eorts of the USIA, 
and assisting the USAID with its training and equipping of police and military 
forces—all with the goal of countering the growth of the le.25 Philip Agee de-
scribes disinformation campaigns that deployed such tactics in his book Inside 
the Company, but he did not arrive in Ecuador until December of the following 
year and so does not discuss these specic events. But United States Embassy 
personnel present at the time recount providing the press secretary in the presi-
dent’s oce—the same source for these items—with communist party material, 
and that might have been their provenance.26 In any case, the party made no 
secret of its political platform and as such these documents were not necessarily 
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out of line with what it publicly advocated. The way the presidency released the 
documents, however, indicates a blatant attempt to instigate anticommunist 
sentiments.
Ponce’s government charged that communist agitators as well as CFP leaders 
had encouraged the demonstrations in Portoviejo and Guayaquil, an accusation 
that State Department analysts willingly echoed, even as military ocials ac-
knowledged that the unrest was not political in nature. Nevertheless, once again 
Ponce contended that communists had smuggled weapons into the country 
and were following a prepared plan to force cancellation of the Inter-American 
Conference and to overthrow the government, even though that had never been 
their modus operandi. The president declared that his actions were necessary 
“to save the republic from anarchy and aggression.” The PCE responded with 
a statement denouncing the government’s “criminal repression” and calling for 
“a great front of popular and democratic unity to prevent dictatorship.”27 As 
had been the case across the 1950s, their rhetoric was radical but returning yet 
again to the formation of a broad electoral front was a moderate solution that 
did little to assuage the demands of a militant membership that desired more 
transformative policies.
In the midst of this political discord, Ecuador’s ambassador Chiriboga Vil-
lagómez once again met with State Department ocials in Washington. Chiri-
boga Villagómez immediately blamed the communists for the disturbances and 
claimed that they were part of their “known plans for disrupting the Quito 
Conference.” The ambassador exploited the protests and their alleged commu-
nist inspiration to appeal once more for United States aid, and in particular for 
military assistance to put down the subversive threats.28 Interestingly, in private 
internal communications the United States consul Moreland had not blamed 
the communists but instead “hoodlums and vandals” who inltrated and tar-
nished what otherwise had “started out to be strictly a student show.” Rather 
than premeditated, the uprising was “spontaneous, and not even the Commu-
nists were organized to capitalize on a situation made to order for Communist 
agitators.” In fact, the consul reported that the PCE was signicantly behind 
the curve with its mobilizations. At a funeral procession that quickly became 
a demonstration with some twenty thousand people, “a youth came dashing 
through the crowd with handbills which he shoved under the armpits of the 
persons present.” The communist manifesto called on the people to launch a 
general strike to demand the president’s resignation. Most people ignored the 
handbills which, according to Moreland, “indicated that the Communists were 
behind schedule.”29 Similar to rank-and-le militants in the party, the consul 
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disregarded communist statements as long on incendiary language and short on 
implementing concrete measures to achieve their stated objectives.
Apparently the PCE manifesto Moreland references is the same one men-
tioned in news reports, although the statement itself is not included in deposito-
ries where other party documents can be found.30 One item that has survived is 
from the party’s provincial committee in Pichincha in the highlands far removed 
from the unrest on the coast and is dated June 7—several days aer the events. 
As with other statements, this one does not so much directly engage the bloody 
events in Portoviejo and Guayaquil as use those as an opportunity to attack the 
communists’ archenemy, the conservative president Ponce, for his reactionary 
policies that contributed to hunger, misery, and oppression. The party charged 
that the president was stirring up fears of alleged foreign communist aggression 
in order to provide a pretext to advance the interests of feudalistic landowners 
and to implement a bloody and repressive dictatorship. As with the manifesto 
in Guayaquil, the Pichincha provincial committee issued its standard call for 
a “great front of popular and democratic unity” that would stand rm against 
a criminal dictatorship that massacred the people. The party instead favored 
policies that would open a path toward liberal freedoms, democratic guaran-
tees, independence for the country, and well-being for the people.31 While this 
was hardly a course of action that would appeal to those inspired by the recent 
triumph of the Cuban Revolution, it does reveal the presence of a persistently 
active and engaged party that was consistent in its proposed strategy and tactics.
Subsequent consular reports from Guayaquil continued a similar narrative 
that “the usual Communist actions and declarations were noticeably absent 
during the height of the troubles,” and that “Communists appear to be laying 
low.”32 The situation had caught the communists by surprise, and as a result they 
“were too poorly organized to be immediately eective.” Before they could act, 
the government declared martial law and jailed their leaders.33 Nevertheless, in 
case any questions might remain as to where alliances ultimately lay, Moreland 
reported that he was surreptitiously supporting anticommunist students in their 
eorts to wrestle control of the FEUE away from the communists.34
In Quito and farther away from the center of activities in Guayaquil, the 
United States Embassy was less charitable in their assessment of the communist 
role than was their consulate on the coast. In a weekly report on developments in 
the country, chargé d’aaires Frederick Leatherman complained that local news-
papers “still did not take [the] threat of Communist intervention as more than 
[a] minor annoyance.”35 He was more eager to fan the ames of anticommunist 
sentiments than his counterparts at the center of activity. The closer one was to 
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the action and the more information one had the less scary the communists ap-
peared, and the more accurate of a picture of their actions and intents emerged.
The New York Times Latin American correspondent Tad Szulc inadvertently 
acknowledged the presence of dierent explanations for communist actions. 
He observed that Ponce’s contention in Quito that the protests “were part of a 
Communist-directed eort to overthrow the Government . . . diered substan-
tially from the views of military commanders and civilian political observers 
on the scene” in Guayaquil. Instead, he reported, “there had been no evidence 
of major Communist involvement” in the unrest. While “the Communists 
may have had some plan to disrupt public order . . . surprisingly, they failed to 
take advantage of the riots.” Szulc blamed their failures on poor leadership and 
the military’s rapid response in quelling the altercations. Even so, the govern-
ment arrested een communist leaders. Further weakening the communists’ 
hand, right-wing elements in the FEUE voted in Loja to disaliate with the 
leist IUS.36
Szulc followed with a series of articles in which he warned of the rise of 
communist threats across the hemisphere. He cautioned that communist 
parties were more active “than they have been in a long time and apparently 
better-coordinated than ever before” as they sought “to exploit situations that 
were ready made for them.” As evidence of his claim, he pointed to a Moscow 
radio broadcast that “gloatingly commented that ‘democratic forces’ in the 
Americas were being channeled toward the nal objective of freeing the area 
of Yankee imperialism” and “that the Ecuadorian Communists were with ‘the 
people.’”37 While numerically small and legal in less than half of the countries, 
“the Latin American Communist parties are exercising inuence that is com-
pletely out of proportion to the size of their memberships or even the ‘fellow 
traveling’ grass roots support they occasionally command.” Their leaders were 
“extremely skilled” in appealing to nationalist sentiments, fostering resentment 
over deep social and economic problems, and inltrating government structures. 
Still, the limits of Szulc’s understanding of communist operations are apparent 
in his reporting. While he acknowledged that the current orthodox communist 
line continued to be one of cooperation with progressive bourgeois parties and 
a desire to gain respectability, Szulc contended that “the Communist hand is 
almost invariably seen in most strikes and incidents of violence that are crop-
ping up with growing frequency,” as well as in “riots in protest against economic 
austerity measures.” The tendency of media sources and the government to label 
protests as “riots” implies an irrationality of action that deprecates serious at-
tempts to advance legitimate concerns. Szulc repeatedly references the claims of 
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“intelligence experts” that communists planned to disrupt the Inter-American 
Conference by violent means, and that travel between Latin America and so-
cialist countries meant that Moscow directed their strategies.38 This narrative of 
foreign agitators as being responsible for the discord in Latin America served the 
political and economic interests of local government ocials who did not want 
to give up their ruling-class privileges. It ignores a long trajectory of sustained 
organizing eorts.
Szulc traced the disturbances in Ecuador—as well as recent attempts to oust 
governments in Panama, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—back to “the victory of 
Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolutionaries at the beginning of the year.”39 The 
Cubans, of course, denied that they intended to export their revolution. The 
militant leist Jaime Galarza Zavala later stated that the Cuban Revolution 
only distantly inuenced the events in Ecuador. Rather, he saw the unrest as a 
natural reaction to the current socioeconomic situation and the government’s 
repressive responses.40 The New York Times acknowledged Castro’s statement, 
“We have been asked if revolution should be exported and we have said no, that 
revolution cannot be exported, that revolution must be carried out by the people 
themselves.” Nevertheless, the paper responded that the Cuban Revolution “has 
fanned the ames of revolution throughout the Latin world.” The newspaper 
contended that Latin America was “in the midst of two distinct revolutions.” 
One was to oust the dictatorships of Somoza in Nicaragua, Stroessner in Para-
guay, and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. A second, and perhaps more sig-
nicant, was “the deep desire of the people for economic improvement and social 
betterment.” According to the paper, “Latin America’s small but well-organized 
Communist parties” aggravated the situation with their eorts to exploit it.41 
The New York Times editorial board made this claim even as Szulc acknowl-
edged that the Ecuadorian government had no proof to support its charges that 
the unrest was communist inspired. Even so, Szulc concluded that regardless of 
the origins of these events, “the explosions demonstrated how near the surface 
violence lay in Ecuador.”42 By all appearances, a revolution was breaking out in 
Ecuador, and the PCE was not positioned to lead it even though its years of en-
gaged activism laid the organizational basis for these developments.
Social conict continued without let up throughout the rest of the year. On 
October 1, another protest broke out in Guayaquil when an Ecuadorian navy 
shore patrol attempted to stop hoodlums from molesting drum majorettes 
who were practicing their routines. Two people were killed and four injured 
in the resulting melee. The police proved unable to restore order so once again 
the government called in the army to patrol the streets. Observers noted that 
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the disturbances unfolded in a similar fashion to what had happened in June. 
Teeming social and economic problems set the stage for an explosive situation 
in which jobless and hungry workers welcomed opportunities to loot stores.43
The United States consulate in Guayaquil complained that communists, social-
ists, and other le-wing groups systematically exploited the volatile situation to 
attack Ponce’s government. Moreland feared that the strife could rapidly esca-
late to a point where the army would not be able to maintain control. Unlike 
his rational explanation of the June disturbances, this time the consul eagerly 
blamed local communist leaders for the unrest.44 The consulate even repeated 
rumors that the political opposition to Ponce paid hoodlums to disrupt public 
gatherings.45
What failed to register on the radar of the diplomats was much more serious 
and signicant political organizing eorts. Several days before the October pro-
test, 850 Indigenous farmers from thirty-ve rural syndicates and community 
organizations converged on Quito to demand higher pay for their labor and the 
promulgation of an agrarian reform program that would give them access to 
land. Their urban allies in the FTP and CTE came to their defense when the 
police refused to let them march from their meeting place at the Casa del Obrero 
to the federal congress to present their demands directly to the legislators.46 “For 
the Indians, history has stopped,” the writer Pedro Jorge Vera editorialized. “Ser-
vitude is the same in the 20th century as it was in the 16th. Independence only 
meant that creole landholders could continue to exploit Indians without the 
intervention of the crown.” Even with this long and bloody history, the current 
government was unequalled in its contempt for Indigenous peoples. Its goal was 
to outlaw Indians together with the communists.47
In a repeat of 1953, Pedro Saad, the communist representative for coastal 
labor, along with the socialist representative for highland labor Miguel Angel 
Guzmán cited Ponce’s minister of government Carlos Bustamante Pérez for an 
interpellation to respond to these violations of people’s rights. The list of com-
plaints that the two presented quickly expanded to touch on all of the problems 
that Ecuador had suered during this pivotal year, including the massacre of 
Indigenous community members at San Pablo del Lago in January, the protests 
at Portoviejo and Guayaquil in May and June, attacks on the students in the 
FEUE, and other issues.48
Aer almost a week of long and exhausting all-night interpellation sessions, 
the minister and the entire administration remained rmly in place. Saad had 
made a good showing, but as in 1953 did not possess sucient political strength 
to shi policy. Even so, as with the earlier interpellation, the United States 
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Embassy gave a shout out to Saad for his sincere and principled opposition, no-
tably unlike that of the “demagogic” CFP. As evidence of a certain amount of 
grudging respect for their ideological foe, the embassy reported that “Saad, using 
reasonable language but following the Communist line, attacked the proposal 
for an inter-American police force as a pretext for U.S. intervention in internal 
aairs of the American Republics.”49 Saad’s long history of political agitation 
provided him with the skills and strength necessary to advance a communist 
agenda even though his adherence to parliamentary strategies failed to appease 
those to his le in the party.
Divisions
On September 1, 1960, José María Velasco Ibarra returned to the presidency for 
his fourth of ve times in oce. In a four-way race, Velasco Ibarra won with 
almost 50 percent of the vote, somewhat of an improvement over the 43 percent 
he had won in 1952. Only three-quarters of a million people out of a total popu-
lation of 4.3 million participated in the election, making the whole aair still a 
highly exclusionary event. As in previous outings, the le’s champion, the dip-
lomat and current rector of the University of Guayaquil Antonio Parra Velasco, 
hardly registered in the polls, nished last with about 6 percent of the vote. With 
literacy restrictions excluding most workers and peasants from the franchise, 
an electoral path to power hardly seemed viable. Some conservative socialists 
supported previous president Plaza because he appeared to be a more viable can-
didate and in comparison to those who had come aer him, his government 
in retrospect appeared to be downright progressive. Even with that backing, 
Plaza barely outpolled the conservative candidate Gonzalo Cordero Crespo for 
runner-up status.50
In a remarkable policy reversal, the CFP unexpectedly joined the PCE 
and le-wing socialists in an anticonservative alliance known as the Unión 
Democrática Nacional Anti-Conservadora (UDNA, National Democratic 
Anti-Conservative Union) in support of Parra Velasco. While previously pro-
gressives had categorically rejected any suggestion of collaborating with the pop-
ulist CFP, a debate had run through the le as to whether Ponce and the right or 
Guevara Moreno and the CFP represented a greater threat. Aer its sixth con-
gress in 1957, the PCE called on liberals to join them and the PSE and the CFP 
in an anticonservative coalition to advance a common platform of democracy, 
development, and sovereignty.51 While some liberals advocated casting a broad 
tent to include everyone in this alliance, others preferred the conservatives over 
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the CFP. From their perspective, the rst was more culta y controlado (cultured 
and controlled) than the CFP, and the idea of a le wing in the CFP with which 
other progressives could collaborate was nothing more than an illusion.52 Politics 
can make for strange bedfellows.
The 1956 presidential election represented a highpoint of electoral strength 
for the CFP, and by the time of the 1957 PCE congress it was already coasting 
into a slow and long decline. The CFP subsequently collapsed due to its disas-
trous administration of Guayaquil’s municipal government, which led to the 
ouster of Guevara Moreno from the party.53 Even without Guevara Moreno’s 
leadership, populist parties continued to play a signicant role in Ecuadorian 
public life. Politics was shiing in a myriad of dierent directions.
Beginning with Velasco Ibarra’s inauguration, it was immediately apparent 
that Ecuador had returned to its status quo ante of political volatility and insta-
bility. Velasco Ibarra had attacked his predecessor and former ally and protégé 
Ponce relentlessly during the campaign, which le the incumbent president so 
angry that he resigned on his last day in oce rather than preside over the in-
auguration of his successor. The resignation technically represented a break in 
an otherwise unprecedented sequence of constitutional transfers of power, but 
more signicantly it foreshadowed a complete unraveling of institutional struc-
tures. As with all except the immediately preceding mandate, Velasco Ibarra’s 
administration quickly degenerated into a military regime, bringing an end to a 
succession of elected civilian governments. Aer fourteen months in oce and 
amid a general strike and violent unrest precipitated by worsening economic 
conditions, the military deposed Velasco Ibarra and installed his vice president 
Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy in his place. The military, in turn, expressed 
discontent with Arosemena Monroy’s pro-Cuban rhetoric and, fearing the 
emergence of a domestic le-wing insurgency, ousted the president in 1963. The 
military junta that took power outlawed the communist party. In the process, 
soldiers captured and probably destroyed the party’s archives, leaving historians 
to search for other sources (including the CIA) to document their activities.
Rather than radicalizing the communist party, the Cuban Revolution di-
vided an already fragmented le into pro-Soviet, pro-China, and pro-Cuba 
wings.54 Competing leist factions criticized the PCE for having lost its revolu-
tionary fervor with its adherence to a pro-Soviet line that advocated for peaceful 
coexistence with imperialism. Young people in particular wanted to engage in 
more aggressive political action. Rather than embracing Castro and Guevara as 
heroes, orthodox communist leaders in Cuba had initially denounced them as 
a radicalized petty bourgeoisie who were provocateurs and adventurers engaged 
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in inappropriate ultra-leist activities. Party leaders in Ecuador now hurled the 
same criticism against the young revolutionaries in their own ranks. Two entirely 
dierent visions emerged as to how a socialist revolution might be realized—one 
peaceful and evolutionary and other violent and rapid. These tensions had long 
run through the le and had been building inside the party for some time, but 
the Cuban Revolution brought them fully out into the open for all to see.
Shortly aer the 1957 PCE congress, the United States Embassy reported “a 
newly-developed potentially serious schism in the Communist Party.” Several 
“higher-echelon leaders” had “expressed their complete disillusionment over So-
viet leadership” as well as Saad’s domination of the party. These quarrels played 
out even as the party proceeded with their plans to build a leist coalition, pub-
lish a daily newspaper, and increase their presence in labor unions. The diplo-
mats anticipated that these divisions “may curtail somewhat the Party’s upsurge” 
aer the congress.55 Cracks in the party did not emerge out of nowhere but could 
be traced to dierent visions that had long been present on the le.
The most serious, visible, and long-lasting of these ris was the Sino-Soviet 
split. Global conicts reached into the heart of what otherwise might be seen 
as marginalized sectors of an international communist movement. In Ecuador, 
the Cuban Revolution inuenced Jaime Galarza and Édison Carrera to found 
the Unión Revolucionaria de la Juventud Ecuatoriana (URJE, Revolutionary 
Union of the Ecuadorian Youth). In April 1962 under the leadership of the PCE’s 
Pichincha provincial committee members Jorge Rivadeneyra and Rafael Eche-
verría, the URJE launched a failed guerrilla uprising at the Toachi River in Santo 
Domingo. Saad, who remained committed to a Soviet line that advocated for a 
peaceful path to power through the formation of electoral alliances with progres-
sive and nationalistic sectors of the bourgeoisie, evicted these radical “ultra-le-
ists” from the party. Rivadeneyra and Echeverría in turn formed the pro-Chinese 
PCMLE in 1964.56 Meanwhile, the socialists also suered a series of divisions, 
with longtime leader and intellectual Manuel Agustín Aguirre leaving in March 
1963 to form the PSRE, which assumed a pro-Cuban position. Other indepen-
dent radical groups emerged during the 1960s, including the Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Le), Vencer 
o Morir (VM, Win or Die), and Unión Revolucionaria de Mujeres del Ecuador 
(URME, Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Women).57 Contributing to these 
divisions were the actions of le-wing women such as Nela Martínez and María 
Luisa Gómez de la Torre who were critical of the communist party’s patriarchal 
and hierarchical structure that favored the prevalence of men in leadership roles. 
Similar to those who engaged in armed struggle, these women activists faced 
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attempts from the mainline communist party to proscribe their political agency. 
Despite these challenges and eventual exclusion, these militants had honed their 
organizing skills within the ranks of the communist party.58
Documentation
Aer a gap of several years in the late 1950s, the level of CIA attention to Latin 
America rebounded signicantly in the aermath of the Cuban Revolution. In 
the nal months of 1959, CIA intelligence bulletins draed at CIA Headquar-
ters in Washington once again centered attention on internal developments in 
Ecuador. Aer not saying anything about the June protests, now these analysts 
discussed the October demonstrations and contextualized them with the earlier 
events. The bulletins identied Guayaquil as “a center of explosive labor and 
economic unrest which the Communists are attempting to exploit with aggres-
sive new tactics.” Ultimate goals included unseating Ponce and disrupting the 
Inter-American Conference.59 Subsequent reports continued the narrative that 
communists sought to capitalize on social discord with the intent of halting the 
conference.60
A lengthy 1963 CIA report on the ramications of the Sino-Soviet split for 
Latin America includes a probing section on Ecuador that details the tensions 
between Saad’s pro-Soviet wing centered in Guayaquil that favored adherence to 
a peaceful transition to power and Echeverría’s much more militant pro-Chinese 
faction in Quito.61 Those divisions became a frequent topic of careful analysis 
for the agency.62 The depth of investigation during the militant 1960s is perhaps 
uncharacteristic in relation to what the agency generated during the second half 
of the 1950s, but not necessarily so if compared to what it produced in the imme-
diate postwar period. Nevertheless, what is missing from the declassied records 
are the information reports similar to those that CIA case ocers generated 
during the early years of the agency’s operation. The raw data that those ocers 
collected from their informers and other sources provide rich detail on domestic 
developments that contributes to a deeper understanding of the le.
As with all things related to secret surveillance, it is dicult to say what might 
account for changes in the nature, quality, and quantity of information. Was 
it a stang issue? One exceptionally highly qualied and motivated individual 
could generate useful intelligence that logically would dissipate when the agency 
transferred that person to a new post. Alternatively, the change could be a result 
of higher-level policy decisions and priorities, both in terms of where to position 
sta and what tasks to assign to them. In this case, the disappearance of the CIA’s 
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information reports in the 1950s may reect the Eisenhower administration’s shi 
toward using the agency for covert actions to achieve foreign policy objectives. In 
that environment, ocials probably communicated the most important informa-
tion and decisions orally so as not to leave written traces. As the historian Charles 
Ameringer observes, “Successful covert operations are rarely documented; only 
the failures receive publicity.”63 Furthermore, it is possible that records were lost 
or destroyed. Or more mundane explanations for missing reports may relate to 
the vulgarities of what documentation the agency has been willing to release and 
even the constraints of the search features of the CREST database.
Even with these limitations, what emerges evident from the declassied doc-
umentation available to researchers is that during the 1950s the CIA hardly 
ignored the Western Hemisphere, even marginal countries like Ecuador with 
small and weak communist parties. Together with other sources of information, 
these reports assist historians in lling in details on the history of the le. The 
archival record that the CIA inadvertently le behind serves to challenge stereo-
types of the 1950s as a period that experienced a turn toward the right. Rather 
than a decade dominated by conservatives, the 1950s witnessed the emergence of 
mass popular movements in the context of a fragmenting and complicated politi-
cal environment. Marginalized and disenfranchised sectors of the population, 
including Indigenous peoples, women, workers, and students, provided signif-
icant leadership to those mobilizations. Their roles disappear from dominant 
narratives, but recovering their contributions is key to gaining a fuller and more 
complete understanding of the le. While the Communist Party of Ecuador 
never had a large membership, it nonetheless exercised signicant inuence in 
these movements. CIA and other surveillance documentation oer opportuni-
ties for a renewed study of these dierent tendencies on the le.
Multiple factors contribute to a heightened state of political mobilization 
and ultimate victory and it goes without saying that each individual situation 
is unique, and it is not the intent of this work to unwrap and analyze all of 
those various considerations. Rather, a goal has been to illustrate how despite 
appearances to the contrary political conicts and actions do not emerge out of 
a vacuum. Furthermore, not considering a broader and longer context that lays 
the groundwork for subsequent political action can lead to a misunderstanding 
of the causes and intent of militant movements. It is for that reason that a study 
of the le in the 1950s is key to understanding how 1959 became such a pivotal 
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